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3Abstract
This study charts the evolution of government attitudes and policies towards 
gambling in Siam between the 1880s and 1945. Based on the assertion that gambling 
was a social evil that impoverished the population, encouraged crime, and retarded 
economic development, successive regimes sought to reduce and regulate the scope 
for legal gambling. This was expressed most concretely through a series of 
increasingly restrictive and punitive laws, which prohibited many popular forms of 
gambling and subjected others to strict licensing. Consequently, there was an increase 
in illegal gambling. In essence, gambling went from being a state acceptable activity 
to one that was criminal unless conducted within certain strict parameters. At the 
same time, the state sought to secure a monopoly over the provision of facilities for 
gambling in order to ensure it was the only institution that might profit from people’s 
gambling habits.
The central concern of this study is to examine the complex process by which 
a once socially and state acceptable activity becomes defined as criminal. It shows 
that the moral and economic arguments against gambling had to be balanced with a 
host of other concerns and, most crucially, the financial imperatives of the Siamese 
state. Along with the recognition that gambling was a part of human nature and 
people would continue to indulge in it regardless of its legality, financial necessity 
prevented the Siamese state from prohibiting gambling outright. This study also 
shows how this process was shaped by other state and semi-state institutions -  
namely the police force, judiciary, penal administration, and Buddhist monkhood -  
and public opinion. It moves beyond conventional histories of Siam, which portray 
the monarchy as the sole agent of change, to demonstrate that the criminalisation of 
gambling was a process in which all parts of Siamese society participated.
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Editorial Note
Transcription
Thai names and words have been transcribed using the ‘General System of Phonetic 
Transcription of Thai Characters into Roman’ devised by the Royal Institute and set 
out in the Journal o f the Thailand Research Society, 33, 1 (March 1941), pp. 49-53. 
However, diacritics have not been employed. Following this system, the aspirated 
consonants k, p  and t are written as kh, ph and th; the Thai word thua should thus be 
pronounced roughly like the English word tour. Proper names of well-known people 
have been spelt according to the preference of that person, where known, or 
according to common usage: for instance, Vajiravudh instead of Wachirawut, and 
Devawongse rather than Thewawong. Official spelling has been used for all place 
names.
Names, Ranks and Titles
Following convention, Thai people are referred to by their first name and this is how 
they are listed in the bibliography. Various titles are used for royalty and these 
indicate the generational descent of a particular member of the royal family. Under 
the absolute monarchy, members of the royal family that entered government service 
where also granted a rank. In this study, the children and grandchildren of kings have 
been referred to simply as princes or princesses. Until the absolute monarchy was 
abolished in 1932, bureaucrats and military officers were granted the following ranks 
in ascending order: khun, luang, phra, chao phraya and, very rarely, somdet chao 
phraya. Individuals were also given a title, which was commonly used in place of 
their actual name, and this is how they are referred to in the text. For example, Pan
12
Sukhum is referred to as Chao Phraya Yomarat. Many retained these titles as 
surnames following the 1932 coup, most notably Luang Phibunsongkhram (Plaek 
Khitasangka).
Until 1939, Thailand was known as Siam. In the text, the country is referred to 
by the name which was in use at the particular time being discussed. The terms 
Siamese and Thai have been used more interchangeably, however.
Dates and Periods
During the period covered by this study, two different dating systems were used: the 
Bangkok Era (rattanakosin sok, abbreviated to r. s.) and the Buddhist Era (B. E., or in 
Thai phutthasakkarat, abbreviated to p. s.). The former ran from the founding of 
Bangkok in 1782. In 1911, it was replaced by the Buddhist Era, which is 543 years 
ahead of the Western calendar. Traditionally, the Thai year ran from 1 April to 31 
March. Therefore, the year R. S. I l l  was equivalent to 1 April 1892 to 31 March 
1893 and in the text is written as 1892/3. Similarly, February B. E. 2478 (1935/6) was 
February 1936. In B. E. 2483 (1940), the start of the year was changed to 1 January, 
meaning that particular year was only 9 months long (from 1 April 1940 to 31 
December 1940).
The reigns of each of the nine kings in the present dynasty (the Chakri 
dynasty) are numbered according to where a particular king comes in the dynastic 
sequence. As in other studies of modem Thai history, the reign of Rama III is thus 
sometimes referred to in the text as the Third Reign and that of Chulalongkom is the 
Fifth Reign, for instance.
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Introduction
“Gambling places were allowed at one time,” Phloi said.
“Then they were banned and if you got caught you could 
be sent to jail. Now they’re back to being legal and 
respectable again. Why, Khun Luang? What’s the reason 
for the change? Which government was right, or wrong?”
“The world turns and turns, Mae Phloi. The pendulum 
swings. Let us enjoy our roast duck.”
Kukrit Pramoj, Four Reigns1
It is World War Two Thailand and Phloi, the heroine of Kukrit Pramoj’s historical 
novel Four Reigns (Si phaen-din), is in her twilight years. Bom in 1882 to a wealthy 
nobleman and his minor wife, she has led a sheltered existence; her life revolving first 
around the Inner Court of the Grand Palace, where she was sent at the age of ten, and 
then, once married to an up-and-coming palace official, her family and home. 
Nevertheless, Phloi has witnessed a bewildering array of events that have transformed 
the traditional, semi-feudal kingdom of Siam into the modernising, nation-state of 
Thailand; the reigns of four successive monarchs, as indicated by the novel’s title; the 
1893 Paknam crisis in which France sent gunboats up the Chaophraya River to 
Bangkok in order to force the Siamese government into surrendering its claims to the 
territory of present-day Laos, perhaps the closest the kingdom came to outright 
colonisation; the much-celebrated administrative, fiscal and legal reforms of King 
Chulalongkom (1868-1910), who is widely credited with securing Siam’s 
independence and laying the foundations of the modern Thai state; the controversial 
reign of King Vajiravudh (1910-25), during which her husband, Prem, rose to 
prominence within the court; Siam’s entry into the First World War on the side of the
1 Kukrit Pramoj, Four Reigns (Si phaen-din), English version by Tulachandra, Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books, 1998 [1953, 1981], p. 629.
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Allies in 1917, and the sending of an expeditionary force to France; the impact of the 
world-wide economic depression of the early 1930s; the 1932 coup by a handful of 
military and civilian officials, including one of Phloi5s sons, who overthrew the last 
absolute monarch, King Prajadhipok (1925-35) and established a constitutional 
democracy; the 1933 failed royalist revolt led by Prince Boworadet, in which another 
of her sons took part and was imprisoned for many years as a result; the military’s 
subsequent usurpation of political power under the strongman, Luang 
Phibunsongkhram (Phibun); the country’s change of name from Siam to Thailand in 
1939; the war with French Indochina in 1940-41 that resulted in the regaining of the 
‘lost’ territories in Laos and Cambodia; the alliance with Japan that quickly turned 
into an occupation; and, most recently, Thailand’s 1942 declaration of war against 
Britain and the United States, leading to the Allied bombing raids on Bangkok that 
destroyed Phloi’s home. Throughout her life, Phloi has bom such misfortunes with 
good grace and Buddhist stoicism. Indeed, she is ‘the embodiment of those ideal, 
genteel values most Thais still hold dear’.2 However, she has only a limited 
understanding of what has gone on around her. As Marcel Barang puts it, Phloi ‘has
■j
seen too much and understood too little.’ Her bemusement at the about-turns in 
government policy on gambling is a good illustration of this. But her reaction is also 
understandable, for government attitudes towards gambling had continually shifted 
throughout her lifetime and were often contradictory, hypocritical and inconsistent.
Until the late nineteenth century, public gambling houses could be found 
throughout Siam. These were run by tax farmers, mostly Chinese, who paid the 
govermnent substantial sums for the right. Indeed, the revenue they provided was 
crucial in funding Chulalongkom’s reforms. Nevertheless, in 1887 that king initiated
2 Marcel Barang (comp.), The 20 Best Novels o f  Thailand, Bangkok: Thai Modem Classics, 1994, p. 
285.
3 Ibid.
15
a policy of gradually closing the gambling houses -  a policy, it will be argued, that 
was motivated by a mix of humanitarian and social concerns, a need to enhance the 
population’s productivity, and a desire to show the West that the leadership of Siam 
was enlightened and civilised. Due to financial constraints, however, the gambling 
houses were not completely abolished until 1917. Concomitantly, the games that had 
been played therein were prohibited. In their absence, people turned to other forms of 
gambling: betting on horse-racing and billiards were the crazes of the 1920s, for 
instance, but Siamese and Chinese games also remained popular. All of these were 
regulated by a series of increasingly restrictive and punitive laws, culminating in the 
Gambling Act B. E. 2478, which was issued in 1936 and is still in force today. 
During the 1930s, the first state lotteries were started and they also remain a feature 
of present-day Thailand. To ensure their success, other organisations were prohibited 
from issuing their own lotteries. In short, the state sought to establish a monopoly on 
the provision of large-scale gambling facilities. As part of this policy, the government 
experimented with state-owned casinos, the first opening in the south in 1939 and 
others in Bangkok during the closing stages of the war. All were short-lived; the last 
were closed in 1945 and the experiment abandoned. It is from one of the Bangkok 
casinos that Phloi’s brother, Phoem, has just returned triumphantly, his winnings 
having purchased the roast duck the siblings are enjoying in the quotation. His answer 
to her questions is based on the Buddhist tenet that everything is impermanent. It also 
implies that as societies evolve so too do attitudes towards gambling. Jan McMillen 
sums up this process in more technical terms: ‘Periodic reformulations of the relation 
between gambling and society have been related to culturally and historically 
accepted definitions of what gambling is, influenced by fluctuating conceptions of
16
morality which reflect prevailing social and political-economic conditions.’4 The 
about-turns and shifts in the Siamese government’s attitudes and policies towards 
gambling were intimately linked with those era-defining events witnessed by Phloi. 
Charting the swing of the pendulum is the purpose of this study.
Definitions of Gambling
The first question that needs to be addressed is: what is gambling? There is no
straightforward answer. The crux of the problem is that gambling is ‘virtually a
universal phenomenon in human societies’, occurring ‘in nearly all cultures and in
every period of time’.5 This leads McMillen to observe that:
Despite its apparent universality, the concept of gambling has no intrinsic 
meaning; rather, its meaning always depends on the socio-historical context in 
which it occurs. The perception and experience of gambling vary significantly 
-  in its history, its organisation and its meanings — according to different types 
of gambling, the various groups involved, and the particular society within 
which the gambling takes place.6
In a modem, capitalist context, gambling is usually defined in terms of a financial
transaction. Roger Munting offers the following definition from the 1978 Rothschild
Committee report: ‘Gambling consists of an agreement between parties with respect
to an unascertained outcome that, depending on the outcome, there will be a
redistribution of advantage (usually but not always monetary) among those parties.’7
This uncertain outcome might be decided by the skill of the parties, by pure chance,
or by a combination of the two. In Thai, the word for gambling is kanphanan.8 A
4 Jan McMillen, ‘Understanding Gambling: History, concepts and theories* in Jan McMillen (ed.), 
Gambling Cultures; Studies in History and Interpretation, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 7.
5 Ibid., p. 6.
6 Ibid. For a discussion o f what gambling means in a Western context see Roger Munting, An 
Economic and Social History o f  Gambling in Britain and the USA, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1996, pp. 1-5.
7 Munting, Economic and Social History’, p. 3.
8 Broadly speaking, kanphanan also subsumes the term khanto meaning to bet. It seems that khanto is 
rarely used outside legal codes and texts. Mannot Suttliiwatthanappphrut, Kham athibai pramuan 
kotmai phaeng lae phanit wa duai yumphalcsap kepkhong nai khlangsinkha pranipranom yomkhwam
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survey of Thai legal commentaries, encyclopaedias and dictionaries on the term 
kanphanan indicates that in a contemporary context its meaning is essentially the 
same as the definition given above. These sources make it explicit that both parties 
involved in the transaction must have a chance of both winning and losing.9 For 
example, offering someone a prize for doing well in their exams before they have sat 
those exams is not gambling because the examinee can only gain, while the other 
person can only lose.
In the past, however, the Siamese state’s perception of what constituted 
gambling was broader and more nebulous than the preceding definition; indeed, 
examining how this definition was reached is a part of this study. None of the four 
principal gambling laws issued in the period covered by this study, nor the Civil and 
Commercial Code, contains an explicit and precise definition. While reviewing the 
draft of one of these laws in 1928, the Minister of Justice alluded to the reasons 
behind this omission by noting that the word ‘gambling’ was particularly difficult to 
explain.10 The lack of a clear legal definition meant it was the judiciary that 
ultimately had to determine what exactly constituted gambling. Rather than define 
gambling, the Siamese state preferred to identify the media through which people 
gambled. In many cases, the act of gambling and the means of doing it were virtually 
synonymous. Perhaps, the best example of this was the Gambling Revenue Act R. S. 
120, which stated that, for the purposes of this particular law, gambling meant 
engaging in any of the games or activities listed in the accompanying regulations for
kanphanan lae khanto [Explanation of the Civil and Commercial Code concerning borrowing and 
depositing property, reconciliation and compromise, consent, gambling and betting], 2nd ed., Bangkok: 
Ramkhamliaeng University Press, 1975, p. 262.
9 Ibid., pp. 262-3; Thanongsak Thinsinuan, ‘Kotmai kieokap kanphanan [Laws about Gambling]’, MA 
thesis, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, 1986, p. 85; Institute o f Linguistics (comp.), 
Potthanukrom chabap luang [Government Dictionary], np, nd, p. 402; Saranukromthai chabap 
ratchabanditthayasathan [Thai Encyclopaedia: National Bar Association edition], vol. 20, Bangkok: 
Thaimitkanphim, 1975-6, pp. 12653-4.
10 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Extract from the Council o f Ministers meeting, 18 Aug. 1928’.
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property of value.11 Each of the main gambling laws split the most common games 
and other means of gambling into two broad groups: those that were totally prohibited 
and those that were permitted subject to license, initially from the tax farmers and 
later from the state. These groups included contests determined by varying degrees of 
skill -  cockfighting, boat races, pitching coins, and some card games, for instance -  
and others based on chance — dice games, various forms of lotteries, and such like. 
Some of these activities might not commonly be considered gambling in a Western 
context: for example, target shooting and throwing hoops over prizes, seemingly 
innocuous activities usually found at fairgrounds, consistently appeared in gambling 
legislation. Indeed, setting up stalls to operate the latter was banned in 1883/4 and 
decriminalised only in 1902.12 Clearly, the Siamese state’s historical conception of 
gambling diverges from the modem, Western-derived one.
The Criminality of Gambling
Before considering why gambling or, perhaps more accurately, certain forms of 
gambling are criminalised, it is worth examining what crime is. Like some of its 
practitioners, crime as a concept is a slippery and shady character, and notoriously 
difficult to pin down.13 It is generally recognised that crime is not a fixed category but 
rather a social construct that is both culturally and temporally relative; indeed, it is 
often said that crime lies in the eyes of the beholder.14 Honour killings, for instance, 
have been tolerated by many cultures, including upper-class English society; in some
11 PKPS, 18, p. 276.
12 PKPS, 10, pp. 129-30; PKPS, 18, p. 254.
13 For a contemporary overview of the problems of defining crime, see Stephen Jones, C rim inology3rd 
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 31-41.
14 Ibid., p. 38; Anand A. Yang, ‘Introduction -  Issues and Themes in the Study o f Historical Crime and 
Criminality: Passages to the Social History of British India’ in Anand A. Yang (ed.), Crime and 
Criminality in British India, Tuscon, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1985, p. 2. See also Ted 
Robert Gurr, Peter N. Grabosky and Richard C. Hula, The Politics o f  Crime and Conflict: A 
Comparative Histoiy o f Four Cities, Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977, pp. 11-14.
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countries, they remain so today but in others such killings are now considered 
criminal acts. Conceptions of criminality are thus dependent on the political, 
economic, social, and cultural context in which they arise. As societies evolve, then 
so too do attitudes towards certain actions and modes of behaviour. In a modem 
context, and at the most basic, essential level of definition, a crime is any action or 
form of behaviour that is proscribed by law. Indeed, some would say that crime is a 
product of the law; it cannot exist independently.15 This is not the place for an in- 
depth discussion of these issues. It suffices to note that criminalisation and 
lawmaking are merely two terms for opposite sides of the same coin. Any study of 
criminal behaviour must therefore examine the process by which the laws governing 
that behaviour came into being.
The definition of crime can be refined further: crimes are acts proscribed by 
law because the state perceives them to be injurious to individuals and the wider 
society. Gambling is often described as a ‘victimless’ crime, a term that disguises the 
potential damage that might arise from unrestricted indulgence. For instance, the 
gambler’s habit might lead them into debt and destitution; this has ramifications for 
not only the gambler and their dependents but also for the community in which they 
live. To feed their family or perhaps just their habit, the gambler might turn to crimes 
such as theft or fraud. The modem state thus has two justifications for criminalising 
gambling: first, it has a duty to protect people from self-harm, and second, it is 
responsible for the prevention of crime.16
The social origins of criminal law -  in other words, how criminal behaviour is 
determined and defined -  has long been a subject of debate among criminologists and 
social historians. One dominant argument is that crimes are acts that threaten the
15 For a critique o f this argument see Jones, Criminology, pp. 31-4.
16 Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsan and Nualnoi Treerat, Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: 
Thailand’s Illegal Economy and Public Policy, Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 1998, p. 215.
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interests and values of powerful groups within society. In short, laws are made by 
elites in the interests of elites. This interpretation is termed conflict theory. On the 
other hand, an older and more traditional view holds that crimes are acts which 
transgress universal norms of conduct. Criminal law is thus the embodiment of a 
moral consensus within a particular society. This is termed the functional or, more 
commonly, consensus theory of crime.17 Rather than seeing them as two contending 
models it is perhaps better to consider them as the opposite ends of a sliding scale, 
with specific crimes falling somewhere between the two. In their 1970s study of 
crime and civil strife in four cities — London, Stockholm, Sydney, and Calcutta — 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ted Robert Gurr and others 
sought to overcome the then perceived dichotomy between these two interpretations. 
They found that the crimes on which there was the greatest degree of consensus in all 
four societies were those against the person -  principally, murder and assault -  and 
crimes of acquisition.18 Along with other studies, theirs also indicated that activities 
such as drug-taking and gambling fall towards the conflict end of the spectrum: the 
large number of people that continue to take part in these activities once they are 
criminalised shows there is a lack of consensus.19
Moreover, in their attempt to delineate the precise role of political elites in 
defining criminality, Gurr et al. highlight the various influences and latent constraints 
to which elites are subject. Firstly, as members of a particular society, elites share 
certain values and beliefs, but not necessarily all, with other members, which they are 
expected to uphold and adhere to. Elites also have to contend with the concerns of 
those institutions responsible for the maintenance of law and order, namely, the
17 For a discussion of conflict and consensus theories see Gurr et al., Politics o f Crime and Conflict, p. 
13; Jones, Criminology, pp. 34-41.
18 Gurr et al., Politics o f Crime and Conflict, pp. 683, 697-8.
19 Ibid., pp. 14, 681-2; Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, p. 216. See also Jones, 
Criminology, pp. 36-7.
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police, the judiciary and the penal administration. Bureaucratic inertia, indifference 
and even resistance can also act as powerful constraints. Lastly, there may be external 
pressure for change from the press, special interest groups, and the general public. 
Gurr et al. conclude that ‘it is too simplistic to maintain that changing policies of 
public order are merely manifestations of an elite’s class interests or narrow desire to 
retain power.’20 Laws may be made by elites but they are moulded for and by society. 
To fully understand why some acts are criminalised it is thus necessary to examine 
the attitudes and perceptions of all the various social groups, not just the governing 
elite.
In his work on the shifting attitudes towards off-course betting on horses-races 
in England and Wales between the 1890s and the 1930s, David Dixon also stresses 
the need to broaden the scope of inquiry in lawmaking studies; it is not enough to 
focus solely on the enactment of criminal legislation by senior legislatures. Firstly, 
attention must also be paid to the role of subordinate lawmakers and the judiciary 
who, through court decisions, ‘contribute crucially to the process out of which 
statutory enactments are produced.’21 Secondly, the subsequent processes of 
enforcement, interpretation, and implementation also need to be examined. Just 
because a law was promulgated does not mean it was enforced. Moreover, the 
judiciary might interpret the law in a way that is at odds with the original intentions 
of the lawmakers. To sum up, Dixon asserts that: ‘Law-making has to be seen not as a 
single event, but as a process in which groups and individuals interact, in which the 
meanings of legislative initiatives change, in which ideologies and commitments vary 
and shift.’22
20 Gurr et al., Politics o f  Crime and Conflict, p. 678.
21 David Dixon, From Prohibition to Regulation: Bookmaking, Anti-Gambling, and the Law, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 28.
22 Ibid., p. 29,
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This present study seeks to incorporate all these theoretical guidelines and 
methodological concerns in order to present a comprehensive account of the 
development of the Siamese state’s attitudes and policies towards gambling. In doing 
so, it explores the complex process by which a once socially and state acceptable 
activity, namely gambling, becomes criminalised. It seeks to place the Siamese ruling 
elite of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in their political and socio­
economic context so that their underlying motives for restricting gambling can be 
fully understood. The roles of state and semi-state institutions -  namely, the police 
force, the judiciary, the penal administration, and the Buddhist monkhood (sangha) — 
along with public opinion, are also examined. Besides providing insights into how 
laws are made and criminal behaviour defined in a modem Asian context, such an 
approach also has many benefits for the development of Thai historiography.
Gambling and Thai Historiography
Conventional historiography on modem Siam/Thailand has long suffered from a 
number of innate and largely unquestioned assumptions that have limited the 
boundaries of historical inquiry.23 These stem from the fact that Siam was never 
directly colonised; as such, the country is deemed to be unique within South East 
Asia and, indeed, most of the non-Westem world. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
supposed uniqueness has only served to limit comparative studies. Siam’s avoidance 
of direct colonisation is generally attributed to the benevolent and farsighted 
leadership of its absolute monarchs, the exemplar being King Chulalongkom, whose 
widespread governmental reforms, modelled on Western lines, transformed the
23 These assumptions and problems were first elucidated by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work on 
Thai studies. See Benedict Anderson, ‘The State of Thai Studies: The State of Thai Studies’ in Eliezer 
B. Ayal (ed.), The Study o f Thailand: Analyses o f  Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in 
Anthropology, Art Histoiy, Economics, Histoiy and Political Science, Papers in International Studies, 
Southeast Asia Series 54, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1978, pp. 193-8.
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traditional state into a modernising, highly centralised one. Siam’s kings were thus 
enshrined as heroic, modernising nationalists: symbols of Thai ingenuity and 
independence. This royalist inteipretation remains the paradigm of Thai 
historiography, due in part to the reverence in which the current monarch, King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, is held, the moral authority he wields, and his symbolic power 
as a unifying figure. This master narrative was also reinforced and legitimated by the 
work of numerous Western scholars, such as David Wyatt and Walter Vella, during 
the 1960s and 1970s.24 Imbued with the anti-colonial sentiment and pro-indigenous 
sympathies common among South East Asianists at the time, these scholars 
uncritically adopted the established monarchs-as-nationalists narrative. Moreover, 
they showed an inclination towards the ‘Great Man’ theory of history, their studies 
focusing almost exclusively on the reigns or policies of a particular king.26 The net 
effect is that Siam’s absolute monarchs have been given an overwhelming centrality 
within Thai historiography and are commonly depicted as the sole agents of change, 
at the expense of other Siamese institutions and social groups.
This conventional, royalist historiography has not gone unchallenged, 
however. During the 1950s and again in the 1970s, Thai Marxists highlighted Siam’s 
loss of economic sovereignty and the absolute monarchy’s collusion with foreign 
economic interests to argue that those kings ‘modernised’ the government only so far 
as it allowed them to consolidate their power, and in so doing they condemned the
24 David K. Wyatt, The Politics o f Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign o f  King Chulalongkorn, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969; Walter F. Vella, Chaiyol King Vajiravudh and the 
Development o f  Thai Nationalism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978.
25 Anderson, ‘Studies of the Thai State’, p. 196.
26 In addition to Wyatt, Politics o f  Reform', and Vella, Chaiyo! see also Benjamin A. Batson, The End 
o f the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984; and Stephen L. W. 
Greene, Absolute Dreams: Thai Government Under Rama VI, 1910-1925, Bangkok: White Lotus, 
1999.
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* 01country to a semi-colonial status and economic backwardness. Rather than being an 
enlightened institution acting for the greater good of the incipient Thai nation, the 
absolute monarchy is portrayed as self-serving, exploitative and oppressive. 
Furthermore, these scholars challenged the centrality of Siam’s kings within the 
historical narrative by concentrating on class struggle and socio-economic factors as 
the determinants of change. However, like the royalist scholars before them, the Thai 
Marxists tended to ignore the mass population; the common man appears in the 
historical narrative only as the subject of changes imposed from on high or without. 
Recently, though, a number of studies have turned the spotlight upon other actors. For 
instance, Matthew Copeland and Scott Barme have focused upon the emergent, 
Bangkok-based middle class of the 1920s, using the rapidly proliferating print media 
of the time as their sources.28 Barme, in particular, has highlighted how this middle 
class began to wield an increasing influence over Siamese cultural life and, indeed, 
acted as agents of modernity.29 Similarly, in her study of the legal reform process that 
led to the promulgation of Siam’s modem law codes in the early twentieth century, 
Tamara Loos has drawn attention to the transnational character of this process and the 
previously underestimated role of foreign legal advisers.30 Moreover, she attempts to 
decentralise the monarchy as the prime agent of Thai history through her examination 
of the debate on polygamy. Although Vajiravudh and Prajadhipok both wished to 
abolish this practice, the entrenched opposition of other members of the elite 
prevented them from doing so. Rather than being omnipotent, the absolute monarchy
27 For a discussion of these critical discourses, see Craig J. Reynolds and Hong Lysa, ‘Marxism in Thai 
Historical Studies’, Journal o f Asian Studies, 43, 1 (Nov. 1983), pp. 77-104; and Thongchai 
Winichakul, ‘The Changing Landscape of the Past: New Histories in Thailand since 1973’, Journal o f  
Southeast Asian Studies, 26, 1 (March 1995), pp. 104-7.
28 Matthew Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 
Siam’, PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 1993; Scott Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok: 
Love, Sex and Popular Culture in Thailand, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
29 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, pp. 9-11, 254-5.
30 Tamara Loos, Subject Siam: Family, Law and Colonial Modernity in Thailand, Ithaca and London, 
Cornell University Press, 2006, pp. 3-4,47-63.
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is thus revealed as just one powerful actor among many. Lastly, Loos notes that ‘“the 
king” more often than not operated as shorthand for a much more complex and 
contingent decision making process’ in which other members of the Siamese elite
31may have taken the initiative.
This present study is part of this attempt to correct some of the biases of 
conventional Thai historiography and go beyond its confines. Principally, by using 
the methodological framework for lawmaking studies outlined in the previous 
section, this study will illustrate how the Siamese government’s legislation and 
policies on gambling were the result of a complex interaction between the political 
elite, the state institutions responsible for enforcing, implementing and interpreting 
the law, and the mass population. Examining the lawmaking process also reveals 
some of the complex relationships underpinning Siamese society: between the 
centralising Bangkok state and its agents, for example, or between government 
officials and the common people. Additionally, a study of gambling has much to tell 
us about Siamese/Thai conceptions of leisure and morality, for instance. Indeed, 
gambling is a prism through which the light of historical inquiry can be shone to 
illuminate various facets of a particular society. Finally, by detailing the process that 
culminated in the 1936 gambling law and the establishment of the state lotteries, both 
of which remain in place today, this study provides an historical perspective on the 
Thai government’s present stance on gambling, which, but for a few tightly regulated 
exceptions such as betting on horse-racing, is to all intents and purposes illegal. 
Needless to say, illicit gambling operations are commonplace throughout the 
kingdom and proposals for relaxing the gambling laws so that the government might
31 Ibid., p. 184.
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profit from gambling’s taxation are regularly touted.32 In short, gambling remains a 
prominent and highly divisive issue in twenty-first century Thailand.
Precious little academic research has been done on the legal or social history 
of gambling in Siam. Indeed, there only are two works, both in Thai, devoted solely 
to the subject. The first of these, Ruang tamnan kanloek bonbia lae huai [The 
Abolition of Gambling Dens and the huai Lottery], was written by Prince Damrong 
Rachanuphap, a half-brother of Chulalongkom and the so-called ‘father of Thai 
history’.33 In his position as the Minister of the Interior from 1892 to 1915, Damrong 
was a key architect of the administrative reforms of the Siamese state. He was also 
president of an Anti-Gambling League, set up to press for the abolition of the 
gambling tax farms.34 As Chapter 2 will show, Damrong played a decisive role in 
shaping the absolute monarchy’s policy on gambling, often suggesting particular 
initiatives and overseeing the drafting of new legislation. His study of the gambling 
tax farms, which was first published in 1919/20 and subsequently revised in 1922/23, 
is very much a reflection of his multiple roles as member of royalty, former 
government minister, dedicated recorder of the past, and anti-gambler.35 It is 
primarily descriptive: detailing the Chinese origins of the games played in the public 
gambling houses and the huai lottery; their introduction into Siam; the methods of
32 For reports on illicit gambling operations see for instance the Bangkok Post (hereafter BP), 24 April 
& 3 July 2004. On deregulation see the Bangkok Post, 28 March & 11 June 2004. For a study o f illegal 
gambling and contemporary attitudes towards it see Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, Chs 2, 
3 ,4 &  10.
33 It is said that Damrong was the first indigenous scholar to employ Western historiographical 
methodologies, principally the critical analysis of all extant sources, in the writing o f Thai history. 
During the latter part o f his life, he sought to compile and publish as much information on the culture, 
history and institutions of Siam as possible. Having been educated in both Western and classical 
Siamese scholarship, Damrong and his work can be viewed as a bridge between traditional and modem 
conceptions of history. For a detailed discussion of his work see Kennon Breazeale, 4 A Transition in 
Historical Writing: The Works of Prince Damrong Rachanuphap5, Journal o f  the Siam Society, 59, 2 
(July 1971), pp. 25-49.
3,1 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail (hereafter BTWM), 15 June 1904.
35 The revised edition has been used in this study. Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, Ruang tamnan 
kanloek bonbia lae huai [The Abolition of the Gambling Dens and the huai Lottery], Cremation 
Volume for Thongyu Phatphongphanit, Bangkok: 1960.
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playing and betting on these games; the organisation and management of the 
respective tax farms; and the reasons, process and constraints in their abolition. Little 
attention is paid to the socio-economic changes the country was undergoing at the 
time. For Damrong, the only virtue of the dens and the huai lottery was that they were 
a highly effective and convenient means of indirect taxation, providing the state with 
revenue for administrative purposes without unduly burdening the Siamese 
population. As for their disadvantages, these were numerous: it sufficed to say that
' Xf igambling impoverished the people and corrupted their character. Damrong’s study 
thereby justifies both the existence of the gambling tax farms and their abolition; 
indeed, it can be seen as state propaganda. By emphasising the amount of revenue the 
government sacrificed in abolishing the gambling tax farms,37 Damrong propagates 
the image of an altruistic and enlightened absolute monarchy. Abolition becomes 
emblematic of Siam’s transition to modernity.
The second study, ‘Nayobai khongratthaban kieokap phasi-akonkanphanan, p. 
s. 2367-2460 [Government Policy Towards Gambling Taxes, 1824-1917]’ is a 
master’s thesis by Kanchana Chintakanon.38 While it is a much more extensive and 
comprehensive work than Damrong’s study, it still looks at gambling solely from the 
perspective of tax farming. Nevertheless, Kanchana places the development, 
expansion, and gradual abolition of the various gambling tax farms in a broader 
historical context. She illustrates how their expansion was linked to the increasing 
levels of Chinese immigration throughout the nineteenth century, changes to the 
fiscal basis of the Siamese state due to the decline in the Chinese junk trade during 
the first half of the nineteenth century and the restrictions placed on customs duties
36 Ibid., pp. 89-92.
37 Ibid., pp. 52,88.
38 Kanchana Chintakanon, ‘Nayobai khongratthaban kieokap phasi-akonkanphanan, p. s. 2367-2460 
[Government Policy Towards Gambling Taxes, 1824-1917]’, MA thesis, Sinlapakon University, 1987.
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under the so-called ‘unequal’ treaties signed with the Western powers in the mid­
nineteenth century, and increases in state expenditure on defence and on the reforms 
of state administration in the second half of the century. The implication is that the 
existence of the gambling tax farms was primarily due to the immigrant Chinese and 
the colonial threat, thereby absolving the Siamese government of responsibility for 
the social damage caused by gambling. With regards to their abolition, Kanchana 
highlights a variety of reasons behind the government’s policy, such as the 
inefficiency of the tax farming system and mounting social problems. But the key 
factor for Kanchana was the growing economic might of the Chinese tax farmers, 
which, against the backdrop of nationalist unrest in early twentieth century China, the 
Siamese political elite found threatening. Abolition is thus portrayed as a strategy for 
curtailing Chinese power.
Of all the English-language studies on modem Thai history, only Ian Brown’s 
The Creation o f the Modern Ministry o f Finance in Siam, 1885-1910 deals with 
government policy on gambling in any depth.39 As the title implies, the gradual 
abolition of the gambling tax farms is related to the wider fiscal reforms of the 
Siamese state. Significantly, all three studies cover the period only to the closure of 
the last public gambling houses in 1917. From then, it is almost as if gambling within 
Siam drops off the historical radar. Studies of gambling in a more contemporary 
setting, meanwhile, deal with the historical context only in passing.40 Given the 
importance of the inter-war period for the development of the government’s policy on 
gambling and its implications for today, this is a serious omission. A perusal of the 
more general histories of Thailand, however, reveals countless fleeting references to
39 Ian Brown, The Creation o f  the Modem Ministry o f Finance in Siam, 1885-1910, London: 
MacMillan, 1992, pp. 23-4, 88-92.
40 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 14-15, 46-8; Thanongsak, [Laws about Gambling], 
pp. 77-81.
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the economic, social and criminal dimensions of gambling.41 Like furtive 
underground gambling operations, the subject of gambling has been lurking in the 
shadows of Thai history. This study brings it into the light.
Overview of the Study
Chapter 1 establishes the socio-economic context to the Siamese government’s policy
towards gambling that was initiated in the late 1880s. It accounts for the expansion of
the gambling tax farms during the nineteenth century, how they were managed, and
how some of the games they covered were played. It also analyses the Siamese elite’s
motivation and rationale for the restrictionist policy initiated during the last decades
of the nineteenth century. Besides the inefficiency of the tax farming system in
general, the government objected to gambling on the grounds that it was a social evil
that impoverished the Siamese population, encouraged crime, and retarded economic
development. It is argued that this last concern was paramount: the Siamese elite saw
the restriction of gambling as a way of reducing debt slavery and freeing up the
labour force for intensive rice cultivation. In other words, it was about making the
country more competitive in the international market. Chapter 2 is the first of two
chronological chapters detailing the Siamese government’s gambling policy between
the late 1880s and 1945. It examines how the government implemented the gradual
closure of the gambling houses, stalling in 1888 and finishing in 1917, and the
abolition of the huai lottery in 1916, while also looking at the various gambling laws
enacted during this period. Chapter 3 looks at the government’s responses to new
forms of gambling, such as betting on horse-racing and billiards, that sprang up in the
1920s and 1930s. It also details the drafting and enactment of the gambling laws
41 See for instance David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 2nd ed., New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2003, pp. 169, 171, 177, 190; Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History o f  
Thailand, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 34, 40, 48, 52, 53, 66, 75, 91, 131, 171.
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issued in 1930 and 1936, the establishment of the first state lotteries in the mid-1930s, 
and the short-lived casino experiment during the Second World War. The central 
argument of these two chapters is that the Siamese government’s attitude towards 
gambling was dictated primarily by financial considerations, its tolerance of gambling 
fluctuating with its economic fortunes. Chapter 4 looks at how Siam’s gambling laws 
were enforced and violations punished. In doing so, the influence of the police, the 
judiciaiy, and the penal administration in shaping government policy is evaluated. 
The role of the Buddhist monkhood (sangha) is also considered. Chapter 5 examines 
the debates on gambling and critiques of government policy espoused in the 
expanding popular press, focusing in particular on the decade before the 1932 coup. 
An attempt is also made to consider popular attitudes towards gambling and 
government policy. The Conclusion tries to put the depiction of gambling in Siam, by 
both the government and the press, into perspective. It also fast forwards to twenty- 
first century Thailand to examine the existing situation regarding gambling and to 
consider what the past can tell us about the present.
A Note on Sources
A wide variety of sources have been used in this study, the majority of which are in 
Thai and are held in the National Archives of Thailand in Bangkok. These archival 
materials include correspondence between the king and his ministers, reports of 
ministerial and -  following the 1932 coup -  cabinet meetings, the annual reports of 
the Bangkok police department and the Ministry of Justice, files from the foreign 
Financial Advisers, anonymous letters -  usually complaining of illegal activities or 
the corrupt practices of government officials -  from members of the public to the 
administration, and newspaper clippings collected by the government.
31
Special mention should be made to some important published collections of 
official documents used in this study. All the legislation referred to comes from 
Prachum kotmai pracham sok [Collected Laws in Chronological Order], compiled by 
Sathian Laiyalak and others, and which, as the name suggests, reproduces all 
Siam/Thailand’s laws since the beginning of the Bangkok era in 1782.42 A large 
number of Supreme Court (san dika) rulings on gambling cases have been drawn 
from the annual legal journal Thammasan that was published from 1917/18 
onwards.43 Lastly, the records of the meetings of the National Assembly, established 
following the 1932 coup, have also been employed 44
These archival materials and official documents have been supplemented by 
the memoirs of prominent Thais, such as the noted scholar Phraya Anuman Rajadhon, 
and the accounts of Western visitors and residents in Siam 45 One final important 
source is the English-language Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, a summary of the news 
from the six previous daily editions of the Bangkok Times that was distributed 
overseas. Both versions of the paper often carried translations of government 
announcements and of articles from the Thai-language press.
42 Sathian Laiyalak et al. (comps), Prachum kotmai pracham sok [Collected Laws in Chronological 
Order], Bangkok, 1935+, 69 vols. This study uses the abbreviation PKPS, as commonly used in other 
works, followed by the volume number when referencing a particular legislative act.
43 Thammasan, Bangkok: Bamrung Nukunkit, 1917/18+.
44 Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phuthaen ratsadon [Records of the National Assembly], Bangkok: 
Office of the Parliamentary Secretary, 1933+.
45 Sthirakoses (Phraya Anuman Rajdhon), Looking Back: Book One, Bangkok: Cliulalongkom 
University Press, 1992. Travelogues and memoirs by Westerners include Carl Bock, Temples and 
Elephants: Travels in Siam in 1881-82, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986 [1884]; and H. 
Warrington Smyth, Five Years in Siam: From 1891-1896, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994 [1898], 2 vols.
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1
Gambling, the Economy, and Siamese Society
This chapter will start by examining the socio-economic factors behind the spread of 
gambling within nineteenth century Siam, manifested by the expansion of the various 
gambling tax farms. After detailing some general features of this method of revenue 
collection, the three main types of gambling tax farms will be described. Gambling’s 
role in Siamese society will then be assessed. It will conclude by considering both the 
expressed rationale and the underlying reasons for the restrictionist policy undertaken 
by Chulalongkom’s government in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
The Chinese and the Spread of Gambling in Siam
Dating back to the seventeenth century, Western visitors to Siam had long been quick 
to comment upon the prevalence of gambling within the kingdom, a trend that 
continued into the nineteenth century.1 During the 1830s and 1840s, however, 
American missionaries, many of whom had resided in Siam for some time, discerned 
a substantial increase in the level of gambling. Dan Beach Bradley, for instance, 
noted that it ‘is the reigning passion of the Chinese, and is rapidly enlisting the heart 
and soul of the Siamese.’2 Such observations were usually accompanied by moralistic 
sermons on the pernicious effects of the ‘vice’. Although these missionaries may have 
been inclined to exaggeration, there are other indications as to the spread of gambling 
within Siamese society during the nineteenth century. The most concrete
1 Simon de La Loubere, The Kingdom o f Siam, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969 [1693], 
p. 50; Nicolas Gervaise, The Natural and Political Histoiy o f the Kingdom o f Siam, trans. & ed. John 
Villiers, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998 [1688], p. 89; B. J. Terwiel, Through Travellers’ Eyes: An 
Approach to Early Nineteenth Centuiy Thai Histoiy, Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1989, pp. 214- 
15.
2 Bangkok Calendar, 1871, p. 119. See also Terwiel, Travellers’ Eyes, pp. 216-17.
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manifestation of this was the growth in the number and types of tax farms responsible 
for the provision, management and taxation of gambling.
The Siamese state had employed tax fanning as a method of revenue 
collection since the time of Ayutthaya, The first gambling house fanns (akon bonbia) 
were established sometime between 1688 and 1756. Originally, this had little to do 
with generating state revenue; rather, it was designed to provide Chinese traders with 
a regulated outlet for gambling, while preventing the Siamese from taking part. This 
latter measure was unsuccessful, however, and separate gambling dens for the 
Chinese and the Siamese were created.4 Following the fall of Ayutthaya, the first two 
kings of the Chakri dynasty (Rama I 1782-1809 and Rama II 1809-24) re-established 
the gambling house farms. Chinese trade and labour were vital for the revival of the 
Siamese economy: letting them gamble as they did in China was a means of 
encouraging Chinese settlement.5
It was not until the reign of Rama III (1824-51), though, that tax farming was 
widely implemented. This was a result of the fundamental socio-economic changes 
the country was undergoing.6 The growth of the China trade during the early 
nineteenth century stimulated the production of cash crops — such as sugar cane, 
pepper and tobacco -  for export and, in turn, gradually drew the Siamese cultivator 
into the market economy. By the mid-1820s, the level of economic activity in Siam 
was sufficient to support a large-scale system of internal revenue collection. The 
substantial increase in the number of gambling house farms and the creation of the 
huai lottery farm during the Third Reign were thus a reflection of a flourishing cash
3 Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 6-7.
4 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 9-10; Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 8-9.
5 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 30.
6 The following discussion is drawn from Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century; Evolution o f  
the Economy and Society, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, Chs 3 & 4, esp. pp. 
82-5; Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, The Rise and Decline o f  Thai Absolutism, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, Ch. 1, esp. pp. 20-3; Baker and Pasuk, Thailand, pp. 32-4, 42-4.
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economy. Concurrently, there was a decline in the state’s reliance upon, and ability to 
extract, forced labour. As a result of the expanding agrarian frontier and the 
increasing penetration of the cash economy, the general population was able to escape 
its corvee labour obligations, either through evasion or, later, the payment of a 
commutation tax. State labour requirements were to be increasingly met by 
immigrant Chinese wage labourers, who, driven by poverty and social disorder in 
China, began to arrive in greater numbers from the 1820s. This trend towards freer 
labour was encouraged by those elements of the Siamese elite that stood to gain from 
taxes on trade and the production of export crops. Consequently, the duration of 
people’s labour obligations to the state was progressively reduced, and eventually 
abolished, over the course of the nineteenth century. These developments have an 
important bearing on the spread of gambling: indicating that the Siamese population 
had both the cash and the free time for gambling, while the growing Chinese 
population meant a greater market and demand for gambling facilities.
The decline of the China trade in the 1840s hastened this trend towards tax 
farming. During the reign of King Mongkut (1851-68), new tax farms were 
established on a range of other gambling activities. This period also saw a re­
orientation of the economy towards the West. The Bowring Treaty, concluded with 
Britain in 1855, and the other so-called ‘unequal’ treaties subsequently signed with 
Western powers gave further impetus to the spread of gambling. The purpose of these 
treaties was to promote free trade: import duties were fixed at three percent and limits 
placed on export duties. Deprived of a key source of revenue, the finances of the 
Siamese state became increasingly dependent upon tax farming. The opening up of 
the economy, meanwhile, reinforced those socio-economic trends outlined above -  
the shift towards freer labour, increasing levels of Chinese immigration, the
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monetisation of the economy -  and, most significantly, acted as a spur for the 
widespread cultivation of rice for export. By the time Chulalongkom came to the 
throne in 1868, tax fanning had become the principal source of state revenue, and of 
all the various farms none were more lucrative than those controlling gambling. 
Indeed, revenue from these made up about one-fifth of the total revenue derived from 
tax farming.7
As should already be apparent, the expansion of the various gambling tax 
farms and the consequent spread of gambling within Siamese society were intimately 
linked with the growth of the immigrant Chinese population. Most obviously, all the 
games conducted within the gambling houses, along with the huai lottery, were of 
Chinese origin. While the Siamese state was prepared to let the Chinese play the 
former in order to encourage immigration, it took numerous precautions to prevent 
these games being taken up by the local population. But after initial prohibitions 
proved ineffective, the state created separate dens for the Chinese and the Siamese. 
This was a damage limitation exercise; Siamese dens were subject to stricter 
regulations so as to prevent addiction. For instance, cash had to be used at all times in 
Siamese dens, whereas Chinese ones were allowed to use counters as substitutes. 
Presumably, there were far fewer Siamese establishments. According to Kanchana, 
this separation was maintained in theory up until the early 1890s but in reality it
o
proved impossible to enforce. That Siamese and Chinese gambled together is 
attested to by Carl Bock, who visited the country in the early 1880s.9 In short, by
7 In 1868, the total revenue from the various gambling tax farms was 599,400 baht. The total tax 
farming revenue was 2,874,236 baht. For a complete breakdown of the revenue from all the tax farms 
during the Fourth Reign see Constance M. Wilson, ‘State and Society in the Reign of Mongkut, 1851- 
1868: Thailand on the Eve o f Modernization’, PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1970, pp. 995- 
1000.
8 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 11, 70-1.
9 Bock, Temples and Elephants, p. 43.
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allowing the Chinese to gamble as they were accustomed to, the state inadvertently
encouraged gambling amongst the Siamese.
Throughout the existence of the gambling houses and the huai, the Chinese
apparently made up the majority of the customers. The tax farm for Chinese dens
invariably cost more than its Siamese counterpart in the same region. Additionally,
available evidence suggests that those in areas where there was a high concentration
of Chinese -  Bangkok, Songkhla and Ratchaburi for instance -  commanded a higher
price than those in other parts of the country.10 B. J. Terwiel argues that rather than
correlating with the relative size of the total population, the price of a farm reflected
the number of Chinese in that particular locale.11 In 1916, Chaophraya Yomarat (Pan
Sukhum), Minister of Local Government from 1907 to 1922 and then Minister of the
Interior from 1922 to 1926, calculated that 75 percent of the gambling houses’
clientele — except during Siamese festivals — was Chinese and that they also made up
1050 percent of the huai lottery’s custom. Indeed, all the ‘vice’ tax farms -  opium, 
gambling and alcohol -  were based on Chinese consumption. This was all part of a 
sophisticated strategy to tax and control these highly transient labourers. Direct 
taxation on the Chinese, namely the triennial poll tax, was kept deliberately low and, 
along with the exemption from corvee, was designed to encourage Chinese 
immigration.13 The freedom to gamble was not merely just another inducement but a 
highly effective mechanism for the indirect taxation of the Chinese. William Skinner 
captures this exploitative aspect of the ‘vice’ tax farms when he states: ‘while the 
country depended on the Chinese virtues for the expansion of commerce and industry,
10 For examples see Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 31,48-9, 74-5.
11 Terwiel, Travellers’ Eyes, pp. 190-1.
12 NA K Kh.0301.1.30/15, ‘[Comment on] H. E. Chao Phya Yomaraj’s letter of 1st March 2458 (1916) 
to H. M. the King on the Chinese Question’.
13 James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Stanford University Press, 1971, pp. 
30-1.
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the government relied on Chinese vices for the expansion of public revenue.’14 
Moreover, many of these immigrants originally came to Siam with the hope of 
acquiring enough money to set themselves up back home. Encouraging gambling 
depleted their savings, prevented them returning and helped keep remittances to 
China low.15 Indeed, Yomarat was so convinced of this latter assertion that, on the 
eve of the abolition of the gambling tax farms, he urged that some dens be kept open 
exclusively for the Chinese.16
The exploitation of the Chinese gambling habit was most blatant in the 
southern tin-mining regions, such as Phuket. Until the twentieth century, the tin- 
mining industry was a virtual Chinese monopoly: the workforce consisted of Chinese 
labourers and the mine owners were invariably Chinese too. Along with the tin tax 
farm, these entrepreneurs commonly held the other major farms — on the import tax, 
opium, alcohol, and gambling -  and were often appointed by Bangkok as the local 
provincial governors.17 The mines were organised around the kongsi system whereby 
the miners were provided with all their necessities on site: food, opium, liquor, and 
housing. But while their wages were relatively high, to compensate for the harsh 
conditions, they managed to save little. Indeed, the whole system was predicated on 
the mining magnate recouping as much of his workers’ wages as possible through 
their consumption habits. Miners were often advanced part of their wages; sometimes 
they might not be left with anything at all, having already blown it all on booze and 
gambling.18 In the 1890s, it was estimated that the government received 40 per cent
14 William G. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1957, p. 120. See also Hong, Thailand, p. 127.
15 Skinner, Chinese Society, p. 125.
16 N A K K h.0301.1.30/15, ‘Yomarat to Vajiravudh, 1 March 1916’.
17 For more details on this combination of entrepreneurial and administrative functions see Hong, 
Thailand, p. 92-3; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp. 95-6.
18 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 75-6.
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of the earnings of all the miners in Phuket indirectly through these tax farms.19 
Suehiro Akira even goes so far to suggest that this was the main reason Chinese 
capital was not active in introducing new technology into tin-mining for, although 
machinery would have saved on labour costs and raised productivity, it would also 
have reduced the manpower requirements and, consequently, the profits of gambling,
0C\liquor and opium dens attached to the kongsi. A comparable situation existed in the 
Federated Malay States where the tax farms were often the only way of making the 
whole operation a viable endeavour for the mine owner. Additionally, Chinese 
capitalists used gambling to encourage indebtedness and thereby hold onto their 
workforce.21 To sum up, promoting gambling was a means of attracting Chinese 
labour, taxing it, and restricting its movements.
Just as they made up most of the gambling houses’ and lottery’s custom, the 
Chinese also dominated their management. Constance Wilson’s detailed examination 
of taxation records from 1825 to 1891 show that the various gambling tax farms 
tended to be held by Chinese, only occasionally falling into Siamese hands.22 This 
dominance is usually attributed to the fact that only the Chinese had the financial 
resources, knowledge, and organisational capabilities to ran these large farms23 
Moreover, these Chinese entrepreneurs had close connections with the Siamese elite, 
ties cemented by intermarriage and joint business ventures; in essence, an alliance
19 Skinner, Chinese Society, p. 110.
20 Suehiro Akira, Capital Accumulation in Thailand, 1855-1985, Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 1996, p. 69.
21 John G. Butcher, ‘The Demise o f the Revenue Farm System in the Federated Malay States’, Modern 
Asian Studies, 17, 3 (1983), pp. 395-7.
22 Constance M. Wilson, ‘Revenue Fanning, Economic Development and Government Policy during 
the Early Bangkok Period, 1830-92’ in John Butcher and Howard Dick (eds), The Rise and Fall o f  
Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence o f the Modern State in Southeast Asia, London: 
MacMillan, 1993, p. 148. Kanchana estimates that 90 percent of the gambling tax farmers were 
Chinese, [Government Policy], p. 101.
23 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 19, 101. This was a feature o f tax farming throughout South 
East Asia, see John Butcher, ‘Revenue Farming and the Changing State in Southeast Asia’ in John 
Butcher and Howard Dick (eds), The Rise and Fall o f Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the 
Emergence o f  the Modern State in Southeast Asia, London: MacMillan, 1993, p. 24.
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between Chinese economic power and Siamese political authority. However, 
conventional explanations as to the reasons for the later termination of tax farming 
portray it as an attempt to limit the insidious effects of Chinese influence. This is the 
line taken by Kanchana in her study of the abolition of the gambling house and lottery
24tax farms.
There are two elements to this argument. First, while gambling may have 
helped limit the remittances of Chinese labourers, the super-profits from the gambling 
farms enabled the Chinese plutocrats that controlled them to remit even greater sums. 
This was a serious impediment to economic development, causing a fall in the 
amount of cash in circulation and preventing capital accumulation for investment in 
the kingdom.25 However, there are only the sketchiest of estimates as to the total 
sums that might have been remitted: Yomarat placed it at 30 million baht in 1916, 
while the Financial Adviser, Walter Williamson, cited a figure of 26 million for 1912. 
The latter sought to downplay the significance of remittances by arguing that they 
amounted to only a fraction of Chinese earnings, the greater part of which were spent 
in the country. Furthermore, the problem was by no means unique to Siam. On the 
other hand, a fierce proponent of the view that the gambling farms fuelled remittances 
was F. H. Giles, head of the Provincial Revenue Department and the man charged 
with finding alternative means of raising revenue. Based on the actual prices of the 
gambling houses and lottery farms, he estimated that the total profits amounted to one
24 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 207.
25 Ibid., pp. 101-2, 173-4; Ingrain, Economic Change, p. 204.
26 NA K Kh.0301.1.30/15, ‘[Comment on] H. E. Chao Phya Yomaraj’s letter of 1st March 2458 (1916) 
to H. M. the King on the Chinese Question’. Other scholars have since questioned their significance, 
see Kenneth P. Landon, The Chinese in Thailand, New York: Russell & Russell, 1941, pp. 43-5; Ian 
Brown, ‘The End of the Opium Farm in Siam, 1905-7’ in John Butcher and Howard Dick (eds), The 
Rise and Fall o f  Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence o f the Modern State in 
Southeast Asia, London: MacMillan, 1993, p. 243.
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01and a half million baht a year, of which he believed the major portion was remitted. 
Thus, while the actual amount and significance of remittances may be difficult to 
determine, the conviction that they were a drain on the economy was held by 
elements in the Siamese administration.
The second aspect is that the Chinese plutocrats threatened to turn their 
economic might into political power.28 During the nineteenth century, they had been 
dependent upon royal and aristocratic patronage to secure the tax farms. From the 
1870s, though, the super-profits from these enterprises enabled them to diversify into 
other areas such as sugar processing, rice-milling, ferryboats, and banking.29 
Additionally, these tax farmers had strong associations with the Chinese secret 
societies.30 This made the Chinese plutocrats less dependent upon the Siamese elite, 
whose political authority they might now challenge. By the reign of King Vajiravudh, 
the court had grown alarmed at how events in China, leading to the republican 
overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, had politicised the Bangkok Chinese 
community and fuelled a nascent Chinese nationalism. To counter these threats, 
Vajiravudh launched an ideological assault that sought to exclude the Chinese from 
the life of the Siamese nation by portraying them as immoral, exploitative aliens: the 
‘Jews of the East’. The increasingly strict regulation of the gambling house and 
lottery tax farms, which culminated in their abolition in the mid-1910s, is thus 
depicted as part of this assault on the Chinese secret societies and Chinese wealth.31 
But while this argument might illuminate some of the short-term factors, it does not
27 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18s ‘Memorandum containing proposals as to the manner in which revenue can 
be raised to supply the deficiency which will be caused by the abolition o f gambling in the provinces, 
F. H. Giles, 7 Jan. 1905’.
28 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 113-14.
29 Ibid., p. 173; Pasuk and Baker, Thailand, p. 96. For an account o f the career of a Chinese
entrepreneur that made this transition see Hong, Thailand, p. 154.
30 Skinner, Chinese Society, p. 140; Hong, Thailand, p. 103.
31 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 157-9. See also Butcher, ‘Revenue Farming’, p. 36; and
Skinner, Chinese Society, p. 166.
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explain why the Siamese state should commit itself to the restriction of gambling 
from the late 1880s. In his study of the end of the main opium farm in 1907, Ian 
Brown highlights how the kingdom’s Chinese entrepreneurs had other sources of 
capital accumulation, having already diversified into more profitable and secure 
business enterprises. Abolishing the tax farms, therefore, was not guaranteed to 
reduce Chinese economic influence. Moreover, Brown asserts that in the first decade 
of the twentieth century the Siamese elite was dependent upon Chinese capital for its 
own business ambitions and thus an attack upon the Chinese was not in its interests.32
What is clear, though, is that the Siamese elite blamed the Chinese for the 
prevalence of gambling within the kingdom. Assessing the causes of debt slavery, 
Prince Dilok Nabarath, one of Chulalongkorn’s many sons, attributed it in part to ‘an 
age-old passionate gambling compulsion which has spread very widely these last
33years, i.e. since the immigration of numerous Chinese to Siam.’ Vajiravudh, 
meanwhile, went further: gambling was ‘a disease embedded deep in the blood of the 
Chinese’ (kanlenphanan pen rok khao luak chin titluk).34 The implication is that 
something had to be done to prevent this ‘disease’ from infecting the Siamese. 
Government attempts to restrict gambling were thus a reflection of deep-seated anti- 
Chinese sentiment, a feeling not limited to the Siamese elite. Terwiel suggests that an 
1848 pogrom in Chachoengsao against local Chinese indicated ‘a smouldering 
resentment’ that stemmed not only from their success in business but also ‘the fact 
that in their wake had come gambling halls, distilleries, and... some prostitution’. In 
short, the Chinese community in Siam was strongly associated with mounting social 
problems. These Chinese-related themes will be teased out in Chapter 2.
32 Brown, ‘End of the Opium Farm’, pp. 243-4.
33 Prince Dilok Nabarath, Siam’s Rural Economy under King Chulalongkorn, trans. Walter E. J. Tips, 
Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000 [1908], p. 36.
34 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Vajiravudh to Yomarat, 13 June 1916*.
35 Terwiel, Travellers’ Eyes, p. 175.
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The Gambling Tax Farms
Tax farming was essentially a compromise on the part of the state. It delegated its 
powers of tax collection on a range of products and services to private operators in 
exchange for a certain fixed rent, which in theory was greater than that which the 
state could collect on its own. The allocation of tax farms was determined by auction, 
with the monopoly rights going to the highest bidder. For their part, tax farmers were 
granted certain powers and privileges to help them run their monopolies and meet 
their obligations. Crucially, they got to keep all the income over and above what they 
had promised to the state. The attractions of tax farming for the Siamese state of the 
early nineteenth century are obvious: it entailed little expenditure on its part but 
provided a certain level of income. It was up to the tax farmers to ensure they ran an
■3 <7
efficient and profitable collection system. Moreover, Hong Lysa argues that: ‘The 
automatic escalation of state revenue in proportion to the profitability of the farm was
-> o
the cornerstone of the dynamics of the tax farming system.’ This was the theory, at 
least. But there was an inherent contradiction in the system; although employed as an 
agent of the state, the tax farmer was a private entrepreneur and, as will be discussed 
later, the interests of the two did not always coincide.
For now, the importance of tax farming to the Siamese state should be 
emphasised. Indeed, by the mid-nineteenth century the state had become dependent 
on tax farming for the greater part of its revenue. This was due to the restrictions on 
custom duties and land taxes imposed by the ‘unequal’ treaties that had deprived the 
state of alternative sources of income. At the same time, the state lacked the 
administrative apparatus and the knowledge to collect taxes on its own. Tax fanning
36 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 24, 81.
37 Hong, Thailand, pp. 90-1.
38 Ibid., p. 93.
39 Butcher, ‘Revenue Fanning’, pp. 19, 37.
43
thus provided a relatively stable source of income at a critical period in the formation 
of the modem Thai state; funding Chulalongkom’s celebrated administrative reforms, 
which laid the foundations of absolutism and safeguarded Siam from the colonial 
threat.40 As Damrong recognised, the particular beauty of the various gambling tax 
farms was that they were the most effective means of extracting revenue from the 
population without provoking discontent; people gambled out of their own free will 
and, should they lose everything, they were likely to blame themselves or misfortune 
rather than the gambling houses or the huai lottery.41 In short, the gambling tax farms 
were essential to the state.
The various gambling tax farms covered three distinct areas: the running of 
public gambling houses, where Chinese games were played; the operation of the huai 
lottery, also of Chinese origin; and, lastly, the supervision of gambling on a variety of 
activities, including traditional Siamese pastimes such as cockfighting and boat- 
racing, and numerous card and board games. A single tax farm might often combine 
all these different functions. For example, the huai lottery was part of one of the 
gambling house farms for Bangkok until Chulalongkom separated them in 1872 so as 
to increase the revenue.42 Conversely, the tax farms for other forms of gambling had 
been merged with those for the gambling houses by 1891 at the latest.43 Even when 
separate, the same tax farmer might have held both monopolies.44 Geographically, 
Bangkok-established tax farms covered all the major towns as far north as Uttaradit, 
to Nakhon Ratchasima in the east, and to Songkhla in the south. Bangkok’s tributaries 
and dependencies — Chiang Mai, the Malay sultanates, and the outer provinces of the
40 This point is made by various scholars, see for instance Wilson, ‘Revenue Farming’, p. 161.
41 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 90.
42 Wilson, ‘Revenue Fanning’, p. 153; Kullada, Rise and Decline, p. 52.
41PKPS, 13, p. 53.
44 Wilson, ‘State and Society’, pp. 635, 1045-6.
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Northeast -  had their own tax farms.45 Following the extension of Bangkok’s control 
in the 1880s, local political leaders were stripped of their power to appoint tax 
fanners and local gambling farms were abolished.46
Before considering these different gambling activities and their management 
separately, it is worthwhile outlining some general features of the tax fanning system. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the system was increasingly regulated in order to 
maximise the revenue accruing to the state; the following discussion of the bidding 
and payment process details the system as it existed before closure of the gambling 
houses started in the 1880s. In 1873, Chulalongkom established the Finance Office 
(Ho Ratsadakonphiphat) to supervise all the tax farms, for previously they had been 
under the control of separate ministries and departments. The Finance Office held this 
role until 1892 when the Ministry of Finance took over.47 Both the auctioning system 
and the procedure for tax farmers to make their payments to the government were 
revised on each of these occasions.48 The tax farmers held their monopoly for a fixed 
term; this was originally three years but at some point in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century was changed to one year 49 At the end of this term, the holder 
could, of course, bid to retain the farm. The auction of a farm was announced one 
month in advance and prospective fanners invited to make proposals. On the day of 
the auction, the highest was announced and those assembled could then make further 
bids, with the monopoly going to the highest bidder. To ensure that the state received 
the money due, the new tax farmer had to have a guarantor and pay a deposit of three
45 See the map and related comments in Wilson, ‘Revenue Farming’, pp. 150-1.
46 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 76-7. The Chiang Mai gambling farm was abolished by 
Bangkok’s Special Commissioner in November 1884.
47 On the establishment of the Finance Office see Hong, Thailand, pp. 116-19; Kullada, Rise and 
Decline, pp. 52-4.
48 For a breakdown of these reforms see Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 58-60, 125.
49 It is unclear exactly when this change was implemented, though Damrong indicates it was before the 
first gambling houses were closed in 1887. Damrong, [Abolition], p. 19. See also Wilson, ‘Revenue 
Farming’, p. 151.
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monthly instalments in advance. The rest of the bid was paid in monthly instalments. 
At the end of their term, the incumbent could continue to hold the farm, provided they 
had not fallen into debt and there were no others who wished to take it on.50
All tax farmers were given an official title with a minimum of 400 sakdina 
marks, making them lesser nobility, and a range of special powers to help facilitate 
their operations.51 Indicating the importance of gambling revenue to the state, 
gambling house and lottery farmers were sometimes granted as many as 800 sakdina 
marks.52 Amongst other privileges, they had the right to arrest any illegal gamblers 
within their jurisdiction and then receive any fines incurred once the case had been 
tried.53 Some had their own jails where debtors could be confined in chains until their 
debt was cleared.54 Moreover, to enforce and protect their monopolies, these tax 
farmers employed their own networks of spies and private armies of toughs. As 
Howard Dick observes of tax farming in general, ‘the state delegated not only the 
collection of taxes but also its powers of coercion’.55 Clearly, gambling tax farmers 
enjoyed a high level of autonomy; their farm was essentially their personal fiefdom to 
administer as they wished, an imperium in imperio,56 While this power may have 
been necessary for the farm to run effectively, it also gave the tax farmer the 
opportunity to abuse his position for personal gain to the detriment of the Siamese 
state and population.
50 Hong, Thailand, pp. 116-17; Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 19-20.
51 Sakdina literally means ‘power over the fields’ and the number of marks indicated one’s position in 
the official hierarchy. See Hong, Thailand, p. 6.
52 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 66.
53 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 21
54 Holt Samuel Hallett, A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, London & Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood & Sons, 1890, p. 243.
55 Howard Dick, ‘A Fresh Approach to Southeast Asian History’ in John Butcher and Howard Dick 
(eds), The Rise and Fall o f Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence o f the Modern State 
in Southeast Asia, London: MacMillan, 1993, pp. 5-6.
56 Butcher, ‘Revenue Farming’, p. 37.
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With regards to the gambling farms in the Federated Malay States, John 
Butcher highlights how colonial officials justified their existence on the grounds that 
they were the ‘best possible means of restricting gambling’ because ‘it was in the 
farmer’s interests to prevent any gambling taking place except with his permission, 
the implication being that he would seldom if ever allow gambling except in the 
known gambling houses since this would undermine his profits.’57 It is possible to 
discern a similar logic to the gambling farms in Siam but, in both cases, the reality 
was rather different. Gambling farmers were only too willing to tolerate illicit 
gambling so long as they received a cut of the profits, and they even ran prohibited
r o
games themselves. Sometimes people conspired with the gambling farmer to set up 
an illegal game: once many people had gathered, the farmer would turn up to arrest 
them. The organiser and the fanner would then split the money the latter received in 
fines.59
Although in theory the revenue from tax farming should have provided the 
state with a guaranteed level of income that steadily rose, this was not always the 
case. There were two principal reasons for this: first, the inability or unwillingness of 
tax farmers to pay the full auction price of their monopoly, and second, the 
domination of tax fanns by certain individuals and syndicates. With regards to the 
first, it was only natural that the tax farmer should try to maximise his income while 
minimising the amount that he paid to the state. Citing problems such as a decline in 
custom because of a bad harvest, the unwelcome attentions of rival Chinese secret 
societies or the failure of subcontractors to make their payments, gambling tax 
farmers would either ask for a reduction in the sum of each monthly instalment or just
57 Butcher, ‘Demise’, p. 393.
58 Ibid.; Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 83.
59 PKPS, 8, p. 135.
47
go into debt to the government.60 Since they often held the monopoly for more than 
one province or more than one of the different farms, they usually sublet their 
monopoly rights. Kanchana gives an example of a gambling house farmer who had 
held his monopoly for many years and by 1891/2 was over 1,200 chang (9,600 baht) 
in debt. When the Ministry of Finance finally demanded payment, he sent back a list 
of all his subcontractors who had failed to pay him and transferred their debts to him 
to the government.61 This problem of incomplete payment was intensified by the 
fierce competition involved in securing a farm. Overestimating the potential profits or 
just being determined to beat all other competitors might lead a prospective farmer to 
submit a bid he could not possibly honour,62 When a farmer asked for a reduction in 
the monopoly price or merely fell behind in his payments, the Finance Office might 
decide to put the farm up for re-auction. However, the value of the farm would be 
significantly reduced, especially if  the farmer had defaulted because of external 
problems. In some cases there might be no others willing, or able, to place a bid and 
the original farmer would end up retaining his farm at a reduced price while still 
being in debt to the state.63 As Kanchana highlights when the gambling farmers 
profited from their operations they rarely raised their bids for the following year but 
as soon as they were in danger of making a loss they were quick to ask the 
government to help share the responsibility.64
More seriously, the monopolisation of tax farms by syndicates undermined the 
very basis of the system, namely that state revenue would increase in proportion to 
the profitability of the farms. As Hong emphasises, however, this was dependent on 
the free play of market forces, a prerequisite that was in short supply by the end of the
60 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 81, 95.
61 Ibid., pp. 94-5. See also Hong, Thailand, p. 103.
62 Hong, Thailand, p. 103.
63 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 96-7.
64 Ibid., p. 98.
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Fourth Reign.65 With the backing of Chinese secret societies, provincial authorities or 
a powerful patron within the court, tax farmers were able to subvert the bidding 
process and retain their monopoly at the original price for many years. Intimidation 
might also be used to ensure there were no rival bids.66 Syndicates were formed in 
which control of the gambling farms was rotated amongst members, with the bidding 
price stagnating or even falling.67 This problem was compounded by a shortage of 
potential tax farmers with the capital and organisational capabilities to run the 
gambling and lottery farms. Unlike tax farms that were based on people’s production, 
these two required large amounts of capital to cover operational costs and losses. 
Running the huai was a particularly complex operation requiring a large staff.68 A 
limited pool of competitors meant the state had to rely on certain individuals they 
might not otherwise have chosen. As Chapter 2 will show, this shortage grew acute in 
the early twentieth century. In short, although tax farming provided the state with a 
fairly reliable and regular source of income, the machinations of the tax farmers 
ensured that the system never worked to its full potential or, towards the end, worked 
at all. Revenue was always being drained away from the state into the pockets of the 
tax farmers.
For much of the nineteenth century, this was a price the Siamese state was 
willing to pay. Indeed, while it lacked the resources to collect taxes for itself, it 
remained dependent on the tax farmers. This dependence was exacerbated by the 
restrictions on custom duties imposed by the ‘unequal’ treaties of the 1850s, denying 
the state alternative revenue sources. All the state could do to correct the imbalance 
was try to regulate the system more strictly. Unsurprisingly, this was one of
65 Hong, Thailand, pp. 93, 103.
66 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 68.
67 Ibid., p. 83; Wilson, ‘State and Society’, pp. 635-6.
68 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 99.
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Chulalongkom’s priorities during the first two decades of his reign.69 As Chapter 2 
will illustrate, the gradual closure of the gambling houses was part of this 
rationalisation strategy. The irony is, of course, that tax fanning, in Siam just as
70elsewhere in South East Asia, ‘sowed the seeds of its own destruction.’ It provided 
Chulalongkom with the funds to create a strong centralised state with a bureaucracy 
that could collect its own taxes, thereby rendering itself obsolete. However, the 
abolition of the gambling farms was not just about dismantling the last vestiges of an 
archaic system. There were strong objections to gambling in itself.
The Gambling Houses
The gambling houses or dens, in Thai bonbia, were places where a specific form of 
Chinese gambling took place. The holder of the farm enjoyed the total monopoly on 
the operation of such establishments within his district. Moreover, no one could play 
these particular games elsewhere without his permission. Until tighter regulations 
were imposed on the gambling farms in the late 1880s, he could open as many dens 
as he desired but, naturally, establishing too many would have undermined his profits. 
Rather than build new dens every time the ownership of the farm changed, the 
incoming fanner would ‘inherit’ those of his predecessor. These were either staffed 
with the farmer’s own personnel or, more commonly, sublet out to another, who 
might then manage that den for many years.71
Evocative descriptions of the gambling houses abound. Indeed, for the 
contemporary Westerner, it seems that no trip to Bangkok was complete without a
69 For a description of the fiscal reforms see Hong, Thailand, pp. 116-19; Kullada, Rise and Decline, 
pp. 52-4.
70 Dick, ‘Fresh Approach’, p. 9. See also Hong, Thailand, pp. 1304.
71 Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 19-21. ’ /  ,
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visit to such an establishment.72 A number of Siamese also recorded their impressions 
of the dens for posterity.73 Prior to the 1890s, gambling houses were located wherever 
large numbers of people tended to congregate, especially around markets and piers. 
Most were extremely basic in design, little more than large bamboo sheds with roofs 
of nipa-palm leaves and earthen floors. If near a waterway or river, a houseboat 
would be used. One Westerner in 1870s Bangkok claimed: ‘you can scarcely go in 
any direction five minutes without coming to a gambling shed or gambling floating 
house.’74 This was no exaggeration; in 1887, there were officially over 400 dens in
75the capital, 126 of which were described as large. As for the provinces, Hallett 
claimed that gambling houses could be found in every village.76 It is difficult to 
pinpoint an exact figure, though, because the only statistics are for the number of 
provincial dens closed between 1898 and 1906, and in some areas no figure was 
given. One secondary source places the number of provincial establishments at 210 in 
1887/8, while Kanchana estimates that there were up to 243 by 1898.77 The 1898 
announcement of closures suggests these were concentrated in the Central Plain, with 
the amount in any given monthon (an administrative area composed of several
72 See for instance Carl Bock, Temples and Elephants, pp. 43, 46; Hallett, Thousand Miles, pp. 234-5; 
Charles Buis, Siamese Sketches, trans. Walter E. J. Tips, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994 [1901], pp. 36- 
7; Prince Wilhelm of Sweden, ‘Extract from In the Lands o f  the Sun'’ in Foreign Records o f  the 
Bangkok Period up to AD 1932: Published on the Occasion o f the Rattanakosin Bicentennial, 1982, 
Bangkok, 1982, p. 218-19.
73 By far the most detailed is Sthirakoses, Looking Back, pp. 134-9, 143-8. See also Phraya Anuphap 
Traiphop, Phramahanakhonb'ungthep nai khwamsongcham khun ayu chetsip [Bangkok as 
Remembered by a Seventy-Year Old], Bangkok: Cremation Volume, 1961, pp. 147-50.
74 Bangkok Calendar, 1873, p. 65.
15 PKPS, 11, p. 127.
76 Hallett, Thousand Miles, p. 234.
77 Chumphon Lohachala, ‘Khambanyai ruang kanphanan chanit tang-tang ti khun-su san [Descriptions 
of various forms of gambling that come up in court]’ in Anuson nai ngan phraratchathan phloengsop 
phontamniattri suwit sotthithat [Cremation Volume for Police Major General Suwit Sotthithat], 
Bangkok: Samphan, 1981, p. 3; Kanchana [Gambling Taxes], pp. 75, 145-6.
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provinces) diminishing the further from Bangkok.78 Most large provincial towns had 
at least one den.
Three games were commonly played in the gambling houses: th.ua> also called 
thua yai\ po pan; and po ham?9 They were known collectively as thua po and, 
discarding cheating, were games of pure chance. Placing a bet was conducted on the 
same principle for all three games, and each was played on one of the many mats that 
covered the floors of the dens. They differed only in the equipment used. Each mat 
was divided into four quarters by a large cross, like the letter X. The four openings, or 
‘gates’ (pratu% formed by the cross were the points on which to bet. The opening 
directly in front of the dealer represented the number four and was called khrop, 
meaning ‘complete’. Going clockwise from the dealer in ascending order were the 
numbers one to three. This arrangement was well known and there was no need for 
the gates to be marked.
There were various ways of placing a bet and the winner would receive 
between one and three times their stake, depending on the odds of winning, losing or 
‘drawing’. These variants were designed to keep players interested. O was the most 
straightforward method: if  the gambler’s number came up, they won three times their 
stake. Other methods were a little more complex since there was the added possibility 
of neither winning nor losing, in Thai gambling parlance: chao. For instance, if meng 
was used, the player would receive only the amount of their stake if  correct.
78 For instance, pre-1898 there were 71 dens in monthon Ayutthaya compared with 11 in monthon 
Naklion Ratchasima. PKPS, 16, pp. 288-91.
79 The following descriptions of these games and the methods of betting are drawn from a variety of 
sources. The most authoritative are Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 27-9; Chumphon, [Descriptions], pp. 
17-21; Phakdi Sirisuwan, Khambanyai wichakansopsuan kanphanan [Explanations o f Gambling], 
Bangkok, 1953, pp. 3-8; Lisut Thonchai, Khu-mu kanphanan [Gambling Handbook], 2nd ed., Bangkok, 
nd, pp. 93-9; Khun Wichit Matra, 80 p i nai chiwit khapphachao [80 Years in My Life], Bangkok, 
1980, pp. 104-5. The best English-language descriptions are in Sthirakoses, Looking Back, pp. 134-9; 
Siam Repository, 1873, pp. 88-9, which refers to thua as the 'mat game’ and po  pan as the ‘brass-cup 
game; and Adolf Bastian, A Journey in Siam (1863), trans. Walter E. J. Tips and ed. Christian 
Goodden, Bangkok: White Lotus, 2005 [1868], pp. 262-3.
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However, should one of the adjacent numbers come up, then they would neither win 
nor lose. In short, players had the same chance, one in four, of winning or losing.
Thua, a variant of fan-tan, was the game on which the big money was won 
and lost. Any number could play but there was a minimum stake.80 Most gambling 
houses ran only one thua circle and the large circular mat, some 20 to 30 feet in 
diameter, on which it was played formed the focal point of the establishment.81 The 
dealer would take between 100 and 200 cowrie shells and heap them in a pile in front 
of him. He would then count out the cowries in sets of four. The remainder was the 
winning number; if the final set was complete, khrop, then four was the winner. Po 
ham was conducted on exactly the same lines, though the cowries were smaller and a 
lesser amount used. There would be as many circles as demand warranted. 
Unsurprisingly, there was some cheating. W. A. R. Wood, a former British consul in 
Siam, implies that the dealers were adept at secreting cowries so that the result would
o 9
be the most amenable for the house.
Po pan was played with a cube, each side of which was half red and half 
white. Before play, the dealer and the players would agree which of the colours was 
the winner; they usually chose white. The dealer would place this cube in a brass 
rectangular box consisting of two parts, the larger of which slid over the other to 
conceal the cube (see Figure 1.1). The brass box was placed in the centre of the cross 
on the mat and then spun by the dealer. After all bets had been placed, the dealer 
removed the outer box to reveal the top face of the cube. The winning number was 
that opposite the agreed colour.
80 Damrong asserts that the minimum stake was one salung (quarter o f a baht), while Wichit places it at 
two salung and Anuman at one baht. Damrong, [Abolition], p. 27; Wichit, [80 Years], p. 105; 
Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 139.
81 Arnold Wright and Oliver Breakspear (eds), Twentieth Century Impressions o f  Siam: Its History, 
People, Commerce, Industries and Resources, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994 [1908], p. 248.
82 W. A. R. Wood, Consul in Paradise: Sixty-Nine Years in Siam, London: Souvenir Press, 1965, p. 21.
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Figure 1.1: Equipment for playing po pan (Source: Phakdi, Khambanyai)
Gambling was not the only attraction. Theatrical and musical performances -  
Chinese operas (ngiu), Thai classical dramas (lakhon), folk comedies (li-ke), and 
shadow-puppet shows -  were staged in order to entice people inside. Indeed, along 
with the lottery hall, the gambling houses were the entertainment hotspots of their 
day. Recalling his childhood, Phraya Anuman Rajadhon noted how ‘the night life 
then was mainly centred around the lottery and the cowries houses, which were fully 
illuminated in contrast to the dark found in the rest of the city.’84 As already 
mentioned, the clientele was predominantly Chinese, the majority of whom were 
male.85 Siamese men and women, young and old could also be found therein. Thua 
was played by the well-off, while po kam and po pan were played by those with little 
cash to spare. The amounts staked varied enormously: from the lowest currency 
denominations such as one phai (1/32 of a baht) or one at (1/64 of a baht) on the
50 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 29; Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 148; Hallett, Thousand Miles, p. 235. 
S4 Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 161.
85 Ibid., p. 146.
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latter two games to thousands of baht on the former.86 A permanent feature was a 
jobless underclass of young men: beggars, opium addicts, thieves, and toughs, 
collectively known as the ‘ghosts of the gambling houses’ (Jda-kui or phnak kui, a 
term of Chinese origin).87 The dens gave them plentiful opportunities for crime: 
picking the pockets of a gambler absorbed in the game or jumping some unlucky
• * * RS • *winner on their way home and relieving them of their winnings. This environment 
was also a breeding ground for recruits into bandit gangs, whose ill-gotten gains
• * RQwould invariably be blown on gambling, opium and liquor. In short, a criminal 
underworld revolved around the gambling houses.
Within the immediate vicinity of the gambling houses there were various 
‘support industries’: liquor stalls, opium dens and pawnshops. Indeed, gambling 
houses and pawnshops had an almost symbiotic relationship. Players down on their 
luck would pawn their jewellery, ornaments, furniture, and even their clothes, before 
returning to gamble once more.90 Moreover, pawnshops commonly received stolen 
property, enabling thieves to easily acquire funds for gambling.91 The depth of this 
relationship is illustrated by the impact of the 1901 Pawnbrokers Act, which required 
all pawnshops to be licensed, all forfeited pledges to be examined by the police 
before sale, and the owner to report any items that appeared on a list of stolen
86 Sthirakoses, Looldng Back, p. 139; Wichit, [80 Years], p. 105; Wright and Breakspear (eds), 
Twentieth Centuiy Impressions, p. 248.
87 Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 147.
88 For more examples see Walter E. J. Tips, Crime and Punishment in King Chulalongkorn ‘s Kingdom, 
Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998, pp. 113-15, 166-7.
89 Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, Ruang sonthana kapphuraiplon [Interview with a Bandit], Bangkok: 
Cremation Volume, 1925, pp. 5-6,41-2; Tips, Crime and Punishment, pp. 85-9, 103-6, 132-6, 276.
90 Anuphap, [Bangkok], p. 150; Ernest Young, The Kingdom o f the Yellow Robe, London: Archibald 
Constable & Co., 1900, p. 18; Hermann Norden, From Golden Gate to Golden Sun: A Record o f  
Travel, Sport, and Observation in Siam and Malaya, London: H. F. and G. Witherby, 1923, pp. 131-2.
91 RFAB 1901-02, p. 3; Warrington Smyth, Five Years in Siam, vol. II, p. 255-6. For example court 
cases in which stolen property was pawned see Tips, Crime and Punishment, pp. 56-7, 62-5, 103-6, 
141-2.
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property published daily by the Police Special Branch.92 Its immediate effect was the
closure of all 432 pawnshops in Bangkok as the proprietors initially refused to
comply with the regulations. The profits of the gambling house and opium farmers
were hit so severely that they agitated, unsuccessfully, for the law to be repealed. As
for the consequent reduction in ciime, Eric St. John Lawson, Acting Commissioner of
Police, observed that:
The very large body of snatch thieves found themselves in the awful 
predicament of either having to do some work or else give up gambling and 
opium. They chose the lesser of two evils and a large number of coolies 
appeared, as if by magic, and the novel sight of Siamese coolies working in
1 93the streets was seen.
With their profits down, the gambling houses then started to receive stolen property 
and other goods in pawn; some den managers even ended up being convicted under 
the Pawnbrokers Act.94 When licensed pawnshops opened later that year, crime 
returned to more regular levels but the pawnshops now acted as instruments of 
detection. Clearly, the gambling houses and pawnshops were interdependent. Indeed, 
it is revealing that when restrictions were imposed on the locations of both 
establishments at the end of the nineteenth century, the government did not physically 
separate them.95 Presumably, such a move would have impacted too heavily on their 
profitability and, in turn, state revenue.
The combination of alcohol, opium, gambling and pawnshops created a locus 
of criminality. But this was not merely limited to theft and robbery. The ready 
availability of alcohol combined with frustration at gaming losses and the practice of 
going around armed created a highly volatile atmosphere. Arguments over some
92 Cecil A. Carter, The Kingdom o f Siam, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904, p. 124; Wright and 
Breakspear (eds), Twentieth Century Impressions, p. 108.
93RPAB 120 [1901/02], p. 22.
94 Ibid.
95 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 180-1.
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perceived slight or allegations of cheating sometimes ended in murder. Indeed, A. J. 
A. Jardine, the Inspector General of Police for Bangkok from June 1897 to March 
1902, attributed the frequency of murders in the capital to five principal causes, of 
which gambling was one.97 His successor, Lawson, also found the number of murders 
high -  113 for the year 1903/4, excluding those committed by bandits -  and 
commented that: ‘The young bloods go to gamble, get drunk, quarrel amongst 
themselves and then someone is murdered. Nearly all the cases occur like this.’98 He 
then expounded on the connection between opium, alcohol, gambling and crime at 
some length:
Drinking, like opium eating and smoking, is getting worse and worse every 
year. A large percentage of the drunkards either murder someone or get 
murdered. The majority of the opium smokers and eaters become robbers and 
thieves. The original main cause, however, is the gambling house. The 
gambler nearly always drinks or smokes opium. How much these three vices 
depend on each other is clearly shewn by the fact that when the gambling 
houses at Pacret, Nontaburi and Paklat were closed on April 1st, nearly all the 
drinking shops and opium shops at those places closed up because there was 
not enough business to be done.99
The British officers that headed the Bangkok police force around the turn of
the twentieth century clearly believed that the gambling houses were a prime cause of
crime.100 In his 1903/4 report, Lawson drew a revealing comparison of serious crime
in Bombay, Calcutta, Rangoon and Bangkok:
Bombay and Calcutta are larger than Bangkok, Rangoon much smaller. All 
four towns are otherwise very similar. All four are ports with a mixed and 
constantly changing population. It is therefore rather startling to find that in
96 Tips, Crime and Punishment, pp. 109-10; Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 86-7.
97 The other causes, in no apparent order, were the Chinese secret societies, jealousy and quarrels about 
women, insufficient restrictions on the carrying of arms, and, lastly, the drinking and opium dens. 
RPAB 1898-99, pp. 40-1.
98 RPAB Year 123 [1903/4], pp. 17-18.
99 Ibid., p. 18.
100 These British officers had previously served in the colonial India and Burma police forces. 
Chulalongkom employed them as part of his modernisation programme and also in the belief that they 
might handle the Western consuls more effectively. Some, such as Lawson, lived in Siam for many 
years. Hong Lysa, ‘Extraterritoriality in Bangkok in the Reign of Chulalongkom, 1868-1910: The 
Cacophony of Semi-Colonial Cosmopolitanism’, Itinerari: European Journal o f  Overseas Histoiy, 27, 
2 (2003), pp. 128-9.
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Bangkok more cases of serious crime were reported to the Police [5,510 
cases] than in Bombay [4,053], and more than in Calcutta [2,504] and 
Rangoon [1,289] together.101
For Lawson, Bangkok’s greater crime levels were due to three factors: the gambling
houses, the opium dens, and the drinking saloons, all of which were open around the
clock. In contrast, the other three cities had no gambling houses, and opium and
alcohol consumption were more strictly regulated. Combined, these three vices made
Bangkok ‘one of the most criminal places in the world’. 102 This perception of the
gambling houses as a prime cause of crime subsequently became orthodoxy for the
Bangkok force; both British and Siamese officers attributed the increase in crime in
the mid-1910s to this source.103
But the gambling houses were not only breeding grounds for crime; given the
large amounts of cash on site they also made an attractive target for organised crime.
Tax farmers frequently complained to the Finance Office about the unwelcome
attentions of Chinese secret societies and Siamese hoodlums.104 Employees and
punters were harassed and sometimes violently assaulted.105 One tactic of these gangs
was to hurl bricks and stones into the dens, and then, in the ensuing disturbance, seize
the cash from the mats and rob the customers.106 Alternatively, fires were lit inside to
provoke chaos. Some of theses incidents were probably attempts at extortion by
Chinese secret societies.107 Even more seriously, bandit gangs also staged raids on
iU1 RPAB 122 [1903/04], p. 1, 3.
102 Ibid., p. 25.
103 In 1914/15, the number o f serious crimes in Bangkok town (as opposed to Bangkok province) was 
almost equal to those in the whole of Burma. NA R.6 N.4.1/73, ‘E. W. Trotter to Yomarat, 23 Dec. 
1915’; NA R.6 N.4.1/51, ‘Phraya Phirentharathibodi to Trotter, 29 June 1915’.
104 See for instance NA R.5 N.42.11/15, ‘Chin Hoi to Finance Office, 4 June 1897’; NA R.5 
N.42.11/16, ‘Prince Alangkan to Phraya Phetchaphani, 15 Nov. 1897’; NA R.5 N.3.3.K/28, ‘Chin 
Chieo to Finance Office, 27 Jan. 1898’.
105 In August 1899, for example, a den manager was stabbed in the head. NA R.5 N .42.11/23, ‘Chin 
Hu to Finance Office, 26 Aug. 1899’.
106 NA R.5 N .42.11/27, ‘Chin Cheng to Finance Office, 22 Oct. 1900’.
107 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 107.
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gambling dens in remote areas.108 One particularly bloody example occurred in May 
1902 when 36 bandits raided the Sam Rong gambling house on the outskirts of 
Bangkok. About 100 shots were fired, leaving nine dead and six seriously wounded. 
The gang made off with over 4,000 baht in cash and then plundered the homes of 
eight Chinese living in the area, seizing a further 5,500 baht worth of goods.109 This 
sparked a major investigation: the culprits were eventually brought to justice and 
some publicly executed.110 Since the tax farmer was unwilling to continue paying the 
original auction price and it would be difficult to find another to take it on given the 
area’s lawlessness, the government decided to close this den immediately.111 In short, 
the gambling houses nurtured crime. This alone was a compelling reason for their 
abolition.
The huai Lottery
As already mentioned, the huai lottery was introduced into Siam from China 
sometime during the reign of Rama III; the exact date and circumstances of its 
establishment being somewhat unclear. According to Damrong, there was a drought 
in Siam during the early 1830s, resulting in a serious rice shortage and, in turn, a 
scarcity of cash. A Chinese alcohol farmer called Chin Hong told the king that the 
people had buried their money and suggested starting a lottery so as to encourage 
them to dig it up. Rama III approved of the idea and Chin Hong established the huai 
in 1835.112 However, Terwiel has revealed that the records of the court astrologers
108 See for instance RPAB 120 [1901/02], p. 14; Tips, Crime and Punishment, pp. 94-101.
109 NA R.5 N.6.2/929, ‘Naret to Sommot, 17 May 1902’; ‘Lawson to Naret, 18 June 1902’.
110 RPAB 123 [1904/05], p. 17.
111 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kli/18, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 5 June 1902’; ‘Chulalongkom to Mahit, 12 June 
1902’.
112 B. O. Cartwright, ‘The Huey Lottery’, Journal o f  the Siam Society, 18 (1924), p. 221. This is 
essentially a direct tr anslation of Dainrong’s description of the lottery, [Abolition], pp. 53-89.
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date its introduction to 1829, before the bad weather occurred.113 This suggests that if 
the Siamese were hoarding their cash, it was not because of economic hardship. 
Rather, it implies that people had begun to acquire a cash surplus as a result of their 
involvement in the expanding export-oriented economy; in the absence of banking 
facilities, burying excess cash was a rational precaution against theft. The 
establishment of the huai lottery was thus a response to a growing cash economy and 
a mechanism for keeping cash in circulation.
The huai lottery was played with 34 letters of the Thai alphabet; hence, it was 
called huai ko kho, literally the ABC lottery.114 Each letter had a name based on that 
of a famous character from Chinese legend and was represented pictorially by both 
this individual and an animal that suggested their former birth-state (for the letter ko 
see Figure 1.2). Stories about these personages were immortalised in verse during the 
late nineteenth century.115 The fact that these were highly popular and that adults and 
children alike could remember all the letters by name is evidence of how the huai 
pervaded Siamese life. Winners stood to gain 30 times their original stake, with one- 
thirtieth being claimed by the operators as commission. The odds were not as good as 
those in the gambling dens but the potential prize made an attractive inducement. By 
picking a winner just once in ten or twenty times or by staking on ten or twenty letters 
and winning on one, people could expect to make some profit.116
113 Terwiel, Travellers ’ Eyes, p. 215-16. An account of the huai in the Bangkok Times also placed its
introduction in 1829. BTWM, 29 March 1916.
114 Originally, 36 letters had been used but two were dropped, either because they were associated with 
trouble or because they were believed to be the most probable winning letters. Cartwright, ‘The Huey 
Lottery’, p. 225; Sthirakoses, Looking Back  P- 154; Bastian, A Journey, p. 264.
115 Sthirakoses, Looldng Back, pp. 154-6. See also Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery5, pp. 222-4.
116 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 228. See also Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 157.
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Figure 1.2: The Chinese legendary figure and animal representing the letter ko sam 
huai (Source: Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 145)
For the greater part of its existence, the huai lottery was limited to Bangkok 
and came under the remit of a single tax farm. At first there was only one draw a day 
but, when it was seen how profitable Chin Hong’s operation was, a rival huai was set 
up, with a draw in the evening. This was short-lived, however, and the two draws 
were subsequently made part of the same farm. The administration of the lottery was 
organised like a three-tiered pyramid. At the apex was the lottery farmer, whose 
centre of operations was the lottery hall located, from the 1870s onwards, inside the 
city walls at Pratu Samyot. Here he had about 200 staff working directly for him.117 
The next tier consisted of the district managers. Bangkok and its suburbs were 
divided into 38 districts (khwaeng), each with its own office. There were two kinds of 
districts, inner and outer, the classification being based on their distance from the 
lottery hall. The inner districts were responsible for sending the daily stakes to the 
lottery hall, for which they received a commission. Any winnings were paid with cash
117 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery', pp. 234-5.
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from the lottery hall. The outer districts, meanwhile, held onto the stakes they
118received but had to pay any winnings themselves. At the base of the pyramid were 
the lottery clerks, who were essentially sub-contractors of the district managers. 
These clerks could be found, sat behind their stalls waiting to receive people’s stakes, 
throughout the city. In 1873, it was estimated that there were over a thousand in 
Bangkok.119 They took their places when the afternoon markets opened, around 4 pm, 
so that they might catch the market traffic. Punters would tell the clerks the letter or 
letters they had chosen for the morning and/or evening draw and how they wished 
their stake to be placed. There were several ways of staking. For instance, with the hu 
method players would re-stake the winnings, or part of, from the morning letter on 
another letter for the evening draw.120 Doing the double was highly profitable: 
Cartwright recalls winning 155 baht 56 atts on an original stake of just 12 atts.121 The 
clerk would provide the punter with a stamped receipt specifying the date and details 
of their stake. He then made two records of the bet, one for himself and the other for 
the lottery hall. The latter account was called the bai phoi. Around 10 pm, the clerks 
sent the bai phoi to the district offices, where the accounts were then compiled. The 
inner districts then submitted the bai phoi to the lottery hall, where the draw took 
place. The morning letter was drawn around 1 am the evening one around 4 am. After 
each announcement, runners were sent out to tell the district offices and clerks the 
result. If the punters were not awoken by the sound of the runner shouting out the 
letter,122 then they could easily learn the result the following day from the board 
hanging next to the clerk’s stall.
118 Ibid., pp. 225-6.
119 Bangkok Calendar, 1873, p. 63.
120 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 232; Sthirakoses, Looking Back, pp. 156-7.
121 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 238. One att was 1/64 of a baht.
122 Sthirakoses, Looking Back, pp. 157-8.
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Perhaps the most curious aspect of the huai was that the winning letter was 
not selected randomly; the lottery farmer chose the morning letter before any of that 
day’s bets had been made, placed a wooden tile bearing that letter in a bag and then 
hung it up in the lottery hall. His decision was made after consulting the bai phoi for 
the previous week to see which letters had been heavily backed recently, hoping this 
might indicate which ones people were likely to back that day and thus be avoided. 
The evening letter was chosen after the fanner had examined the winning bai phoi for 
the morning draw.123 In this sense, the fanner was playing the game as well. Regular 
lottery gamblers, meanwhile, had various methods for getting into the fanner’s 
mindset: keeping records of the results and then trying to discern any particular 
patterns, such as how many days would pass before the farmer would draw the same 
letter.124 This was actively encouraged; all the lottery clerks had a record board
12.5showing all the recent results hanging near their stall. Moreover, the 34 letters were 
divided into six groups according to the Chinese personage associated with them for 
this purpose; on the days when the fanner made merit at the temple, it was believed 
he would draw one of the six letters in the phra (holy men) group, for instance.126 The 
huai was thus a battle of wits between the farmer and the hardcore punters, with each 
trying to guess which letter the other might back. Indeed, when Damrong asked one 
lottery farmer why he did not draw a letter at random he was told that, if they were to 
do so, these players would lose interest and the amount staked would fall.127 It would 
seem that the lottery farmers had ample opportunities for fraud but the historical 
record is surprisingly quiet on this. While the fanner may always have been trying to 
fix the result in his favour, it can be surmised that corrupt practices were kept in
123 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, pp. 236-7; Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 159.
124 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 61; Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 164.
125 Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 157; Siam Repository, 1873, pp. 23-4.
126 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 228-9.
127 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 62.
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check by the fear of being exposed and the disastrous loss of custom that might result. 
Of course, whatever the farmer did to minimise his losses, someone was bound to 
have the winning letter.
There were a host of less systematic means of predicting the huai. People 
were constantly on the lookout for lucky omens -  a gesture from a holy man, a 
strange marking on an ancient tree or a dream -  as an indication of the winning letter. 
Offerings were made and rituals performed. Many monks, willingly or not, acquired 
reputations as great tipsters.128 Indeed, there was a whole lottery-tips industry: 
astrologers and fortune-tellers, magic potions and books of formulas.129 Part of the 
lottery’s popularity was no doubt due to the way in which it appealed to people’s 
mystical leanings and sense of fate. It is also easy to imagine market places buzzing 
with speculation about that day’s winning letter.
Originally, the huai was confined to Bangkok. In 1865, however, Mongkut 
granted permission for it to be established in the towns of Ayutthaya and Phetchaburi. 
Presumably these were two separate farms to the one covering Bangkok and, given 
their distance from the capital, did their draws independently. Information on the 
Ayutthaya lottery is scarce but sources for the Phetchaburi one indicate that its 
establishment was a reflection of economic growth. The town had prospered as a 
result of the sugar industry and, since the 1850s, from the rice trade. Mongkut 
claimed, however, that the people had been hoarding their money; the lottery was 
thus established to encourage cash circulation, just as had been the case with the 
original one. Additionally, the revenue was to be invested in developing the country: 
digging canals, laying roads, and employing police to suppress banditry.130 Neither
128 For details o f these see Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, pp. 230-1; Sthirakoses, Looking Back, pp. 161- 
4; Siam Repositoiy, 1873, p. 24; Bastian, A Journey, pp. 60-1.
]29BTWM, 29 March 1916.
130 Hong, Thailand, p. 90; Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 46.
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lottery lasted long, however; the local authorities claimed they had impoverished the 
people and both were abolished within a year.131 As future governments were to 
learn, trying to exploit people’s gambling habit for economic development was, in 
itself, a huge gamble.
Unlike the gambling houses, which had low-class and criminal associations, 
the huai had universal appeal and was played by all sections of Bangkok society.132 
According to Damrong, its popularity amongst the higher-classes was partly due to 
the fact they could play it anonymously by getting another to place a stake for 
them.133 In the early 1870s, the most common stake was one baht -  though the 
wealthy might bet as much as 50 baht or more -  and the daily receipts of the lottery 
hall were apparently between 4,000 and 4,800 baht.134 By the latter years of the 
huai*s existence this had risen to about 40,000 baht a day, out of which the lottery
i 35farmer would usually pay out around 10,000 baht. The increase in lottery takings 
was partly due to the construction of a rail network into the provinces -  the north­
eastern line to Nakhon Ratchasima was completed in 1900 -  which enabled people to
136come to Bangkok occasionally to place a stake. The most popular time of year for 
this was the end of Buddhist Lent in October. Indeed, in 1904 passenger demand was 
so great that additional trains had to be put on, leading the Bangkok Times to 
conclude that ‘the railways have increased the facilities for gambling.’137 Huge 
crowds would gather outside the lottery hall to await the draw and the total amount 
staked reached as much as 150,000 baht a day, though the fanner might have had to
131 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 222; Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 47.
132 Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 157; BTWM, 29 March 1916.
133 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 90.
134 Bangkok Calendar, 1873, p. 64.
135 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 239.
136 RFAB 1902-03, p. 4.
137 BTWM, 26 Oct. 1904.
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pay out large sums.138 Clearly, the huai was a highly profitable enterprise for the 
lottery farmers, most of whom were Chinese. Indeed, only three Siamese held the
I ■IQ
monopoly during Chulalongkom’s reign. As Chapter 2 will show, this Chinese 
dominance was a critical concern behind the abolition of the huai. Nevertheless, 
compared with the gambling houses, the lottery was considerably less problematic for 
the state. The revenue it provided was much more stable and the farmer less likely to 
default. Indeed, throughout its existence, there was apparently only one holder who 
was unable to make his payments to the Finance Office.140
Other Forms of Gambling
Besides those discussed so far, there was a plethora of other activities, indigenous and 
imported, on which people in Siam gambled. During the early 1850s, a tax farm on 
17 games -  including cock, bird and fish fighting; a number of card and dice games; 
and various types of racing involving boats, horses, and ox-carts -  was set up, 
covering all the towns in the Central Plain and the lower north.141 The fanner 
received a commission on all stakes on these games. As with the other farms, he 
commonly sublet his monopoly rights. It seems this farm was later broadened to 
include other activities on an ad-hoc, regional basis. Kanchana sees this as primarily a 
revenue raising measure but it can also be seen as an attempt to regulate, and thereby 
restrict, an upsurge in gambling.142 Indeed, the state revenue it provided was but a 
fraction of that from the dens and the huai.[ 43
138 Ibid.; Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 239. For a breakdown of daily takings and the farmer’s profit 
over the end of Buddhist Lent in 1913 see BTWM, 17 Oct. 1913.
139 BTWM, 29 March 1916.
140 Cartwright, ‘Huey Lottery’, p. 239.
141 For the complete lists of games and towns see Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 23 fn. 44, 49 fn. 
47.
142 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 49-50.
143 For a comparison of the revenue from these farms during the Fourth Reign see Wilson, ‘State and 
Society’, pp. 995-6.
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Animal fights, and the obligatory betting, were immensely popular with men 
throughout the country: perhaps none more so than cockfighting, the quintessential 
pastime of the Siamese cultivator (see Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3: Temple mural of a cockfight (Source: Pairote Samosom, E-sani Mural 
Paintings, Bangkok: E-sam Cultural Center, IChon IChaen University, 1989, p. 236)
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During his sojourn in the northeast in the 1880s, Etienne Aymonier spent some time 
observing how cockfights were conducted. Fights were held everyday; the day he 
arrived there were about ten spectators, who bet more than ten baht in total, and the 
local tax farmer, waiting to collect his commission.144 Considering the popularity of 
cockfighting in the entire South East Asian realm, Anthony Reid suggests this was 
due to ‘the close identification of the rooster with the male ego.’145 Cockfighting and 
the associated wagers thereby performed the function of a status signifier. He 
concludes:
The apparently frenzied betting was motivated not so much by the hope of big 
winning as by identification with the kin group, faction, or village of the 
cock’s owner. The cockfight was therefore a vivid dramatization both of the 
solidarity of the vertically organized group and of the hostilities generated in 
its endless status competition with other groups.146
Bullfighting was unique to the south: two bulls were set upon each other, butting and
shoving until one was driven off (see Figure 1.4).147 Another curiosity for the
Westerner was the Siamese fighting fish (see Figure 1.5).148 Other such contests
involved rams, buffalo, birds and even crickets.
144 Etienne Aymonier, Isan Travels: Northeast Thailand’s Economy in 1883-1884, trans. Walter E. J. 
Tips, Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000 [1895, 1897], p. 173
145 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age o f Commerce, 1450-1680. Volume One: The Lands Below 
the Winds, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, p. 193.
146 Ibid., p. 194.
!47 For a detailed description of a bullfight see W. A. Graham, Kelantan, A State o f the Malay 
Peninsula: A Handbook o f Infomiation, Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1908, pp. 118-20.
148 Ernest Young, Peeps At Many Lands: Siam (2nd ed. revised W. A. Graham), London: A & C Black, 
1927, p. 23; Bock, Temples and Elephants, p. 35.
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Figure 1.4: A bull fight (Source: Graham, Kelantan, facing p. 118)
Figure 1.5: Placing bets on Siamese fighting-fish (Source: Young, Kingdom o f the 
Yellow' Robe, p. 151)
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People would gamble on anything given the opportunity. While in Chiang 
Mai in the early 1880s, Carl Bock witnessed a trial by water, held to resolve a dispute 
between two officials over the ownership of some slaves. Two men were chosen to 
represent the disputants; whoever remained under water the longest would be the 
winner. Predictably, there was much betting amongst the spectators who lined the 
riverbank.l4l, Even an activity as innocuous as kite-flying provided opportunities for 
gambling, with people betting on the outcome of dogfights (see Figure 1.6).150 This 
was a Bangkok phenomenon: from the 1890s onwards, contests were held on the 
Sanam Luang field near the Grand Palace. These attracted large numbers of people, 
including the aristocracy, and the sport enjoyed the patronage of the king.151
Figure 1.6: Temple mural of a kite-flying contest (Source: Pairote, E-sarn Mural 
Paintings, p. 234-5)
149 Bock, Temples and Elephants, pp. 233-6.
150 For descriptions of these kite-flying contests see Mr. and Mrs. Emile Jottrand, In Siam: The Diary 
o f  A Legal Adviser to King Chulalongkom’s Government, trans. Walter E. J. Tips, Bangkok: White 
Lotus, 1996 [1905], pp. 139-41; Young, Kingdom o f the Yellow Rohe, pp. 150-3; Wright and 
Breakspear (eds). Twentieth Century Impressions, pp. 236-7.
151 Sombat Plainoi, Sorties into Thai Cultural History, Bangkok: Ministry of Education, 1982, pp. 36- 
7.
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Playing cards, and the games played with them, were apparently introduced 
into Siam from China during the Third Reign. These cards were modified to suit the 
Siamese and became known as phai phong thai or phai tong. A pack consisted of 120 
cards numbered one to 10 and divided into three suits -  people, birds, and vegetables
I ^ 2
-  with four of each number (see Figure 1.7 for some examples). Cards became a 
favourite pastime and a factory for producing them was established in Bangkok (see 
Figure 1.8).153 With the opening of the country to Western trade from the 1850s came 
Western cards and games. Collectively these were called phai pok, the second word 
probably being derived from the word poker.154
Figure 1.7: Chinese and Thai playing cards (Source: Anek, Phai phong thai, p. 18)
152 Anek Bunyaphakdi. Phai phong thai [Thai Card Games], Bangkok: Cremation Volume, 1967, pp. 
12-13.
153 BTWM, 25 Oct. 1913.
154 Anek, [Card Games], pp. 11-12.
71
Figure 1.8: Siamese men and women playing cards (Source: Baker and Pasuk, 
Thailand, p. 100)
Bets were also placed on board games such as duat, which was similar to 
backgammon and played with dice and cowries (see Figure 1.9), dice games, such as 
hi-lo (see Figure 1.10), and games using dominoes, such as to tern. At the assorted 
festivals and fairs that punctuated the year there were a number of other gambling 
games, such as mai mun (a Siamese version of roulette) and nam tao (matching 
pictures on dice with those on a board). As the following chapters will show, new 
games were constantly springing up, while others fell out of fashion. In the first two 
decades of the Fifth Reign, for instance, the Chinese introduced the game huai chap 
yiki (twelve-letter lottery). Gambling house farmers asked that it be included in their 
monopoly but Chulalongkom refused and the game was prohibited.1^5
155 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 18; PKPS, 11, pp. 180-1.
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Figure 1.9: Siamese men playing a game with cowries (Source: Foumereau, Lucien, 
Bangkok in 1892, trans. Walter E. J. Tips, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998 [1894], 
backcover)
Figure 1.10: Temple mural of a Chinese man hosting a game of hi-lo (Source: 
Preecha Kanchanakom, Sinchai Krabuansaeng, Marut Amranondha and Kamol 
Chayawatana, Dhonburi Mural Painting, Bangkok: The Society for the Conservation 
of National Art Treasures and Environment, 1980, p. 69)
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Figure 1.11: Temple mural of a Chinese man hosting a game of three-stick trick 
(Source: Preecha et al., Dhonburi Mural Paintings, p. 68)
The Players
Every section of Siamese society gambled: from princes to slaves, Chinese merchants 
to coolies, government officials to farmers, and monks to children. Indeed, for 
Western contemporaries, it was the Siamese vice.156 Given their imperial or 
proselytising ambitions, they may have had reason for exaggeration but there is 
compelling evidence that gambling was a feature of daily life. Its ubiquity is most 
graphically represented by the numerous depictions of people gambling in temple 
murals (see Figures 1.10 and 1.11 for instance). The size of state gambling revenue is
156 See for instance Siam Repository, 1874, p. 413; Smyth, Five Years, II, p. 255; J. G. I). Campbell, 
Siam in the Twentieth Century: Being the Experiences and Impressions o f a British Official, London: 
Edward Arnold, 1902, p. 148; P. A. Thompson, Lotus Land: Being an Account o f the Country o f Siam 
and the People o f  Southern Siam, London: T. Werner Laurie, 1906, p. 65.
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also a strong indicator. This section will focus on gambling by the aristocracy and by 
children. The involvement of monks will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Numerous Western sources from the first half of the nineteenth century 
commented on the Siamese elite’s penchant for gambling, even Rama III was said to 
gamble by proxy.157 The clearest indication of the extent of this passion, however, is 
the various prohibitions on gambling by state officials and royalty. Rama I, for 
instance, forbade all officials from playing thua po (len bia): offenders were to be 
whipped 90 times, reduced to the status of a commoner (phrai), and tattooed upon 
their forehead.158 Mongkut, meanwhile, attempted to prohibit gambling within the 
royal palace after there had been a serious theft, motivated by gambling debts.159 
Kanchana highlights how the nobility were the first to take part in new games that
1 / A
then filtered down to the rest of society. Indeed, the palace was the conduit for 
many innovations; Rama III was apparently the first to play cards.161 What is 
interesting is how the various residents of different status gambled together in the 
royal palaces.162 In 1893, for instance, two concubines of the king {chao chom) were 
found playing thua with four household slaves in the Bang Pa-In palace. One of the 
concubines justified their behaviour by explaining that since the slaves often sneaked 
out to gamble during the night, it was preferable to let them gamble within the 
palace.163 Furthermore, while Damrong claims the aristocracy were unlikely to show 
their faces in the gambling houses, they did on occasion.164 During the Fourth Reign, 
for example, one minor prince lost 260 baht on po over the course of two visits to a
157 Terwiel, Travellers’ Eyes, pp. 214-15. See also Frederick Arthur Neale, Narrative o f  a Residence in 
Siam, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996 [1852], pp. 143-4.
158 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 13.
159 PKPS, 5, pp. 65-71; Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 84-5.
160 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 104.
161 BTWM, 25 Oct. 1913.
162 King Chulalongkom, Phithi songltran [Songkran ceremonies], Bangkok: Cremation Volume for 
Bamrung Sisombun, 1978, p. 93.
163 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/6, ‘Chaiyan to Chulalongkom, 25 Oct. 1893’.
164 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 90.
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den.165 This suggests that gambling had the power to cut across the hierarchies within 
Siamese society. In other words, everybody, from the highest to the lowest, gambled 
and, on occasion, they did so together.
Western observers often commented on how the gambling passion was 
instilled in the Siamese from a young age.166 There were many opportunities to learn 
the mechanics of gambling. Children could commonly be seen playing yot lum -  a 
game similar to marbles played with coins that also doubled as the stakes -  in the 
streets.167 Parents often visited the gambling houses with their children in tow: ‘it is 
no uncommon thing to see little creatures of seven or eight years old... joining, with 
all the zest imaginable, in “backing” the luck of older gamblers.’168 More sinisterly, 
unscrupulous characters cheated children out of their cash and jewellery by using card 
tricks and such like.169 In short, children grew up in an environment where gambling 
was pervasive and their participation in it encouraged. Chulalongkom realised, 
therefore, that to wean people off gambling he would have to start with the young. In 
the mid-1870s, three acts were passed with this purpose in mind. Under the first, 
adults were prohibited from playing games such as three-stick trick (mai sam an) with 
children; offenders were to be whipped 30 times and fined. Additionally, gambling 
house managers were instructed to stop fifteen year-olds and under from playing thua 
po . Finally, parents were to prevent children from playing a range of games that 
might lead to more hardcore forms of gambling.170 The two subsequent acts 
prohibited further games.171 This underlines a key dynamic in the legislative process:
165 Wilson, ‘State and Society’, p. 503.
166 Hallett, Thousand Miles, p. 237; BTWM, 9 July 1904.
167 Thompson, Lotus Land, p. 203; Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 140.
168 Bock, Temples and Elephants, p. 131.
169 PKPS, 9, pp. 204-5; Tips, Crime and Punishment, p. 165.
170 PKPS, 8, pp. 207-11.
171 PKPS, 8, pp. 224-5; PKPS, 9, pp. 204-6.
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the forms of gambling in Siam were constantly evolving as a response to legislation, 
thereby necessitating further legislation.
If the country suffered from a gambling mania, as Westerners and the Siamese 
elite both claimed, then how can it be explained? The attraction of certain games has 
already been mentioned but it is worthwhile considering some more general reasons. 
Unfortunately, there are, to the best of my knowledge, no anthropological studies of 
gambling in a Thai context; the following discussion will thus be based on the 
observations of contemporaries and studies on the psychology of gambling in 
different cultures. Damrong recognised that there were two reasons as to why people 
gambled: for money and for fun (sanuk), of which he believed the latter to be the 
more important.172 This was also the view of Westerner visitors: Tn the gambling- 
houses of this phlegmatic people neither party -  the banker nor those that play -  seem 
to care a whit whether they win or lose; only let them enjoy their excitement, and that 
seems to satisfy even the unfortunate.’173 Another explained the average coolie’s 
propensity to gamble away all his pay as follows: Tt is his form of amusement and he 
never contemplates the possibility of making any money by it.’174 Kanchana also 
emphasises this leisure aspect, arguing that as a largely agrarian society, the majority 
of the population had large amounts of free-time, some four to seven months a year, 
between harvesting and planting; free-time that would be spent gambling.175 
Gambling, with all its risks and thrills, is thus portrayed as an escape from the 
humdrum realities and hardships of everyday life. But, while no doubt true, this is a
172 NA R.5 M .2.11/12, ‘Report on meeting of provincial governors, 16 Sept. 1905’.
173 Maxwell Sommerville, Siam On the Meincim: From the Gulf to Ayuthia, Bangkok: White Lotus, 
1985 [1897], pp. 87-8.
174 Thompson, Lotus Land, p. 65.
175 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 31-2.
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conventional explanation for the appeal of gambling in many cultural settings;176 it 
does little to illuminate the specifics of Siamese/Thai gambling.
Gambling in Siam had an important social function. It was an integral part of 
the various ceremonies and festivals that measured the rhythm of life. For instance, 
permission might be sought from the tax fanner for thua po  to he played at a child’s 
top-knot shaving ceremony.177 Moreover, the only times people were allowed to 
gamble freely without the pennission of the tax farmer were during the Chinese New
1 nQ
Year, the Siamese New Year and Songkran. These were occasions when taboos 
were lifted and license given for indulgence. This social dimension is one aspect that 
Ellen Oxfeld Basu emphasises in her study of gambling and entrepreneurship
179amongst the overseas Hakka Chinese community in Calcutta. Her study offers 
other observations that, in addition to being pertinent to the Chinese in Siam, may 
also give some insight into Siamese gambling. Status and hierarchy are important 
facets of both cultures; gambling is a means of confirming and, occasionally, 
overcoming them. First, high-stakes gambling is a form of conspicuous consumption: 
it enables the well-off to display their wealth and confirm their status by showing 
indifference to large-scale gambling losses. Moreover, gambling, as a contest, 
provides opportunities for displays of character; to show how one acts when faced 
with loss.180 Within Thai society a great premium is placed on remaining cool-headed 
(chai yen) when under pressure, gambling is a way of illustrating this characteristic. 
In other words, one may lose large amounts of money through gambling but gain
176 Munting, Economic and Social Histoiy, pp. 189-90.
177 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 21.
178 Bangkok Calendar, 1873, p. 67. Damrong dates this dispensation back to the reign of King Taksin 
(1767-1782), attributing it as a morale raising measure during those years of conflict, [Abolition], pp. 
12-13.
179 Ellen Oxfeld Basu, ‘Profit, Loss, and Fate: The Entrepreneurial Ethic and the Practice of Gambling 
in an Overseas Chinese Community’, Modern China, 17, 2 (April 1991), pp. 244-6.
180 Ibid, pp. 251-4.
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prestige and respect in return. Lastly, luck recognises no social hierarchy. In the case 
of the two royal concubines gambling with their slaves mentioned earlier, those 
slaves had as good a chance of winning at thua as their more illustrious hosts. 
Perhaps part of gambling’s appeal was that it offered an escape from the rules of a 
highly stratified society, a chance for people of different status to interact with each 
other, albeit briefly, as equals.
One major difference between Siamese and Chinese, however, is their attitude 
towards money. Within Siamese society, there was much less emphasis on capital 
accumulation, with status being detennined by birth and ability, martial or 
ecclesiastical. So long as one had enough for the basic welfare, why save? There were 
other factors that militated against the Siamese cultivator saving. First, there was a 
lack of banking facilities meaning that come the end of the harvest season, they had 
money in their pockets but nowhere to keep it safely, besides burying it.181 Second, 
their income was intermittent and came in large chunks, principally, once the 
cultivator had sold their crop. In his study of working-class gambling in Britain 
around the turn of the twentieth century, R. McKibbin notes that it was an irregularity 
of income, combined with other factors, to create ‘a rhythm of debt and credit of
1 89which gambling was to become an intrinsic part.’ Under these circumstances, he 
argues that betting by the working-class can be seen as a ‘rational’ activity.183 An 
irregular income may thus have encouraged gambling among Siamese farmers. 
Lastly, some commentators have noted that the Thai tendency to live for the moment 
rather than invest for the future makes them more predisposed towards gambling.184
181 Virginia Thompson, Thailand; The New Siam, New York: MacMillan, 1941, p. 694.
182 R. McKibbin, ‘Working-Class Gambling in Britain, 1880-1939’, Past and Present, 82 (Feb. 1979),
p. 161.
183 Ibid., pp. 161-3.
184 Robert Cooper and Nanthapa Cooper, Culture Shock! Thailand: A Survival Guide to Customs and 
Etiquette, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2005, p. 72.
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The Case Against Gambling
Although Chulalongkom’s predecessors recognised the harmful effects of gambling, 
little was done to restrict it.185 Such laws that did exist were primarily concerned with 
safeguarding the profitability of the gambling farms for the tax farmers, thereby 
ensuring the steady provision of revenue to the state. The first two Chakri monarchs 
prohibited a number of games, including cockfighting, on the grounds that they were 
cruel to animals, against Buddhist precepts, and a cause of arguments and fraud. Of 
greater importance, though, was the fact that these games were so popular, 
cockfighting especially, that they were drawing people away from the gambling 
houses, resulting in a drop in revenue. Certain games were forbidden, therefore, so 
that the dens might prosper.186 In short, the underlying rationale for the restriction of 
these games was financial. However, the Siamese state lacked the administrative 
apparatus to make such a ban effective; the Catholic missionary Bishop Pallegoix, 
who travelled widely throughout the kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, notes
* 187that the prohibition on cockfighting was ignored. Conversely, Mongkut’s decision 
to allow tax farms on these other forms of gambling stemmed from the realisation 
that it was better to regulate gambling, and thereby derive some revenue from it, than 
to impose unenforceable laws.188 Financial necessity was thus a reason both for the 
restriction of gambling and for its promotion by the state. As the following chapters 
will show, this tension was a feature of government policy on gambling for many 
years to come. The difficulties of enforcement were also to remain a critical 
determinant in policy.
185 Apparently, Mongkut first suggested abolishing the gambling farms in 1859/60 but his proposal 
received no support from his ministers. Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 116.
186 Ibid., pp. 27-8.
187 Jean-Baptiste Pallegoix, Description o f the Thai Kingdom o f Siam, trans. Walter E. J. Tips, 
Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000 [1854], p. 123.
188 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 49-50.
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Chulalongkom was the first king to be in a position to seriously attempt to 
restrict gambling. His extensive administrative reforms of the Siamese state during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century and early twentieth established an 
unprecedented degree of control over what is present-day Thailand, with power 
centralised in Bangkok. A number of reasons for the restriction of gambling have 
already been considered but these have tended to focus on its associations with the 
Chinese and the structural problems of the tax fanning system rather than the 
undesirability of gambling itself. These other arguments against gambling will be 
discussed in the following chapters but here it is worth examining their general thrust. 
Throughout the period covered by this study, the Siamese elite referred to gambling 
as ‘a corrosive vice’ (abaiyamuk) and, more commonly, ‘an evil thing’ (pen khong 
chua-rai) that led people into poverty and ‘utter ruin’ (khwam chip-hai).m  The 
metaphor of disease was also employed. For example, Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat 
(M. R. W. Sathan Sanitwong), a government minister during the last years of the 
Fifth Reign and throughout the Sixth, described gambling as ‘this cancer which is 
eating into our bones’.190 Similarly, when Damrong assessed whether the gambling 
houses or the huai was more harmful, he compared the speed with which the two 
drove people into poverty: ‘a loser in the gambling den was like a cholera patient, 
while the lottery addict was a tuberculosis patient. Of course, both were bound to die, 
but one at a slower rate than the other.’191 This disease had infected the Siamese 
people, corrupting their morals and behaviour.192 As Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat 
put it, the Siamese cultivator suffered from ‘the general thriftlessness, uneconomical
189 See for instance PKPS, 11, p. 180 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Explanation of how to play tomsuk as played 
by people in inonthon Udon, 3 May 191T; NA R.6 N.11.5.Ch/17, ‘Ministry o f the Interior 
consultation on Class 2 gambling’.
190 NA R.6 KS.1/4, ‘Memorandum on our Domestic Economy, 7 Dec. 1910’.
191 Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 90-1.
192 Ibid., p. 90; NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Prince Boriphat to King Prajadhipok, 8 Aug. 1928’.
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habits, and the lack of sufficient energy in their work. All of which has been mostly 
brought about by long years of the gambling habit which is ingrained in their 
bones.’193
The symptoms of this gambling disease were poverty, debt slavery, and crime. 
With regard to the last of these, it was not only the gambling houses that nurtured 
criminal activity. Both the Siamese elite and Western residents considered gambling 
in general to be a prime cause of robbery, theft, banditry, plunder, and murder.194 A 
few examples will illustrate this point. In 1907, for instance, there was an outbreak of 
banditry in the Central Plain. Damrong attributed this to migrant Lao farmhands and 
coolies who had gambled away all their savings and were unable to return home to 
the Northeast. With nowhere to live and no job, they had resorted to banditry.195 
Similarly, there was said to be an increase in crime after the three main holiday 
periods when free gambling was allowed.196 At a more personal level, an elderly 
resident of Bang Chan village recalled that as a young man in the 1920s he had once
i Q \n
stolen some paddy and sold it so as to get money for gambling. Besides turning to 
crime, it was widely believed that impoverished gamblers sold themselves and their 
families into slavery. In the 1890s, for instance, H. Warrington Smyth attributed ‘half
1 QO
the slavery ... to the reckless love of gambling’. Chulalongkom also made this 
connection in the 1874 proclamation on the restriction of slavery.199 In his thesis on
193 NA R.6 KS.1/4, ‘Memorandum on our Domestic Economy5.
194 See for instance NA R.5 N .8.1.216, ‘Special Report on Crime in the two Divisions o f the Suburbs 
with recommendations with a view to reduce Crime and improve the administration of Criminal Justice 
and Police, Lawson, 29 April 19025; NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Boriphat to Prajadhipok, 8 Aug. 19285; Jottrand, 
In Siam, p. 10. A judge in the British Consular Court thought nine-tenths o f the crime in Siam was 
attributable to gambling, though this was more likely to have been a hunch than a statistically-proven 
fact. BTWM, 9 July 1904.
195 NA R.5 N.6.2/963, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 5 March 1907’.
m  PKPS, 26, p. 286.
197 Lauriston Sharp and Lucien Hanks, Bang Chan: Social Histoiy o f a Rural Community in Thailand, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 138-9.
198 Smyth, Five Years, vol. II, p. 255.
199 Hallett, Thousand Miles, p. 238.
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Siamese agriculture, Prince Dilok described the causal link between gambling and 
slavery in detail:
According to old customs and traditions there were ... great feasts after the 
harvest time with gambling too and fanners often lost not only their cash 
money but also their farm-yard and all their possessions. Also, when fanners 
went with their crop on ships and boats to Bangkok and other great cities to 
sell it and they had completed their sales, they often went into gambling 
houses there and when they had lost their crops’ proceeds they took, devoid of 
means, a loan against debt-serfdom. Often, they also immediately gambled 
away this loan in the gambling houses and piled up their debts with a new 
loan which they could no longer pay with their home and farm. Numerous 
Siamese have become debt slaves through gambling.200
This assessment is supported by the testimony of some commoners. Following the
first decree restricting the buying and selling of slaves in 1874, some complained that
they were no longer able to sell their children in order to pay off gambling debts and
wondered when gambling might also be prohibited.201 At first glance, the Siamese
elite’s concern with gambling as a cause of slavery might be taken solely as a
humanitarian impulse but there was a deeper, underlying reason for the restriction of
both activities.
Western influence should not be underestimated. As contacts with the West 
increased and the British and French empires advanced across mainland South East 
Asia, the Siamese elite of Mongkut’s generation were exposed to, and absorbed, the
909Western conceptions of ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’. In this process, they came to 
perceive Siam as occupying a mid-point on a sliding scale of civilisational 
achievement, with the West at the high end and ‘barbarian’ peoples, such as the hill- 
tribes, at the other. Being civilised, or siwilai as it was transliterated into Thai, was
200 Dilok, Rural Economy, p. 36.
201 Chatchai Panananon, ‘Siamese “Slavery”: The Institution and its Abolition’, PhD dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 1982, p. 236. For examples of the connection between gambling and slavery 
see ibid., 76.
202 The following discussion is drawn from Thongchai Winichakul, ‘The Quest for “Siwilai”: A  
Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth- 
Century Siam’, Journal o f Asian Studies, 59, 3 (Aug. 2000), pp. 528-49; Scott Barme, Luang Wichit 
Wathakan and the Creation o f a Thai Identity, Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1993, 
pp. 18-21; Kullada, Rise and Decline, pp. 36-7.
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associated with Western practices and modes of conduct. Moreover, they were 
acutely aware of how the imperial powers used these concepts to justify colonial 
intervention. For Mongkut, therefore, it was imperative that the Siamese become 
more civilised. But, as Thongchai Winichakul argues, the ‘quest for siwilai’ was not 
just a defensive reaction but also an attempt ‘to attain and confirm the relative 
superiority of Siam; as the traditional imperial power in the region, Siam was anxious
90^about its position among modem nations.1 It was thus a strategy for preserving 
Siamese dignity and independence. In this context, ‘uncivilised’ practices such as 
polygamy and slavery came under intense scmtiny and criticism from some sections 
of the elite. As the following chapters will show, certain gambling games were also to 
be dubbed uncivilised.
The concept of siwilai also had strong connotations of material progress and 
economic development, with a society’s level of civilisation being determined by the 
nature of its economic system. The traditional manpower system came to be seen as 
backward and barbarian; trade and taxation were the economic basis of a modem, 
civilised state’s power.204 As Barme highlights: ‘Given this particular formulation, 
such developments as the expansion in commodity production and increased trade 
with the West represented Siam’s gradual progress along the path to civilization.’205 
In other words, being civilised meant integration into and production for the world 
economy. The quest for siwilai thus gave further justification for and impetus to the 
reduction of labour controls. It made the abolition of slavery an economic imperative 
for those sections of the elite, specifically the faction led by the Bunnag noble family, 
that stood to profit from increased participation in the world economy. Kullada
203 Thongchai, ‘Quest for “Siwilai”’, p. 529.
204 Kullada, Rise and Decline, p. 36.
205 Barme, Luang Wichit, pp. 20-1.
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206emphasises how restricting gambling was part of this attack on slavery. But, more 
fundamentally, it was a way of making Siamese cultivators more effective producers. 
Finally, the quest for siwilai led to a new awareness of the role of the state; it now had 
a central role in developing the country. However, the state was not only responsible 
for promoting trade, it was also responsible for stamping out bad habits such as
207gambling.
To sum up, just as the spread of gambling within Siam was a symptom of 
socio-economic changes in the first half of the nineteenth century, the move towards 
restriction was a symptom of further such changes in the second half. It was also a 
reflection of an ideological shift within the elite as they sought to accommodate 
Western norms and economic ambitions.
206 Kullada, Rise and Decline, pp. 46-7.
207 Ibid., p. 51.
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2
Government Gambling Policy and Legislation, 1887-1917
This chapter will chart the development and implementation of the Siamese 
government’s policy on gambling from the late 1880s until the abolition of the 
gambling house tax farms in 1917. It will pick up on the themes introduced in 
Chapter 1 -  the influence of Chinese entrepreneurs and the West, the quest for 
siwilai, the damaging socio-economic effects of gambling -  and determine their 
influence over the government’s restrictionist policy. The success of this policy will 
also be assessed.
Closure of the Gambling Houses
Between 1887 and 1917, all the gambling houses within the kingdom were gradually 
closed and the tax farms responsible for them abolished. It was a lengthy process 
because the revenue they provided was crucial to the state and alternative sources of 
income had to be found; closing all of them at once would have been financially 
disastrous. Nevertheless, this was the most significant part of the absolute monarchy’s 
attempt to restrict opportunities for legal gambling: the closure of the last dens in 
1917 marked the end of an institution that had been a feature of life in Siam for over 
150 years. This process has been detailed elsewhere but, for the purposes of this 
study, it is necessary to present an overview of it.1
Although Chulalongkom first raised the possibility of abolishing the gambling 
farms back in the early 1870s, it seems this was just a ploy to secure the support of 
the foimer regent, Somdet Chaophraya Si Suriyawong (Chuang Bunnag), for his early
1 Kanchana, [Government Policy], Ch. 4; Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 35-52; Brown, Ministry o f  
Finance, pp. 23-4, 88-92.
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fiscal reforms.2 Indeed, the gambling farms were some of the few tax farms under the 
direct control of the crown and, as Kullada notes, it was unlikely that the king was 
willing to give up such a key source of revenue at this time.3 It was not until the late 
1880s that Chulalongkom was in a sufficiently strong financial and political position 
to seriously contemplate closing the gambling houses. By this time, the key figures of 
the old order, Suriyawong included, had passed away and the king had appointed his 
brothers as heads of the great ministries of state. Under the stewardship of Prince 
Narathip Praphanphong, first the Finance Office and then the reformed Ministry of 
Finance had assumed control of all the kingdom’s tax farms. It was these institutions 
that were to administer the closure of the gambling houses.
This process can be divided into three phases. Bangkok was the focus of the 
first phase that took place between 1888 and 1893, during which the number of 
gambling houses within the capital was reduced from over 400 to 16. The first 
declaration of closures, issued by the Finance Office in 1887, made the reasons for 
this restrictionist policy explicit: the Siamese had become hopelessly addicted to the 
‘evil’ Chinese games of thua po , wasting both time and money that would be better 
invested in trade. Moreover, these games were compared unfavourably with 
traditional Siamese activities that involved betting, such as boat races and 
cockfighting. It was the Chinese and their games that had corrupted the Siamese. But 
just as the Chinese were blamed for the gambling problem, they were also used to 
justify the gradualist aspect to this policy: some dens were to remain open because 
closing all of them at once would anger the Chinese.4 The implication was that the 
Chinese were unable to give up their gambling habit but the Siamese could. No
2 For a detailed discussion of these initial reforms and their political context see Kullada, Rise and 
Decline, pp. 51-8.
3 Ibid., p. 58.
4 PKPS, 11, pp. 126-8.
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mention is made of the other reason for a gradual reduction in the number of dens, 
namely, that the government wished to see how limited closures would affect revenue 
from the gambling farms. By October 1890 at the latest, it is clear that the 
government had no intention of closing all the Bangkok establishments in the 
immediate future. In correspondence with the king, Narathip identified 16 as the 
optimum number and noted that their abolition would be impossible while there were 
no alternative revenue sources.5 Just as the Siamese population were ‘addicted’ to 
gambling, the Siamese state was addicted to gambling revenue. In the absence of an 
equally lucrative substitute, it was unable to go cold turkey.
These initial closures were just one aspect of government policy during this 
period. Comprehensive regulations for the dens, combining new and existing rules, 
were issued;6 these subjected the gambling house farmer and his operations to a 
greater degree of state scrutiny and control. The remaining 16 dens were transferred 
to permanent, state-owned premises that were then rented to the tax farmer.7 These 
were located away from the city’s major roads and waterways so as to discourage 
passers-by from entering.8 Furthermore, these were the only places where games of 
thua po could now be conducted, depriving the gambling farmer of the right to set 
these games up in the homes of private patrons. Other regulations included the fixing 
of opening hours from 7 am to 12 am and the requirement that police officers be 
stationed in every den to maintain order. The latter provision was not the only state 
encroachment on what had been the gambling farmer’s personal fiefdom; when
5NAR,5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/l, ‘Narathip to Chulalongkom, 5 Oct. 1890 & 15 Oct. 1891’.
6 One set o f regulations was issued in October 1891 and a further set in March 1893. For both sets see 
PKPS, 13, pp. 51-60,280-4.
7 Anuman describes a typical government-built den as ‘a large tile-roofed hall, without any ceiling and 
with cement walls. The front wall was lower in height and topped with an iron grill. Such a building 
normally had two or three entrances with pots of saladai [a cactus-like shrub] hanging in the doorway.5 
Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 143.
*PKPS, 13, p. 43.
arresting illegal gamblers he now had to be accompanied by either the district chief 
(nai amphoe) or the police, and he no longer had the power to whip or detain 
offenders. Perhaps the only part of these regulations that worked to the advantage of 
the tax farmer was the effective merger of the farm covering betting on animal fights 
and such like with the gambling house farms. This meant the gambling house farmer 
now had the right to collect license fees for the playing of these games and receive 
any fines from people convicted of playing them illegally. More than likely, however, 
this was merely official recognition of an already existing practice, namely, that the 
same tax farmer commonly held the monopolies on both categories of gambling.
These regulations had a dual purpose: to limit gambling and safeguard state 
revenue. As noted in Chapter 1, the dens were often targets for criminal activity, 
which led to a loss of custom, followed, invariably, by a petition from the tax farmer 
for a reduction in his payments to the state. But, while the stationing of police in the 
dens was meant to protect against this, it created further problems. Primarily, it 
placed a large additional burden upon an undermanned and overstretched police 
force. In the late 1890s, Jardine repeatedly asked for extra men to supervise the dens.9 
The shortage of police is also attested to by the gambling house farmers who 
requested more men, sometimes complaining that there were none assigned to their 
dens in the first place.10 Even if  there was a police presence it was no guarantee 
against fights or extortion. In at least one case, off-duty police caused trouble and 
their on-duty colleagues were reluctant to intervene and make arrests.11 There was 
also the issue of who should pay the wages of these police. With the support of Prince
9 NA R.5 N .8.1/142, ‘Jardine to Prince Naret Worarit, 13 Dec. 1897 & 8 July 1898’; RPAB 1898-99, 
pp. 9-10. In 1898/9, the total force was 2,101 men, policing a population that Jardine estimated at 
450,000.
10 NA R.5 N.42.11/16, ‘Alangkan to Phetchaphani, 15 Nov. 1897’; NA R.5 N.42.11/23, ‘Chin Hu to 
Finance Office, 26 Aug. 1899’.
11 NA R.5 N.42.11/15, ‘Chin Hoi to Finance Office, 4 June 1897’.
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Naret Worarit, Minister of Local Government from April 1892 to December 1907, 
Jardine took the view that since the alcohol and opium fanners paid all the costs of 
employing police to monitor and protect their operations, the gambling farmers 
should do so as well.12 On the other hand, Prince Mahit Rachaharithai, Minister of 
Finance from August 1896 to May 1906, believed that it was the government’s duty 
to maintain law Mid order, and thus its responsibility to provide police for free. Of 
course, he was also concerned how charging the gambling farmers for the police 
might impact on their payments to the state.13 In the end, the administrative side of 
government seems to have triumphed over the fiscal. Lawson noted that the increase 
in private guards, meaning police constables contracted out for private use, in 1901/2 
was partly due to the gambling farmers paying for the men in their establishments.14 
Nevertheless, the Bangkok force remained shorthanded and monitoring the dens was 
a drain on precious resources that might have been better spent elsewhere.
Although supposedly intended to reduce the amount of gambling in Bangkok, 
these initial closures and stricter regulation had a limited effect. After all, while some 
dens remained open, people would continue to gamble in them and, as Brown 
suggests, these establishments enjoyed a large increase in business.15 Turning to 
illegal gambling, meanwhile, there was a sharp increase in people playing thua po 
outside the gambling houses. To make matters worse, the relevant authorities — the 
gambling farmers, district officials, and police -  were turning a blind eye to 
infringements or even conspiring with illicit gamblers. Narathip attributed this 
negligence and complicity to the lack of incentive: since there were no stipulated 
rewards for informing on or arresting offenders, no-one was willing to come forward
l2RPAB 1898-99,p.9.
13 NA R.5 N .8.1/142, ‘Mahit to Naret, 7 April 1898’.
14 RPAB Year 120 [1901/2], p. 9.
15 Brown, Ministry o f Finance, p. 23.
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with information or do their duty rigorously. For the Minister of Finance, this attitude 
undermined the very basis of state authority and could not be allowed to continue.16 
His solution was to issue a declaration prescribing heavy fines for various forms of 
illegal gambling and offering substantial rewards for information that led to a 
conviction.17
For the tax farmers, increased custom at the dens meant greater potential 
profits. This would have led to greater competition at the auctions and, consequently, 
higher bids. When combined with stricter regulation, this would then have lessened 
the tax farmers’ margin for error, making the operation of a gambling house an 
increasingly risky affair.18 In the long term, this led to potential tax farmers being 
priced out of the market, making it more and more difficult for the Ministry of 
Finance to find individuals with sufficient capital to take on a gambling farm.19 Those 
that did manage to secure one of the monopolies, however, would have found their 
economic power considerably enhanced as their rivals were eliminated and the 
government’s dependence on them magnified. Picking up on the argument in Chapter 
1, it is difficult to see how these initial closures were part of an attack upon Chinese 
capital since they effectively strengthened the positions of the most powerful tax 
farmers.
Of course, the real winner was clearly the state. Although there are no figures 
for the revenue from the gambling house farms before 1892, it appears that the state’s 
income was not affected adversely.20 More significantly, between 1892/3 and 1896/7 
when there were no further closures or significant changes to the gambling farm 
system, gambling house revenue rose by over a third, from 1.832 million baht to
16NAR.5 N.11.3.K/1, ‘Narathip to Chulalongkom, 11 April 1890’.
17 PKPS, 12, pp. 113-15.
18 This was true of tax farming in general. See Butcher, ‘Revenue Farming’, p. 34.
19 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 99-100.
20 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/l, ‘Narathip to Chulalongkom, 15 Oct. 1891’.
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2.948 million.21 Rather than see this first phase of closures as a measure to restrict 
gambling, it is more instructive to view it as an attempt to maximise the revenue from 
a chaotic and unwieldy system. Closing most of the dens in Bangkok was a quick and 
effective way of rationalising it. The success of this policy swelled the state’s income 
and enabled Chulalongkom to implement cmcial administrative reforms during the 
1890s that secured his political hegemony and his kingdom’s independence. 
However, as state revenue and expenditure expanded in tandem, gambling house 
revenue became indispensable. Finding an adequate replacement thus became the 
primary factor in determining the pace of further closures.
It seems that the absolute monarchy wished to implement the same policy in 
the provinces but this had to wait for a number of reasons. First, it lacked the 
administrative apparatus to put its will into practice. It was not until 1893 that 
Damrong began to implement the thesaphiban system of administration throughout 
the kingdom, gradually bringing the provinces under direct Bangkok control. Under 
this system, provinces were grouped together into administrative units called 
monthon, each of which was supervised by a Bangkok appointed commissioner (see 
Map 2.1 for the division of monthons in Siam in 1907/8). Second, Narathip resigned 
as Minister of Finance in March 1893 following allegations of embezzlement. Third, 
during 1893 Siam was drawn into a confrontation with France, culminating in the 
Paknam crisis, that threatened the continued independence of the kingdom. Although 
disaster was averted, this incident shook the Siamese elite to its very core. 
Chulalongkom fell seriously ill and in his absence the government ceased to function 
effectively. Fourth, under the leadership of Prince Narit and then Prince Sirithat, the 
Ministry of Finance was too busy trying to establish budgetary controls over the other
21 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 150.
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ministries to contemplate closing any more of the gambling houses. But, following 
the appointment of Prince Mahit as Minister of Finance in August 1896, the ministry 
was able to establish greater control over government expenditure and thoughts 
returned to the gambling farms.
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The second phase began in 1898 with the closure of all the gambling houses 
in monthons Nakhon Si Thammarat and Chumphon in the south and another 46 dens 
in the rest of the country.22 The remaining dens were now subject to the same bidding 
procedure and regulations as those in the capital.23 Between 1899 and 1903, a further
2476 establishments were closed in the provinces. The creation of monthon Krungthep 
in the late 1890s, which incorporated the surrounding townships of Samut Prakan, 
Pathum Thani, and Nakhon Khuan Khan (Phra Pradaeng) into the administrative area 
of the capital, temporarily swelled the number of dens within the Bangkok area. But 
by 1903 the number had been reduced to 16 once more and these were mostly 
concentrated in the capital itself. As with the first phase, the Minister of Finance 
was working on the principle that fewer gambling house farms would mean greater 
competition amongst the tax farmer and higher bids for the remaining monopolies. 
Increased auction prices would thus offset the revenue losses incurred by closure.26 
Indeed, this policy actually led to a substantial increase in government income. 
Revenue from the gambling house farms rose from 2.948 million baht in 1896/7 to 
5.244 in 1900/1. Combined with the revenue from the huai lottery, gambling was 
providing the state with around one-fifth of its total income.27 Yet Mahit was well 
aware that this balancing act could not be maintained indefinitely; sooner or later a 
tipping point would be reached whereby there would not be enough gambling houses, 
whatever their auction price, to cover the shortfall from further closures.28 As a result,
22 PKPS, 16, pp. 288-91.
23 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 125; Damrong, [Abolition], p. 47.
24 For details o f these closures see PKPS, 16, pp. 475-9; NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/12, ‘Mahit to 
Chulalongkom, 21 Dec. 1899’; NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/15, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 13 Dec. 1900’; NA  
R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 9 Dec. 1901 & 12 Dec. 1902k
25 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 46; Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 148.
26 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/8, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 11 May 1898’; NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/10, ‘Mahit to 
Chulalongkom, 27 Nov. 1898k
27 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 163.
28 Brown, Ministry o f Finance, p. 89.
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from 1899 onwards, he began to apply the brakes on provincial closures, which were 
brought to a brief halt in 1904.29 With the exception of the year 1902/3, gambling 
house revenue remained at over 5 million baht a year during the first half of the 
1900s, peaking at 6,87 million baht in 1904/5.30
This policy of gradual closures was not without its reversals, however. In 
April 1902, an act sanctioning the re-opening of dens in monthons Nakhon Si 
Thammarat and Chumphon was issued.31 The closure of all the dens within these 
areas four years previously had caused problems amongst the Chinese workforce 
employed in the South’s tin mines. Gambling was one of their few means of 
recreation; with this outlet removed they were reluctant to work and some moved 
away from the area, resulting in a labour shortage.32 To resolve this situation, tax 
farmers were allowed to re-establish dens exclusively for adult Chinese males in 
districts with a large concentration of Chinese. Presumably this meant these dens 
were confined to the kongsi mining settlements. All gaming establishments within 
monthon Phuket were also subject to these new restrictions. As in the past, the 
government promoted gambling in order to accommodate the Chinese. Nevertheless, 
this was only a temporary concession; the local authorities hoped that, by the time 
these dens were to be closed once more, the miners might have taken up some new 
games.33
Commenting on this second phase of closures, Brown observes that there is 
little evidence it had any impact in reducing the amount of legal gambling and indeed
29 In 1899 and 1900, for instance, Mahit objected to the proposed number o f den closures put forward 
at the annual meetings of the provincial governors and ensured that a more conservative number were 
closed. By the latter year, he was also calling for closures to be postponed to give time to consider the 
best way o f proceeding and find alternative revenue sources. NA R.5 Kh,14,l.Kh/12, ‘Mahit to 
Chulalongkom, 21 Dec. 1899’; NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/15, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 13 Dec. 1900*.
30 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 150.
31 PKPS, 18, pp. 348-9.
32 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/22, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 5 April 1902’; Damrong, [Abolition], p. 49; 
Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 143.
33 Damrong, [Abolition], p. 49.
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suggests the high level of Chinese immigration would have meant an increase.34 This 
requires some qualification, though. In areas such as monthon Ayutthaya where there 
was a high concentration of gambling houses, it seems unlikely that the level of legal 
gambling dropped for, as in Bangkok, people could have transferred their custom to 
one of the remaining dens.35 But in areas such as monthon Nakhon Ratchasima where 
there were relatively few dens to begin with, the closure of a local gambling house 
would have deprived the people of an outlet for legal gambling.36 These observations 
are based on a report in December 1903 by the governor of monthon Nakhon Si 
Thammarat. In the past, this region had been wracked by crime, poverty and debt 
slavery but following the abolition of gambling there had been a marked 
improvement, along with a concomitant increase in local trade. Although there had 
been many cases of illegal gambling around the town of Songkhla, this was 
considered normal in the wake of closures and was expected to diminish over time. 
The report went on to contrast the situation in monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, where 
all the dens -  except those for Chinese miners -  had been closed, with that around the 
towns of Suphanburi and Nakhon Chaisi in the Central Plain, where gambling houses 
still remained.37 Wherever there was a den in these latter areas, large groups of people 
gathered and the inhabitants of these areas lived in poverty. Even those who lived far 
from the towns could not escape the pull of the dens; when they came into town to 
sell their rice they invariably returned home penniless.38 In short, the impact of this 
second phase of closures on legal gambling varied considerably between regions:
34 Brown, Ministry o f  Finance, p. 89.
35 There were still 27 dens in monthon Ayutthaya in 1904, 11 of which were in Ayutthaya province. 
NAR.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 7 Jan. 1905-T otal remaining dens in 1904/5’.
36 Pre-1898, there were just 11 dens in monthon Nakhon Ratchasima and only one remained by 1904. 
Ibid.
37 There were five dens in Nakhon Chaisi town and three in Suphanburi. Ibid.
38 This report is discussed in NAR .5 Kh. 14.1. Kh/18, ‘Damrong to Sommot, 13 Feb. 1904’.
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gambling was restricted effectively only in those areas where all opportunity to 
gamble in the dens was removed.
The debate about opening hours for the gambling houses provides a good 
indication of the government’s priorities. Under the regulations issued in the early 
1890s, all establishments were supposed to close at midnight. This was widely 
ignored, however. When Lawson successfully prosecuted one proprietor for violating 
the regulations in 1902, two gambling farmers petitioned the Ministry of Finance for 
redress. With his eye firmly on the balance sheet, Mahit argued that the regulations 
were an unnecessary hindrance for the gambling farmers and did little to prevent 
excessive gambling.39 For his part, Lawson was adamant that those dens which 
remained open after midnight were hangouts for ‘thieves and other criminals’ and 
that, if the closing time was enforced, there would be less crime in the city.40 
Although the Minister of Local Government shared this view, the fiscal side of the 
government prevailed. An amendment to the regulations was issued that enabled the 
Minister of Finance to issue permits for extended opening hours to meet the 
entertainment needs of the public.41 Nevertheless, this remained a contentious issue 
right up until the last dens were closed in 1917. Lawson and other officers within the 
Bangkok force continued to insist that the increasing levels of crime were attributable 
to gambling houses being open around the clock 42 Mahit, meanwhile, maintained 
that the benefits of re-imposing closing times would be outweighed by the adverse 
impact on gambling revenue.43 In short, rising crime rates were the lesser of the two 
evils for the government.
39 NAR.5 N .42.11/31, ‘Mahit to Naret, 23 May 1902’.
40 NAR.5 N .42.11/31, ‘Lawson to Naret, 31 May 1902’.
^ PKPS, 18, p. 441.
42 NA R.5 N .8.1/306, ‘Lawson to Naret, 17 Jan. 1904, 9 Feb. 1905’; NA R.6 N.4.1/51, ‘Phraya 
Phirentharathibodi to Trotter, 29 June 1915’.
43 NA R.5 N .8.1/306, ‘Mahit to Naret, 31 Jan. 1905’.
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As already mentioned, closures came to a halt in 1904 as the government
paused to consider alternative ways of raising revenue to compensate for that lost
from the proposed complete abolition of the kingdom’s gambling houses. After over a
year of discussions, it was decided that the shortfall from closing the provincial dens
would be covered by raising the rate of land tax and the losses from abolishing the
capital’s establishments would be made good by a revision of the limits on the
country’s import duties.44 The third and final phase of closures started in early 1905
as the government initiated an ambitious three-year plan. In 1905/6, all dens where
the revenue derived was less than 50,000 baht would be closed. This included five
dens in monthon Bangkok. The following year, 1906/7, all remaining provincial dens
would be shut. Lastly, provided the negotiations with the treaty powers over revising
import duties were successful, the capital’s gambling dens would be closed in 1907/8.
The government issued a notification of its plans in advance and this document is
particularly revealing of its priorities. Firstly, it is very open about the importance of
gambling revenue for state finances but recognises that the disadvantages outweighed
the benefits. Secondly, it places great emphasis on how gambling is a barrier to
economic development; the moral arguments against it are secondary:
People expend in gambling not only their own wealth but the wealth of others. 
They devote to gambling time during which they should be attending to their 
work. Under present conditions, large sums of money which come into the 
hands of the gambling farmers are sent out of the Kingdom. Gambling is also 
responsible for much of the crime that is committed. The abolition of 
gambling would, therefore, not only result in an improvement in the morals of 
the people and in increased industry, but money expended therein would 
remain in circulation within the country thereby adding to the wealth of the 
community.45
44 Brown, Ministry o f  Finance, pp. 89-91.
45 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Notification by the Minister of Finance on the Abolition o f Gambling, 
124’. This notification was published in the Bangkok Times, 23 Feb. 1905. For a Thai-language 
version, see PKPS, 19, pp. 370-4.
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Thirdly, it makes no secret of the fact that the loss of revenue resulting from the first 
two years of closure will necessitate an increase in the rates of taxation and the 
introduction of new taxes. Finally, it sets a clear timetable for abolition: the last of the 
kingdom’s gambling houses will be closed in 1907/8, though dependent on the treaty 
powers agreeing to a revision of custom tariffs.
In assessing the purpose of this document and the aims of the Siamese 
government, it is worth considering who the target audience was. Most obviously, it 
was directed at the population of Siam. By carefully outlining the benefits of 
abolition alongside the price people will have to pay, it can be seen as an appeal for 
understanding. The closing of the provincial dens therefore becomes both a 
justification and a pretext for increasing direct taxation. In other words, it is all about 
increasing the power of the central state and reducing its dependence on tax fanning. 
It also gives the population ample warning of impending closure, thereby hopefully 
diffusing any discontent that sudden abolition might generate, among the Chinese in 
particular. Nevertheless, as Damrong’s comments at the Council of Ministers on 14 
January 1905 make clear, there was another intended audience, namely, the treaty 
powers.46 In making the government’s intentions so explicit, this document 
demonstrates to the West that the Siamese elite was determined to rid the country of 
gambling. Furthermore, by emphasising the potential benefits to the Siamese 
economy and, in turn, international trade, the government sought to use the Bangkok 
gambling houses as a lever to remove some of the provisions of the ‘unequal’ treaties 
and regain a degree of fiscal sovereignty. This was a win-win situation, for if  the 
foreign powers refused then the Siamese government would be absolved of 
responsibility for the continued existence of the dens, and the attendant crime, while
46 NAR.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Report of the Council o f Ministers, 14 Jan. 1905’.
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still being able to enjoy the revenue they provided. In other words, the government 
was saying that it had done all it could to restrict gambling and the final step, the 
abolition of the Bangkok dens, was out of its hands. Thus, it was appearing to use its 
essential weakness as a bargaining chip to increase its power. The Siamese approach 
does seem unduly optimistic, however. As long as the foreign powers continued to 
benefit from low customs duties, they were unlikely to agree to a rise. It is more 
instructive to view the Siamese government’s announcement as a symbolic act, 
designed to counter criticism, both at home and from overseas, about its reliance on 
gambling revenue.
The two-year closure of the provincial gambling houses went ahead as 
planned, leading to public celebrations throughout the country. These will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. It also attracted congratulations from some missionary 
organisations, with the US ambassador passing on the following message: ‘In taking 
this step the Government is bringing itself into line with the best reforms of modem 
Government and is doing what is not only right in itself but what is for the largest and 
most permanent interest of the Siamese people.’47 However, the Siamese government 
never entered formal negotiations with the treaty powers; the limit on import duties 
remained in place and, for the time being, so too did the Bangkok dens. As expected, 
gambling revenue dropped by about 3 million baht, from the high of 6.87 million in 
1904/5 to 3.6 million in 1906/7, but this was easily covered by the land tax
A Q
increases. The government temporarily shelved the idea of an immediate end to the 
capital’s gambling houses and reverted to gradual closures. Between 1909 and 1912, 
the Bangkok dens were whittled down from 11 to 5. As in the past, the revenue lost 
was offset by an increase in the auction price for the remaining dens. Thus, from
47 NA R.5 Kh. 14.1 .Kh/18, ‘Hamilton King to Devawongse, 20 April 1905’.
48 Brown, Ministry o f  Finance, p. 91.
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1906/7 until the final closures in 1917, gambling house revenue averaged around 3.3 
million baht a year.49
Closing all the provincial gambling houses had a number of effects. As 
Damrong observed at the meeting of provincial governors in September 1905, people 
would continue to gamble, legally or otherwise, and there was indeed a marked rise in
SOrequests for permits to play cards. There are also indications of an increase in 
people playing thua po illegally.51 Moreover, according to contemporary English- 
language newspapers, Bangkok became the gambling centre of Siam, with country 
folk descending upon the capital every holiday period to chance their luck.52 It was 
also feared that the city would be inundated with criminals from the provinces.53 
Crime statistics suggest that a crime wave did subsequently engulf Bangkok: the 
number of criminal cases before the capital’s courts rose from just under 9,000 per 
year in 1903/4 and 1904/5 to 10,147 in 1905/6, to 11,801 in 1906/7 and then to 
14,766 in 1907/8.54 Perhaps it is fortunate that the Bangkok dens did remain open, for 
as the Bangkok Times observed in 1910: ‘the nuisance of illegal gambling would have 
been very much greater than it is but for the continuance of the houses in Bangkok.’55 
Prince Chanthaburi, a son of Chulalongkom and Minister of Finance from 1908 to 
1923, later claimed that the provincial closures had been successful in curbing 
gambling.56 While this may have been true in the outlying regions of Siam, it seems 
overly optimistic for the provinces neighbouring Bangkok. People that wished to
49 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 150.
50 NA R.5 M.2.11/12, ‘Report on meeting o f provincial governors, 16 Sept. 1905’; NA R.5 M.2.11/11, 
‘Report on meeting o f provincial governors, 8 Sept. 1906’.
51 NAR.5 M .2.11/11, ‘Report on meeting o f provincial governors, 16 Sept. 19045.
52 BDM, 14 Feb. 1916; BT, 15 March 1916. See also Thompson, Thailand, p. 695.
53 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Report o f the Council of Ministers, 15 Dec. 1904’; RPAB [1904/5], p. 10.
54 These figures are taken from the Ministry o f  Justice Report 1903-04, p. 8; Ministry o f  Justice Report 
1904-05, p. 5; Ministiy o f  Justice Report 1905-06, p. 5; Ministry o f  Justice Report 1906-07, p. 14; 
Ministiy o f  Justice Report 1907-08, p. 10.
55 BTWM, 26 Feb. 1910.
56NAR .6 Kh.18/5, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 25 Feb. 1916’.
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gamble legally could, with a little effort, still do so. Lastly, increased custom in the 
Bangkok dens meant their auction prices soared and the shortage of tax farmers with
57 *the necessary capital became even more acute. In brief, the closure of the provincial 
gambling houses may merely have exacerbated the problems associated with the 
capital’s establishments and the relevant tax farms.
When the end came, it came quickly. In February 1916, Chanthaburi 
presented the king with a plan to abolish the huai lottery and the gambling houses 
within three years. This was to be done without the introduction of any new taxes or 
further attempts at renegotiating import duties but through the use of treasury reserves 
and economising in government expenditure.58 Treasury reserves had been 
strengthened by budget surpluses totalling nearly 20 million baht for the years 
1913/14 and 1914/15, and a part of these surpluses was to be used to cover the 
shortfall resulting from abolition.59 Natural increases in other sources of government 
revenue, combined with frugality on the part of all government ministries, would 
then, it was hoped, help state finances return to balance within five years. 
Chanthaburi concluded by likening the abolition of the huai and the dens to one of the 
most celebrated acts of Chulalongkom’s reign, namely, the abolition of slavery.60 
Vajiravudh approved of the scheme; the only change he requested was that all the 
dens be closed in 1917/18 to coincide with the festivities celebrating the completion 
of his third life-cycle.61 This suggests the Siamese elite considered abolition to be, in 
part, a question of image and prestige. Indeed, for Chanthaburi, stopping the 
government’s dependence on gambling revenue for its income, and the accompanying
57 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 100, 166.
58 NA R.6 Kh.18/5, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 25 Feb. 1916’.
59 RFAB 1916-17, p. 5. The year 1916/17 also saw another surplus o f over 7 million baht, further 
easing the state’s financial situation. RFAB 1917-18, p. 4.
60 NA R.6 Kh.18/5, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 25 Feb. 1916’.
61 NA K Kh.0301.3/5, ‘Vajiravudh to Chanthaburi, 10 Nov. 1916’.
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criticisms, seems to have been just as important as curtailing the population’s 
gambling addiction. On one occasion, for example, he commented that the 
termination of state-sponsored gambling ‘placed the administrative reputation of the
63country on a still higher plane.’ The comparison with the abolition of slavery is 
particularly revealing, indicating that the Siamese elite considered the closing of the 
last gambling houses as a mark of the kingdom’s progress, a step forward in the quest 
for siwilai. By renouncing gambling as a key component of state income, the Siamese 
government was showing the ‘civilised’ West that it was a responsible, enlightened 
administration. At a deeper, more subconscious level, the comparison recognises that, 
like the abolition of slavery, the closure of the gambling houses was part of the 
strategy for making Siam a more efficient and competitive producer for the world 
economy.
The last of Siam’s gambling houses were closed in April 1917.64 At the same 
time, the games of thua po were forbidden throughout the kingdom.65 Yet, for all the 
historic significance of abolition, its impact upon the overall level of gambling in 
Bangkok should not be overestimated. Firstly, the winning bids for the capital’s main 
den, that at Saphan Lek, had been falling since 1914/ 15, suggesting a decline in 
attendance.66 Although the prices of the other four had continued to rise, the Bangkok 
Times thought the increases for 1916/17 so slight -  given that the abolition of the huai 
lottery and the recent bumper rice crop would have suggested a good year for the 
dens -  that it raised the possibility that gambling was losing its hold on the Siamese.67
62 NA R.6 Kh.2/12, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, July 1917 & 30 March 1918’. The Financial Adviser, 
W. J. F. Williamson, also noted that the purpose of abolition was ‘to purge the administration of its 
connection with the old-established system o f State-licensed public gambling.’ RFAB 1917-18, p. 4.
63 NA K Kh.0301.3/5, ‘The Abolition o f Gambling (Communique by Ministry o f Finance)’.
64 RFAB 1917-18, p. 4.
65 PKPS, 29, p. 327. See also NA R.6 Kh.2/9, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 13 March 1917’.
66 NA R.6 Kh.18/5, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 27 March 1915 & 20 March 1916’.
67 BTWM, 21 March 1916.
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This seems somewhat optimistic. Chanthaburi attributed the decline in auction prices 
partly to the war in Europe and its impact upon the price of rice; people had less 
money and were thus gambling less.68 Nevertheless, these observations do suggest 
another explanation: that the popularity of the gambling house and the games played 
therein was waning as people turned to other games of chance. The government had 
announced its intention of closing all the dens over ten years earlier and the people of 
Bangkok had had plenty of time to accustom themselves to the fact that the dens’ 
days were numbered. Secondly, one might have expected a sharp increase in the 
number of people convicted of illegal gambling in the wake of closure. But this was 
not the case in Bangkok. Before abolition, the number of people convicted rose from 
534 in 1913/14 to 1,030 the following year and to 1,664 in 1915/16.69 After the 
abolition of the huai in April 1916 and the last dens in April 1917, the number fell to 
1,489 in 1917/18 and 1,089 in 1918/19.70 Over the next three years (1919/20 to 
1921/2), the number of people convicted stabilised at around 1,500 a year.71
As in the provinces, the new craze was cards. A year* after the last closures, 
Chanthaburi estimated that three times as many people in the capital had asked for 
card permits in 1917/18 as in 1916/17, leading him to conclude that the Siamese were
72still obsessed with gambling. Rather than reduce the level of gambling within the 
kingdom, the government’s policy of closing the gambling houses merely channelled 
people’s desire to gamble into other forms that remained legal or forced them to 
gamble illegally.
68 NA R.6 Kh.18/5, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 27 March 1915’.
69 S Y 1917, pp. 200-1.
70 SY 1920, pp. 220-1.
71 Ibid; SY 1924-25, pp. 250-1.
72 NA R.6 Kh.2/12, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 30 March 1918’.
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Abolition of the huai Lottery
The guiding principle of the government’s policy on the huai lottery was simply to 
keep it profitable for the tax farmer, thereby ensuring a steady stream of state 
revenue. As with the gambling houses, whenever the avowed aim of restricting 
gambling conflicted with the state’s financial imperatives, the latter won out. Lottery 
revenue rose steadily throughout this period, from just under 1 million baht a year in 
the early 1890s to well over 3 million during the 1910s.73 There were a number of 
factors behind this increase. First, as the administrative area of the capital expanded, 
so did the area covered by the lottery farm. By 1904, the tax fanner had established 
operations in most of the townships that comprised monthon Krungthep.74 Second, 
the extension of the rail network into the provinces adjoining Bangkok enabled 
people from outlying districts to come into the capital occasionally and place a stake 
on the huai.15 Third, the lottery farm profited from the closure of the provincial 
gambling houses as people sought different and still legal ways of trying their luck. 
Lastly, lottery revenue tended to reflect the population’s wealth. As the Financial 
Advisers observed on a couple of occasions, a good rice crop meant greater 
indulgence in gambling, larger profits for the tax farmer and more revenue for the 
state.76 The steady year-on-year growth can thus be seen, as it was by the Bangkok 
Times, as an indication of increasing prosperity.77 Nevertheless, the government was 
required to take some steps to safeguard the tax farmer’s monopoly and lottery 
revenue.
73 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 163. Lottery revenue peaked at 3.62 million baht in 1912/13.
74 During the nineteenth century, the huai was limited to Bangkok, Nonthaburi and Patlium Thani. 
From the start of the twentieth century, it was extended into the towns of Nakhon Kliuan Khan (Phra 
Pradaeng), Samut Prakan, Minburi and Thanyaburi. NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/19, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 
27 March 1902 & 24 March 1903’; Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 47, 168.
75 RFAB 1902-03, p. 4.
76 Ibid.; RFAB 1904-05, p. 7.
11BTWM, 21 March 1916.
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The most serious problem for the tax farmer was fraud, and this commonly 
took the form of either the inner district managers or the lottery clerks engaging in kin 
phoi, which literally means ‘eating the accounts’. Instead of submitting people’s 
stakes and records of them to the central lottery house, a manager or clerk would hold 
onto the money. When someone won, they would pay out the winnings from their 
own pocket; the loser’s stake would, naturally, remain there. By the start of the 
twentieth century, this practice was seriously affecting the lottery farmer’s profits. 
The problem was compounded by the fact that the farmer had recently been stripped 
of his power to arrest, fine and imprison employees, thereby removing the threat of 
punishment by the farmer himself. Moreover, even when the farmer was, with the 
assistance of the police, able to bring charges against fraudulent employees, the 
courts were unable to punish them heavily because existing gambling legislation did 
not cover kin phoi?* A law covering offences of this sort was thus issued in January 
1901; the penalty being a fine not exceeding 400 baht, a maximum prison sentence of
79six months or both.
Although the extension of the rail network into the provinces around Bangkok 
broadened the huaV s customer base, it had some drawbacks. Just as easily as the train 
could carry people into Bangkok to place a stake, it could carry news of the winning 
letter back to the provinces. People, mostly Chinese, were quick to take advantage of 
this, setting themselves up as unofficial lottery clerks in order to receive bets. 
Sometimes they worked illicitly for the district managers of the outlying areas. This 
not only opposed government attempts to restrict gambling but also affected lottery 
revenue as provincial people no longer had to travel to the capital to place a stake on 
the huai. In early 1902, Damrong therefore suggested that since it was impossible to
78 NA R.5 Kh,14.1,Kh/4, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 11 Jan. 1901’.
79 PKPS, 17, pp. 536-7.
106
suppress these underground clerks, the lottery farmer should be allowed to extend his 
operations into four neighbouring monthons: Ayutthaya, Nakhon Ratchasima, 
Nakhon Chaisi and Ratchaburi. In return, the government could expect a healthy 
increase in the amount the tax farmer paid for the monopoly.80 After lengthy 
discussions, it was decided to limit the extension to those districts through which 
railway lines passed. Starting in the year 1903/4, lottery operations were established 
in 11 sub-districts (tambon): four in Ayutthaya province, two in Saraburi, and five in 
Nakhon Chaisi.81 This was hardly the act of a government committed to restricting 
gambling.
The extension lasted only a year, however. Chin Tai Chin, the lottery farmer, 
was unhappy with restrictions on where he could set up lottery stands, which limited 
his potential profits.82 More importantly, local people had taken to the huai with a 
passion, with many running up debts, and it was feared this would lead to still greater 
poverty and crime. Underground lottery operations could not be curtailed so easily, 
though. A year after the extension had been terminated, the new lottery farmer 
complained to the Ministry of Finance about the existence of unauthorised clerks 
receiving stakes clandestinely once more. Takings on the huai had fallen as a result.84 
Although the government had not created this problem, it may have inadvertently 
made it worse.
The Siamese government tried a different approach to resolve the situation. In 
April 1905, a law was passed that prohibited all huai operations outside monthon 
Krungthep. Offenders were to be punished under the earlier 1901 act. Furthermore,
80 NA R.5 Kh.14.1 .Kh/19, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 29 April 1902 & 5 March 1903’. Mahit predicted 
an increase o f 3,000 chang (240,000 baht) at least.
81 NA R.5 Kh.14.1.Kh/19, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 29 May 1903’.
82 Ibid.
83 NAR.5 Kh.14.1.Kh/19, ‘Phraya Si Sahathep to Ministry of Finance, 19 Jan. 1904’.
84 NA R.5 Kh.14.1.Kh/19, ‘Mahit to Chulalongkom, 26 March 1905’.
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both the lottery farmer and public prosecutors were given investigative powers and 
the right to bring charges against suspects. This was necessary to prevent the farmer 
from using his associates or own employees to receive stakes in districts outside his 
jurisdiction.86 In other words, the government had recognised that the lottery farmer 
was part of the illegal gambling problem. Despite these measures, underground huai 
operations continued to thrive, even spreading to other regions through which railway 
lines passed such as monthon Prachinburi. In March 1910, Chanthaburi wrote to 
Chulalongkom commenting on the inadequacy of the existing legislation, specifically 
the fact that the penalties were relatively light and did not act as a sufficient 
deterrent.87 The 1905 law was subsequently replaced with a new one that not only 
detailed heavier penalties for illicit clerks -  fines were increased to between 500 and
4,000 baht with prison sentences ranging from six months to two years -  but also
o n
made it an offence to place a stake with these people. Obviously, this provision had 
little to do with the ‘immorality’ of gambling since betting on the huai was legal in 
Bangkok. It was only a crime when the lottery farmer and, by extension, the 
government did not receive their share of the proceeds. As with other types of 
gambling, lottery legislation arose out of the need to protect the tax farmer’s profits 
and state revenue.
But even this law was not enough to curb the popularity of the underground 
huai in the provinces, and successive lottery farmers continued to complain of its 
impact on their profits right until the lottery’s final years.89 Indeed, so great was the 
problem that there were further suggestions of extending the huai into the provinces,
85 PKPS, 20, pp. 26-8.
86 NA R.5 Kh.14.1.Kh/19, ‘Report o f Council o f Ministers, 30 March 1905’.
87N A R .5 M .l.3/20, ‘Chanthaburi to Chulalongkom, 10 March 1910’.
88 PKPS, 23, pp. 237-8.
89 NA R.6 Kh.18/5, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 27 March 1915’.
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and the government even considered administering the entire operation itself.90 Just 
months before the lottery was abolished, the Bangkok Daily Mail came out in favour 
of the former proposal. It argued that the increase in lottery revenue resulting from 
such an extension would offset the losses from closing the last of the gambling 
houses. It might also help to put more cash into circulation and ‘prevent the people 
from wasting their time and money in coming to the capital to gamble.’91 This 
underlines how the government had no definite timetable for abolishing the huai. As 
the situation got increasingly out of hand, the government was forced to do something 
sooner rather than later. When the opportunity did eventually arise, the government 
was quick to seize it.
The state’s inability to deal with illegal gambling on the huai was clearly a 
key factor in its abolition but there was another: the economic power of the Chinese 
community, their growing sense of identity and the rise of Chinese nationalism, and
Q9the threat this presented. In June 1910, Bangkok was plunged into chaos when 
Chinese workers went on a mass strike in protest against their increased tax burden 
following the imposition of the annual capitation tax. The strike was organised by the 
secret societies and its failure left this traditional community leadership discredited. It 
also left a marked impression upon Vajiravudh, who came to the throne in October 
that year, and later wrote an anti-Chinese tract entitled The Jews o f the East.92 
Unsurprisingly, these sentiments had a direct bearing on the government’s attitude 
towards the Chinese plutocrats that dominated the tax farming system. Kanchana 
highlights how government investigations revealed that Chin Hong, holder of
90 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 151.
91 BDM, 14 Feb. 1916.
92 Inspired by events in China, the first decade o f the twentieth century saw the establishment of  
Chinese newspapers and schools in Bangkok, an increase in Chinese political activity in the kingdom, 
and a strengthening of ties with the homeland by overseas Chinese. See Skinner, Chinese Society, pp. 
155-9.
93 Ibid., pp. 162-5.
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multiple tax farms including the huai and one of the gambling houses, had been a key 
force behind the strike. However, the government did not have enough evidence to 
convict him in court and therefore tried to force him to return to China by barring him 
from taking on any tax farms and forcing him to pay up all his outstanding debts.94 
From then on, Vajiravudh tried to prevent any Chinese from becoming a tax farmer. 
In the case of the huai, this policy was bound to fail for there were few individuals 
who were not Chinese that had the resources and personnel to administer the farm. 
One Phra Aphaiwanit, presumably a Thai, offered to take it on for the year 1912/13 
but submitted a lower bid than Chin Hoi, a member of the Chin Hong cartel. But, 
instead of giving the farm to Chin Hoi, Chanthaburi allowed Phra Aphaiwanit to 
increase his bid and he duly received the monopoly. Unfortunately for the 
government, he was unable to make his payments and the lottery farm reverted to 
Chin Hong in 1913/14 95 It was he who then suggested extending the huai into the 
provinces once more to counter the underground lottery. As it was, another Chinese 
tax farmer received the lottery monopoly for the year 1915/16. According to 
Kanchana, it was this inability to find non-Chinese tax farmers that forced the 
government’s hand.96 The huai lottery farm was abolished on 1 April 1916 and the 
huai itself totally prohibited throughout the kingdom, with heavy penalties for 
violations.97 This latter act was significant because it precluded the government or 
private organisations from setting up their own huai operations. In other words, 
abolition was due not just to problems with the tax farming system and its dominance 
by the Chinese; as with the games of thua po , the Siamese elite found something 
undesirable in the nature of the huai lottery itself.
94 Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 151-2.
95 Ibid., p. 152.
96 Ibid., p. 153.
97 PKPS, 28, pp. 472-3.
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Gambling Legislation
Terminating the kingdom’s gambling house farms and the huai lottery farm was just 
one aspect of the absolute monarchy’s policy for restricting gambling. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, new gambling games were continually coming into fashion as the 
kingdom’s links with the wider world deepened. Moreover, once closure of the dens 
got underway in the 1880s, people began to turn to other games as replacements for 
thua po . Playing cards became especially popular. In 1894, for instance, then Minister 
of Finance, Narit, commented on the boom in phai pok dens in the capital and raised 
the spectre of a corrupted youth stealing from their families and friends to feed their 
gambling habit.98 These developments necessitated legislation designed to regulate 
legal gambling and penalise illegal gambling. During the Fifth Reign, two principal 
laws, supplemented by a myriad of amendments, were introduced and these formed 
the legislative basis for the control of gambling until 1930. Under these laws, 
numerous games were forbidden and others permitted subject to license, at first from 
the gambling house farmer and later from the state. This section will examine the 
provisions of these laws, the penalties they prescribed for illegal gambling, and their 
impact. It will also analyse the factors that determined the legal status of particular 
games.
The first of these laws was the Gambling Revenue Act R. S. I l l ,  which was 
enacted throughout the kingdom in April 1893 and annulled all previous gambling 
legislation.99 In terms of its format and purpose, it can be considered Siam’s first 
‘modem’ gambling law. In contrast to previous legislation that was issued on an ad 
hoc basis, it was an attempt to lay down one comprehensive system to cover every 
aspect of gambling and its administration, and it collected together all extant
98 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/4, ‘Narit to Sommot, 23 Jan. 1894’.
99 For the complete act, seePKPS, 13, pp. 250-8.
I l l  •
provisions and regulations. Gambling games were divided into four broad groups: 
first were those totally prohibited; second, the huai lottery; third, all those games 
played exclusively in the gambling houses; and fourth, games that could be played 
anywhere with license from the gambling house farmer. The prohibited list included 
huai chap yild (the twelve letter lottery), mai sam an (three-stick trick), and making 
turtles race by lighting fires on their backs. While the second of these was a trick 
designed to part the foolish from their cash and the last was obviously banned on 
grounds of cruelty to animals, the reason why huai chap yiki was forbidden is less 
clear. This will be considered later. As for games permitted subject to license, the act 
listed eleven broad types -  various card and board games, animal fights and races, 
amongst others -  and the corresponding fees to be paid to the tax farmer. Any game 
that was not listed could be played freely.
One area that saw a fundamental change was penalties. Marking a clear break
from the past, whipping was no longer a punishment for illegal gambling.100 Penalties
now consisted of fines, with a clear differential in their severity depending on the
legal status of the game. For instance, the fine for playing a prohibited game was
2,000 baht compared with 200 baht for playing a permitted game without license.
This suggests that the crime lay not so much in gambling itself but rather in the nature
of specific games. In all cases, half of the fine was payable to the plaintiff,
presumably the tax farmer, and the other to the state. If the fine could not be paid, the
guilty party was subject to imprisonment with hard labour on a sliding scale of from
two months for a fine of 100 baht to two years for 8,000 baht.101 That imprisonment
was only an option in lieu of a fine might suggest the government considered
gambling a financial crime first and foremost. It is more likely, though, that this was a
100 Under the 1891 regulations for the Bangkok dens, 30 lashes was a potential penalty for playing 
some banned games. PKPS} 13, p. 55.
m PKPS, 13, pp. 254-5.
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practical measure bom of the fact that the state did not have enough prison space to 
incarcerate hordes of gambling offenders. How the courts actually punished gambling 
offenders will be considered in Chapter 4.
The second of the laws marked a major progression in government policy. 
Damrong’s reforms of the provincial administration during the 1890s had enabled 
Bangkok to establish an unprecedented amount of control over many of Siam’s 
outlying regions and tributary states. The Siamese state had now acquired enough 
administrative penetration for it to collect revenue by itself and was no longer totally 
dependent upon the tax farmers. In March 1902, Damrong wrote to Chulalongkom 
outlining the main provisions of the new law he had had drafted. The previous year, 
the right to issue licenses and collect fees for gambling games conducted outside the 
dens -  those in the fourth group of the 1893 law -  had been removed from the 
gambling house farmers for Bangkok and sold as a separate ‘betting’ farm, with a
1 09substantial increase in revenue. The Ministry of Finance now wished to implement 
a similar scheme in the provinces but with the government taking the place of the tax 
farmer. Furthermore, Damrong had reviewed the 1893 law and found it to be 
ambiguous, deficient and inadequate for the day and age. It specified games that were 
no longer played and activities, such as horse-racing, that he thought inappropriate to 
tax. Recognising that games and methods of gambling varied from region to region, 
there were separate regulations for the inner monthons, constituting the core of the 
country, and for monthon Phayap, which consisted of the northern provinces centred 
on Chiang Mai.103
Under the Gambling Revenue Act R. S. 120, promulgated in March 1902, the 
government thus assumed control of the licensing of gambling games, apart from the
102 The betting farm fetched a price of 103,040 baht. RFAB 1901-02, p. 3.
103 NA R.5 M .l.3/20, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 19 March 1902’.
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huai and those played in the dens.104 The Ministers of the Interior and Local 
Government were charged with administering the act and given the power to enact 
the necessary regulations for those areas under their jurisdiction.105 This shift in 
responsibility for gambling from the Ministry of Finance to these two administrative 
ministries was primarily a practical measure. Mahit had long sought to divest the 
Ministry of Finance of the duty of collecting revenue so that it might focus on 
controlling state expenditure. In the late 1890s, first the Bangkok Revenue 
Department and then its provincial equivalent had been set up within the ministries of 
Local Government and the Interior respectively for this purpose.106 It was these two 
departments that were to administer the licensing of gambling. Furthermore, the 
Ministry of the Interior under Damrong was the vanguard of the central state’s 
administrative push into the provinces and, since it was often the first ministry with 
personnel on the ground, it often assumed the duties of other ministries. Nevertheless, 
the transfer of responsibility also implies a shift in the state’s perception of gambling 
from being primarily a financial issue to a social one.
In contrast to the 1893 law, the 1902 one made no distinction in teims of 
penalties for different types of offences. The penalty for playing forbidden games was 
the same as that for playing permitted games without a license: a fine not exceeding 
200 baht or imprisonment for up to 6 months or both.107 Most likely, the Siamese 
lawmakers considered this a more realistic and appropriate tariff for gambling 
offences. An alternative interpretation, however, is that the two offences were now 
considered equivalent in terms of criminality: depriving the state of its due income by
104 In those areas where there were no gambling house farms, the games of thua po  also came under the 
act.
105 For the complete act, see PKPS, 18, pp. 275-9.
106 Brown, Ministry o f  Finance, pp. 62-5.
107 PKPS, 18, p. 278.
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playing certain games without license was as serious as playing a game forbidden, 
presumably, on moral grounds.
Turning to the ministerial regulations, there were few significant differences 
between those for the inner monthons and those for monthon Phayap.108 Both worked 
on the same principles, listing those games that were forbidden and those that were 
permitted subject to license. Prohibited games consisted of three broad categories: 
first, games that were calculated to deceive the players, including three-stick trick and 
its card equivalent; second, games in which the chances were disproportionately in 
favour of the banker, such as huai chap yiki\ and third, games which entailed cruelty 
to animals, such as cockfighting with spurs. Permitted games were divided into three 
classes. Class 1 covered games that involved a large congregation of people, such as 
bullfighting and fish-fighting, and these could only be played in certain licensed 
venues. Class 2 might be termed ‘fairground games’ since it included activities such 
as target shooting, throwing rings over prizes, and raffles. These could be played 
only, with a permit, during important festivals and other special occasions. Lastly, 
Class 3 games could be played anywhere and at any time once a permit had been 
obtained; this included all card games and some dice, board and domino ones. 
Moreover, keeping with tradition, they could be played without license during the 
Chinese New Year, Siamese New Year and Songkran periods.
The new law and attendant regulations came into force in the inner monthons 
and monthon Phayap on 1 April 1902.109 Financially, its impact was immediate. In
108 For both sets of regulations, see PKPS, 18, pp. 264-9, 269-74. In a concession to the traditional 
northern elite, the state council on which they sat (khao sanam luang) was granted some regulatory 
powers.
i°9 p K p ^  185 pp. 339-40, 346-7. The actual areas covered by the act were 1) monthon Krung Kao 
(Ayutthaya), 2) monthon Phitsanulok, 3) monthon Nakhon Sawan, 4) monthon Prachinburi, 5) 
monthon Nakhon Ratchasima, 6) monthon Phetchabun, 7) monthon Phayap, 8) monthon Nakhon 
Chaisi, 9) monthon Ratchaburi, 10) monthon Chumphon, 11) monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat except 
for the seven Malay sultanates in the far south, 12) muang Chanthaburi, 13) muang Trat, 14) muang 
Rayong, and 15) muang Prachantakhirikhet.
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the budget, Mahit had estimated that the sale of gaming licenses might amount to
200,000 baht; the actual figure for the first year was 458,626 baht.110 This success, 
however, was tempered by fears about the viability of the Bangkok betting farm. 
Mahit expected its price for the year 1903/4 to drop by as much as 800 chang (64,000 
baht) because of the lack of tax farmers willing to place competitive bids after the 
incumbent fanner had already called for a reduction in his payments. The Minister of 
Finance thus wished the 1902 law to be implemented in Bangkok immediately.111 
However, Naret, the minister responsible for the capital, expressed some doubts as to 
the wisdom of this move. Citing the fact that the revenue from the sale of licenses in 
the provinces had exceeded all expectations, he asserted that the new law had made it 
easier for people to gamble and would have the same effect in Bangkok. Revenue had 
increased only because people were gambling more, a situation that would inevitably 
lead to greater poverty. Indeed, whatever the amount of revenue collected, the 
population would waste much more on gambling. Viewed from this perspective, 
Naret believed the 1902 law should be abolished. However, he was a realist and 
recognised that the people of Bangkok would continue to gamble regardless. It was 
better therefore that the profits of gambling should fall to the state rather than the tax 
farmers.112 In short, his internal debate boiled down to the question of which was the 
greater evil: a loss of state income or an increase in popular gaming. And, in what 
was becoming a familiar pattern, the moral and economic arguments against 
gambling lost out to the financial requirements of the Siamese state.
The 1902 law and specific ministerial regulations for Bangkok came into
113force in the capital on 1 April 1903. In principle, these regulations were essentially
110 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 133.
111 NA R.5 N.2/95, ‘Naret to Chulalongkom, 7 Feb. 1903’.
112 Ibid.
113 18, p. 547. For the complete Bangkok regulations, see ibid. pp. 548-53.
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the same as those for the provinces; the only significant difference lay in the legality 
of certain games. For instance, to tern, played with dominoes, was a Class 3 permitted 
game in both the inner monthons and monthon Phayap but was forbidden in Bangkok 
on the grounds that it consumed money quickly and frequently led to quarrels. 
Conversely, mai mun, a game similar to roulette, was prohibited in the provinces but 
was placed in Class 2 for the capital on the basis that it tended to be played only 
during festivals, did not involve much money, and was usually played for prizes.114 
Clearly, some games were prohibited for moral reasons, most obviously those that 
were banned under all three sets of regulations, but the fact that other games might be 
illegal in one region but permitted in another implies there were other considerations 
at work. The clearest statement of one principle for determining the legal status of 
games came up in a discussion in 1917 on a proposed new gambling law to deal with 
the anticipated boom in other forms of gaming following abolition: ‘it is not until a 
particular game is too frequently played, or proves injurious to morals or public 
security, that it should be dealt with by law, either in the way of imposing the 
restriction of a license, or by forbidding the game altogether.’115 In other words, the 
legality of a game was partially determined by its popularity; when the playing of it 
reached epidemic levels, the government would take action.
A good illustration of this point is the series of acts forbidding bia bok. 
Originally, this game was not covered by any legislation and was especially popular 
in the Northeast. It was played with four cowries that were placed in a bamboo
114 NA R.5 N.2/95, ‘Naret to Chulalongkom, 7 Feb. 1903’.
115 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Memorandum of a discussion, on 5th March 1917, between H. R. H. the 
Minister of Finance, the Financial Adviser, and the Legal Adviser to the Ministry, on Phya Indra 
Montri’s proposed new Gaming Law’.
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cylinder and then shaken on to the floor (see Figure 2.1). Bets were placed on 
whether the number of cowries lying face up was going to be odd or even.116
Figure 2.1: Equipment for playing bia bok (Source: Phakdi, Khambanyai)
In late 1902, the commissioner of monthon Nakhon Ratchasima, the administrative 
centre of the Northeast, expressed concern about the proliferation of bia bok dens in 
the towns of Chaiyaphum and Buriram. Invoking the familiar mantra of crime and 
poverty, he described how people had become so absorbed in the game they were no
116 Lisut, [Gambling Handbook], pp. 106-7.
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longer interested in making an honest living, with many resorting to banditry.117 Bia 
bok was promptly prohibited in that monthon and a couple of months later in 
monthon Phetchabun as well.118 Two years later, it had reared its head in the vicinity 
of the capital, brought by migrant Lao farmhands from the northeast.119 Bia bok was 
quickly banned within monthon Krungthep.120 Similarly, as a result of increasing 
inter-provincial trade between monthons Nakhon Ratchasima and Phetchabun and 
adjacent provinces, bia bok was being transmitted from place to place by peddlers 
and itinerant workers. The only solution was to ban it throughout the inner 
monthons.121 This example clearly shows how government policy tended to be 
reactive; steps to limit the playing of bia bok were taken only once the game had 
become a problem in specific areas. It also highlights how the increasing economic 
integration of the provinces with the capital, facilitated by the expanding rail network, 
encouraged the spread of new games.
The gambling tax farmers also exerted an influence in determining the legality 
of some games. In April 1903, for instance, the holders of the gambling house farms 
for five Bangkok districts complained to the Minister of Finance about the 
widespread playing of si ngao lak, a dice game included in Class 3 of all the different 
regulations, in the capital. The game was very popular among both the Siamese and 
the Chinese and they estimated that at least 200 permits for it were being issued daily. 
Custom in their five gambling houses had fallen and they predicted that state income 
would suffer unless something was done to limit the game.122 Nevertheless, rather 
than forbid si ngao lak, Naret thought reclassifying it as a Class 2 game, meaning it
117 NAR.5 M. 1.3/20, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 11 Sept. 1902’.
118 PKPS, 18, pp. 458-9; NAR.5 M. 1.3/20, ‘Chulalongkom to Damrong, 10 Nov. 1902’.
119NAR.5 M .l.3/20, ‘Naretto Chulalongkom, 10 Aug. 1904’.
120 PKPS, 19, p. 244.
121 NA R.5 M .l.3/20, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 5 Oct. 1904’; ‘Act prohibiting bia bok in various 
monthons’.
122 NA R.5 N.2/95, ‘Nai Ki and Chin Khai Ho to Mahit, 20 April 1904’.
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could be played only on special occasions, would be sufficient to protect the 
revenue.123 An added bonus was that the state would also continue to profit from the 
sale of permits, indicating why the Siamese government preferred regulation to 
prohibition. Over the rest of the decade, these processes of prohibition and 
reclassification were repeated with a number of other games.124
The 1902 law had a number of effects. Most obviously, it opened up a new 
revenue source for the state. During the first decade of its enactment, income from 
license fees was usually around 550,000 baht a year, rising to a high of 770,373 baht 
in the year 1906/7 when all the provincial gambling houses were closed.125 While this 
was less than a tenth of the revenue the gambling house and lottery farms were 
bringing in, it did help offset the losses resulting from closures. Furthermore, both 
Damrong and Naret believed that since the issuing of gambling licenses had been 
transferred to the Revenue Departments, it had become easier for people to gamble.126 
Indeed, in those areas where the government had terminated all the gambling house 
farms before the 1902 law was enacted, the local people had been temporarily 
deprived of any facilities for legal gambling. In other words, this law was designed to 
facilitate the state’s exploitation of the population’s gambling habit for revenue 
purposes rather than to restrict gambling. Finally, it also created new opportunities for 
corruption and fraud amongst those government officials responsible for 
administering and issuing licenses. In 1914, for instance, police investigations into 
why some people in Phra Khanong district just south of Bangkok had been playing
123 NA R.5 N.2/95, ‘Naret to Chulalongkom, 4 May 1903’; PKPS, 19, pp. 11-12. The game was 
similarly reclassified in the inner monthon regulations as well. PKPS, 19, p. 21.
124 The game of i-chong, for instance, was first forbidden in monthon Phayap in 1906 and then in all 
other parts o f the country were the 1902 law was in force in 1909. NA R.5 M .l.3/20, ‘Damrong to 
Chulalongkom, 18 April 1906,26 Oct. 1909’; PKPS, 21, pp. 17-18; PKPS, 23, pp. 172-3.
125 SY 1931-33, p. 295.
126 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 4 Aug. 1903’; NA R.5 N.2/95, ‘Naret to 
Chulalongkom, 7 Feb. 1903’.
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cards without a license revealed that the district chief had been issuing handwritten 
letters as ‘special’ permits. This official claimed he had done this because he had run 
out of proper permits and that he had faithfully recorded all the fees collected in the 
accounts book. It later emerged, however, that he had been pocketing the cash from 
the sale of these ‘special’ permits.127 Similarly, licensing officials were sometimes 
accused of demanding extra cash before granting gambling permits, though this was 
not always proved.128 There were also frequent complaints of conniption and other
129injustices in the licensing system.
As the administrative and territorial integration of areas on the kingdom’s 
peripheries progressed, the 1902 law was gradually enacted in these places. In the 
south, the seven Malay sultanates came under its jurisdiction in June 1902 and
1 30monthon Phuket in October 1904. The last areas to be covered were those on the 
kingdom’s eastern flank bordering French Indochina: monthon Burapha, consisting of 
the towns of Siem Reap, Sisophon and Phnom Sok in what is now Cambodia in 
1906;131 the semi-autonomous province of Nan and monthon Udon in 1907;132 and, 
finally, monthon Isan in 1909. In both Nan and Udon, the law was enacted in order 
to help alleviate outbreaks of banditry resulting, supposedly, from unregulated 
gambling.134 The Siamese government no doubt feared that this banditry might 
destabilise these sensitive border regions and provoke intervention by France. This 
certainly seems to have been the logic behind the decision to prohibit all forms of
127 NA R.6 N .l 1.5.Ch/l, ‘Luang Wichan to Phraya Ratsadakonkoson, 25 Feb. 1914’.
128 NA R.6 N.42/92, ‘People of amphoe Bang Loeng to Lord Mayor of Bangkok, 16 April 1925’; NA  
MT.0201.1.1/125, ‘Undersecretary of the Interior to Provincial Committee for Phra Nakhon and 
Thonburi, 16 March 1937’; NA MT.0201.1.1/835, ‘Provincial Committee for Phitsanulok to 
Undersecretary o f the Interior, 30 July 1938’.
129 See for instance N A  R.6 N.42/26, ‘The Oppressed to Yomarat, 20 Sept. 1915’; NA  
MT.0201.1.1/1549, ‘Nai Kang to Luang Phibun Songkhram, 5 April 1940’.
130 PKPS, 18, p. 431; PKPS, 19, pp. 288-9.
131 PKPS, 21, pp. 15-16. The following year these provinces were ceded to France.
132 PKPS, 21, pp. 120-1, 166-7
133 PKPS, 23, pp. 13-14.
134NAR.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/20, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 5 June 1906’.
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gambling in the district of Mae Sot, Trat province, which bordered British Burma.135 
The implementation of the 1902 law throughout the kingdom was, therefore, not just 
a reflection of administrative integration and centralisation, it was also a mechanism 
for reinforcing it, maintaining internal security, and defending the kingdom’s 
sovereignty. In this sense, the regulation and restriction of gambling was paid of the 
process whereby the ‘geo-body’ of modern day Thailand came into focus.136
The Siamese government was realistic as to how far it might restrict people 
from gambling; it was fully aware that closing the gambling houses would only force 
gamblers to seek their thrills elsewhere. As Damrong observed in a letter to the king 
in March 1906, ‘gambling is similar to opium addiction. Forcing people to stop it at 
once is more difficult than getting them to reduce it gradually.’137 On the eve of the 
closure of all the provincial gambling houses, the government took a number of pre­
emptive measures to tighten the existing legislation and forestall the anticipated boom 
in other forms of gambling. First, the penalties for illegal gambling under the 1902 
law were increased: the fine for playing a permitted game without license rose from 
200 baht to 1,000 and that for playing a prohibited game rose to 4,000 baht.138 The 
heavier fine for the latter offence suggests that the lawmakers perceived a differential 
in criminality between the two offences once more. Second, a new set of regulations 
for the inner monthons came into force on 1 April 1906.139 The games of thua po 
were brought under the scope of the 1902 law and, along with bia bok, placed in the 
prohibited category. License fees for all Class 2 games and all card games were
135 NA R.5 M .l.3/20, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 27 June 1902’; PKPS, 18, pp. 431-2.
136 ‘Geo-body’ is the term coined by Thongchai Winichakul to describe the territorial extent o f a 
nation. See Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History o f the Geo-body o f  a Nation, Honolulu: 
University o f Hawaii Press, 1994.
137NAR.5 M .l.3/20, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 10 March 1906’.
138 PKPS, 20, pp. 505-6. No mention was made of any increase in the maximum term o f imprisonment 
so presumably it remained six months.
139 For the complete regulations, see PKPS, 20, pp. 508-12.
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increased.140 Damrong later claimed this was purely to discourage gambling rather 
than to increase state revenue.141 Provincial governors were also granted greater 
powers to restrict Class 3 games: if they felt that trade was suffering or crime 
increasing, they could limit the number of licenses that might be issued in a specific 
area on any given day or, in extreme cases, totally prohibit the issuing of licenses.
Similar measures were also taken in the capital. In July 1906, the recently 
appointed Minister of Finance, Phraya Suriyanuwat, wrote to Naret lamenting the 
excessive number of card dens in Bangkok and recommended that permit fees be 
raised to six baht a day and 12 at night. The beauty of this was that: ‘Even though 
card dens may be reduced by 80 percent, the government would still make a profit of 
over 200 percent from license fees. Revenue will rise by 300,000 baht per year.’142 
Naret and the Bangkok police had some reservations about this, however. Raising 
permit fees could work in the provinces because there was no other legal outlet for 
gambling: but increasing fees in the capital would effectively put many card dens out 
of business and drive gamblers back into the gambling houses. Based on the 
assumption that the games played in the dens were the quickest road to poverty, 
higher permit fees would thus only lead to an increase in crime.143 Yet, despite these 
fears, the proposed rise in card fees went ahead.144 This highlights one of the tensions 
in formulating the government’s policy on gambling; specifically, the recognition that 
strict regulation was necessary to discourage people from gambling but should 
legislation to be too restrictive it would encourage illegal gambling. Judging from the 
receipts from license fees, these precautions seem to have been successful in curbing
140 License fees for cards were raised from 1 baht a circle per day to 4 baht for a day and 8 baht a night.
141 NAR.5 M.2.11/11, ‘Report of meeting ofprovincial governors, 8 Sept. 1906’.
142 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/20, ‘Suriyanuwat to Naret, 24 July 1906’.
143 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1,Kh/20, ‘Report of the Council of Ministers, 2 Aug. 1906’; ‘Naret to the Crown 
Prince, 23 Aug. 1906’.
144 PKPS, 21, pp. 57-9.
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card-playing. Although revenue rose from 665,365 baht in 1905/6 to 770,373 baht in 
1906/7, the year in which the remaining provincial dens were closed, the fact that the 
price of a permit for playing cards during the day quadrupled at the start of the latter 
year indicates a sharp decline in the number of permits issued. Furthermore, over the 
next five years, revenue from license fees dropped to 650,469 baht in 1907/8 and to 
521,903 in 1911/12.145
Besides the abolition of the Bangkok gambling houses and the huai lottery, 
the Sixth Reign also saw an end to the long established custom of allowing the 
population to gamble freely during the three great annual holidays, namely, the 
Siamese and Chinese New Years and Songkran. Traditionally, these were times when 
people stopped work to make merit and take part in all manner of fun and games. In 
the past, sporting contests, such as running and boat-races, had been an integral part 
of the Songkran festival. This was a means of keeping the male population fit and 
ready to fight in the region’s periodic wars. No doubt there was some small-scale 
gambling on the outcome of these contests and, perhaps to encourage them, a 
moratorium on the collection of gambling taxes was declared.146 With the increase in 
Chinese immigration during the Third Reign, this was extended to the Chinese New 
Year as well. Moreover, as the kingdom began to enjoy relative peace from the mid­
nineteenth century onwards, there was less need to keep large numbers of men in 
readiness for war and, according to the Bangkok Times, ‘coincident with this the 
virility of the people began to find other and less praiseworthy outlets.’147 By the 
Fifth Reign, the sports element of these festivities had almost disappeared as people 
devoted themselves to the Chinese gambling games and cards. To make matters
145 5 7 1931-33, p. 294.
146 Damrong dates this dispensation back to the reign o f King Taksin (1767-1782), attributing it as a 
morale raising measure during those years o f conflict, Damrong, [Abolition], pp. 12-13.
141BTWM, 21 Oct. 1913.
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worse, there was a sharp increase in banditry and illicit gambling once the festivals 
were over. Damrong therefore urged that the concession for free gambling be 
abolished.148 For his part, Vajiravudh was very keen on the promotion of sport as a 
means of instilling nationalism. This interest stemmed from his time at school in 
England, where he was impressed by the fervour with which crowds of spectators 
cheered their football or cricket team and the camaraderie created by team sports. 
Promoting sporting activities was thus a key policy of the Sixth Reign; through it 
Vajiravudh hoped to restore the ‘warrior spirit’ -  dissipated by indulgence in 
gambling, drinking and opium smoking -  in the Thai man.149 The royal decree 
abolishing free gambling, issued in October 1913, was thus part of this strategy.150 
Numerous athletics events were subsequently organised throughout the country. For 
the elite of Vajiravudh’s generation, the suppression of gambling was a means of 
reviving tradition and checking a perceived national decline. However, it seems 
unlikely that this was successful in reducing the level of gambling during the festival 
periods. Indeed, the Krungthep Daily Mail reported the general opinion that the 
cancellation was really designed to increase revenue from the sale of permits since 
people would still gamble at these times.151 License fee revenue rose from 534,937 
baht in 1912/13 to 699,313 in 1913/14 and then to 736,497 baht the following year.152 
Clearly, people continued to gamble at these festivals; the only difference was that 
now the government profited from it.
As the closure of the last gambling houses grew imminent, there were a 
number of discussions about how to prevent the population from taking up other
148 NA R.6 Kh.18/11, ‘Damrong to Vajiravudh, 2 Oct. 1913’.
149 Vella, Chaiyo!, p. 144.
iso 26, pp. 285-6. As a concession to local preference, this restriction was not applied in
monthon Phayap until 1918. NA R.6 Kh.8/11, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 28 May 1918’; PKPS, 31, 
pp. 133-4.
151 KDM, 19 Oct. 1913.
152 SY 1931-33, p. 294.
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forms of gambling, card-playing in particular. The Director General of the Revenue 
Department, F. H. Giles, put forward a draft law that entailed a radical change to 
government policy: all games other than those specified in the law were to be 
forbidden.153 This was an attempt to place European card games, which could 
apparently be played without license, on the same legal footing as Thai and Chinese 
ones. The draft law also outlined a comprehensive licensing system for gambling in 
private residences, members clubs and public card-rooms, and prescribed harsh 
penalties for all offences.154 A number of objections to these provisions were raised, 
however. First, forbidding all games except those listed in the law was in direct 
contradiction to the principle of the existing legislation: that forbidden games and 
those requiring a license were specifically mentioned, while all games that were not 
listed could be played freely. Adopting the new, proposed principle was deemed 
impractical because the list of permitted games would have to include games of all 
the nationalities residing within the kingdom -  Malay, Indian, Burmese, and Danish 
for instance -  for it to be equitable. Perhaps more crucially, the existing principle was 
thought preferable because it conformed better with European laws on gambling. 
Second, the proposed licensing system was felt to be too complex: applying for a 
license and paying a fee might deter casual card-players but not compulsive gamblers. 
Moreover, it was argued that, ‘from the European point of view, such a system would 
be regarded as an undue interference with the liberty of the subject.’155 The need to 
accommodate Western preferences and games was to remain an obstacle to the 
restriction of gambling throughout the period.
153 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Note on the draft Gaming Law prepared by the Director General of the 
Revenue Department’.
154 The penalty for gambling without a license, for example, was a maximum sentence of two years’ 
imprisonment or a 4,000 baht fine or both. Ibid.
155 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Memorandum o f a discussion, on 5lh March 1917, between H. R. H. the 
Minister o f Finance, the Financial Adviser, and the Legal Adviser to the Ministry, on Phya Indra 
Montri’s proposed new Gaming Law’.
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In the end, the government introduced no pre-emptive legislation, preferring 
to adopt a policy of wait and see. Predictably enough, cards were the new craze 
within Bangkok, Just a few months after the last gambling houses had been closed, 
Chanthaburi observed how card dens, packed with players day and night, had sprung 
up along almost all the capital’s streets. The problem was that die ministerial 
regulations for Bangkok were inadequate, and did not give local authorities enough 
power to restrict the issuing of permits. His solution was to replace the Bangkok 
regulations with the more rigorous ones introduced in the inner monthons following 
the closure of the provincial dens.156 These were duly enacted in August 1917, with 
some minor adjustments to account for different rates for permit fees in the capital 
and the abolition of free gambling during the New Year holidays.157 Yet this was not 
sufficient. If anything, the number of card dens continued to grow as people realised 
there was a good living to be made out of them: organisers collected entrance fees 
and commission on people’s winnings. The strongest evidence of this boom in card- 
playing was the increase in revenue from license fees, which jumped from 715,091 
baht in 1915/16 to 1,065,905 in 1916/17 and then almost doubled in 1917/18 to reach
1SR •an all-time high of 2,129,025. For Chanthaburi, there was little difference between 
these card dens and the recently deceased gambling houses; allowing people to make 
a living in this way was tantamount to the government nurturing vice and promoting 
poverty. But an outright ban would not work because gambling was a fundamental 
part of human nature. To forbid it would be to drive it underground and the state 
lacked the resources to suppress illegal gambling effectively. The Minister of Finance 
concluded that prohibition would be more harmful than allowing play to continue but
156 NA R.6 Kh.2/12, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, July 1917’.
157 PKPS, 30, pp. 366-9. In 1918, the regulations for monthon Phayap were also replaced with those for 
the inner monthons. PKPS, 31, p. 133-4.
158 S Y 1931-33, p. 294.
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under stricter regulation.159 The solution was a further refinement of the 1902 
legislation. Under the Gambling Revenue Amendment Act B. E. 2461, promulgated 
in April 1918, anyone applying for a permit for any Class 3 game had to satisfy the 
licensing officer that it was going to be played only for pleasure, not for profit. Profit 
was defined as any money received by the licensee or another from any of the 
players, except as stakes on the game. The penalty for contravening this provision 
was a maximum fine of 1,000 baht or up to six months’ imprisonment or both.160 The 
impact of this act was immediate. Revenue from license fees dropped by over two- 
thirds to 581,626 baht in 1918/19, implying a considerable reduction in the amount of 
legal gambling.161
The year 1917 marked a shift in emphasis in the Siamese government’s policy
on gambling. By abolishing the huai lottery in 1916 and the gambling houses the year
after, the absolute monarchy effectively rejected gambling as a major revenue source.
Although the state continued to derive income from the sale of gambling licenses, this
was primarily a restrictive measure rather than a revenue one. The success of this
restrictionist policy was limited, however. As the following chapter will show, it was
handicapped in particular by the temptation for the government to fall back on the
promotion of gambling for fundraising. The end of the gambling tax farms also saw a
shift in the rationale for regulating gambling. Previously, regulation had been
designed largely to safeguard the financial imperatives of the tax farmers and the
state. Now, the damaging socio-economic effects of gambling were to become the
paramount concern. But despite these shifts, there was no corresponding change in
the legal mechanisms for dealing with illegal gambling: the 1893 and 1902 laws
159 NA R.6 Kh.2/12, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 30 March 1918’.
m  PKPS, 31, pp. 3-6.
161 S Y 1931-33, p. 294.
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remained the basic tools. Some forms of gambling were inadequately covered, if at 
all, by this legislation. Western forms posed a particularly strong challenge in this 
regard, in part because the Siamese government felt obliged to conform to European 
norms. Moreover, as the following chapter will show, Western games and betting 
activities were associated with modernity and siwilai, and thus held a certain appeal 
for elements of the Siamese elite. In contrast, the Chinese games played in the 
gambling houses and the huai lottery had come to represent backwardness and a 
bygone age. They had no place in the modernising kingdom of the early twentieth 
century.
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3
Government Gambling Policy and Legislation, 1917-1945
This chapter will explore the Siamese government’s attempts to deal with the various 
forms of gambling that sprang up in the wake of the abolition of the gambling tax 
farms and continued to evolve over the next thirty years as people sought to avoid 
government restrictions. This situation was exacerbated by the government’s 
contradictory attitudes. Despite supposedly rejecting gambling as a major revenue 
provider, within a few years of the abolition of the gambling tax farms the absolute 
monarchy began to promote Westem-style lotteries and other forms of gambling to 
raise money for prestige developmental projects. This approach was taken a step 
further by the constitutional governments that replaced the absolute monarchy 
following the 1932 coup. The first state lotteries were issued in the mid-193Os and 
these have persisted to the present day. Alongside these, the first Phibun Songkhram 
government (December 1938 to August 1944) briefly experimented with state-run 
casinos. However, from around the mid-1920s the absolute monarchy, and then its 
parliamentary successor, started to take a harder line towards privately organised 
gambling. These three themes -  the emergence of new forms of gambling, the 
government restriction of private gambling, and the growth of state-sponsored 
gaming -  form the core of this chapter.
Lotteries Unleashed
A profusion of card dens was not the only result of abolition. In 1916 and early 1917, 
there was a spate of public raffles in Bangkok. Some were set up by state and 
religious institutions for charitable causes, others were run solely for the benefit of
130
the organisers, who often tried to cheat their subscribers. Once it was established that 
raffles came under the 1902 law, and thus required a license, this craze seems to have 
subsided.1 More problematic, however, were the numerous lotteries instituted by the 
kingdom’s resident European communities during the First World War in order to 
raise funds for their countries’ Red Cross organisations. Like raffles, lotteries were 
categorised as Class 2 gambling, meaning they could be conducted, subject to license, 
only on special occasions. Tickets for them could be sold only on those particular 
days.2 Nevertheless, these restrictions seem to have been ignored in the case of the 
Red Cross lotteries. Indeed, their very success would have depended on tickets being 
available for purchase over a long period of time. To further complicate matters, 
lottery tickets issued in Siam’s colonial neighbours were sometimes distributed for 
sale in the kingdom. Unsurprisingly, the Siamese government was none to happy 
about this situation. When the German Charge d’ Affaires approached the 
government about setting up a lottery for the German Red Cross, Prince Devawonse, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, felt that ‘it would be unfortunate if  foreign legations 
should go extensively into the running of lotteries just at this time when the Royal 
Government itself was progressively restricting gambling among its own people.’3 
However, the Siamese government was reluctant to deny the German request because 
it had done nothing to restrict a similar lottery organised by the French, and consent
1 For details o f these raffles see BDM, 1 March 1917, and the various newspaper clippings in NA R.6 
N.20.17/15, ‘Raffles’.
2 NA R.6 B .ll/2 , ‘Chanthaburi to Prachin, 5 Dec. 1919’. Whether lotteries set up by European 
residents, who enjoyed extraterritorial rights, came under the 1902 law is harder to discern. The British 
Red Cross lottery in Bangkok was licensed accordingly, whereas the French instituted theirs without 
first consulting the Siamese government. Nevertheless, S. H. Cole, the legal adviser to the Ministry of 
Finance, found the latter to be perfectly legal since it was not set up in Siam by persons subject to 
Siamese law and had been authorised by the French authorities. See NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, 
‘Memorandum with reference to lotteries conducted in Siam by foreigners in aid o f Red Cross funds, 
29 January 1917 [by W. H. Pitkin, Adviser in Foreign Affairs]’; ‘Opinion [by S. H, Cole]’; Note on 
Mr. Pitkin’s Memorandum on lotteries [by S. H. Cole]’.
3 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Memorandum with reference to lotteries conducted in Siam by foreigners in 
aid of Red Cross funds, 29 January 1917’.
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was thus given.4 It is unclear whether the German lottery ever went ahead, though. In 
July 1917, the Siamese government abandoned its policy of neutrality and entered the 
war on the side of the Allies. It was hoped this might build up goodwill for the 
eventual renegotiation of the ‘unequal’ treaties. As part of Siam’s war effort, plans 
were made to send an expeditionary force -  consisting of automobile drivers, 
ambulance teams, and airmen -  to France.5 Presumably, the German Red Cross 
lottery, if not yet drawn, was cancelled.
These Red Cross lotteries had a profound impact upon the government’s 
gambling policy. Most fundamentally, they re-legitimised the use of gambling as a 
revenue provider: despite its avowed restiictionist policy, the Siamese elite had to 
concede that exploiting people’s gambling instinct for charitable causes was 
acceptable under certain circumstances. Furthermore, they set a precedent for similar 
lotteries. In 1918, Siamese nationals in monthons Ratchaburi and Phuket set up 
lotteries to raise money for the expeditionary force and the Siamese Red Cross. The 
Ministry of Finance initially objected to these initiatives but, when it was revealed 
that the relevant local authorities had already granted permission and many of the 
tickets had already been sold, it was forced to consent, for otherwise the local 
authorities would have been liable for the losses incurred by cancellation. 
Nevertheless, Chanthaburi felt this state of affairs could not be allowed to continue. 
Since refusing all future applications might damage relations with the Western 
powers, he suggested laying down some strict criteria for lotteries: ‘permission 
should only be given to people of reliable financial standing in proportion to the total 
value of the tickets, and that the persons who issue them must do so without any
4 N A K  Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 21 May 1918’.
5 For details of Siam’s involvement in the First World War and the expeditionary force, see Vella, 
Chaiyo!, pp. 101-17; and Greene, Absolute Dreams, pp. 102-13.
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profits to themselves.’6 Additionally, not less than a quarter of the proceeds from the
sale of tickets were to be set aside for the charity or the Siamese government. The
king agreed that permission to hold a lottery should be dependent on the merits of
each case, noting that ‘when it is held with the object of contributing money in aid of
a nation’s war, recourse to it seems all the more necessary’.7 A principle for
regulating these wartime lotteries had been established. When the Royal Bangkok
Sports Club asked for permission to conduct a 500,000 baht lottery in aid of the
Siamese Red Cross and the expeditionary force, it was denied on the grounds that it
* * 8did not meet the above criteria. As the government made clear, ‘permission to 
organise such a lottery... would not be sufficiently justifiable on the ground of charity 
[sic] to preclude it from being turned into a precedence which might possibly be 
made use of by others who have not so charitable an object.’9 But the damage had 
already been done. From later correspondence on the subject, it is clear that the 
Minister of Finance considered this special dispensation to run lotteries was a 
temporary wartime measure.10 Other elements of the Siamese elite did not share the 
same view, however.
In the first half of the 1920s, large-scale lotteries were to become a regular 
occurrence in Siam. This development was partly due to the funding requirements of 
Vajiravudh’s personal paramilitary unit, the Wild Tiger Corps (Sua pa). The king had 
established the Wild Tigers at the start of his reign as a means of promoting loyalty to 
the throne, fostering nationalism and instilling a sense of unity amongst civil seivants. 
Since it received no allowance in the state budget, this organisation was dependent
6 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 21 May 1918’.
7 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/7, ‘Phanurangsi to Chanthaburi, 23 May 1918’.
8 NA R.6 B .ll/1 , ‘Chanthaburi to Yomarat, 19 June 1918’. The proposed donation was only 20 percent 
of the proceeds.
9 NA R.6 B .l 1/1, ‘H. M.’s Private Secretary to J. Caulfield Janies, 8 July 1918’.
10 NA R.6 B .l 1/2, ‘Chanthaburi to Prachin, 5 Dec. 1919’.
133
primarily on royal grants and membership fees for funding.11 This placed a heavy 
strain upon the Privy Purse, already depleted by Vajiravudh’s extravagant whims and 
taste for luxury.12 Equipping the force with guns and ammunition meant the Wild 
Tigers also incurred significant debts — in the early 1920s, for instance, it owed an 
arms-dealer 538,000 baht -  and this situation persisted until the end of the Sixth 
Reign.13 Lotteries were an attractive solution to the funding problem.
The economic crisis that beset the Siamese state in the immediate post-war 
period gave further impetus towards the lottery trend. The rising prices of silver and 
rice created a heavy demand for the baht, which although tied to gold, had a 
substantial silver content. A disastrous rice crop in 1919 then provoked a foreign- 
exchange crisis and a deficit in the kingdom’s balance of trade. The end result was a 
series of budget deficits, which were exacerbated by increases in the monarchy’s 
expenditure.14 The government sought to alleviate the problem by reducing its 
ordinary expenditures, which formed the major part of its total expenditure. Minimal 
amounts went on capital expenditures, such as public works and developmental 
projects, which in the recent past had been funded largely by foreign loans. But in 
1922 and 1924, the government was forced to float two foreign loans to replenish the 
treasury’s foreign currency reserves, which had been depleted during the crisis. 
Despite these belated attempts to resolve state finances, the king continued to exceed 
his personal budget and by the end of the reign the treasury’s reserve fund had almost 
run out.15 In sum, the government had little capital for investment in projects, the 
development of a national air force in particular, that the absolute monarchy deemed
11 For details o f the Wild Tigers and its junior division, the Tiger Cubs (Luk sua), which was modelled 
on the Boy Scout movement, see Vella, Chaiyo!, Ch. 3; Greene, Absolute Dreams, pp. 41-6, 81-4.
12 The Royal Division alone, which was under the direct control o f the king, received 600,000 baht 
annually from the Privy Purse. Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 164.
13 Ibid., p. 140; NA R.6 B .l 1/7, ‘Nonthisen to Vajiravudh, 17 Aug. 1923, 11 April 1924’.
14 Ingram, Economic Change, pp. 155-7, 190.
15 Ibid., p. 190; Greene, Absolute Dreams, pp. 141-2, 158-9, 166.
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essential for the welfare and security of the kingdom.16 Clearly, there was a 
compelling case for using lotteries as fundraisers.
The first such lottery appears to have been that organised by Chao Phraya 
Yomarat, the Minister of Local Government, in connection with a motor-racing 
meeting held at Sanam Luang in Bangkok during the Siamese New Year of 1920.17 
To raise money for the Wild Tigers and Tiger Cubs, tickets of admission were sold in 
advance at one baht each, these then doubled up as a ticket for the lottery drawn on 
that day (for an example ticket see Figure 3.1a). At first, the Minister of Finance had 
fiercely opposed this scheme. As far as Chanthaburi was concerned the special 
allowance for the wartime lotteries had finished and Yomarat5 s lottery exceeded what 
was permitted under the 1902 law.18 Yet, in spite of Finance’s opposition, Yomarat 
received special permission from the king for his lottery scheme.19 Similar events, 
which came to feature aviation displays as well, were held in 1922 and February 
1923, with the value of the attendant lotteries rising to one million baht (see Figure 
3.1b for an example ticket).20 The latter event raised 200,000 baht for the Ministry of 
War to purchase aeroplanes 21
16 As the Financial Adviser Williamson noted in 1924, ‘the nature o f expenditures has undoubtedly 
deteriorated, and unless the tendency is checked there will be a danger o f nearly the whole of the 
disbursements of the government consisting of salaries and contingencies — leaving practically nothing 
for permanent works, whether of a developmental or administrative character.’ Quoted in Greene, 
Absolute Dreams, p. 161. On the security fears o f the absolute monarchy and the establishment o f the 
army aviation corps, see Vella, Chaiyo!, pp. 79-87.
17 NA R.6 B .l 1/2, ‘Yomarat to Prachin, 4 Nov. 1919’.
18 NA R.6 B .l 1/2, ‘Chanthaburi to Prachin, 5 Dec. 1919’.
19 NA R.6 B. 11/5, ‘Prince Nen to Devawongse, 4 Dec. 1920’.
20 NA R.6 B .l 1/2, ‘Yomarat to Chakraphan, 23 Feb. 1922; Khamrop to Ram Rakkhop, 26 Jan. 1923’.
21 NT, 11 July 1923.
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Figures 3.1a and b: Tickets for the motor-racing events in Bangkok (Source: Anake 
Nawigamune (comp.), A Century o f Thai Graphic Design, London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2000, p. 65)
Over the same period, Phraya Nonthisen (Maek Siansewi), a royal favourite 
and the Chief of the Wild Tigers General Staff, also organised lotteries on behalf of 
the Wild Tigers. Like the motor-racing lotteries, these had royal approval and thus 
were not subject to the restrictions of the 1902 law. The first was issued in 1921 to 
raise money for the purchase of firearms, although it seems likely that the proceeds 
were used to pay off the debt to the arms-dealer mentioned earlier.23 Tickets for a 
second went on sale in late 1923 and it was hoped the draw would be held before 
April 1924. A million tickets were issued for each (see Figures 3.2a and b). Provided
22 NA R.6 B.l 1/5, ‘Prince Supphayokha to Chakraphan, 29 July 1922’; NA R.6 B.l 1/7, ‘Chao Phraya 
Mahithon to Nonthisen, 20 Aug. 1923’.
22 NA R.6 B.l 1/2, ‘Yomarat to Chakraphan, 23 Feb. 1922’; Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 140.
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it sold out, the latter was to have a first prize of 100,000 baht, a second of 40,000 and 
a third of 10,000; there were also 650 smaller prizes of either 1,000 or 500 baht. After 
expenses, it was hoped that 30,000 baht might be raised for the Wild Tigers.24
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Figures 3.2a and b: Wild Tiger lottery tickets (Source: Anek, A Century o f Thai 
Design, p. 65)
Other institutions and private groups also applied for permission to hold 
lotteries but most did not have the advantage of close contact with the king and were
24 BTWM, 22 Aug. 1923.
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refused. For instance, in late 1919 one Nai Hong Heng and 42 others petitioned 
Vajiravudh for permission to conduct a three million baht lottery to raise funds for the 
lengthening and dredging of the Singhanat canal in Ayutthaya province. Although 
this scheme would have benefited many and encouraged trade at no expense to the 
government, Chanthaburi insisted it was against the law and permission was 
refused.25 However, as the examples of the motor-racing and Wild Tigers lotteries 
indicate, there was a sharp division of opinion within the government. While the 
Ministry of Finance objected to all large-scale lotteries, other members of the 
Siamese elite preferred to judge each lottery application on its merits. It was this latter 
group that held the upper hand. The Bangkok Nursing Home lottery, held to provide 
the funds for a rebuilding scheme, provides a good example of these tensions. As 
with previous cases, Finance opposed it on the grounds that it exceeded the 
provisions of the 1902 law. In addition, the nursing home was only open to members 
who paid a subscription and was thus of no benefit to the general public 26 In spite of 
these objections, Vajiravudh sought the opinion of Prince Devawongse, the long­
standing Minister of Foreign Affairs, who argued strongly in favour of the lottery.27 It 
was promptly given the green light.
These conflicts of opinion are indicative of the deteriorating relationship 
between the king and Chanthaburi, the main cause of which was the latter’s repeated 
refusals to increase Vajiravudh’s personal budget. Vajiravudh tried to neutralise his 
half-brother’s power by overburdening him with ministerial duties: in 1919 
Chanthaburi became Supervisor of Agriculture and a year later was also made
25 NA R.6 B .l 1/4, ‘Nai Hong Heng to Vajiravudh, 17 Dec. 1919’; ‘Chanthaburi to Vajiravudh, 22 Dec. 
1919’.
26 NA R.6 B .l 1/5, ‘Supphayokha to Chakraphan, 29 July 1922’.
27 NA R.6 B .l 1/5, ‘Chakraphan to Devawongse, 30 Aug. 1922’; ‘Devawongse to Chakraphan, 30 Aug. 
1922’.
28 For details o f the dispute see Greene, Absolute Dreams, pp. 117,123-4.
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president of the newly established Ministry of Commerce and Statistics. The king 
thereby hoped control of the ministries would fall to the more amenable assistant 
ministers.29 In the case of Finance, this was Prince Nen -  later to be Prince 
Supphayokha — who succeeded Chanthaburi as Minister of Finance in January 1923. 
At the same time, Chanthaburi was trying to divest Finance of responsibility for 
administering and applying the gambling laws. His basic argument was that now that 
gambling revenue was no longer a major source of income, determining the legality 
of particular forms of gambling should fall, as it did in other countries, to the 
administrative side of the state, namely the ministries of Local Government and the 
Interior.30 A similar case was put forward by Prince Nen in 1921 and again in 1923.31 
On both occasions, his proposal for a transfer of responsibility was resisted by 
Yomarat, who argued that the present system -  whereby the administrative ministries 
were responsible for investigating and suppressing illegal gambling and Finance 
controlled licensing -  functioned just fine.32 Nevertheless, it was the Ministry of the 
Interior -  into which Local Government was incorporated in August 1922 -  that came 
to make the important decisions on the licensing of lotteries and other new forms of 
gambling, with Finance being left out of the loop.
Despite the enthusiasm for lotteries amongst some of the elite and other 
organisations, they do not seem to have been as successful as their promoters might 
have hoped. The draws usually took place about a year after the tickets were first
29 Ibid., pp. 127-8.
30 NA R.6 B .l 1/2, ‘Chanthaburi to Prachin, 5 Dec. 1919’.
31 NA R.6 N.11.5.Ch/14, ‘Nen to Yomarat, 8 Aug. 1921’; NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Supphayokha to 
Vajiravudh, 25 May 1923’.
32 NA R.6 N.11.5.Ch/14, ‘Yomarat to Nen, 17 Sept. 1921’; NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Yomarat to Mahithon, 14 
Sept 1923’.
33 N AR.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’. When the king granted special dispensation for 
the 1923 Wild Tiger lottery to go ahead, it was Interior, rather than Finance, that had to be informed of  
the decision. NA R.6 B .l 1/7, ‘Nonthisen to Vajirvaudh, 17 Aug. 1923’; ‘Yomarat to Mahithon, 23 
Aug. 1923’.
139
issued so as to give them plenty of time to sell.34 Even then, however, they regularly 
failed to sell out: there were 400,000 tickets left over for Yomarat’s one million baht 
lottery drawn in 1923, and the Bangkok Nursing Home lottery, for which there were
>5 r
only 250,000 tickets, did not sell out either. As for the Wild Tiger lottery issued in 
1923, the draw was first postponed to 1 September 1924, and in the end was not held 
until January 1925.36 Phraya Nonthisen speculated that the reason for the slow take- 
up was that people did not have enough money to buy tickets.37 It is more likely, 
though, that they were deterred by the scandals that had blighted previous lotteries.38 
People had good reason to be wary. When the Wild Tiger lottery was finally drawn in 
January 1925, Nonthisen and some of his associates committed a swindle whereby 
they conspired to hold the winning tickets for 40 odd prizes; some of which they 
claimed there and then, while others were later claimed under false names.39 
Suspicions of foul play were raised by a number of abnormalities: none of the 
winners of the top three prizes made donations from their winnings to charity and 
they shunned the limelight. Moreover, they were totally unknown to residents of 
those areas for which they had given an address, and, despite their best efforts, the 
police were unable to locate the winner of the third prize.40 Lastly, none of the tickets 
for these prizes was creased or soiled in anyway.41 Despite a huge public outcry and 
a concerted campaign by local newspapers for a thorough inquiry, it was some six 
months before Vajiravudh ordered an investigation into the scandal. Although no 
accounts for the lottery were found, it was suspected they had been destroyed, the
34 BTWM, 8 Nov. 1923.
35 NA R.6 B .l 1/7, ‘Nonthisen to Vajiravudh, 11 April 1924’.
36 Ibid.; SO, 9 April 1924; Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 165.
37 NA R.6 B .l 1/7, ‘Nonthisen to Vajiravudh, 11 April 1924’.
38 BTWM, 21 March 1925.
39 BTWM, 3 Sept. 1925; NA R.7 Y.4/1, ‘Mahithon to Phraya Thepwithura, 25 July 1925’; Greene, 
Absolute Dreams, p. 164.
40 BTWM, 9 Feb. 1925.
41 NA R.7 Y.4/1, ‘Phraya Anuphap to Ram Rakkhop, 24 July 1925’.
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committee found sufficient hints of wrongdoing for the case to be passed on to the
AO *Department of Public Prosecutions. At the same time, Phraya Nonthisen was 
declared persona non grata within the royal court.43 In September 1925, he and five 
accomplices were charged with criminal misappropriation, destroying important 
evidence, and counterfeiting documents.44 Over two years later, in which time the 
case passed through the Appeals Court and the Supreme Court, Nonthisen and one 
other defendant, Phraya Sitthi Sorasongkhram, were sentenced to 15 and six years 
imprisonment respectively, and ordered to repay the 253,106 baht they had 
embezzled 45
Although public faith was severely shaken by this scandal, this did not curtail 
the regime’s reliance on lotteries for fundraising. Vajiravudh had set his heart upon 
holding a national exhibition, modelled on the annual Wembley Exhibition in 
England, to mark the fifteenth year of his reign in November 1925. It was to be 
staged in Lumphini Park and would be a showcase for Siamese art, agriculture and 
industry. Foreign exhibitors would also be invited to display the latest agricultural 
machinery. The purpose of the Siamese Kingdom Exhibition was to promote 
economic development and increase awareness of the country, among both foreigners 
and Siamese.46 Vella argues that Vajiravudh undoubtedly hoped that, by bringing 
large numbers of people together in a glorification of the country, the exhibition 
would instil pride in the Siamese nation.47 Unsurprisingly, however, the government 
did not have the funds to complete the landscaping of the park, let alone cover the
42 NA R.7 Y.4/1, ‘Phraya Ratchamanu to Mahithon, 24 July 1925’; ‘Mahithon to Thepwithura, 25 July 
1925’.
43 Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 167.
44 BTWM, 3 Sept. 1925; N AR.7 Y.4/1, ‘Report-Extract from letter No. 157/68’.
45 NA R.7 Y.4/1, ‘Phanurangsi to Phraya Chinda, 6 Oct. 1927’; Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 167,
46 On the construction o f the park, and the planning of the exhibition and lottery, see BTWM, 29 Jan. 
1925; Vella, Chaiyol, pp. 174-5, 258; Greene, Absolute Dreams, pp. 164-5, 168-9.
47 Vella, Chaiyol, p. 259.
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costs of the exhibition. Amongst other fundraising initiatives, a two million baht 
lottery, that was optimistically hoped to produce 600,000 baht in profit, was issued 
(for an example ticket see Figure 3.3).48 Vajiravudh died shortly before the exhibition 
was scheduled to be opened, however, and his successor, King Prajadhipok, promptly 
cancelled it. Nevertheless, the drawing of the lottery went ahead, although it was 
postponed until April 1926 so it did not distract from this time of mourning.49
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Figure 3.3: A Lumphini Park Lottery Ticket (Source: Anek, A Century o f Thai 
Design, p. 65)
Vajiravudh’s hope that the Siamese Kingdom Exhibition might instil 
nationalism within the population suggests a deeper purpose behind the frequent 
semi-official lotteries of the Sixth Reign. By appealing to people’s love of a gamble, 
Vajiravudh’s regime used lotteries to excite interest in, and encourage attendance at, 
patriotic events in aid of national development projects. Moreover, in purchasing a 
ticket, people would have been aware that they were one among many sharing the 
same dream of winning big and that, by supporting the lottery’s cause, were
48 Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 165.
49 NA R.6 B.l 1/8, ‘Yomarat to Mahithon, 18 Dec. 1925’.
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participating directly in the life of the nation. In short, lotteries were a mechanism for 
promoting nationalism. However, this potential was not to be fully realised until the 
dawn of the constitutional era in the 1930s.
All the Fun of the Fair
Lotteries were not the only way in which the Sixth Reign government continued to 
exploit the population’s gambling habit as a revenue source. By the mid-1920s, 
fundraising fairs and fetes, where gambling was one of the key attractions, were being 
regularly staged in Bangkok and the provinces. Foremost among these was the 
capital’s annual Winter Fair, usually held over a week in mid-January to mark the 
cool season. Organised by the royal court in aid of the Wild Tiger Corps and 
charities, it was the great social event of the year, attended by all levels of Bangkok 
society.50 Attractions included arts and crafts exhibits, flower displays, miniature 
trains, switchbacks, Thai boxing contests, a dance hall with full orchestra, a roller- 
skating rink, and the ubiquitous gambling stalls -  a kaleidoscope of colour and noise 
set in the illuminated splendour of one of the royal gardens.51 Gambling had long 
been a feature of the fair and the games were mostly of the Class 2 ‘fairground’ 
variety: raffles for motorcars, wheels of fortune, fishing for prizes, target shooting 
and such like. By the 1920s, however, more serious forms of gaming, especially cards 
and dice games played for cash rather than prizes, had become prevalent. Although 
the legality of gambling for cash at such occasions was ambiguous -  as will be shown 
in Chapter 5, some newspapers thought it was downright illegal -  the advantages 
were obvious since it was guaranteed to increase the fair’s appeal. In sum, the Winter
50 Rachel Wheatcroft, Siam and Cambodia in Pen and Pastel, London: Constable & Co., 1928, pp. 
165, 168; Ebbe Komerup, Friendly Siam: Thailand in the 1920s> Bangkok: White Lotus, 1999, pp. 
250-1.
51 For descriptions o f the Winter Fair, see BTWM, 7 Jan. 1916, 8 Jan. 1917, 8 Jan. 1919, 6 & 10 Jan. 
1921, 9 & 10 Jan. 1922,12 Feb. 1923, 8 Jan. 1924,19 Jan. 1925.
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Fair had become little more than an excuse for gambling, as evidenced by the large 
numbers of people that would crowd around all the gaming stalls.52 One newspaper 
estimated that not more than 10 percent of the people went to see the sights -  the rest 
were there to gamble. Not for nothing was it known as the country’s ‘annual Monte 
Carlo’.54
Money was raised through entrance fees, totalling about 245,000 baht for the 
1924 fair,55 and the rental of stall space. Gaming stalls at the 1923 fair cost 500 baht 
for the week, in addition to the fee for the gambling permit. The rent was 
considerably higher than that charged at similar events, such as the temple fair at the 
Golden Mount, but stallholders at the Winter Fair benefited from being allowed to 
pay out in cash rather than prizes.56 Such were the profits to be made that there were 
not enough stall spaces to meet demand. Those who did secure spaces, mostly 
government officials and Chinese businessmen, might then sublet to others who were 
willing to pay up to 800 baht for the privilege.57 One entrepreneur was even willing to 
submit a bid of one million baht for the rights to all the gaming stalls at the 1925 
fair.58 The level of gambling must have been extraordinary for stallholders to make a 
profit. As for the Wild Tigers, they received just over 300,000 baht from the 1924 
fair, though this was considerably more than in previous years.59 Clearly, it was a 
good little earner for all.60
52 BTWM, 12 Feb. 1923, 8 Jan. 1924,21 Jan. 1925.
53 NA R.6 N .20.17/29, ‘Fundraising initiatives o f the Wild Tigers compared with other those of other 
organisations.
54 CSW, 13 Feb. 1923.
55 Samphan thai, 19 Jan. 1924. Entrance fees ranged from 25 satang (one quarter o f  a baht) to one baht 
depending on which section of the fair one wished to enter.
56 Satri sap, 16 Dec. 1922.
57 Yamato, 12 Dec. 1922; CSW, 11 Jan. 1923.
58 Sanphranakhon, 24 Nov. 1924.
59 Ibid.
60 All except the king at least. It was rumoured that the 1924 fair cost the Privy Purse one million baht. 
BTWM, 28 Jan. 1924.
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Similar fairs were also staged in the provinces, though if anything, the
emphasis there was even more heavily on gambling. In August 1923, for instance,
Phraya Khathathonbodi, the Lord Lieutenant (samuha-thesaphibari) of monthon
Ratchaburi, held a week-long fete in Ratchaburi town to raise money to build an
airstrip and purchase aeroplanes. The rights to the 32 gambling stalls were auctioned
off for 42,600 baht and, as with the Winter Fair, playing for cash was permitted.61
The following year, the Lord Lieutenant staged another event, this time in aid of the
Wild Tigers, where there was even more gambling: the rights to the 100 stalls fetched
114,500 baht.62 Both occasions were heavily attended by people from Bangkok.63
During and after these fairs, local newspapers were full of horror stories
detailing the malign effects of the unfettered gambling. Take for instance, the wife of
a soldier who hanged herself after losing more than 7,000 baht at the Winter Fair, or
the naval officer who slit his throat, apparently also out of despair at his losses.64 The
Bangkok Times carried a translation from the Kammakon newspaper, which conveyed
the extent of the social damage:
in many cases husbands and fathers of families have pawned and sold 
everything they could lay their hands on in order to gamble away the proceeds 
at the Saranrom Gardens [the location of the Winter Fair]. In a number of such 
cases... the young children in these households have been crying for hunger 
because there has been no money to buy rice, the families have been turned 
out of their dwellings because the rent has not been paid, and husbands and 
wives have parted in anger.65
Press opinion of these events will be examined more deeply in Chapter 5. The general
consensus was that the facilities for public gambling at the fundraising fairs
61 Sayam rat, 16 July & 14 Aug. 1923; BTWM, 17 July 1923; Yamato, 26 July 1923. A similar event in 
aid of the air force was held in Phitsanulok province. Sayam Rat, 21 & 22 Feb. 1924.
62 BTWM, 25 Nov. 1925.
63 NT, 9 Aug. 1923 & 22 Nov. 1924.
64 Samphan thai, 19 Jan. 1924; BTWM, 21 Jan. 1924.
65 BTWM, 21 Jan. 1924.
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impoverished the population and encouraged crime, just as the huai lottery and 
gambling houses had done.
By the final years of the Sixth Reign, the Ministry of the Interior had come to 
this exact conclusion. In addition, it felt that the licensing of Class 2 gambling at fairs 
had too many inconsistencies: some regional authorities took a hard line and did not 
permit it at all, while others allowed excessive indulgence. Moreover, auctioning off 
the monopoly rights to gambling had enabled people to make a living by exploiting 
the general public. At the annual meeting of regional authorities for the year 1924/5, 
it was agreed that permission for Class 2 gambling should be cancelled throughout 
the provinces.66 The cancellation was never implemented, however, due to the 
objections of some local authorities. They insisted that in times of hardship it was
67necessary to raise money in such a manner. Once again, government initiatives to 
curtail gambling fell victim to financial necessity, and fundraising fairs with 
gambling continued to be held into the 1930s.
At the Races
Another form of gambling that benefited from the abolition of the gambling farms 
was that associated with horse-racing. Regular race meetings had been held since the 
Fifth Reign. In 1902, the Royal Bangkok Sports Club (hereafter the RBSC) was 
established by royal charter and was given a lease of land, on which it still stands 
today (for a contemporary photograph of the clubhouse see Figure 3.4).68 Among its 
many purposes, the club was to ‘promote horse breeding and to organise horse 
shows’.69 Siamese ponies were generally used in the races and the methods of betting
66NAR.6N.11.5.Ch/17, ‘Ministry of the Interior consultation on Class 2 gambling’.
67 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
68 Wright and Breakspear (eds), Twentieth Century Impressions, p. 236.
69 NA R.5 N.20/10, ‘Translation of draft of royal charter’.
146
included a totalisator, the bookmakers, and sweepstakes. Originally, the government 
wanted to tax the club’s gambling operations, which would also have required a
70special permit from the Ministry of Finance. The club’s president, A. E. Olarovsky, 
objected strongly to these proposals, reasoning that free permission for the tote and 
lotteries should be given because ‘all over the world [they] are not considered
71gambling and are not subject to gambling laws’. Moreover he argued that, with the 
exception of France, no country taxed the tote and if the club were burdened with 
such taxes in its infancy, it would be unable to function.72 The government was 
swayed by these arguments. The club was granted a tax exemption for three years -  
although this does not seem to have been rescinded after that time -  and, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, horse-racing was not covered by the 1902 gambling law. The 
RBSC was later joined by the Turf Club, which presumably enjoyed similar 
privileges.
Figure 3.4: The Royal Bangkok Sports Club clubhouse (Source: Steve Van Beek, 
Bangkok Then and Now, Bangkok: A B Publications, p. 101)
70 NA R.5 N.20/10, ‘Naret to Chulalongkom, 28 June 1901’; ‘Contract for the leasing of land to the 
RBSC’.
71 NA R.5 N.20/10, ‘Olarovsky to Chulalongkom, Aug. 1901’.
72 NA R.5 N.20/10, ‘Olarovsky to Sommot, 17 & 18 Aug. 1901’.
147
Betting on horse-racing was therefore very loosely regulated. This was no doubt due 
in part to its status as the ‘sport of kings’, reinforced in Siam by royal patronage, and 
its image as a refined, upper-class pursuit. In short, it was siwilai. Furthermore, the 
government may have thought it would have limited appeal for the ordinary Siamese, 
and thus was not as potentially harmful as other forms of gambling. Indeed, for the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, only upper-class Siamese and Westerners 
attended race meetings.73 Lack of regulation meant that the two clubs were perfectly 
placed to take advantage of the abolition of the gambling tax farms, though.
In the early 1920s, horse-racing experienced an enormous surge in popularity 
and every race day, of which there were three or four every month, the courses were 
packed with spectators. Every section of Bangkok society was present: men and 
women, nobles and commoners, government officials and military officers, coolies 
and clerks, wealthy businessmen and destitute beggars, even monks. Banks and 
government offices would close early so their employees could make haste to the 
races. Employers would be approached for loans by staff claiming that their parents 
or children were sick but who would then be found at the racecourse. Pawnshops 
would enjoy increased business. In 1923, at the height of racing’s popularity, over
12,000 people attended one meeting at the Turf Club.74 It was widely recognised that 
this had little to do with a sudden interest in the sport itself but, rather, was due to the 
opportunity for legal gambling that the race meetings provided.75 According to the 
Bangkok Times, ‘Nine-tenths of the outside public have no interest at all in the racing, 
and this they show by leaving the course the moment they have lost all their
73 Sayam sakkhi, 7 July 1923.
74 BTWM, 9 May 1922 & 18 July 1923; NT, 18 April 1923; CSW, 25 June 1923; Sayam Sakkhi, 9 July 
1923.
75 ‘Why is horse-racing so popular with the general public?’ asked one Thai newspaper rhetorically. 
‘The answer is easy: it’s [because of] the lotteries.’ Sayam sakkhi, 7 July 1923.
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money.’76 Of all the ways of betting, the most popular was the one-baht sweepstakes, 
introduced in 1920, which were held on each of the six to eight races run every race 
day. They were affordable to most, offered considerable prizes, and required no skill 
or knowledge of horse-racing to play.77 When the sweepstakes were first launched, 
the prizes ranged from 200 baht to 1,800 but in 1923 the first prize was raised to the 
princely sum of 4,000 baht, further enhancing the appeal of the sweeps.78 At one Turf 
Club meeting in July 1923, it was estimated that 35,000 baht changed hands on the 
sweeps alone.79 For the press and some sections of the reading public, these sweeps 
were nurturing the population’s gambling obsession, impoverishing Bangkok’s 
lower-classes, and accentuating social problems. In brief, the racecourses had become 
little more than open-air gambling dens.
After a concerted campaign by some of the Thai- and English-language 
newspapers, the government finally took action. On 17 July 1923, the Bangkok Police 
Commissioner, Phraya Athikon Prakat, informed the two clubs that the one-baht 
sweeps were henceforth prohibited.81 The impact was immediate: the race meeting at 
the RBSC on 21 July was practically deserted. While the ban was well received by 
the Thai-language press, and most of the Bangkok population apparently,83 some of 
the English-language papers criticised the move. Besides concern about the impact
76 BTWM, 9 May 1922.
77 As the racing correspondent for the Bangkok Times observed: *1 know o f hundreds, who never even 
see the running of the race but await the hoisting of the numbers of the winning ticket and rejoice or 
despair over the result. ’ BTWM, 13 May 1922.
78 Ibid.; BTWM, 9 May 1922; CSW, 18 July 1923.
79 BTWM, 18 July 1923.
80 For examples of these sentiments, see Sayam sakkhi, 9 July 1923; CSW, 18 July 1923; BTWM, 28 & 
31 Jan. 1924.
81 BTWM, 18 July 1923.
82 Yamato, 26 July 1923.
83 Ibid.; KDM, 25 July 1923; Sayam sakkhi, 10 Aug. 1923.
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upon the clubs’ finances, the wisdom of prohibition was questioned.84 As the
Bangkok Times' racing correspondent argued:
The Sweeps were a very mild form of a game of chance and with their closure 
it is but natural to expect that new and more desperate means of gambling will 
be resorted to. For a hundred years the spirit of gambling has been encouraged 
in this country, and in the opinion of not a few experienced men it is an error 
of judgment to seek suddenly to prohibit any indulgence of this weakness of 
nature without providing a more gradual means to the end.85
The original newspaper campaign against the sweeps will be examined in Chapter 5.
For now it suffices to note the influence of the press on government policy. Both
clubs tried to find new ways to appeal to the public and circumvent restrictions
imposed on their betting operations -  lowering the minimum stake for bets on a win
or a place from five baht to one, for instance.86 Nevertheless, horse-racing’s heyday
had passed.
The government’s approach to gambling during the latter half of the Sixth 
Reign was highly contradictory. The Straits Times summed it up as follows: ‘When 
you stop one innocent form of gambling such as the one tical sweeps at the local 
races and sell gambling rights of a province for over Ticals 42,000 [a reference to the 
1923 Ratchaburi fair] it would appear that there is something wrong somewhere. Is it 
that gambling is quite legal if the State reaps benefit?’87 The roots of this 
contradiction lay in the financial imperatives and problems of the Siamese state. It 
meant that playing cards without a license was a harmful ‘evil’ that needed to be 
suppressed and punished but buying a Wild Tiger lottery ticket was a welcome and 
patriotic act, although the player’s motivation was essentially the same in both cases:
84 The objections of the English-language press were addressed in an editorial in the Chino sayam 
warnsap. CSW, 21 July 1923.
85 BTWM, 20 July 1923.
86 Yamato, 26 July 1923.
87 Article reproduced in BDM, 21 Aug. 1923.
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the hope of personal enrichment. In short, gambling was acceptable so long as it 
benefited the nation or, more crucially, the state.
Gambling during the Seventh Reign
The legacy that Vajiravudh bequeathed to his successor, and the last of Siam’s 
absolute monarchs, was an unenviable one. Upon his accession to the throne, King 
Prajadhipok was immediately faced with a range of unresolved political, economic 
and social problems. Not least among these was the issue of gambling. Since the 
abolition of the gambling tax farms, underground dens had flourished, in many cases 
with the support and protection of government officials. This was blamed for rising 
crime levels and greater poverty.88 Moreover, judging from local newspapers and 
government reports, government officials and their wives were some of the most 
inveterate gamblers. Besides making a mockery of state efforts to curb the vice, their 
gambling habit often led to debt, fraud, and corruption.89 Combined with scandals 
such as that surrounding the Wild Tiger lottery and the blatant contradictions in 
government policy, this had given critics of the absolute monarchy ample 
ammunition. It was thus imperative that the government settle upon a consistent 
gambling policy. The Winter Fairs were discontinued and, besides the Lumphini Park 
lottery which was already underway, the Seventh Reign government abandoned the 
use of gambling as a fundraising device. No more lotteries were initiated in Siam 
until the 1930s, although lotteries issued overseas were sometimes allowed to be sold 
in the kingdom.90 This lessening of dependence upon gambling for revenue was made 
possible by the restoration of financial stability in the late 1920s. In early 1926, the
88 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
89 Ibid. Among other examples o f gambling’s pernicious effects, the writer o f this report told o f how a 
wife of low-level official had been reduced to prostitution to pay off her gambling debts.
90 In 1927, for instance, the French colonial government in Indochina issued a lottery in aid of flood 
victims in Tonkin, tickets for which were sold in Bangkok. Si krung, 6 Jan. 1927.
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new king launched an economy drive to reduce government spending, which he led 
by example in cutting royal expenditures. By the late 1920s, state finances were on a 
sound basis once more; the government even managed to record budget surpluses. 
This was aided by the successful revision of the ‘unequal’ treaties, which allowed for 
a modest rise in import duties with a consequent increase in revenue.91 Furthermore, 
Prajadhipok took a hard line on government officials involved in any gambling that 
compromised their duties, instituting a number of disciplinary procedures that will be 
dealt with in Chapter 4. This was mirrored by a broader clampdown on illegal 
gambling: the number of people convicted for gambling offences rose significantly in 
the second half of the 1920s, from 10,586 in 1925/6 to 18,850 in 1929/30.92 
According to a contemporary scholar, greater police activity and harsher sentencing 
by the courts meant ‘innumerable forms of petty gambling were dying out’.93
Nevertheless, people continued to find ways to evade government restrictions 
and get their gambling fix. Two variants of billiards were the craze of the late 1920s. 
Billiards had been played in gentleman’s clubs, both for Westerners and Siamese, 
since the 1910s, perhaps earlier, and, like other Western imports, was not covered by 
existing gambling legislation.94 However, following a clampdown on street gambling 
-  games such as yot lum that involved pitching coins -  labourers and teenage boys 
turned to a variant of billiards, called billiard ru.95 It was played on a table with nine 
holes set into the far end, each of which carried a different points value, and three 
balls (see Figure 3.5). The winner was the first player to reach a certain number of 
points. It was normally played by 2 to 4 people and the usual bet was one or two baht
91 Ingram, Economic Change, p. 190; Batson, End o f the Absolute Monarchy, pp. 34-6, 90-4.
92 S Y 1929-30, pp. 302-3.
93 Landon, Chinese in Thailand, p. 91.
94 See the numerous newspaper clippings on billiards competitions in NA R.6 N .20,17/13, ‘Kanphanan 
binliatb
95 KDM, 25 May 1928.
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per game, although children might bet as little as 10 satang.% Like other forms of 
popular gaming, billiard m  required little skill and, according to the press, tended to
97 • jbe paid purely for betting purposes. By mid-1928, the game had spread throughout 
the country: it was so popular in Saraburi province that owners of tables did not have
n o
to engage in any other form of work. One newspaper declared it ‘the age of little 
billiards’ in the capital." It was not long before newspapers began to carry reports of 
fraud, burglaries, violent quarrels, divorces and suicides that were all attributed to the
1 n n  i  m
game’s pernicious influence. As with previous gambling crazes, they pressed the 
government to take action.
Figure 3.5: A billiard ru table (Source: Phakdi, Khamnbanyai)
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.; NT, 13 June 1928’; Si krung, 13 Aug. 1928; Bangkok kanmuang, 25 Aug. 1928.
98 AT, 13 June 1928’.
99 Si krung, 15 June 1928.
i°° ^   ^July 1928; KDM, 3 & 13 Oct. 1928; Bangkok kanmuang, 30 Jan. 1929.
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It was against this backdrop that the government began to consider drafting a 
new gambling law. The consensus was that the existing legislation was deficient and 
out of date. First, the 1902 law had been designed with the taxation of gambling in 
mind rather than its restriction. Second, the requirement that all games under the 
scope of the act had to be specified by name failed to take account of the fact that the 
forms and methods of gambling were constantly evolving, as evidenced by the spread 
of billiard ru. Stemming from this, courts commonly dismissed cases of illegal 
gambling on the grounds that the game being played was not mentioned in the 
relevant laws. Once again, the idea of a blanket prohibition on all forms of gambling, 
with exceptions for certain games on certain occasions or when specific criteria were 
met, was raised.101 The focus of this proposed law was to be the suppression of 
gambling rather than the protection of revenue. As in the past, however, this principle 
was rejected as too radical. For the Minister of Justice, defining gambling was 
extremely difficult, and the possibility of people being imprisoned for something as 
innocuous as playing golf for cigarettes was brought up. Nevertheless, it was agreed 
that the legislation needed revising and that, reflecting the shift in focus, 
responsibility for issuing regulations and administering the law should be transferred
109from Finance to the Ministry of the Interior. Work on drafting a new law began in 
September 1928.
Once news of the drafting became public, rumours began to circulate that 
billiard ru would be prohibited under the new legislation.103 This had an interesting, 
though unintentional, side-effect. Although the government took no further 
immediate actions against the game, owners of billiard halls began to convert their 
tables so that another variant, billiard him, might be played instead and the impending
101 NA R.7 Kli.2/2, ‘Boriphat to Prajadliipok, 8 Aug. 1928’.
102 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Extract from the Council o f Ministers, 18 Aug. 1928\
m  Lakmuang, 15 Oct. 1928.
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ban avoided. Because this version had been around for a long time and was 
commonly found in Western hotels, these owners believed it would escape the ban. 
Moreover, by converting to lum they hoped to circumvent the recent prohibition on 
government officials playing ru and thereby enjoy an increase in custom.104 Lum used 
a similar scoring system to ru but was played on a regular billiards table. By February 
1929, it was estimated that there were up to 900 billiard lum tables in the capital, ten 
times as many as there were for ru.105 According to the Krungthep Daily Mail, not 
one table was free during Chinese New Year and the billiard halls resembled the 
gambling houses of old.106 Predictably, some elements of the press expressed concern 
about this latest development and once again urged the government to do 
something.107 Rather than wait for the new law to be enacted, the police launched a 
clampdown in February 1929 on a number of operators on the grounds that they had 
set up tables outside and were obstructing the roads.108 Shortly after, the Director 
General of the Public Prosecutions Department ruled that billiard lum had similar 
characteristics to some forbidden games and it was promptly prohibited by the 
Bangkok Police Commissioner.109 Besides illustrating the power of the press, this 
example demonstrates how gambling organisers and players often remained one step 
ahead of the law. Gambling legislation was like an old, leaking ship. Once one hole 
had been plugged, another would quickly appear. The principle on which it was 
founded -  that all gambling was legal except for that proscribed in legislation -  meant 
that making the law watertight was impossible; people were constantly finding novel 
and inventive ways of breaching the ship’s hull.
104 Ibid.
105 KDM, 13 Feb. 1929.
106 KDM, 10 Feb. 1929.
107 See for instance Bangkok kanmuang, 4 Feb. 1929.
108 Bangkok kanmuang, 7 Feb. 1929.
109 KDM, 19 & 20 Feb. 1929.
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After two years of discussions and preliminary drafts, the Gambling Act B. E. 
2473 and its attendant ministerial regulations were finally issued in September 1930, 
annulling all previous gambling legislation.110 As mentioned above, this law adhered 
to the principle of specifying forbidden games and those that required a license. There 
were 24 of each. Joining the banned list were some that had previously required a 
license, such as si ngao lak, and a few new games that had become so widespread as 
to alarm the government, including the two variants of billiards and the dice game hi- 
lo. More importantly, the range of games that required a license was broadened: 
bookmaking, bingo, sweepstakes and totes were now included, and the procedure for 
licensing large-scale lotteries finally standardised. Besides the usual permit fees, a 10 
percent tax was imposed on lotteries, raffles, sweeps, totes and bookmaking; ensuring 
the state might profit directly from these undertakings. Moreover, people wishing to 
sell foreign lottery tickets now had to apply for a permit and also pay this tax. 
Regulations governing the conduct of licensed games were also tightened. Operators 
of fairground gambling games -  bingo, target shooting, throwing rings over prizes 
and suchlike -  could no longer offer monetary prizes and were prohibited from taking 
back any prizes in return for cash. In all cases, the price of permit fees was increased 
substantially. With regard to penalties, all offences carried a maximum sentence of 
two years or a fine of up to 5,000 baht or both. This was a significant increase in the 
tariff. Significantly, the courts were given a relatively free hand in the sentencing of 
gambling offenders.
The law did make some concessions to public tastes, however. As noted in a 
Ministry of the Interior circular, the purpose of the new act was to eliminate harmful 
forms of gambling, while relaxing the regulations on games played for
110 For the complete act and regulations see PKPS, 43, pp. 143-55.
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entertainment.111 Therefore, playing cards or billiards in piivate homes between
family and friends, or in clubs between members, no longer required a permit,
provided it was done for entertainment and the organiser or owner of the house
received no commission. Card games could only be played in this way between
midday and 2am.112 This allowance was a reflection of how widespread unlicensed
card playing in private homes had become. No doubt due to the inherent difficulties
in detecting such violations, people had been gambling on cards without fear of
arrest.113 ‘Free’ card playing was a state recognition of the futility of attempting to
enforce this aspect of previous legislation and the burden it placed upon an
overstretched police force. In this respect, the Seventh Reign government adopted a
realistic, practical approach to the gambling problem.
Two controversial aspects of this law were the provisions in Sections 5 and 6,
which read as follows:
Section 5 — In the case of anyone who arranges for or promotes games which 
are usually considered to be gambling games, whether the stakes be money or 
other property, the law assumes that such person arranges such games to 
derive personal profit. And anyone who takes part in such games is assumed 
by the law to be gambling for money or other property.
Section 6 -  Any person found in the circle (yvong) where there is being played 
a game that contravenes this Act, the Ministerial Regulations or the conditions 
of the license, is assumed to be taking part in the game. This Section does not 
apply to spectators of games at fairs, markets or other public places.114
As a contemporary commentary on the act observed, these effectively reversed the
established Western legal principle whereby the prosecution was responsible for
proving the guilt of the defendant.115 In other words, if  the accused contested the
prosecution’s claim that they were gambling illegally, it was up to them to prove they
111 Thesaphiban, 30, pp. 801-2.
112 RKP5, 43, p. 153.
113 Anek, [Thai Card Games], p. 13.
m PKPS, 43, pp. 144-5.
115 Thesaphiban, 30, pp. 739-41.
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were not. This was tantamount to a presumption of guilt until proven innocent and, 
from a Western legal point of view, highly dubious. The original draft had gone even 
further: anybody arrested while leaving or entering a place where gambling was 
going on was presumed to have participated in the gambling, and in cases where the 
defendant was the owner of the building, the slightest hint that they might have 
known of the gambling was reason enough to presume they were fully aware of it.116 
While reviewing this draft, the Council of Ministers decided to cut these particular
117provisions because they contradicted legal norms. That some of these specific 
measures did survive is a reflection of the inherent difficulties in prosecuting 
gambling cases successfully and, like the rise in penalties, a testament to the 
seriousness with which the government viewed the gambling problem.
By the time the new law was promulgated, Siam had begun to feel the impact 
of the worldwide economic depression. Crop failures in May 1930 were swiftly 
followed by a slump in rice exports and by early 1932 the price of rice had fallen to 
one-third of its 1930 value.118 The economic crisis was exacerbated by the Siamese 
government’s decision to remain on the gold standard when Britain abandoned it. The 
high foreign currency price of Siam’s rice, compared to rice sold in currencies that 
had left the gold standard, made it uncompetitive. This led to a severe reduction in 
farmers’ cash income and an inability to pay their taxes or debts. Consequently, 
purchase of retail goods and expenditure on ‘non-essentials’ such as merit-making 
and marriages declined. There was a flood of petitions to the king calling for 
reductions in the capitation and land taxes to alleviate the economic distress. 
Moreover, a drop in imports and exports meant a fall in government revenue and by 
early 1932 the necessity of cutting state expenditures by one-third was painfully
116 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Draft o f Gambling Law 2 47 ...’.
117 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Report of the Council o f Ministers, 4 Feb. 1929’.
118 Batson, End o f  the Absolute Monarchy, pp. 188, 207.
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apparent. The government embarked upon another round of retrenchment, more 
drastic than the last. Many government officials were dismissed or had their salaries 
cut. The bureaucracy was also burdened with a new salary tax.119 Given all this, it is 
hard to assess the exact effect of the 1930 law on gambling. Revenue from license 
fees rose slightly in the crisis years -  from around 340,000 baht in 1929/30 to just 
over 420,000 in 1931/2 -  before falling to just under 380,000 baht in 1932/3.120 This 
was more likely a result of the rise in permit prices and the increased number of 
activities that required licensing rather than a reflection of higher levels of legal 
gambling. There was also a drop in the number of people convicted for illegal 
gambling, from 18,580 in 1929/30 to 16,006 in 1930/1 and then to 12,588 the 
following year.121 Since the government did not abandon its policy of suppression, 
these figures suggest a decrease in illegal gambling.
Nevertheless, there are indications that the allowance for ‘free’ card playing 
was taken up enthusiastically by all levels of Siamese society, from nobles and 
government officials down to the common man. In his memoirs, Khun Wichit Matra 
recalls that it was during this period that the phrase pai yat mit, meaning ‘to go [and 
see] relatives and friends’, became slang for ‘to play cards.’122 The most graphic 
illustration of the boom in card playing was the expansion of the local playing-card 
industry. In the early 1930s, the three principal card manufacturers were churning out
5,000 packs a day, while other companies produced around 2,000. This eliminated the 
problem of having to import cards from China or the West, making cards more easily
119 Wyatt, Thailand, pp. 227-8; Batson, End o f  the Absolute Monarchy, pp. 207-8.
120 Sy 7937-33, p. 294.
121 Convictions for gambling as a percentage o f total convictions and the ratio o f people convicted per 
10,000 of population also decreased over the same period. S Y 1931-33, pp. 354-5.
122 Wichit, [80 Years], p. 95.
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available and cheap.123 From this it can be surmised that people played cards as a 
respite from the economic and political turbulence of the early 1930s.
In 1932, at the lowest point of the crisis, the Siamese Red Cross requested 
permission to conduct a 500,000 baht lottery. This organisation relied on donations 
from the public and the government for its income but these had dried up, and it had 
been unable to balance its budget for the year 1932/3. Income from the lottery was 
vital if it was to continue all its operations. Although lotteries had fallen out of favour 
during the Seventh Reign and this was the first request for several years, both the 
king and the Minister of the Interior, Prince Boriphat, supported the proposal; arguing 
that the lottery would benefit public welfare and the government, which stood to 
receive 50,000 baht in tax. Boriphat gave weight to his opinion by noting that a Royal 
Commission on Lotteries and Betting had recently been set up in Britain to consider 
relaxing the prohibition on lotteries in aid of public charities.124 A final decision was 
deferred to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, scheduled for 27 June 
1932  125 g ut Siamese Red Cross had to wait a little longer for a reply. On 24 June 
1932, a small group of disaffected military officers and low-level civilian bureaucrats, 
the self-styled People’s Party, staged a remarkably bloodless coup, bringing an end to 
the absolute monarchy and instituting a new age of constitutional government.
The Birth of the State Lotteries
Under the direction of the People’s Party but in active consultation with the king, a 
constitution that invested supreme authority in a partially elected National Assembly 
was drawn up. The permanent version of this constitution was proclaimed on 10
123 Anek, [Thai Card Games], p. 14.
124 NA R.7 M.15/4, ‘Boriphat to Mahithon, 17 June 1932’; NA (2) SR.0201.101/1, ‘Cover Sheet -  
Royal Opinion, 20 June 1932’. On the Royal Commission, see Munting, Economic and Social History, 
p. 58.
125 NA R.7 M.15/4, ‘Wibun to Damrong, 24 June 1932’.
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December 1932. Yet, despite the change in leadership and all its professed democratic 
ideals, real political change was slight. The People’s Party was the real power in the 
country and it attempted to halt any challenges to its authority by outlawing rival 
political parties. In other words, a small royal elite was merely replaced by an equally 
small elite composed of military officers, old-school bureaucrats and younger 
officials. Within this loose coalition, there was fierce jockeying for power during the 
first years of the constitutional era. From this emerged two figures who were to play a 
central role in the politics of the 1930s and 1940s: Phibun Songkhram, head of the 
military faction, and Pridi Phanomyong, leader of the civilians. Both saw the 
promotion of certain forms of gambling and the suppression of others as a means to 
shape Siamese society to their divergent ideals. Economically, the new regime had 
the good fortune to come to power at the worst point of the depression. Recovery was 
rapid: exports began to grow almost immediately, as did the government’s revenues. 
Indeed, despite all the problems, budget surpluses were the norm during the 1930s. 
Financial conservatism remained the guiding principle.126 Similarly, there was no 
radical change in the policy on gambling. As Virginia Thompson put it, ‘The 
constitutional regime inherited its predecessor’s confusing and unrealistic attitude 
towards gambling, namely, that it was demoralizing if for private benefit but harmless 
if the State used the proceeds to finance public works.’127 In this respect, it is telling 
that the People’s Party gave approval to the Siamese Red Cross lottery within two 
months of coming to power.128 However, the new regime was to go much further in 
promoting state-sponsored gambling and suppressing private gaming than the 
absolute monarchy ever had.
126 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 239; Ingram, Economic Change, pp. 191, 329.
127 Thompson, Thailand, p. 696.
128 NA (2) SR.0201.101/1, ‘President of People’s Committee to Minister o f the Interior, 11 Aug. 
1932’.
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From the outset, state-run lotteries were a key component of the new
government’s plans for the economic development of the country. In early 1933, Pridi
submitted his ‘Outline Economic Plan’ to the National Assembly.129 Influenced by
European socialist thought, to which he had been exposed during his studies in Paris,
this plan was an expression of Pridi’s belief that the state should play a central role in
fostering economic progress. Tucked in amongst proposals for the voluntary
nationalisation of all land and state-led industrialisation was the suggestion for a
national lottery.130 Pridi justified it as follows:
Although a lottery is a form of gambling and risk taking, the gain or loss for 
the risk taker is only a small amount.... Concerning the organization of a 
lottery in this way, some Thai people are sensitive to criticism for promoting 
gambling. But please see the example in France where the Credit National 
bonds to raise money for rebuilding the country which had been destroyed in 
war, were bonds of a type which also provided a lottery for the bondholders. 
In Britain itself there are horse racing courses and there are many British 
people who like horse racing. But we have no wish to go that far. We wish 
only a lottery which people can play in small amounts but have an opportunity 
to make a lot of money.1 1
In brief, the use of gambling as a revenue source by Western states legitimised the
promotion of lotteries by the Siamese state.
The more radical proposals in Pridi’s plan caused a wave of controversy and
sparked a political struggle, both within the People’s Party and between the new
regime and the old, royalist one. From this, the military faction of the People’s Party
emerged as the dominant force. Prajadhipok was enlisted in denouncing the plan and
he wrote a highly critical commentary in which he likened Pridi to Stalin; the only
point of which he approved was the introduction of a lottery.132 The plan was
rejected, the Assembly suspended and Pridi sent into brief exile. In spite of this, the
129 For a complete translation o f the plan, see Pridi Banomyong, Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on 
Life, Politics, and Economy, trans. Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books, 2000, pp. 83-123.
130 Ibid., pp. 100, 120.
131 Ibid, p. 123 n. 10.
132 Ibid., p. 63; Baker and Pasuk, Thailand, p. 120.
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idea of a state-run lottery was taken up with enthusiasm. It is worth noting that many 
European governments had recently lifted restrictions on lotteries; France, for 
instance, reintroduced government lotteries in 193 3.133 This lent additional legitimacy 
to the Siamese government’s scheme. While there may have been doubts about the 
wisdom of encouraging gambling, even for charitable purposes, previous experience 
had shown that if the state was not going to provide an outlet for gambling, other 
interests, legal or illegal, would take advantage of the gap in the market. Then 
Financial Adviser, James Baxter, provided a neat summary of the government’s 
approach: ‘Since it would... appear* that the Siamese are ardent devotees of the 
Goddess of Chance and will not be denied access to Her shrine, public interest would 
seem to lie in the Cult being guided, controlled and exploited by the State.’134
In April 1933, a committee was set up to organise the first state lottery, the 
proceeds of which would be used to develop education and health care.135 The plan 
was to experiment with a single one million baht lottery, with tickets at one baht each, 
in the first year. Rather than having just a few large prizes, the government decided to 
have many smaller ones as well, in order to strengthen the lottery’s appeal, encourage 
sales and ensure a large number of winners. If it proved a success, it would become 
a regular affair and its frequency might be increased. Although it was plagued by a 
number of problems -  delays in the printing of tickets, difficulties distributing them 
in the provinces, accusations of official negligence, and disrupted tickets sales due to 
the royalist rebellion led by Prince Boworadet during October and November 1933 —
133 Munting, Economic and Social History, p. 36.
134 N A K K h.0301.1.3/11, ‘Subject:- Issue ofLotteries by Public Authorities, 30 June 1934’.
135 NA (2) SR.0201.101/5, ‘Cabinet Secretary to Minister of the Interior, 18 April 1933’.
136 There were 383 prizes amounting to 500,000 baht in total. These ranged from a first prize o f 80,000 
baht to 250 prizes of 400 baht each. See NA (2) SR.0201.101/5, ‘Report o f meeting o f committee for 
laying down framework for lottery in aid of education and health care, 1 May 1933’; ‘PM to Chao 
Phraya Mukkhamontri, 2 June 1933’; ‘System for issuing first state lottery’; ‘Mukkhamontri to Phraya 
Mano’; ‘Report of state lottery committee meeting, 12 June 1933’.
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and the expenses were much more than anticipated, the first lottery was deemed 
enough of a success for more to be organised.137 Even before it was drawn on 8 April 
1934, preparations were being made for the next one million baht extravaganza. With 
the government planning to reduce the rate of the capitation tax in 1934/5, the 
expressed aim of these lotteries was to make good the revenue shortfall.138 
Significantly, to ensure that all tickets were sold and the state lotteries were a success, 
it was decided that other organisations would be prevented from issuing their own 
lotteries.139
In a sense, government gambling policy had come full circle since the days of 
Chulalongkom. When he started the closure of the gambling houses, the revenue 
basis of the Siamese state shifted from indirect to direct taxation. In the depressed 
economic climate of the mid-193Os, the constitutional government partly reversed 
this process in order to alleviate the hardship being felt by the Siamese population. 
Lotteries allowed the government to reduce the direct tax burden on the population, 
and thereby win popular support, while also raising income for much-needed 
infrastructure projects. The crucial difference was that the government was no longer 
dependent on tax farmers to operate gambling ventures and collect the revenue. The 
state had evolved to the point where it could undertake these tasks itself. Moreover, 
lotteries were to be a monopoly of the state, no competitors were tolerated. Thus, 
when the Siamese Red Cross, which was still experiencing financial difficulties,
137 NA (2) SR.0201.101/5, ‘Mukkhamontri to PM, 18 Sept. 1933’; ‘Mukkhamontri to Cabinet 
Secretary, 1 Nov. 1933’; NA (2) SR.0201.101/6, ‘Minister o f Finance to PM, 8 June 1934*.
138 NA K Kh.0301.1.3/10, ‘D. G. of Revenue’s Memo on State Lottery Scheme B. E, 2477 to S. C. 
Finance dated 2nd Jan. B. E. “76 [1934]’.
139 NA (2) SR.0201.101/6, ‘Minister o f Finance to PM, 25 Jan. 1934’; ‘Cabinet Secretary to Minister 
of Finance, 15 Feb. 1934’.
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asked for permission to conduct another lottery, it was refused, though it was 
informed that it might request a share of the proceeds from the state lottery.140
Tickets for the second state lottery went on sale from 13 April 1934 and sold 
out within four months. One significant innovation was 100 baht prizes for all tickets 
that shared the same three final figures as the winning ticket. This meant there were 
over 1,000 prizes in total. Moreover, winning tickets were evenly distributed 
throughout the country; when the results were issued on 17 August 1934 only two 
provinces did not have a winner. Total profits were over 440,000 baht.141 No sooner 
had the results been issued than tickets for the next lottery that year went on sale; the 
draw was scheduled for December 1934.142 Regular state lotteries were to become a 
permanent fixture and the state was using gambling once more to provide a steady 
income. Such was their popularity among the population and their profitability for the 
government that in 1939 the Phibun Songkhram government set up the Lottery Office 
to conduct monthly lotteries. These have continued to the present day, going twice 
monthly in 1989.143
Besides the official state lottery, the new regime initiated another in 1933: the 
Constitution Celebration lottery. The proceeds from this were to cover the costs of the 
countrywide festivities for Constitution Day on 10 December 1933. Any surplus 
funds would be used to distribute copies of the constitution.144 Two sets of 150,000 
tickets each, one probably just for sale in Bangkok and the other with a wider 
distribution, were issued in November 1933 and the results were drawn on 11 and 12
140 NA (2) SR.0201.101/12, ‘Chairman of the Siamese Red Cross to Phraya Phahon, 12 March 1934’.
141 On the framework and organisation o f this lottery, see NA K Kh.0301.1.3/10, ‘D. G. of Revenue’s 
Memo on State Lottery Scheme B. E. 2477 to S. C. Finance dated 2nd Jan. B. E. “76 [1934]’; NA (2) 
SR.0201.101/6, ‘Report on issuing million baht state lottery (1st occasion), B. E. 2477’.
142 NA (2) SR.0201.101/6, ‘Cabinet Secretary to Minister of the Interior, 9 June 1934’.
143 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, p. 48.
144 Celebrations were held in 67 provinces. NA (2) SR.0201.101/8, ‘President o f the Constitution 
Celebration lottery committee to Cabinet Secretary, 18 Nov. 1933’; ‘Cabinet Secretary to Minister of 
the Interior, 6 Jan. 1934’.
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December, Demand was so great that the second set sold out within four days.145 
There were also reports of people selling them for more than their stated price of one 
baht.146 Total profits amounted to almost 100,000 baht.147 But the Constitution 
Celebration lottery did not have only a fundraising purpose. Having brought an end to 
monarchical absolutism, the People’s Party used constitutionalism as the basis for
14R *rationalising and legitimising its rule. Moreover, it sought to remove the king as the 
central component in the pre-existing state ideology -  the ‘holy trinity’ of Nation, 
Religion, and King -  that formed the bedrock of Siamese identity and the unity of the 
Siamese nation. A fourth element, the constitution, was now promoted as the 
guarantor of Siamese independence and progress.149 Making the constitution a focus 
of public loyalty was thus imperative for the new government. However, for most of 
the population, a constitution -  in Thai ratthathammanun -  was an alien idea of 
which they had only a shaky understanding. Apparently, some even thought 
ratthathammanun was a relation of Phraya Phahon, the prime minister from June 
1933 to September 1938.150 During the Constitution Day celebrations, people were 
encouraged to make offerings to copies of the constitution, which was presented as a 
sacred entity to which even the king was subordinate.151 By the mid-1930s,
145 NA (2) SR.0201.101/10, ‘President o f the Constitution Celebration lottery committe, 2nd instance, 
to Minister o f Finance, Dec. 1933’.
146 NA (2) SR.0201.101/8, ‘President of the Constitution Celebration lottery committee to Cabinet 
Secretary, 25 Nov. 1933’.
147 NA (2) SR.0201.101/8, ‘President o f the Constitution Celebration lottery committee, 1st instance, to 
Cabinet Secretary, 29 Dec. 1933’; NA (2) SR.0201.101/10, ‘President o f the Constitution Celebration 
lottery committee, 2nd instance, to Cabinet Secretary, 10 Jan. 1934’.
148 Chai-anan Samudavanija, ‘State-Identity Creation, State-Building and Civil Society, 1939-1989’ in 
Craig J. Reynolds (ed.), National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today, revised ed., Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm, 2002, p. 51.
149 As Pridi explained in a radio broadcast on the fourth anniversary o f the coup: ‘The constitution is 
the highest dhamma to enable the Siamese people to survive as an independent nation.’ See Pridi, 
Pridi, p. 196. Similarly, the chief ideologue o f the new regime, Luang Wichit Wathakan, proclaimed: 
‘Let everybody be confident that this constitution will bring progress and happiness to our country. We 
must make our constitution secure as it is the basis o f our nation.’ Quoted in Barme, Luang Wichit 
Wathakan, p. 109.
150 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 239.
151 Barme, Luang Wichit Wathakan, pp. 111-13.
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Constitution Day had been turned into the premier national holiday, complete with 
beauty contests, musical concerts and parades. Constitution Celebration lotteries also 
became regular fixtures, and these served to generate public interest.1^ 2 Even the 
lottery tickets were an integral part of the strategy for familiarising people with the 
constitution and sacralising it. Each bore an image of the constitution, resting on a 
pedestal, with rays of light emanating from it, suggesting enlightenment (see Figure 
3.6a for an example ticket for the first Constitution Celebration lottery and Figure 
3.6b for one, bearing an image of the recently completed Democracy Monument, for 
1940 lottery). In short, this lottery had a political purpose as well as a financial one.
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Figures 3.6a and b: Constitution Celebration Lottery tickets (Source: Anek, A Century 
o f Thai Design, p. 65)
152 Constitution Celebration lotteries were held intermittently up to 1956. Anake Nawigamune (comp.), 
A Century o f Thai Graphic Design, London: Thames and Hudson, 2000, p. 65.
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The endorsement and promotion of lotteries by the central government 
inspired local authorities to organise them as well in aid of local development 
projects. The first request came in early 1934 from the MP for Ratchaburi, who 
identified improving that province’s communications infrastructure as the top 
priority.153 Because it lacked the funds to carry out such a project, the Cabinet 
approved the proposal but with the condition that tickets could be sold only within 
Ratchaburi province.154 A wave of similar requests from other MPs followed but 
these were all denied. The Cabinet was concerned that a proliferation of such lotteries 
might lead to administrative confusion.155 Given the central government’s plans to 
expand the scope of the state lotteries in the year 1934/5, these refusals presumably 
also stemmed from fears of competition. However, the Ministry of the Interior did not 
object to provincial lotteries as such, so long as they were centrally organised. In July 
1934, the Cabinet gave the Ministry of the Interior permission to issue lotteries to 
raise capital for the establishment of municipal authorities in every province.156 
Taking up some earlier proposals of Prajadhipok for more representative government 
at the local level, the constitutional regime had issued the Municipality Act in 
1933.157 This was designed to give local people a greater say in the administration of 
their own provinces and the Ministry of the Interior began to implement the act in 
1935/6. To support the country’s seventy-odd municipal governments, two types of 
municipal lottery (chalak kinbaeng thesaban) were established: monthly ones of
200,000 baht a time in aid of particular provinces, the tickets of which could be sold
153 NA (2) SR.0201.101/2, ‘Nai Kim Seng to Minister of the Interior, 10 Feb. 1934s.
154 NA (2) SR.0201.101/2, ‘Cabinet Secretary to Minister of the Interior, 17 Feb. and 7 March 1934s.
155 NA (2) SR.0201.101/7, ‘MP for Samut Sakhon to Phahon, 27 Feb. 1934s; ‘Cabinet Secretary to MP 
for Samut Sakhon, 21 March 1934s; ‘Cabinet Secretary to Nai Sanit Charoenrat, 15 March 1934’; 
‘Cabinet Secretary to Luang Sri Prakat, 22 March 1934s.
t56 NA (2) SR.0201.101/13, ‘Report o f meeting laying down the framework for 1st municipal lotteries, 
B. E. 2477s.
157 For Prajadhipok's proposals on municipal governments, see Batson, End o f  the Absolute Monarchy, 
pp. 139-41.
168
only in that province; and countrywide ones to the value of one million baht that were 
issued every four months (for example tickets of this second type see Figures 3.7a 
and b).158 Proceeds from this second type went into a central hand that was then 
shared amongst all the provinces for building municipal offices, provincial hospitals, 
schools, wells, and sports stadia.I5g It is ironic that something designed to enable 
more representative local government should be so strictly controlled by the central 
state. But it shows just how protective the state was of its ability to tap people’s 
gambling instincts to fund public works.
Figures 3.7a and b: Municipal Lottery tickets (Source: Anek, A Century o f  Thai 
Design, p. 65)
To sum up, within a few years of the 1932 coup, the constitutional 
government had set up a system of lotteries that in their purpose, size, and scope 
surpassed those that had been organised during the 1920s. Indeed, the various state- 
run lotteries were an integral part of the new regime’s plans for the economic,
158 NA (2) SR.0201.101/13, ‘Report of meeting laying down the framework for Is* municipal lotteries, 
B. E. 2477’.
159 NA (2) SR.0201.101/13, ‘Minister of the Interior to PM, 8 Nov. 1935’.
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administrative, and educational development of the county. The provision that 
winning tickets in the state lottery were evenly distributed throughout the country 
made this a truly national event. The structure of the municipal lotteries, meanwhile, 
emphasised the individuality of each province but as a unit within a much greater 
national whole. Lastly, the Constitution Celebration lotteries served to raise public 
awareness of and, possibly, loyalty to the new pillar of state authority. In short, the 
state lotteries were a tool for nation-building.
The Monte Carlo of the Far East
The People’s Party had come to power with the support of the business community 
and, initially at least, it was more accommodating than the absolute monarchy had 
been towards companies establishing gaming ventures for profit. In the early years of 
the constitutional era, there were numerous requests to establish enterprises such as 
bingo halls; one businessman even agitated for pennission to re-establish the huai 
lottery. Applications stressed how the country would benefit economically through 
the creation of jobs and in taxes paid to the government, though not all were 
successful.160 Places such as the Suan S’nuk {suan sanuk) entertainment hall, which 
offered fairground-style gambling games and bingo, but no cash prizes, sprang up in 
Bangkok.161 The more liberal government attitude towards gambling was reflected in 
the sharp increase in revenue from license fees, from around 400,000 baht a year 
during the last years of the absolute monarchy to just under one million baht in 
1933/4 and then to almost 1.7 million baht in 1934/5.162 One idea that was frequently
160 For bingo halls see NA (2) SR.0201.31/1, ‘Nai Song Rattanaphlin to Phraya Mano, 15 Feb. 1933’; 
Nai Maen Makhaburut to Phraya Mano, 25 March 1933’. The request to run /jwch-style lotteries was 
denied. NA (2) SR.0201.31/2, ‘Phra Anuwat Ratchaniyom to the Cabinet, 6 March 1933’; ‘Cabinet 
Secretary to Anuwat, 6 Jan. 1934’.
161BTWM, 19 May 1934.
162 S Y 1937-38 & 1938-39, p. 280.
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touted -  in the government, business circles, and the press -  was the creation of 
Westem-style casinos and the transformation of Siam into ‘the Monte Carlo of the 
Far East’.163 Although this was not the first time the example of Monte Carlo was 
brought up, it seems to have particularly excited the public imagination in the mid- 
1930s. Literate Siamese would have been familiar with Monte Carlo and its casinos 
through their portrayal in travelogues, essays, and Arkartdamkeung Rapheephat’s 
1929 hit novel, Lakhon haeng chiwit (The Circus of Life) in particular.164 Although 
Arkart does not hold back in detailing some of the grim realities of the city, the 
overall impression of Monte Carlo is of a sophisticated locale in which the rich and 
famous rub shoulders. The novel’s protagonist, a Thai man called Wisoot who works 
as an overseas journalist, meets and interviews an array of luminaries, including 
Edgar Wallace, George Bernard Shaw and the American millionaire Vanderbilt.165 
While most of these people would have been unfamiliar to the average Siamese 
reader, the name-dropping would have enhanced the glamorous image of Monte 
Carlo and, by association, casinos. Among certain parts of Siamese society the casino 
was identified as a symbol of modernity and siwilai.
Casinos certainly had the support of powerful elements within the new 
political elite, who saw them as a mechanism for promoting economic development 
and tourism. In March 1934, Phibun suggested building a casino on the island of Ko 
Si Chang, one of the country’s main ports. Because large ships were unable to pass 
upstream to Bangkok, the island was an unloading point for cargo and was often host
163 BTWM, 19 May 1934.
164 Chulalongkom visited Monte Carlo on his two trips to Europe, first in 1897 and again in 1907. His 
impressions and those o f this retinue are included in Phraya Si Sahathep (Seng Wiriyasi), Chotmaihet 
sadet praphcit yurop r. s. 116 [Records o f the royal visit to Europe in 1897], Bangkok: Khrusapha, 
1997, p. 487 and King Chulalongkom, Klai ban [Far from home], vol. 1, Bangkok: 
Sophonphiphanthathankan, 1923/4, pp. 184-92. See also Thongchai, ‘Quest for “Siwilai’”, pp. 537-40.
165 Arkartdamkeung Rapheebat, The Circus o f  Life, trans. Phongdeit Jiangphattanarket and ed. Marcel 
Barang, Bangkok: Modem Thai Classics, 1995, pp. 194-6. Arkart travelled to Europe in 1924 and then 
went on to the United States.
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to large numbers of sailors. A casino would provide them with entertainment, 
increase state revenues and help develop the port.166 When the company that managed 
Suan S’nuk learnt of Phibun’s proposal, it offered to take on the project and transform 
the island into a tourist resort. Alongside the Monte Carlo-style casino where Western 
games such as roulette and baccarat would be played, its plans included building a 
hotel, a harbour, tennis courts, a golf course and swimming pool to attract foreign 
visitors.167 Shortly after, the Ministry of Economic Affairs suggested the creation of a 
public corporation, in which the government would hold the majority of shares, to 
manage a casino in the royal coastal resort of Hua Hin. It would also stage horse- 
racing meetings.168 Around the same time, a former government minister and his 
associates formed a company to establish the ‘Little Heaven’ (muang sawan noi) 
casino in Bangkok. This met with fierce public opposition and permission was 
refused.169 Similarly, neither of the first two proposals seem to have got off the 
ground.
Despite these setbacks, the proponents of casinos received a boost when the 
Gambling Act B. E. 2478 was promulgated in January 1936. This law will be 
discussed more fully in the next section but for now it should be noted that Section 4 
allowed for casinos, in which any game specified in List A (banned games) could be 
played.170 This provision provoked heated debate when the draft law was given its 
second reading in the Assembly. Despite objections that casinos would be the ruin of 
the Siamese population, the key argument in their favour was that since gambling was 
a part of human nature, it was better that it was confined to certain areas and that the 
government derive some revenue from it. Moreover, restrictions could be imposed to
166 NA (2) SR.0201.31/3, ‘Report o f Cabinet meeting, 9 March 1934’.
167 NA (2) SR.0201.31/4, ‘Phraya Khathathonbodi to Phahon, 20 March 1934s.
168 NA (2) SR.0201.31/6, ‘Minister of Economic Affairs to PM, 22 May 1934’.
169 Thompson, Thailand, p. 696&TWM, 25 May 1934.
m PKPS,4S, p. 1773.
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prevent certain classes of people from entering these casinos. Perhaps another 
deciding factor was the existence of casinos on the kingdom’s borders; these led to 
Siamese nationals leaving the country to play and a flight of capital.171 In sum, the 
advantages outweighed the potential harmful effects, which in any case could be 
mitigated.
It was not until Phibun became Prime Minister in December 1938 that the idea 
of establishing casinos was fully realised. In April 1939, a royal decree was issued 
that laid down the framework for government-run casinos. It allowed for the playing 
of any games on the prohibited list within the premises, empowering the Minister of 
Finance to choose which games in particular and also to issue regulations prohibiting 
certain classes of people from entering. The admission fee was fixed at no more than 
20 baht a day, though for foreigners who had all the required documentation -  
passports, registration certificates or such like -  it was only 2 baht. Lastly, the 
government was entitled to accept tenders for the right to operate either all or part of
1 7 7the games played inside. Clearly, the high entrance fees for the local population 
were designed to exclude the poorer segments of Siamese society. Attending one of 
the government-run casinos was meant only for the wealthy.
On 3 May 1939, the first establishment was opened in the seaside town of Hua 
Hin. The opening was a grand affair, attended by a number of important government 
officials, including Pridi as the Minister of Finance, members of the royal family and 
other notables. One of the opening speeches stated the rationale for casinos as 
follows:
171 The MP for Ubon Ratchathani gave the example of people in his constituency crossing the border 
into French Indochina to gamble in the town of Pakse in southern Laos. For the complete discussions, 
see Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phuthaen ratsadon samai ti 2 saman p. s. 2478 [Assembly Records, 
1935/6], Bangkok: Office of the Parliamentary Secretary, pp. 2053-82.
172 PKPS, 52, pp. 88-91.
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Though a Casino is a place for forms of gambling, yet it is based on strict 
methods, quite different from the gambling houses of former times. This 
Casino has as its aim the promotion of tourist traffic, which is a means of 
attracting money from foreign parts in the country and at the same time it 
prevents the export of money.173
It was generally acknowledged that the Hua Hin casino was not ideally placed to
attract tourists.174 But as Pridi explained it was an experiment, with the government
planning to open further casinos in the south close to the border with Malaya in the
near future.175 During the first week, admission fees were kept low to attract
customers, though most of these appeared to be from Bangkok.176 There seems to
have been a distinct lack of Westerners.177 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the experiment
seems to have been a failure. Not long after opening, the casino was temporarily
closed, though it never seems to have been reopened.178
In spite of this initial setback, the government did not abandon its casino
project, opening one in Hat Yai in late 1939, with more to follow. Described as
having ‘real Monte Carlo settings and atmosphere’, games included roulette, baccarat,
and some old Siamese favourites. There was also a cabaret ‘with charming Thai
hostesses’, an orchestra, a ‘first class’ bar, and restaurant.179 By locating the casino so
close to Malaya, where gambling was confined to horse-racing, the government
hoped it might attract large numbers of Malayans, particularly Chinese. Given the
downturn in the Malayan tin and rubber industries, however, the Malaya Tribune
1 RDthought this unduly optimistic. Besides encouraging tourism, the casino was 
intended to provide alternative revenue sources to replace that lost through the
173 Quoted in BTWM, 4 May 1939.
174 BTWM, 2 May 1939.
175 BTWM, 6 May 1939.
176 BTWM, 4 May 1939.
177 A photo taken at the casino showed only two Westerners among all the guests. Landon, Chinese In 
Thailand, p. 90.
178 Commenting on the closure in September 1939, the Bangkok Times stated it did not know the 
present position. BTWM, 28 Sept. 1939.
179 BTWM, 28 Jan. 1940.
180 Article reproduced in BTWM, 15 May 1939.
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abolition of direct forms of taxation such as the land and capitation taxes.181 This was 
part of Pridi’s extensive tax reforms, manifested by the enactment of the country’s 
first revenue code in March 1939, which attempted to shift the tax burden from the 
rice farmer onto business and other high-income groups in pursuit of a more equitable 
society.182 The Hat Yai casino had a promising start. During January and February 
1940, attendance was around one thousand people a day, rising to two thousand over 
the Chinese New Year. Most of the gamblers were Chinese labourers from the nearby 
tin and rubber plantations and Malays from across the border. Few Thais were 
present.183 Moreover, between January and March, the casino recorded profits of 
between 90,000 and 100,000 baht per month; the expected profits for the whole year
1RJ. •were one million baht. From 1 April 1940, however, the casino was temporarily 
closed. According to Pridi, this was due to the war in Europe, which hampered the 
tourist trade and the flow of money into Siam; the casino would be reopened once
|  O r
conditions returned to normal. The Bangkok Times, meanwhile, attributed the 
closure to the fact that too many Thais and not enough foreigners frequented the 
casino.186 As with the Hua Hin establishment, it seems to have never been reopened.
The casino project was given one last roll of the dice during the last years of 
the Second World War. The first Khuang Aphaiwong government (1 August 1944 to 
31 August 1945) opened casinos throughout Bangkok and in some other provinces in 
order to ‘tax’ wartime profiteers. These were supposed to be exclusively for the rich 
but in reality were open to all. Predictably, it was said that the casinos encouraged 
gambling and the general population began to experience greater hardship and
181 BTWM, 20 March 1940. On the abolition of the capitation and land taxes see Pridi, Pridi, p. 181; 
and Baker and Pasuk, Thailand, p. 88.
182 Ingram, Economic Change, p. 184; Pridi, Pridi, p. 181.
183 BTWM, 22 Feb. 1940.
m  BTWM, 20 March 1940.
185 Ibid.
m  BTWM, 2% May 1940.
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poverty. Under mounting criticism from the press and the public, the Khuang 
Aphaiwong government shut all the casinos on 10 June 1945.187 Despite the revenue 
it provided, the casino experiment had been a failure, primarily because the 
government was unable to attract the ‘right’ clientele -  whether foreign tourists or 
wealthy Thais -  or to exclude the majority of the population that could ill afford to 
gamble. When a private company subsequently proposed to open a casino in Phuket 
for a five-year period, offering 100,000 baht advance payments annually, the 
government refused permission, claiming it had no policy of opening any further 
establishments. The constitutional regime’s flirtation with casinos was over.
Tightening the Grip
The establishment of state lotteries and government-run casinos was just one aspect 
of the constitutional regime’s policy on gambling. For these enterprises to be 
successful, the government needed to ensure there was an enthusiastic market for 
them and that any competition, legal or illegal, was blunted. As the Bangkok Times 
observed: ‘The Government does not need to be told that the State revenue will 
always be greater and more certain if  the gambling craze can be kept under strict 
control.’188 Between 1932 and 1945, the regulations and restrictions on many forms 
of gambling were progressively tightened. In early 1933, for instance, book-making 
at race meetings was prohibited.189 In so doing, the government hoped to squeeze 
some forms out of existence and so encourage people to play those that provided the 
state with the greatest revenue. Government policy was thus more redirection than 
restriction. However, such a strategy ran the risk of forcing people to gamble
187 Thanongsak, [Laws about gambling], pp. 80-1; Thai mai, 1 June 1945.
188 BTWM, 19 May 1934.
m  BTWM, 15 March 1933.
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illegally. Moreover, the government’s promotion of lotteries and casinos fuelled the 
gambling problem since it gave implicit approval to gambling in itself.
The government’s approach to card-playing provides a good illustration of 
these tensions. The provision that allowed people to play cards for entertainment 
purposes between friends and family without a permit was clearly open to divergent 
interpretations and abuse, particularly in the definition of a ‘friend’.190 Moreover, 
given the economic problems of the early 1930s and the new regime’s commitment to 
lowering direct taxation, it can be surmised that the government was no longer 
willing to forgo the lucrative income from card permits. In June 1933, therefore, the 
second edition of the ministerial regulations for the 1930 law came into force, 
annulling the provision for card playing without a license. Perhaps to compensate for 
this cancellation, permit fees were reduced from 20 baht a day per circle to 6 baht.191 
This may partially account for the sharp rise in revenue from license fees, referred to 
earlier, during the first half of the 1930s. In turn, this increase implies that the revised 
regulations did little to diminish people’s appetite for cards. Indeed, they may have 
been counterproductive, inadvertently creating a larger market for card dens, the 
operating costs of which were significantly reduced by the lower permit fees. In 1934, 
officials reported that people were setting up cards dens along almost every road and 
alley in Bangkok. Items of clothing, wooden signs and bamboo blinds would be hung 
outside these premises to indicate to passers-by that gambling was going on inside. 
The Ministry of the Interior considered a range of measures to restrict the issuing of 
permits but the Ministry of Finance was sceptical as to their effectiveness. It doubted
190 In 1932, for instance, the Public Prosecutor for Singburi petitioned the Supreme Court (san dika) 
about an illegal gambling case, claiming that some of the defendants could not be friends because they 
had met only on the day they played cards together. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 
grounds o f invalidity. ‘Ruling No. 123/2475’, Thammasan, 16, pp. 96-7. See also ‘Ruling No. 
454/2475, Thammasan, pp. 391-2.
191 The only card game that remained exempt was bridge, probably as a concession to resident 
Westerners. For the complete regulations, see PKPS, 46, pp. 125-6.
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that greater restriction would really reduce card playing but was sure the government 
would lose revenue from card permits without any appreciable benefit. It boiled down 
to whether the new regime was to continue the policy of suppressing gambling or 
wished to exploit it for revenue purposes once more.192 The Cabinet came down 
firmly on the side of suppression and the Ministry of the Interior issued a series of 
guidelines for the granting of permits; officials were instructed to conduct thorough 
investigations into the backgrounds and intentions of people applying for licenses.193
Gambling at festivals and temple fairs, such as that at the Golden Mount in 
Bangkok, was also brought under stricter control. As already mentioned, local 
authorities and temples had long allowed gambling at such events in order to raise 
money. A range of illegal practices had sprung up around these gambling operations: 
stallholders commonly altered the methods of play to make their games more 
appealing to the public, and got round the prohibition on cash prizes by allowing 
winners to exchange the articles they won for money, or to use these prizes as a future 
stake. More seriously, individuals who had received the monopoly rights for the 
gaming stalls would auction them to others for large profits, in clear violation of the 
law.194 All of these illicit practices were on display at the Nakhon Pathom festival, an 
annual event held around the great Buddhist stupa in the town, in November 1934. As 
usual the Bangkok Times attributed the large crowds to the opportunity to gamble. 
The police were kept busy closing down gaming stalls that broke the law, eventually 
shutting them all down, by which time it was estimated that over 20,000 people had 
entered the gambling enclosure. Despite the police action, both the stallholders and
192 NA (2) SR.0201.31/5, ‘Minister o f the Interior to Cabinet Secretary, 19 Oct. 1934’.
193 NA (2) SR.0201.31/5, ‘Minister of the Interior to Cabinet Secretary, 19 Dec. 1934’; Thesaphiban, 
34, pp. 1448-9; 35, pp. 1040-1.
194 Thesaphiban, 34, p. 1011.
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the monopolists were reported to have made healthy profits.195 Just days after this 
festival finished, the Ministry of the Interior issued regulations to stop these abuses. 
With the exception of the forthcoming celebrations for Constitution Day, permission 
for gambling games during festive occasions was suspended until the gambling law 
could be amended. Only games of skill such as target-shooting or throwing hoops 
over prizes were to be allowed. Moreover, stallholders were to be vetted by licensing 
officials and required to pay a security, which would not be returned should they 
contravene the law or conditions of their permit.196 These measures seem to have 
brought an end to large-scale gambling at some public events. Indeed, the Nakon 
Pathom festival the following year was marked by the complete absence of
1 Q7gambling.
In 1935, the constitutional regime began discussions on a new gambling law. 
Once again, the idea of prohibiting all forms of gambling except for those specified in 
the act was considered, leading to extensive discussions within the National 
Assembly.198 But, as in the past, this principle was rejected. The usual objections and 
problems were raised. Banning all gambling games without specifying their names or 
their nature would lead to numerous difficulties in defining what exactly constituted 
gambling; one MP claimed that playing billiards for a bottle of beer might be 
breaking the law, for instance. Perhaps the decisive factor, however, was the fact that 
forbidding all forms of gambling was in direct opposition to established legal
195 BTWM, 24 Nov. 1934.
196 Thesaphiban, 34, p. 1012-15.
197 BTWM, 11 Nov. 1935.
198 For the complete discussions on this, see Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phuthaen ratsadon samai ti 2 
saman p. s. 2478 [Assembly Records, 1935/6], Bangkok: Office of the Parliamentary Secretary, pp. 
2031-53.
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principles, specifically, that people had to be given a reasonable chance to know what 
was illegal before they could be held to account for breaking the law.199
The Gambling Act B. E. 2478 was issued in January 1936.200 In essence, it 
was little different from the 1930 law, though updated to include all the changes since 
the 1932 coup outlined above. Alongside some additions and modifications to the 
forbidden list (List A) and that for games permitted subject to license (List B), the 
legal age for gambling -  except on lotteries -  was raised from 16 to 20. The most 
significant changes were to the penalties for gambling offences. Running any of the 
first sixteen games on the prohibited list was now punishable with a prison sentence 
of three months to three years and a fine ranging from 500 to 5,000 baht. For the first 
time, organisers of games such as po pan or three-stick trick were faced with a 
guaranteed jail sentence if  found guilty. As for the players (luk kha) of these games, 
there was a maximum sentence of three years or fine of 5,000 baht or both. Playing 
any of the other games on either list was subject to a sentence of up to two years or a
7fi1fine not exceeding 2,000 baht. Whereas the 1930 law had left sentencing to judicial 
discretion, the 1936 act gave clear parameters and re-established the differential 
between playing forbidden games and playing permitted ones illegally. The 1936 law 
remains in force in present day Thailand, though it and its accompanying ministerial 
regulations have been regularly updated to reflect inflation and to cover new ways of
t99 Ibid., p. 2045.
200 For the complete act, see PKPS, 48, pp. 1772-81.
201 This reduction in the maximum fine, from 5,000 under die 1930 law, may have bucked the trend for 
heavier penalties but it was a practical measure. The misdemeanour courts in Bangkok (san porisapha) 
had recently been changed to district courts (san khwaeng), which could only impose a maximum fine 
of 2,000 baht. The tariff for minor gambling offences was therefore lowered in order to avoid having to 
send these cases to the Criminal Court. See Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phuthaen ratsadon samai ti 2 
saman p. s. 2478 [Assembly Records, 1935/6], Bangkok: Office o f the Parliamentary Secretary, p. 
2022 .
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gambling, such as slot machines, which are forbidden, football tables and even
909pinball machines, both of which require a license.
For some of the Siamese elite, the new law was not enough. One idea that had 
often been mooted was imposing restrictions on the possession, production, and 
import of gambling equipment.203 During the mid-1930s, two members of the 
National Assembly submitted draft legislation for the licensing of such equipment. 
Both reasoned this would aid the detection of illegal gambling and discourage legal 
gambling. Despite support from some members and an admission from the 
government that it had considered including similar measures in the 1936 law, neither 
draft was passed. Many objections and potential pitfalls were raised: it was 
impossible to regulate the equipment for all games because some used everyday items 
such as coins, matches or seeds; it was inappropriate to restrict equipment for legal 
games; it would encourage underground gambling; enforcing the law would place 
unreasonable demands upon officials; and such controls would infringe the rights of 
the people.204
Nevertheless, the government did not discard the idea of regulating some 
types of gambling equipment. Following the successful renegotiation during 1937 and 
1938 of Siam’s ‘unequal’ treaties with the Western powers, resulting in the 
restoration of the country’s fiscal and judicial sovereignty, the government drafted a 
law for the control of playing cards. Under this legislation, the production, retail and 
import of playing cards would be illegal except under license from the Excise 
Department, which would also manufacture its own cards for sale. When Pridi
202 See, for example, the 17th and 18th editions o f the ministerial regulations in Lisut, [Gambling 
Handbook], pp. 11-29.
203 See for instance NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
204 For the discussions on each draft see Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phutaenratsadon samai ti 2 
wisaman p. s. 2478, vol. 2 [Assembly Records, 1935/36], Bangkok: Office o f the Parliamentary 
Secretary, pp. 1103-10; Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phutaenratsadon samai ti 2 saman p. s. 2480, 
vol. 2 [Assembly Records, 1937/38], Bangkok: Office of the Parliamentary Secretary, pp. 714-37.
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introduced the draft to the Assembly, he made it clear that, besides restricting card 
playing, it was intended to create a new revenue source. This was in line with the 
government’s policy of reducing and abolishing some forms of direct taxation and 
replacing them with indirect forms that would not trouble the population unduly. 
Such a frank admission led one MP to question the government’s commitment to 
suppressing gambling. Indeed, he believed that printing government cards would 
encourage card playing. Pridi’s response is interesting: he reaffirmed the restrictionist 
policy but also observed that the legislation would, at the very least, act as an indirect 
tax on illegal card playing.205 This was a tacit admission that, since the state’s ability 
to suppress illegal gambling was limited, it was better that the government should 
profit from it in some way. The Playing Cards Act B. E. 2481 and accompanying 
ministerial regulations were promulgated in March 1939.206 Anyone wishing to 
import or sell cards required a license, which was valid for one year and cost up to 10 
baht. The only cards anyone was allowed to keep in stock for sale were those made 
by the Excise Department or those that had been stamped by that agency, for which 
there was a fee. It was also illegal to possess printing blocks for cards without a 
permit. As a result of the Card Act, the Bangkok-based card manufacturers were 
forced to shut down and their printing presses were bought by the Excise Department. 
With a government investment of 180,000 baht, this department established its own 
printing house and began producing Thai, Chinese and Western cards in December
9 0 71939. Overseas manufacturers, meanwhile, were allowed to import no more than
205 For the complete discussions see Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phutaenratsadon samai ti 2 saman 
p. s. 2481, vol. 2 [Assembly Records, 1938/39], Bangkok: Office o f the Parliamentary Secretary, pp. 
996-1042.
206 For the complete act and regulations see PKPS, 51, pp. 901-4, 938-9.
207 Anek, [Card Games], pp. 16-17.
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200,000 packs a year.208 The production of playing cards was thereby transferred to 
government control and, just as with lotteries, the state assumed a virtual monopoly.
There were loopholes in the legislation, however, and these were ruthlessly 
exploited. During the Assembly sessions in September 1939, one MP reported how 
managers of card dens stockpiled large quantities of unstamped cards. When 
licensing officials tried to enforce the law, these managers took advantage of an 
omission in the card act to claim they were merely keeping the cards for the purpose 
of play, rather than for sale, and thus the cards did not require a stamp. Presumably, 
they sold these unstamped cards on the sly. The MP thus submitted a private 
members bill to close the loophole 209 The second edition of the Playing Cards Act B. 
E. 2481 was issued in November that year and this placed a limit on the amount of
910unstamped cards a person might possess. Problems with implementation and 
enforcement clearly persisted, however, for in December 1943 the act was annulled 
and replaced by the Playing Card Act B. E. 2486. The import and sale of cards were 
more tightly regulated, with a greater distinction between retail and wholesale, and
■ 911some additional offences prescribed.
While the first Phibun government was responsible for establishing the 
country’s first casinos, it also launched a vigorous clampdown on other forms of 
gambling, perhaps the most contentious being the prohibition on cock- and fish- 
fighting introduced in July 1939.212 As the quintessential pastime of the Siamese 
farmer, the prohibition on cockfighting was bound to cause resentment. No doubt in 
recognition of this, the Director-General of the Department of the Interior made a
209 Rai-ngan kanprachum sapha phutaenratsadon samai ti 2 saman p. s. 2482, vol. 2 [Assembly 
Records, 1939/40], Bangkok: Office o f the Parliamentary Secretary, pp. 727-9.
210 PiCPS, 52, pp. 1209-10
211 For the complete act and regulations see Lisut, [Handbook], pp. 373-7, 380-2.
212 Thesaphiban, 39, p. 1574.
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radio address in which he gave four reasons for the ban.213 Besides the standard 
criticisms that both games were cruel to animals -  an extreme sin, no less -  and that 
the free-flowing alcohol within the dens made them a hotbed of violence, the 
government justified its stance by referring to the pastimes’ corrosive impact on 
family relationships and agricultural development. Barme has illustrated how the 
constitutional regime took up the popular press’ call for the promotion of women’s 
rights and greater gender equality214 The critique of cock- and fish-fighting was 
framed within this discourse. According to the government, most men who raised 
cockerels or fish for these purposes were the heads of their households and neglected 
their families in favour of their animals, indeed, considered the latter to be more 
important. Their wives had to bear the burden of making a living alone while the 
children were left to their own devices. Prohibition would redress the balance. With 
regai'd to the agricultural side, rearing cockerels or fish for fighting was of little 
economic benefit and the government urged these men to focus on more profitable 
forms of animal husbandry. This prohibition must also be placed in the context of the 
Phibun regime’s attempts to refashion the Siamese nation and Siamese culture 
through the issuing of the Cultural Mandates between 1939 and 1942. Their purpose 
was to encourage the perception that the country had left its royalist past behind and 
had entered the new age of the strong nation-state, a transformation potently signified 
by the change of name from Siam to Thailand on 24 June 1939. In order to build a 
modem image for the country, certain Western modes of behaviour and dress -  the 
wearing of hats and kissing one’s wife before leaving for work, for instance -  were 
officially encouraged, while some traditional customs which were considered
213 NA (2) SR.0201.31/8, ‘Explanation concerning the prohibition o f fish-fighting and cockfighting’.
214 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, pp. 232-3.
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uncivilised -  such as betel chewing -  were proscribed.215 Cockfighting and fish- 
fighting should also be viewed as targets of this policy. Similarly, in November 1939 
Phibun made a radio broadcast in which he urged people to refrain from gambling on 
the street. Not only did it have a deleterious effect upon the players but on the nation 
as well: foreign visitors might think Thailand was a nation of inveterate gamblers and 
leave with an unfavourable impression of the country.
One last piece of legislation that merits attention was the third edition of the 
gambling law issued in 1942. This provided for heavier penalties for those convicted 
of illegal gambling within three years of having served a sentence or paid a fine for a 
previous gambling offence. If such an offender had originally been imprisoned and 
fined, then they would now face a penalty twice as severe. For those offenders who 
had originally been either imprisoned or fined, the penalty upon conviction for a 
second offence was imprisonment and a fine.217 This was the culmination of a 
decades-long process whereby the penalties for illegal gambling had been 
progressively strengthened -  from just a fine under the 1893 law to a guaranteed 
prison sentence for repeat offenders in 1942 -  in a vain effort to deter would-be 
gamblers. That successive governments adopted an increasingly hard line indicates 
that the threat of punishment was an insufficient deterrent for large sections of the 
population.
The government’s gambling policy during the first decade or so of the 
constitutional era was part of a modernisation project aimed at transforming the 
revenue basis of the Siamese state and remaking Siamese society. State lotteries and 
government-run casinos were established as forms of indirect taxation that,
21 s On the Cultural Mandates or State Conventions as they are sometimes called, see Barme, Luang 
Wichit Wathakan, pp. 144-60; and Baker and Pasuk, Thailand, pp. 132-5.
216 BTWM, 20 Nov. 1939.
217 Lisut, [Gambling Handbook], p. 6.
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supposedly, targeted the well-off and enabled the government to reduce and abolish 
direct forms of taxation, such as the land and capitation taxes, which fell heaviest 
upon the Siamese farmer, the backbone of the economy. These enterprises also 
provided income for developmental and administrative schemes, such as the creation 
of municipal governments. The promotion of certain forms of gambling and the 
prohibition of others was also geared towards transforming the kingdom of Siam into 
the nation-state of Thailand. On the one hand, casinos were opened to attract foreign 
visitors and to highlight the civilised, developed state of the reborn Thai nation. 
Gambling within such an establishment was acceptable because it was sophisticated, 
modem and siwilai. Cockfighting, on the other hand, was prohibited because it was a 
traditional rural pursuit, a throwback to the old Siam. The contradictory and 
hypocritical nature of this policy was obvious.218 Perhaps it is these contradictions, 
more than any other factor, that made government attempts to restrict gambling 
ultimately futile.
By 1945, the Thai government had effectively criminalised all forms of 
gambling except for those conducted within tightly regulated parameters or those 
operated by the state itself. Moreover, the provision and management of gambling 
ventures, even the production of playing cards, had passed from the hands of private 
individuals and organisations -  tax farmers, charities and businesses — into the almost 
exclusive possession of the state. In other words, the state had established a virtual 
monopoly on the ability to exploit gambling as a revenue provider; a right it guarded 
jealously through increasingly strict laws and complex licensing regulations. The end
218 One MP, for instance, queried the government’s initial lack of action against street gambling and 
questioned how it could be truly committed to restricting gambling when it was opening casinos. Rai- 
ngan kanprachum sapha phutaenratsadon samai ti 2 saman p. s. 2482, vol. 2 [Assembly Records, 
1939/40], Bangkok: Office o f the Parliamentary Secretary, pp. 685-8.
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result was a narrowing of the legal and social space in which people could gamble, in 
effect, the criminalisation of gambling.
187
4
Enforcement and Punishment
Laws are meaningless if not enforced. This chapter will examine how the Siamese 
government’s gambling policy was implemented on the ground. It seeks to 
demonstrate the influence of those state institutions responsible for administering and 
enforcing the law -  the police, the judiciary, and the penal administration -  in 
determining government policy. These institutions tested the viability of the 
restrictions on gambling outlined in the preceding two chapters; it was they that 
ultimately determined the success or failure of particular policies. In this sense, they 
acted as a feedback loop that shaped future initiatives. Attention will also be paid to 
the influence of Buddhist teachings and the role of the Buddhist monkhood (the 
Sangha) on gambling policy.
Agents of Enforcement
Before exploring how gambling legislation was enforced it is necessary to establish 
who was responsible for its enforcement. Until the 1890s, the suppression of illegal 
gambling was primarily the responsibility of the gambling tax farmers.1 As noted in 
Chapter 1, they had the power to investigate any cases of unsanctioned gambling 
within their district, arrest those involved, prosecute them, and then receive any fines 
imposed by the courts. Following the first closures of the Bangkok gambling houses 
in the late 1880s and early 1890s, these powers were gradually qualified and limited. 
For instance, the regulations for the gambling houses and huai lottery farm issued 
during this period required the tax farmers to be accompanied by either the district
1 Before the 1890s, it seems that state officials were expressly charged only with enforcing the laws 
preventing children from gambling. See PKPS, 9, pp. 105-6.
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chief or the police when making arrests. Moreover, the lottery fanner was later 
stripped of the power to arrest fraudulent employees and punish them.3 Over the same 
period, state officials were given greater responsibility for suppressing illicit 
gambling. The 1893 gambling law, for example, charged the Ministry of the Interior 
and inspectors within the Revenue Department, in addition to the tax farmer, with 
enforcing the act.4 Nevertheless, Jardine, the first Inspector General of Police for 
Bangkok, indicates that the gambling tax farmers detected and prosecuted the 
majority of gambling offences until the end of the nineteenth century and perhaps 
later.5 The 1902 gambling law saw a further broadening of responsibility: all 
government officials down to the level of kamnan (sub-district chief) and village 
headman were charged with investigating and arresting cases of illegal gambling.6 
Thus, while the gambling and lottery farms remained in existence, enforcement duties 
were shared between the tax farmer and state officials. However, the limitations on 
the tax farmer’s authority made them unduly dependent upon the state for the 
protection of their monopolies, an interest that was not always shared by officials. In 
July 1899, for instance, a gambling house farmer in Nonthaburi complained to the 
Ministry of Finance that people were playing thua po  and cards without his 
peimission and the local authorities were doing nothing about it.7 Greater state 
involvement in the suppression of illegal gambling did not, therefore, necessarily 
mean improvements in the level of law enforcement; indeed, the example above 
suggests there may have been a decline.
2 PKPS, 13, pp. 57,277,282.
3 NAR.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/4, ‘Mahitto Chulalongkom, 11 Jan. 1901’.
4 PKPS, 13, p. 256.
5 RPAB 1899-1900, p. 52.
6 PKPS, 18, pp. 268, 273, 551.
7 NA R.5 N.42.11/22, ‘Chin Sieo Chu to Mahit, 13 July 1899’.
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Perhaps the principal problem in enforcing Siam’s gambling laws from the 
1890s onwards was a lack of incentive: the gambling tax farmers had much more to 
lose from illegal gambling than the low-level state officials also charged with its 
suppression. Illicit gaming operations posed a serious threat to the gambling farmers’ 
profits: underground thua po dens drew potential customers away from the gambling 
houses, while unauthorised individuals receiving stakes on the huai were essentially 
stealing directly from the lottery farmer. A further incentive for the tax farmers were 
the fines they stood to collect from those found guilty of gambling offences. In 
contrast, government officials had no such reason to pursue cases of illegal gambling. 
Given the inherent difficulties and dangers in detecting and busting illegal gaming 
rings, their negligence is understandable. Bandit gangs and Chinese secret societies 
were often involved in running underground dens; just infiltrating these groups in
Q
order to gain information was highly risky. Carrying out raids on illicit gaming 
operations could be even more so. In January 1919, for instance, four policemen were 
attacked when carrying out a bust. One was knocked unconscious and another pushed 
down a well; the situation was brought under control only after the police shot dead 
one of their assailants.9
A lack of motivation was compounded by an array of institutional problems 
within the police force, not least of which was the poor salaries policemen received. 
In his first annual report, that for 1898/9, insufficient pay topped the list of factors 
that Jardine believed were retarding the Bangkok force’s efficiency.10 The low rate of
8 See, for instance, the 1924 report on the operations and hangouts of three criminal gangs in monthon 
Prachinburi. NA R .6 N .4.1/234, ‘Yomarat to Phetchapani, 21 Jan. 1924’.
9 NA R .6 N.4.1/9, ‘Phraya Si Woraphotthirat to Prince Prachin, 22 Jan. 1919 & 8 March 1919’. In 
December 1916, an official was shot dead by a group of illegal gamblers. NSPT, 6 Dec. 1916.
10 RPAB 1898-99, p. 2. Originally, a constable’s rate o f pay had been determined by the length of time 
they agreed to serve. Under Jardine, all salaries were revised: Siamese Chief Inspectors received 150 
baht per month; Inspectors, 100; Head Constables, 60; Sergeants, 20, 30 or 40; and Constables 12, 15 
or 18. Ibid., p. 3.
remuneration remained an issue throughout the period in question: it not only meant
police constables had little incentive to carry out their duties fully and encouraged
corruption but, initially, it also made recruitment difficult. Consequently, around the
turn of the twentieth century, the Bangkok force did not reach its sanctioned
strength.11 Moreover, those who did sign up were apparently of a low calibre: slaves,
12 *ex-convicts, the old, and the infirm. Some improvements were made to the 
conditions of service during the 1900s and the manpower shortage was partially 
ameliorated by the introduction of conscription. But while this latter measure ensured 
there were more young recruits, conscription had, according to Lawson, a malign
i
effect on discipline and morale. In 1920, conscnpts were required to serve two years 
on a salary of just four baht a month and, understandably, their one concern was 
serving out their term. Within the force as a whole, salaries did not keep pace with 
inflation, leading Lawson to observe that while 20 baht a month for a first-grade 
(non-conscripted) gendarme had been adequate in the 1890s, ‘It is not a living wage 
now and it is not possible to obtain good men for such remuneration.’14 Moreover, the 
force remained undermanned in spite of conscription. In 1915, E. W. Trotter, another 
British subject appointed to the Bangkok police, estimated there were 12,000 
policemen -  of whom only 7,000 were on active duty — in total in Siam, policing a 
population of about nine million. He recommended the force be increased by at least
6,000 in order to deal with crime adequately.15 Manpower was still an issue in the 
mid-1930s; each district had only eight policemen and as one MP in the Assembly 
put it: ‘how could they [the Assembly members] expect such a small force to
11 RPAB 1898-99, pp. 3-4; RPAB 1899-1900, pp. 4-6; RPAB Year 120 [1901/2], pp. 6-7; RPAB Year 
122 [1903/4], pp. 5-7.
12 RPAB 1898-99, p. 2; RPAB 1899-1900, p. 6.
13 NA R .6 N.4.1/165, ‘A Report on work o f Police and Gendarmerie and on the Criminal Statistics o f  
Siam for the year B. E. 2462’, pp. 62-4.
14 Ibid., p. 3.
15 NA R .6 N.4.1/73, ‘Trotter to Yomarat, 23 Dec. 1915’.
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successfully tackle gambling suppression work?’16 In short, the police force remained 
underpaid and undermanned throughout the period covered by this study. When these 
factors are combined with the large number of more serious offences that demanded 
police attention, it can be seen how suppressing illegal gambling was afforded a 
relatively low priority. Much the same considerations applied to other state officials. 
Outside of Bangkok and until 1920 at the earliest, investigating crime was the 
responsibility of the district chief rather than the provincial gendarmerie, whose role 
was confined to keeping the peace and capturing bandits. As Lawson noted in his 
1920 report, The investigation of crime by Amphurs is a failure. Amphurs have 
neither the time, the knowledge, nor the necessary subordinates to do the work.... For 
the last ten years both prevention and detection have been growing worse and worse. 
The amphurs themselves are not more incompetent than they were but their other
17 * •work has increased enormously.’ Similarly, a newspaper article in 1928 asserted 
that if the government wanted to improve suppression efforts, it should increase the 
salaries of kamnans and village headmen so that they might take more pride in their 
work.18
When all these factors are taken into consideration it is not surprising that 
state officials might chose to turn a blind eye to illegal gambling in return for bribes, 
or even conspire with illicit gaming rings in return for a cut of the profits. Corruption 
seems to have become especially acute in the post-1917 period. In his 1920 report, 
Lawson observed that: T he abolition of gambling houses has not reduced gambling 
and has greatly increased bribery and corruption amongst the lower ranks of the
]6BTWM, 6 Nov. 1935.
17 NA R.6 N.4.1/165, ‘A Report on work o f Police and Gendarmerie and on tire Criminal Statistics of 
Siam for the year B. E. 2462’, p. 64.
18 Si krung, 12 May 1928.
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Government services, not only in the Gendarmerie.’19 If anything, the police became 
even more complicit in illegal gambling operations. By the mid-1920s, for instance, it 
was rumoured that police in monthon Ratchaburi were receiving 300 baht a month 
from each underground den in the area.20 Police Commissioner Phraya Athikon 
Prakat’s Special Force was deeply implicated in such activities. After the 1932 coup, 
a former police officer stated that:
high-ranking police officers of the Special Force are receiving monthly 
payments from Chinese casino operators; a given establishment is required to 
pay each officer 150 baht per month. If the money isn’t paid by the first of the 
month, the casino owner is arrested the following day and required to double 
the payment in order to escape prosecution. Moreover, at Chinese New year, 
the officers’ men expect presents of gold and other things of value. Many 
casinos are operating by these arrangements, which I can personally attest 
have been in effect since at least 1923 21
So for every underground den busted by the police, there was another that enjoyed
their protection. It is in this light that newspaper reports congratulating Phraya
Athikon on the latest successful raid must be read; some papers were so effusive in
their praise that it bordered on the ridiculous. The Yamato, for instance, was sure that
gambling would disappear due to the Police Commissioner’s ‘supernatural powers’
22(iamnat khwamsaksit).
Under such circumstances it was vital that the state offer some incentive for 
officials to suppress illegal gambling. Cash rewards for informing were offered from 
the late 1880s but it was not until June 1903 that they were given to police officers for 
making arrests.23 Even then, though, the police received rewards only for pursuing
19 NA R .6 N.4.1/165, ‘A  Report on work o f Police and Gendarmerie and on the Criminal Statistics of
Siam for the year B. E. 2462’, p. 66. For an example of a sub-district chief (kamnan) who was asked to
resign because of allegations that he was receiving a share of the profits from an illegal den, see NA  
R.6/1 N.42/103, ‘Governor of Minburi province to Chao Phraya Surabodi, 10 May 1926’.
20 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
21 Quoted in Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, pp. 86-7.
22 Yamato, 5 May 1923. See also CSW, 9 May 1923; Awanti, 11 May 1923.
23 PKPS, 19, pp. 126-7.
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offences against the 1902 law. This led Lawson to reiterate the importance of such 
bonuses:
Now it may not be a very high moral standpoint but as a matter of fact 
Constables will take far more interest in arresting cases of gambling if they 
receive rewards than they will if they do not. Also I would point out it is quite 
impossible to have illicit gambling on any scale without the fact being known 
to the Police. The gamblers will naturally try and bribe the Police but it is not 
possible to bribe them all. If therefore the fines or a considerable proportion of 
them were paid to the arresting Police it is certain that illicit gambling will be24very hard indeed.
In spite of these suggestions, little seems to have changed over a decade later. As 
Lawson noted in 1920:
The law is not enforced because either rewards are paid not at all, or else after 
such a long delay that they might as well not be paid. But though Government 
will neither pay the Gendarmerie a living wage, nor give rewards then c
proprietors of the illicit gambling houses will and do.
In short, the Siamese case provides a good example of the futility of trying to 
suppress gambling with an undermanned, underpaid and overburdened police force. 
Indeed, it was the government’s restrictionist policy that gave state officials the 
opportunity to profit from gambling’s illegality by entering into alliance with criminal 
gaming lings. While the police may have been successful in busting some 
underground operations, the protection certain elements of the force afforded to other 
illicit enterprises ultimately rendered the law largely irrelevant. Since it was 
impossible to eliminate illegal gambling, the police had little option but to regulate it 
informally, and, in the process, they acquired a vested interest in the continued 
illegality of gambling. This then became not only an impediment to the enforcement 
of Siam’s gambling laws but also a barrier to the liberalisation of those laws.
24 NA R.5 N .8.1/306, ‘Lawson to Nares [Naret], 17 Jan. 1904 [1905]’.
25 NA R .6 N .4.1/165, ‘A Report on work o f Police and Gendarmerie and on the Criminal Statistics of 
Siam for the year B. E. 2462’, p. 66.
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Obstacles to Enforcement
Having detailed some of the internal, institutional problems that hampered the 
enforcement of the gambling laws, it is time to consider external factors. By its very 
nature, illegal gambling is difficult to detect. It is often described as a ‘victimless’ 
crime, an epithet that, whilst crude, does emphasise the fact that when illegal 
gambling does take place there are no direct victims that might report the crime (there 
are, of course, many indirect victims). Moreover, due to its illegality, illicit gambling 
is usually conducted behind closed doors or in secretive, out-of-the-way places. 
Detecting gambling within private homes was complicated by police procedure. 
When the police wished to search a residence, they were required to produce a search
warrant and to knock on the door. This gave those inside time to hide any evidence of
26wrongdoing or to flee the premises. In the countryside, Siam’s topography and 
sparse population made it ideal for conducting illegal activities. Dense jungle 
provided protection from prying eyes and rural people commonly gambled within its 
shadowy depths.27 Farmer’s shelters or isolated groves in the middle of paddy fields 
also made makeshift dens; players could see any officials approaching from afar and 
dispose of the evidence, throwing it in the flooded paddies or -  in the case of games 
such as bia bok that were played with only a small number of cowries -  swallowing 
it.28 If gambling was being conducted within a village, scouts were posted to warn of 
police raids.29 Under these circumstances, the detection of gambling offences was 
heavily dependent on surveillance operations by undercover police or spies, and tip- 
offs from informers.
26 The Nangsuphim thai newspaper identified this as one of the main difficulties for the police in 
suppressing illegal gambling. NT, 12 Dec. 1916.
27 Following the closure o f dens in the south, for instance, many people were caught gambling in the 
jungle around the town o f Songkhla. NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Damrong to Sommot, 13 Feb. 1904’.
28 NA MT.4/153, ‘Discussion on the suppression of illegal gambling -  Meeting of Provincial 
Governors B. E. 2478*.
29 BTWM, 20 March 1908.
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Underground gambling rings naturally took precautions to protect their 
livelihoods, employing a wide range of security measures and stratagems to avoid 
detection and arrest. The Nangsuphim thai likened the underground gambling dens in 
the Sampheng district of Bangkok, which was a hotbed of illicit goings-on, to the 
hideouts of criminals in the movies, with their secret passages and elaborate escape 
routes.30 The main entrances were usually stout wooden or metal doors; sometimes 
there was a series of them. Passwords were required to gain entry. Breaking these 
doors down took a long time, allowing the illegal gamblers to escape.31 Watchmen, 
usually proteges of the treaty powers and thus protected by extraterritorial rights, 
were employed to give warning of a raid and obstruct the police.32 One infamous den 
in the residence of a high-ranking official had a sophisticated electric lighting 
warning system: when the white bulb was on, it was safe to play; the red one came on 
when there was a raid.33 Organisers of banned games such as po pan might also take 
the precaution of having a card license for their den, using it to delay officials and so 
gain time to hide any prohibited equipment.34 In 1923, the Bangkok Times reported on 
the emergence of ca new kind of gambling resort’, which ‘is not run in any one place 
for more than a couple of days and nights. Then it moves on to some other places
35known to followers of the game’.
The underground hnai lottery, which was based on the results of the official 
huai and was run in those provinces with rail links to Bangkok, was particularly 
difficult to suppress due to strong organisational backing. Most of the unauthorised
30 NT, 12 Dec. 1916.
31 This was the case when the provincial gendarmerie busted a large den, where up to 200 people 
usually gathered, in Takuapha province and managed to arrest just four. KDM, 14 Feb. 1930.
32 NA R.6. N.4.1/51, ‘Phirentharathibodi to Director-General of the Police Department, 29 June 1915’; 
NA R .6 N.4.1/9, ‘Si Woraphotthirat to Prachin, 11 Sept. 1917’.
33 Yamato, 25 May 1923.
34 KDM, 12 Jan. 1917.
35 BTWM, 2 Oct. 1923.
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clerks were Chinese and, given the large amounts of cash involved, it can be surmised 
that these operations had the backing of Chinese secret societies. A conspiracy of 
silence seems to have existed between the organisers and the players, and everything
36was done to ensure there was no evidence of wrongdoing whatsoever. If arrests 
were made, they were only of low-level employees who would be supported 
financially while serving out any prison sentence.37 Elaborate codes were used to 
disguise transactions and communications between the various parts of the operation. 
Illegal lottery clerks in Nakhon Pathom, for instance, would send the daily register of 
stakes received in the form of a shopping list to their agents in Bangkok: an order for 
five bahts-worth of cardamom and ten of cloves meant five and ten baht had been 
placed on the letters ko kai and kho khai respectively. Even if the authorities should 
manage to seize this register, it would never stand up as evidence in court. The 
governor of monthon Nakhon Chaisi managed to break this particular ring by using 
three women to place stakes on all 34 letters of the lottery -  12 letters for two of them 
and ten for the other -  with four illegal clerks. By doing this, one of the girls was 
guaranteed to win with each of the clerks. When they went to collect their winnings, 
the local police were able to arrest the clerks, though one escaped. Effective as this 
ploy was, though, Damrong thought it could not be used again because everyone now 
knew of it.38
Given all the inherent difficulties in detecting illegal gambling, cash rewards 
were vital for not only ensuring the commitment of the police but also for securing 
the services of spies and informants. Rewards of one chang (80 baht) were first 
offered in the late 1880s for information that led to the successful conviction of hnai
36 KDM, 19 Sept. 1913.
37 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Phraya Maha Ammat to Vajiravudh, 19 March 1915’.
38 NA R.5 N.6.2/982, ‘Damrong to Sommot, 13 Aug. 1910’.
chapyiki organisers.39 Following the initial closures of the Bangkok gambling houses 
and the consequent increase in illegal gambling, the range of offences on which 
rewards were offered was broadened and the sums increased so as to encourage 
people to come forward. Informants now stood to receive half of the fine levied on 
the guilty party; if the latter could not pay, the state would offer one chang.40 The 
payment of rewards for convictions under the 1902 gambling law was on a different 
principle, however. The convicted party was expected to pay a reward in addition to 
any fine imposed; if unable to pay, they were liable to imprisonment. Crucially, this 
law did not commit the state to cover the reward if the guilty party defaulted 41 This 
raised the problem of how rewards were to be paid, if at all, in such circumstances. 
The 1930 law, meanwhile, made no provision for their payment. Phraya Chinda 
Phirom (Chit na Songkhla), then Minister of Justice, objected to the convicted party 
paying rewards in addition to a fine because it amounted to them paying for their own 
arrest. The government thus reverted to the original system whereby rewards were 
deducted from any fine imposed on the offender. The state would pay if the offender 
could not and a sum of money was budgeted for this purpose 42 Finally, the 1936 law 
once more made the convicted party responsible for paying a reward -  one quarter of 
the amount they were fined — in addition to the fine.43 Nevertheless, the Ministry of 
the Interior still applied for an annual budget for the payment of rewards in those 
cases where the defendants could not pay but this was quashed by the Ministry of
39 PKPS, 11, pp. 180-1.
40 PKPS, 12, pp. 113-15.
41 PKPS, 18, p. 278. The tariff for rewards was later set at no more than two-thirds of the fine. PKPS, 
19, pp. 126-7.
42 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Report o f the Council o f Ministers, 23 June 1930’; NA MT.4/153, ‘Discussion on 
gambling rewards -  Meeting o f provincial governors, B. E. 2478’.
43 PKPS, 48, p. 1777.
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Finance.44 These constant changes to the payment system indicate that the 
government clearly recognised the necessity of offering rewards but was highly 
reluctant to cover the costs itself.
This thriftiness on the part of the state severely handicapped efforts at 
suppressing gambling. During the first half of the 1930s, there was a clear difference 
in the number of arrests made for gambling offences when rewards were paid and 
when the budget for them ran out.45 Similarly, when the courts stopped ordering the 
payment of rewards in the mid-1910s, arrest rates fell46 Moreover, the complicated 
regulations and payment procedure led to frequent delays.47 There were often cases 
where an informant thought they were entitled to a reward but did not receive one due 
to a technicality.48 Such problems clearly had a demoralising effect upon these spies 
and informers, and were hardly going to encourage others to offer their assistance. In 
1936 one Nai Phrom summed up this situation in a petition to the Ministry of the 
Interior. Despite his frequent requests, he had yet to receive a reward for his part in 
helping bust a large, long-established den. He had taken a great risk in infiltrating the 
operation in order to gain the necessary information for a successful raid and he fully 
expected the defendants would seek their revenge. If the reward was not forthcoming, 
he, and others like him, would not be so willing to help the government in the 
future.49
44 NA (2) SR.0201.31/7, ‘Minister of the Interior to PM, 22 March 1937’. In late 1935, a request for a 
similar budget provoked heated debate in the National Assembly but was eventually granted. BTWM, 6 
Nov. 1935.
45 NA MT.4/153, ‘Discussion on gambling rewards -  Meeting o f provincial governors, B. E. 2478’.
46 NA R.6 N .l 1.5.Ch/4, ‘Yomarat to Phetchapani, 5 June 1915k
47 Delays in the payment of rewards were a problem right from when rewards when introduced in the 
late 1880s. See for instance NA R.5 N.42.11/2, ‘Phra Siriaisawan to Phra Antinarakon, 27 May 1892k
48 In 1937, for instance, one informer did not receive anything because the court had decided only to 
imprison the defendants and there was thus no fine on which to calculate the reward. NA  
MT.0201.1.1/690, ‘Nakhon Si Thammarat Provincial Committee to Undersecretary of the Interior, 
Nov. 1937 k
49 NA MT.0201.1.1/19, ‘Nai Phrom to Minister o f the Interior, 21 March 1936k The reason for the 
delay was that the budget for rewards had run out in the middle o f the year 1935/6 and the Ministry of
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Enforcement of the gambling laws suffered from a range of other problems. 
When the government first began to implement its restrictionist policy in the late 
1880s and early 1890s, it laboured under two major constraints. Firstly, some aspects 
of the new legislation conflicted with established custom. As mentioned earlier, the 
Siamese and Chinese New Years and the Songkran festival were traditionally times 
when there was a free license to gamble, on whatever and wherever one chose. 
However, the 1891 gambling house regulations and the 1893 law made it illegal to 
play thua po outside the gambling houses.50 Nevertheless, the government realised 
that clamping down too heavily and too hastily on such gambling might antagonise 
segments of the population, especially the Chinese. It was thus initially willing to turn 
a blind eye to infringements during these festivities.51 Secondly, the state lacked the 
administrative capabilities to fully enforce its will; the criminal justice system had 
neither the manpower nor the infrastructure to cope with an influx of illegal gambling 
cases. Events surrounding the Siamese and Chinese New Years in 1896 provide a 
good illustration of these points. They also mark the start of a more hard-line policy. 
Since the law had not previously been strictly enforced, it had given rise to the 
mistaken belief that these festivities were exempt from the law.52 It had also 
encouraged royalty and government officials to indulge in gambling, behaviour that
* 53was considered inappropriate for their status and rank. Convinced by Prince
the Interior had refused to sanction more. The reward thus had to wait until the next annual budget had 
been authorised, though it is not recorded whether Nai Phrom did eventually receive it. NA  
MT.0201.1.1/19, ‘Nakhon Naiyok Provincial Committee to Undersecretary o f the Interior, 20 May 
1936’.
50 PKPS, 13, pp. 53,252-3.
51 NA R.5 N.11.3.K/3, ‘Devawongse to Sommot, 1 Feb. 1896’; NA R,5 N.11.3.K/4, ‘Prince Phichit to 
Chulalongkom, 29 April 1896’.
52 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/4, ‘Phichit to Chulalongkom, 29 April 1896’.
53NAR.5 N.11.3.K/3, ‘Naretto Sommot, 24 Jan. 1896’.
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Devawongse that the Chinese would not cause trouble, Chulalongkom ordered that 
the law was now to be upheld and playing thua po outside the dens forbidden.54
Once both sets of festivities were over, Prince Phichit Prichakon, the Minister 
of Justice from October 1894 to March 1897, wrote to the king concerning a report 
from the Criminal Court. One Nai Am had brought charges of illegal gambling, 
specifically playing thua po outside the gambling houses, against 49 Siamese and 
Chinese, men and women. Since he suggested that the defendants be fined 500 baht 
each and that he, as plaintiff, should receive no less than half the total fines, it can be 
concluded that Nai Am was motivated by greed.55 On the argument that the accused 
were gambling during a time when it was traditionally allowed, the court sought 
advice on whether to try the case or not.56 In Phichit’s opinion it was unwise. If the 
court were to fine the defendants, he reasoned, it would set a precedent and lead to a 
flood of similar accusations because those who successfully prosecuted a case stood 
to make large sums of money. He feared troublemakers would be quick to take 
advantage at the expense of the general population. Moreover, the courts and 
judiciary would be overwhelmed with such cases. The poor, meanwhile, would be 
unable to pay their fines and would thus end up in prison, leading to overcrowding.57 
Despite these objections, Chulalongkom insisted no exceptions could be made: the 
gambling act had been issued long ago and advance warning of a clampdown had 
also been given. If exceptions to the law were made on the basis of tradition, the
* ■ 58people would not heed future legislation. In other words, Chulalongkom considered 
enforcing the gambling laws to be essential for maintaining state authority.
54 NA R.5 N.11.3.K/3, ‘Devawongse to Sommot, 1 Feb. 1896’; ‘Chulalongkom to Naret, 4 Feb. 1896’.
55 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/4, ‘Report of Criminal Court, 7 April 1896’.
56 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/4, ‘Phraya Thammasan to Phra Si Thammasan, 7 April 1896’.
57 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/4, ‘Phichit to Chulalongkom, 29 April 1896’.
58 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/4, ‘Chulalongkom to Phichit, 9 May 1896’.
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One persistent obstacle to the enforcement of the gambling laws throughout 
the entire period covered by this study was the involvement of royals, nobles and 
government officials in illegal gambling. From the late 1910s, this became 
particularly acute and, as Chapter 5 will detail, it was a major issue for the kingdom’s 
nascent popular press and some sections of the public. Due to their status and 
privileges, high-ranking members of society and those close to them seemed to enjoy 
near immunity from arrest and prosecution. Although the police may have known full 
well that illegal gambling was going on in the residence of some prince or senior 
official, carrying out a raid on such a place was risky. As the Bangkok Post explained: 
‘it is essential that the raid should yield evidence that would prove the case to the hilt 
in Court’,59 the implication being that otherwise those hapless police officers 
involved in the arrests would face the wrath of the house owner. Similarly, the Sara 
rat noted that it was this fear of status and privilege that ensured only commoners 
were arrested for gambling offences.60 It is revealing that when the long-running 
gambling den on the estate of Phraya Phuban Banthoeng -  an important official 
within the Ministry of the Palace -  was busted in May 1923, a number of senior 
police officers were in attendance as a mark of respect.61 Moreover, the official 
apparently boasted that the police would be unable to touch him. Similarly, one 
Phraya Mahathep, a senior officer in the Royal Bodyguard who was with Phraya 
Phuban Banthoeng at the time of the raid, dared one of the policemen to arrest him.63 
Clearly, both officials believed their rank guaranteed them protection from the law. 
However, although neither were at the actual scene of the crime, the fact that illegal 
gambling had been going on right under their noses was sufficient for charges to be
59BTWM, 19 July 1924.
60 Sara rat, 8 May 1923. See also Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 202.
61 Yamato, 5 May 1923.
62 Awanti, 11 May 1923.
63 Yamato, 25 May 1923.
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brought against them. Significantly, this seems to have been the first time the police 
had successfully busted an illicit den in the home of such high-ranking officials.64 
The way in which Vajiravudh’s government dealt with this case will be examined 
later.
A further obstacle was that the police had to obtain the king’s permission to 
arrest and prosecute any member of the royal family, as well as to search any royal 
residences.65 This latter process was time-consuming and meant these places were 
effectively off-limits to the police. Unsurprisingly, some royals and those close to 
them -  relatives, servants, friends -  took advantage of this protection. During January 
1909, investigations into illegal gambling in Thanyaburi, a farming district on the 
outskirts of Bangkok, revealed that an illicit gambling ring was operating in the 
residence of a prince’s wife (Mom). This was a major operation: the residence was 
guarded by Sikhs and every evening towards the end of the harvest season 
(December-January) around one hundred people, mostly ethnic Lao migrant 
farmhands, would go there to gamble away their wages. The organisers included a 
government official, the younger brother of the prince’s wife -  Nai Chi -  and one of 
her servants; each night it was estimated they were making between 600 and 1,200 
baht in commission (kha tong). For the local authorities, it was imperative something 
be done to stop this: they had had considerable success in arresting and prosecuting 
minor cases of illegal gambling but their failure to do anything about large-scale 
cases had led people to criticise them for being unjust (pen a-yuttitham).66 Chao 
Phraya Yomarat urged the governor of Thanyaburi to bring charges against those
64 Yamato, 5 May 1923.
65 See, for instance, NA R.7 M.99/3, ‘Prince Lopburi to Mahithon, 12 June 1926’, in which the king’s 
permission is asked for a raid on a prince’s palace and NA R.7 Y.4/8, ‘Chinda to Mahithon, 15 March 
1930 & 7 June 1930’, in which pennission is requested to prosecute another prince. Following the 
latter’s conviction for illegal gambling, he absconded. The police were thus obliged to obtain 
permission to arrest and imprison him once more.
66 NA R.5 N.3.2.K/111, ‘Khun Naranukunkit to Phraya Nonthaburi, 28 Jan. 1909’.
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involved if he believed there was enough evidence but warned him to be careful not 
to fail.67 Summons were issued for Nai Chi, identified as head of the ring, and his 
cohorts but they went into hiding in the residence, meaning royal permission was 
required before a raid could be conducted. A year later the gambling was still going 
on. Indeed, during Chinese New Year, the residence was apparently as crowded as 
one of the capital’s gambling houses. As the governor observed, even if Nai Chi and 
his followers were successfully prosecuted, the gambling would continue because the 
proceeds would be more than enough to cover any fine. Furthermore, since the 
residence was protected, the police would have to receive further permission before 
entering again, blocking the opportunity for a lightning raid to disrupt the operation.68
Even when it was more a case of bending the law rather than breaking it, such 
activities served as a vivid illustration of the uneven application of the law. Lawson 
summed up this state of affairs when he drew attention to how a prince had exceeded 
the time limit for licensed gambling to be conducted in his palace: Tt does not seem 
right to me that it should go on in this way, the festivities being over. More-over [sic] 
I hear that he proposes to have gambling every month and if the Police are to allow 
his Royal Highness to do it I really do not see how they can prevent any one else 
doing the same.’69 Perhaps this was considered an abuse of privilege only in Western 
eyes but, as Chapter 5 will illustrate, Lawson’s concern that such behaviour by 
members of the Siamese elite was undermining efforts to reduce gambling was 
echoed by the emergent popular Thai-language press of the 1910s. Indeed, the 
injustices resulting from the special status of the princes was one of the reasons cited
67NAR,5N.3.2.K/111, ‘YomarattoNonthaburi, 31 Jan. 1909’.
68 NA R.5 N.3.2.K/111, ‘Nonthaburi to Yomarat, 15 Feb. 1910’.
69 NA R.5 N .8.1/236, ‘Lawson to Nares [Naret], 19 Dec. 1902’.
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by Luang Wichit Wathakan, chief ideologue of the Phibun regime, for the 1932
70coup.
Extraterritoriality and the participation of foreigners in illegal gambling 
presented a similar problem.71 Under the provisions of the numerous ‘unequal’ 
treaties Siam signed with the various Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century 
and with Japan in 1898, both indigenous and colonial subjects of these countries 
enjoyed the right to be tried by their own consul rather than the Siamese courts. The 
decision as to whether or not Siamese law might be applied to foreigners and, by 
extension, whether they should be punished for any violations of it, was thus down to 
the consuls.72 Following the decision to clamp down on the playing of thua po outside 
the gambling houses in 1896, for instance, the Bangkok police had to ask the British, 
French and Portuguese consuls to prohibit their subjects from breaking this law.73 
Additionally, the Siamese police had to apply to the relevant consul for warrants to 
search the property of their protected subjects and to arrest them: the arrested person 
was then turned over to the consul. Rather than give general warrants allowing for the 
arrest of all subjects committing a particular offence, certain consuls would require 
the name of the suspect and sometimes even evidence of their wrongdoing before 
issuing a warrant.74 All of this created a time-consuming process that prevented the 
police from taking immediate action against foreign lawbreakers. Extraterritoriality 
thus afforded subjects of the treaty powers a great deal of protection from the
70 Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition: A Brief Survey o f Cultural Trends in the Five Years since 
the Revolution o f 1932, London: Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 18-19.
71 On the implications o f extraterritoriality for the policing of Bangkok see Hong, ‘Extraterritoriality in 
Bangkok’, pp. 128-33.
72 For an overview of extraterritoriality in Siam and die provisions o f the various treaties see Francis 
Bowes Sayre, ‘The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam’, American Journal o f  International Law, 22, 
1 (Jan. 1928), pp. 70-88. Extraterritorial rights were gradually limited from the 1900s onwards but 
were not fully revoked until 1938.
73 NA R.5 N.11.3.K/4, ‘Naret to Chulalongkom, 26 Feb. 1896’; ‘Phra Anan Nararak to Naret, 13 Feb. 
1896’. While die British and Portuguese consuls consented, the French consul was not present and the
police were thus unable to secure his assistance.
74 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/5, ‘Chulalongkom to Naret, 3 Feb. 1898’; CSW, 27 April 1917.
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Siamese authorities. The potential for abuse was compounded by the fact that other 
Asians, primarily Chinese immigrants, could also gain this protection by applying to 
one of the treaty powers for protege status; these protection papers were commonly 
bought and sold by consular officials.75 Indeed, the ease with which French papers 
could be secured made it ‘the nationality “of choice” for pawnshop operators, heads 
of secret societies, and others who were on the thin edge of the law.’76
For the Siamese government, extraterritoriality meant it was dependent on the 
assistance and goodwill of the treaty powers for the successful suppression of illegal 
gambling. But this help was not always forthcoming. In 1917, for instance, the Chino 
say am warns ap newspaper criticised some unnamed consuls for protecting those of 
their subjects making a living through illegal gambling, instead of aiding Siamese 
officials in its suppression.77 The French were especially uncooperative at times. 
Indeed, during Chulalongkom’s reign, both Siamese and British officials believed the 
French exploited extraterritoriality to stir up disorder within Bangkok and thereby
- 7 0
further their imperial ambitions. Moreover, following the Paknam crisis and the 
subsequent Franco-Siamese treaty in 1893, France was particularly aggressive in 
enrolling proteges amongst the kingdom’s ethnic Khmer and Lao, as well as the
noChinese, in an attempt to increase its influence. Unsurprisingly, the French consul 
was disinclined to aid the Siamese authorities in suppressing illegal gambling. For 
instance, when the Bangkok police applied for warrants in January 1898 to search 
four properties in Sampheng where illegal gambling was suspected and which were 
owned by Chinese under French protection, the consul initially refused on the
75 Sayre, ‘Passing o f Extraterritoriality’, p. 73.
76 Hong, ‘Extraterritoriality in Bangkok’, p. 134.
11 CSW, 17 April 1917.
78 Hong, ‘Extraterritoriality in Bangkok’, p. 129.
79 Ibid., p. 134; David Streckfuss, ‘The Mixed Colonial Legacy in Siam: Origins of Thai Racialist 
Thought, 1890-1910’ in Laurie Sears (ed.), Autonomous Histories, Particular Truths: Essays in 
Honour o f  John Smail, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1993, pp. 132-7.
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grounds that such gambling was traditionally permitted during Chinese New Year, 
which was fast approaching.80 Warrants were eventually granted but only with the 
condition that the police be accompanied by a French official when searching these 
properties.81 More seriously, it was even suggested that the French consul had been 
warning those under his jurisdiction of impending raids.82
Although France and Britain gave up extraterritorial rights for their Asian 
proteges in the border treaties concluded with Siam in 1907 and 1909 respectively, 
extraterritoriality remained an impediment to law enforcement. In the immediate 
aftermath of the abolition of the gambling houses, underground gambling rings 
commonly employed foreigners with extraterritorial rights, particularly Japanese 
citizens, to act as fronts for their illicit operations. These Japanese would become 
residents in houses doubling as gambling dens and thereby prevent the police from 
carrying out spontaneous raids. As with the French, the Japanese consul granted 
search and arrest warrants only on condition that a consular official was always in 
attendance.83 The first raid on such a den was carried out on the night of 11 August 
1917. Fifteen police officers, accompanied by the obligatory Japanese representative, 
raided a house in Bangkok’s Hualamphong district, which, according to a sign in 
Thai, was the residence of a Japanese person called Ono. Despite Ono’s attempts to 
delay the police while the gamblers disposed of the evidence and tried to escape, the 
raid was a success. Twenty-three people, mostly Chinese and Siamese including one 
government official, were arrested. Cash and equipment for playing po kam were 
seized. Ono, meanwhile, was instructed to report to the Japanese embassy the 
following day. However, he was arrested later that night for assaulting a rickshaw
80 NA R.5 N.11.3.K/5, ‘Naret to Chulalongkom, 21 Jan. 1898’.
81 NA R.5 N.11.3.K/5, ‘Devawongse to Chulalongkom, 28 Jan. 1898’.
82 NA R.5 N.11.3.K/5, ‘Chulalongkom to Devawongse, 24 Jan. 1898’; ‘Devawongse to 
Chulalongkom, 28 Jan. 1898’.
83 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Yomarat to Prachin, 15 Aug. 1917’.
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coolie and a policeman. The police had planned a number of similar raids for the 
same night but, once they had returned to the station with the suspects and evidence, 
they received news that various dens had already shut up shop. While the evidence at 
the first raid was being collected, two other Japanese had briefly turned up there and 
it was assumed they had tipped off the other dens. This suggests that Ono and other 
Japanese ‘doormen’ like him were part of a city-wide organisation offering protection 
for illegal gambling dens.84 Recognising the seriousness of this situation, Chao 
Phraya Yomarat urged that all involved should be heavily punished so as to deter 
others from using foreigners to protect themselves from the authorities: the Chinese 
were to be deported and the official dismissed.85 Furthermore, Vajiravudh felt it was 
imperative that they prosecute Ono in the Japanese consular court in order to set an 
example.86 However, the Japanese consul gave him the choice of either being 
prosecuted in Siam or voluntarily leaving the country. Ono chose the latter.87 To sum 
up, extraterritoriality not only provided protection for the subjects and proteges of the 
treaty powers but also, indirectly, for Siamese nationals.
Under certain circumstances the Siamese authorities were willing to turn a 
blind eye to illegal gambling. In 1921, for instance, an informer wrote to the king’s 
secretary concerning the gambling taking place in a teacher’s club. As he openly 
admitted, he was looking for a reward, and had already informed the local police and 
the Minister of Education but neither had taken any action.88 This was his last resort 
but to no avail. Chao Phraya Yomarat merely wrote to the chairman of the club, Chao 
Phraya Thammasakmontri, urging him to be more careful in future. He justified this
84 Following this raid, there were also rumours that these Japanese ‘doormen* held a meeting with den 
owners in order to reassure them that they could still protect them against police action and that their 
activities should continue. NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Phirentharathibodi to Prince Khamrop, 13 Aug. 1917’.
85 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Yomarat to Prachin, 15 Aug. 1917*.
86 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Vajiravudh to Yomarat, 17 Aug. 1917’.
87 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Si Woraphotthirat to Prachin, 25 Sept. 1917’.
88 NA R.6 N.26/6, ‘Letter from B. Boon Long, 1 Feb. 1921’.
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stance by arguing that, while gambling in members clubs was against the law, it was 
in reality quite normal and a custom all over the world. So long as it was for 
entertainment and relaxation, was conducted among members only, and the sums 
staked were not excessive, it was harmless. Additionally, since it was not possible to 
prohibit gambling in the clubs and hotels frequented by foreigners, it was 
inappropriate to take action against Siamese social clubs where gambling also went 
on.89 While such a position was bom out of common sense, the idea that gambling in 
certain locations and/or by certain persons was perfectly acceptable undermined the 
general thrust of the government’s attempts to restrict gambling.
To conclude, there were too many institutional weaknesses, obstacles and 
inconsistencies in the way the gambling laws were enforced for gambling to ever be 
successfully tamed. The police may have had periodic success in curbing illegal 
gambling but it and its organisers always remained just out of reach, continuously 
evolving and finding new tricks for evading the law. Indeed, there was a limit to the 
extent illegal gambling could be restricted; a limit that was, in a sense, self-imposed 
by the police, who were happy to tolerate certain underground operations in return for 
bribes. This informal regulation of illegal gambling by the police merely reflected the 
inherent contradiction within the government’s broader policy, specifically, that, 
despite efforts to reduce gambling, certain forms of gambling in certain conditions 
with certain players were acceptable. In practice, however, it was the police, rather 
than the government, that determined what was and what was not tolerable.
89 NA R.6 N.26/6, ‘Yomarat to Chakraphan, 26 Feb. 1921’.
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In the Dock
Having examined the role of the police and the problems they faced in enforcing the 
gambling laws, it is now necessary to consider the role of the Siamese courts. Besides 
trying and sentencing offenders, the courts were also crucial in determining what 
exactly constituted gambling. This section will examine both these aspects. But first it 
is necessary to outline briefly the development and structure of the country’s judicial 
system, and to comment on the limitations of the sources.
Prior to Chulalongkom’s state reforms in the 1890s, there were some thirty- 
odd courts under the jurisdiction of the various traditional ministries. The Ministry of 
Justice was established in 1892 in order to rationalise this chaotic and inefficient 
system along Western lines and to bring all the kingdom’s courts under its centralised 
administration.90 Three basic levels of court were established: courts of first instance, 
appellate courts, and the Supreme Court (san dika). Within Bangkok, the first tier 
included a civil court, a criminal court, and several misdemeanour or magistrate 
courts (san porisapha). Following the promulgation of the Law on the Provincial 
Courts in 1896, a three-tiered system of courts of first instance based on monthon, 
provinces (muang) and districts (khwaeng) was gradually implemented throughout 
Siam.91 According to Tamara Loos, this process coincided with a year-on-year 
increase in court cases due to ‘better accounting systems; the penetration of the 
centralized state, its police force, and its laws into areas outside the capital; and the
QO
promulgation of standardized procedural law.’ During the 1890s, the newly-
90 For an in-depth examination o f the transformation o f the judicial system see David Engel, Law and 
Kingship in Thailand during the Reign o f  King Chulalongkom, Michigan Papers on South and 
Southeast Asia No. 9, Anri Arbor, Michigan: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1975, pp. 
59-93.
91 These provincial courts remained under the jurisdiction of the trail-blazing Ministry of the Interior 
until they were transferred to the Ministry o f Justice in 1912.
92 Tamara Loos, ‘Gender Adjudicated: Translating Modem Legal Subjects in Siam’, PhD dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1999, p. 60.
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reformed court system was faced with a backlog of cases, a situation exacerbated by a 
shortage of trained judges. Indeed, the courts remained overburdened and the judges 
overworked into the 1930s.
The following discussion of the judiciary’s attitude towards illegal gambling 
is based largely on cases that were submitted to the Supreme Court. Although such 
cases came from all over the kingdom, usually passing through the appellate courts 
first, they are by no means representative of gambling cases dealt with by the lower 
courts. There were strict limits on the circumstances in which a case could be 
appealed, usually on the basis of misapplied law, as opposed to the prosecutor’s or 
defendant’s dissatisfaction with the outcome.93 Thus, those cases dealt with by the 
Supreme Court tended to be unusual or unique. Nevertheless, this does have some 
advantages for the historian. When the Supreme Court resolved complicated legal 
issues, its decisions often became the standard (banthatthan) to be applied to similar 
cases in the future.94 For instance, it played a critical role in determining whether a 
particular game that was not mentioned specifically in the gambling laws was 
sufficiently similar to games that were mentioned as to bring it within the scope of the 
law. Moreover, the Supreme Court also set precedents on the appropriate sentence for 
particular offences. In other words, an examination of Supreme Court cases indicates 
how the judiciary wished the law to be applied. These cases have been supplemented 
by records of lower court decisions drawn from a wider variety of sources, including 
newspapers, to build up a more detailed picture of how the law was actually applied.
The first aspect of the judiciary’s work for consideration is how gambling 
offenders were punished, with particular attention to the circumstances under which
93 Ibid., p. 63.
94 As the compiler o f a collection o f Supreme Court rulings on gambling cases eloquently put it, these 
judgments were like a whetstone on which to sharpen a knife. See ‘Foreword’ in Phra Borirak 
Nitikaset (comp.), Phraratchabanyat kanphanan kap khamphiphaksadika banthatthan [The Gambling 
Act and Supreme Court Precedents], np, nd.
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custodial sentences were imposed. Many of the pre-1890 gambling laws prescribed 
strokes of the rattan as a penalty, in addition to a fine, but this was rarely applied 
following the judicial reforms of the 1890s.95 From then on, a fine was the usual 
penalty for the majority of gambling convictions. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the 1893 law prescribed terms of imprisonment only in lieu of payment of a fine. 
Moreover, given Prince Phichit’s concerns about the ability of the criminal justice 
system to handle an influx of gambling cases, it can be surmised that during the 
1890s the courts kept the amount people were fined for minor gambling offences to a 
minimum so as to prevent the prisons from being flooded with convicted gamblers 
who were unable to pay. Indeed, this seems to have remained the standard for most 
minor cases throughout the period covered by this study, even though the 1902 law 
and its successors in the 1930s prescribed imprisonment as a penalty for playing both 
forbidden games and permitted ones without a license. Up until the late 1910s, fines 
in these minor cases tended to be around 60 to 100 baht, with about 20 baht being the 
lowest and rising to 200 baht at most.96 Along with the organiser or banker, the owner 
of the property in which the gambling took place usually received a heavier fine. 
Guilty pleas entailed a reduction in the offender’s penalty: under Section 59 of the 
1908 Penal Code this was set at a maximum of half the original penalty.97 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent leniency of the courts, there were times when the
95 During its work clearing the backlog o f cases in Ayutthaya province in 1896 and 1897, for instance, 
the Special Commission converted a Chinese man’s sentence for gambling with children from 30 
strokes to 15 days’ imprisonment, which the offender had already served while awaiting trial. Tips, 
Crime and Punishment, p. 165. Whipping was abandoned under the 1908 Penal Code. Tokichi Masao, 
‘The New Penal Code of Siam’, Journal o f  the Siam Society, 5, 2 (1908), p. 4.
96 NT, 12 May 1917. For examples of fines in this range see NA R.5 N.3.5.K/5, ‘List o f criminal cases, 
August 1903’; NA R.5 N.3.5.K/12, ‘List o f criminal cases, January 1905’; NA R.5 N.3.5.K/67, ‘List o f  
criminal cases, May 1905’; ‘List o f criminal cases, June 1905’; NA R.5 N.3.3.Ch/16, ‘Phra Thepphlu 
to Minister of Local Government, 8 June 1907, 11 March & 5 April 1908’; SO [t], 2 Feb. 1916; CSW, 
20 Dec. 1916; NT, 27 Jan. & 16 Feb. 1917; ‘Ruling No. 594 & 595/2460’, Thammasan, 1, pp. 303-7; 
‘Ruling No. 38/2461’ & ‘Ruling No. 87/2461’, Thammasan, 2, pp. 31-4, 85-9; ‘Ruling No. 888/2462’, 
Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 31-32.
97 The Penal Code fo r the Kingdom o f Siam R. S. 127 (1908), Bangkok: American Presbyterian 
Mission Press, 1908, pp. 17-18.
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defendants were unable to pay these fines and thus found themselves imprisoned. In 
1907, for instance, a Chinese man found guilty of being the banker (chao mu) for a 
forbidden game and two players were imprisoned for four months and two months 
respectively in lieu of paying their fines.98 When it came to huai lottery offences, 
however, the courts did not hesitate to impose prison sentences. In 1915, for example, 
a Chinese man was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment and fined 500 baht for 
illegally receiving stakes on the huai."  A year later the Bangkok Criminal Court gave 
two other Chinese terms of imprisonment for running underground lottery operations; 
both were sentenced to two years, with one receiving an additional eight months 
because he was a repeat offender.100 These heavy sentences reflected the importance 
of the huai lottery farm for state finances.
From the 1910s onwards, the public prosecutors and the courts began to take 
an increasingly hard line towards repeat offenders and those playing particular 
banned games. Indeed, a Supreme Court judgment in 1912 seems to mark a 
watershed. That year the public prosecutor for Phetchaburi filed a petition against the 
light punishment of 11 Siamese, including two women, convicted of playing thua 
outside the gambling houses. The provincial court had passed sentence as follows: the 
banker, Nai Khian, had previously been convicted of playing a prohibited game; once 
this and his guilty plea had been taken into consideration he was fined 150 baht. The 
remaining defendants pleaded not guilty; the two women and one man were fined 80 
baht each, while the rest were acquitted. All convicted managed to pay their fines. 
The prosecutor then appealed on the grounds that a mere fine was not going to deter
98 NA R.5 N.3.3.K/87, ‘Thepphlu to Naret, 10 M y  1907’. See also NA R.5 N.3.3.Ch/7, ‘Phraya 
Damrong to Naret, 29 April 1903’; NA R.5 N.3.3.Ch/15, ‘Thepphlu to Naret, 18 May 1907’.
99KDM , 10 Nov. 1915.
i°o 12  Aug. 1916. Under Section 72 of the Penal Code, any found guilty of a further offence
within five years o f having been convicted for a previous one were to have their new sentence 
increased by one third. The Penal Code, p. 21.
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them from offending again (mai khet lap). The appellate court duly amended Nai
Khian’s fine but it was not enough for the prosecutor, whose petition to the Supreme
Court was approved by Prince Damrong. The Supreme Court took the view that:
The people of the outer and inner monthons are hopelessly addicted to 
gambling and repeatedly break the law. Nai Khian has already been fined 
once for illegal gambling but has not learned his lesson and persists in 
gambling. It is not fitting to show any mercy. He should be punished with 
imprisonment to set an example (yiangyang) to the people.101
Nai Khian’s fine was increased to 200 baht and he was sentenced to two months’
imprisonment. The other three received one month. The importance of this ruling is
underlined by the fact that it was published in Thesaphiban, the Ministry of the
Interior periodical that contained guidelines for the kingdom’s administrators.102
The need for harsher penalties was echoed by some sections of the press.
Commenting on the prevalence of illegal gambling in Sampheng, the Nangsuphim
thai noted that fines were ineffective because they were insignificant when compared
with the proceeds from running an underground den. Only prison was a sufficient
deterrent.103 During the 1920s, heavier fines began to be levied for playing banned
games. In June 1924, for instance, the Criminal Court fined the female owner of a
house in which po kam was being conducted 600 baht; others present were fined 400
baht.104 The government also considered a range of other deterrents such as
banishment from Bangkok to the provinces for all nakleng, in this case meaning
recalcitrant gamblers, who had been convicted three times, ‘as it is thought a good
many people will think again before running that risk.’105 Similarly, in contrast to
t01 ‘Ruling No. 881 & 882/131’, Thesaphiban, 15, pp. 293-4.
102 Ibid., pp. 292-4.
103 NT, 5 Jan. 1917. See also CSW, 27 Dec. 1916.
104 BTWM, 27 June 1924. For case in which similar fines were levied see ‘Ruling No. 641 & 642/2465’ 
Thammasan, 6, pp. 506-9 BTWM, 29 Jan. 1924. In 1923, die Bangkok Criminal Court imposed a fine 
as high as 2,000 baht on a repeat gambling offender and fines of 1,500 and 1,000 baht on the others 
convicted in the same case. This seems to have been unusually harsh, however. See ‘Ruling No. 
4/2466’, Thammasan, 1, pp. 186-9.
105 BTWM, 2 Oct. 1923.
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most other offences, Vajiravudh did not grant clemency to those convicted of illegal 
gambling.106 By the mid-1920s, a large fine and imprisonment seems to have become 
standard for those complicit in large-scale illegal gambling. In 1924, the Lopburi 
provincial court found eleven guilty of running a large den where cockfighting and 
the prohibited games of thua po and bia bok were conducted: all received prison 
sentences ranging between six months for the ringleader and one month, and fines 
from 1,000 to 400 baht. When the defendants appealed, however, the appellate court 
found the lower court’s judgment to be too severe and thus lifted the prison sentences. 
After the prosecutor petitioned against this decision, the Supreme Court, sending out 
a strong message as to the appropriate punishment for major gambling offences, 
upheld the judgment of the provincial court, though it did reduce the ringleader’s 
term of imprisonment to three months.107 In terms of heavy penalties for serious 
gambling offences, legislation lagged behind the general attitude of the judiciary: 
recall that it was not until the 1936 gambling law was enacted that imprisonment 
became the standard tariff for organising most prohibited games, at least a decade 
after it had become the unwritten standard in court. In other words, the law was 
merely formalising an established pattern. This suggests that it was the judiciary, 
rather than the legislature, that was driving the Siamese state’s increasingly punitive 
stance towards illegal gambling.
Around the same time, the Supreme Court tried to make imprisonment the 
standard for playing some banned games, particularly those formerly conducted in the 
gambling houses. In 1926, the Bangkok Appeals Court overturned the criminal
106 BTWM, 19 July 1924.
107 ‘Ruling No. 363/2467’, Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 51-3. Earlier that year, the Bangkok Criminal 
Court found three guilty of running a large po kam den; as a repeat offender one received four months’ 
imprisonment and a 2,666 baht 66 satang fine, while the other two were sentenced to two months and 
fined 2,000 baht. ‘Ruling No. 7/2467’, Ibid., pp. 46-8. For a further example, see ‘Ruling No. 
731/2469’, ibid., pp. 59-61.
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court’s decision to acquit eleven people accused of played po kam and fined each of 
them 400 baht. One defendant petitioned against this judgment. Unfortunately for 
him, however, the Supreme Court found there was incontrovertible proof of illegal 
gambling and, citing an earlier ruling -  No. 228/2469 -  as a precedent for 
imprisoning those convicted of playing po , sentenced the defendant to one month.108 
This Supreme Court ruling was in turn cited as justification for imprisoning some 
defendants in a similar case a couple of years later.109 That the courts made a 
distinction between playing prohibited games and playing permitted ones without 
license was not lost on the population; those charged with the former might insist 
they had actually been playing one of the latter, no doubt in the hope of avoiding a 
prison sentence. In January 1934, for instance, six people up before Samut 
Songkhram provincial court denied playing po kam but admitted to playing a dice 
game without a license, despite all the evidence to the contrary. With the exception of 
a minor, all were fined and imprisoned.110
While a custodial sentence had become common for playing banned games by 
1930, small fines remained the principal penalty for gambling without a license or in 
contravention of one.111 Nevertheless, even the smallest infraction might be punished, 
though the fine was usually light. In 1929, for example, a man was fined five baht for 
gambling without a permit. His only crime, though, was to have changed the location 
of the card game for which he had obtained a permit; one of his children had fallen ill
108 ‘Ruling No. 529/2469", Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 56-8.
109 ‘Ruling No. 200/2471", Thammasan, 12, pp. 225-8. For more example cases o f where imprisonment 
was imposed for playing the games formerly played in the dens see ‘Ruling No. 307/2470’ & ‘Ruling 
No. 76/2472’, Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 67-70, 84-5; BTWM, 27 March 1930, 22 Aug. 1936; 
‘Ruling No. 789/2474’, Thammasan, 15, pp. 828-30.
110 Curiously the appellate court lifted the fines only for them to be restored by the Supreme Court. 
‘Ruling No. 731/2476’, Thammasan, 17, pp. 980-2. For an earlier case in which the defendants tried 
the same tactic, also in vain, see ‘Ruling No. 71/2471’, Thammasan, 12, pp. 76-8.
111 For example cases from the 1920s and 1930s see ‘Ruling No. 4/2466’, Thammsan, 7, pp. 5-7; 
‘Ruling No. 396/2468’, Thammasan, 9, pp. 258-61; ‘Ruling No. 196/2471’, Thammasan, 12, pp. 215- 
17; ‘Ruling No. 544/2480’, Thammasan, 21, pp. 632-8; ‘Ruling No. 362/2481’, Thammasan, 22, pp. 
554-7.
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112and so the game had been moved to a friend’s house. Similarly, seven were fined 
16 baht each for exceeding the number of people, a maximum of six, that were 
specified on the card permit.113 People were also penalised for playing games that, 
although permitted subject to license, were not the game specified on the particular 
license they had obtained.114 These examples indicate that both the public prosecutors 
and the judiciary tried to ensure that the letter of the law was rigorously upheld.
Having established that the majority of gambling offences were punished with 
fines, it is worth considering the impact fines had upon the people of Siam. In the 
hierarchy of punishments, fines might have been preferable to imprisonment, which 
involved both a loss of liberty and the potential income that could have been earned 
while incarcerated, but their effects could still exceed a simple loss of money. 
Moreover, it is clear that not all could afford to pay and would thus find themselves 
imprisoned anyway. A consideration of the typical income of the general population 
will put the punitive effects of these fines into perspective. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the fixed daily rate for a Bangkok coolie was two salung (0.5 
baht).115 By the end of the Fifth Reign, the average daily wage for an unskilled 
Bangkok labourer was 0.75 baht, rising to 1 baht a day in the mid-1920s and then 
falling to 0.8 baht during the 1930s.116 In rural areas, meanwhile, agricultural wage 
labourers were usually paid at least 80 baht for a season’s work (9 months), with free 
housing and food provided by their employer, though this fell to between 30 and 60 
baht a season in the depression years.117 From this it can be surmised that, for the
112 ‘Ruling No. 9/2472’, Thammasan, 13, p. 15.
113 ‘Ruling No. 113/2478’, Thammasan, 19, pp. 171-5.
114 See for instance ‘Ruling No. 60/2478’ & ‘Ruling No. 427/2478’, Thammasan, 19, pp. 70-3, 713-18; 
‘Ruling No. 1689 & 1690/2479’, Thammasan, 20, p. 1974.
115 Jottrand, In Siam, p. 284.
116 Batson, End o f  the Absolute Monarchy, p. 90; Constance Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook o f  
Historical Statistics, Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1983, p. 95.
117 Dilok, Rural Economy, p. 91; Wilson, Thailand, p. 95.
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majority of the population, even a small fine would have had a punitive impact 
disproportionate to the seriousness of most gambling offences. Educated 
professionals in Bangkok were paid more, of course. In 1922, clerks in a foreign-run 
store had salaries of between 60 and 90 baht per month, for instance.118 It is probably 
these people, and those better-off, to whom the Bangkok Times referred when it 
claimed: ‘Many people do not mind a small fine, which is all that is inflicted in these 
card playing cases.’119 This explains why a number of Thai-language newspapers 
called for heavier penalties.
Besides sentencing, the judiciary was also crucial in determining whether 
certain activities qualified as illegal gambling. Firstly, people did not always gamble 
for cash, instead using edibles or other items such as cigarettes as stakes. When such 
cases were brought to court, it was up to the judiciary to decide whether these items 
counted as property (sap-sin) and thus whether an offence had been committed. In 
1922, for instance, a woman and two men were accused of playing cards for cash 
without a license. The defendants admitted to playing cards but insisted they had been 
doing so for cakes not for money; the game had been taking place in the woman’s 
food shop and none of them had any cash on their person. Both the porisapha and 
Bangkok Appeals Court dismissed the case on the grounds that the defendants had 
not been gambling for cash. Nevertheless, the prosecution petitioned the Supreme 
Court, claiming that cakes were a form of property and an offence had thus been 
committed. The Supreme Court ruled that it was impossible to determine whether the 
accused had been playing for cakes to eat, which was not an offence against the 1902 
law, or had been playing for cakes as a property from which they might make a profit,
1,8 BTWM, 9 May 1922.
m  BTWM, 19 July 1924.
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which might be an offence. The prosecution’s appeal was thus dismissed.120 This 
ruling, No. 271/2465, was subsequently used as a precedent to decide other cases in 
favour of the defendants.121 However, the principle that gambling had to involve 
some fonn of profit making, meaning that gambling for cigarettes or cakes amongst 
friends was not a wrong, was called into question by the 1930 law. Indeed, the lack of 
a precise definition of gambling and some ambiguous wording in this act led the 
Chiang Rai provincial court to find nine guilty of playing phcii pok, a prohibited card 
game, despite their insistence they had been playing without stakes and there being 
no evidence to the contrary. After the Appeals Court upheld the lower court’s 
judgment, it was the Supreme Court that decided no offence had been committed, 
based on the argument that, since the 1930 law did not clearly state that playing a 
forbidden game without stakes was an offence, the accused should be given the 
benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court also cited the ruling discussed above to
199further justify its stance. The judiciary thereby established that gambling had to 
involve some transfer of value between the different parties.
On a similar note, the courts often had to decide whether some of the 
incentives shopkeepers used to encourage customers to purchase their wares qualified 
as gambling. Take a 1922 case concerning a machine that randomly dispensed 
postcards of variable quality after 10 satang (one tenth of a baht) had been inserted, 
for instance. The prosecution charged the owner of the machine with conducting a 
gambling activity similar to a raffle (chap chalak) illegally because some of the 
postcards were supposedly worth less than 10 satang and some were worth more. For 
his part, the accused asserted that the machine was just a means of encouraging 
people to buy his postcards, which were worth at least 10 satang or more.
120 ‘Ruling No. 271/2465’, Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 41-2,
121 See, for instance, ‘Ruling No. 463/2471’, ibid., pp. 81-3.
122 ‘Ruling No. 1011/2474’, Thammasan, 15, pp. 1204-6.
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Additionally, if the customer was unhappy with the postcard they received, he was 
willing to exchange it. The first porisapha court dismissed the case and, although this 
ruling was overturned by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court upheld the original 
court’s decision.123 Conversely, in 1925 the porisapha court found a man guilty of 
gambling illegally for selling watermelons by means of lots. Customers paid one 
satang and drew a lot: if it bore the number one, they received one watermelon; if it 
bore the number two, they received two watermelon, and so on. Citing the previous 
case, the Appeals Court reversed the lower courts’ decision but was, once again, 
overruled by the Supreme Court. The latter found the accused guilty of conducting a 
raffle without a permit on the basis that his customers were trying their luck; if they 
received only one watermelon, they had effectively lost on their investment but if 
they received three, they had made a profit.124 One common technique employed by 
shopkeepers was to insert banknotes or coupons entitling the holder to a prize of 
some sort into some packets of produce, such as bars of soap or packages of dried 
longan fruit. The Supreme Court decided this type of gambling case on the principle 
that offering free gifts to lucky customers was not an offence so long as the products 
on which the gift was offered were not sold for more than their market price.125 In 
other words, for an action to be considered gambling both parties had to have a 
chance of making a profit at the others expense. The legislative side of the 
government was clearly not satisfied with this, however, for the 1936 law made it an 
offence to offer prizes to customers randomly unless prior permission from the
123 ‘Ruling No. 623/2465’, Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 43-5.
124 ‘Ruling No. 583/2468’, Thammasan, 9, pp. 422-5. This ruling was then used as a precedent in a 
1930 case. See ‘Ruling No. 836/2473’, Thammasan, 14, pp. 539-42.
125 Thammasan, 17, pp. 1180-3. For cases in which this principle was applied see ‘Ruling No. 
653/2475’, Thammasan, 16, pp. 635-7; ‘Ruling No. 818/2476’, Thammasan, 17, pp. 1176-80; ‘Ruling 
No. 142/2479’, Thammasan, 20, p. 205.
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authorities had been obtained.126 By most definitions this practice was not gambling 
but the Siamese government regulated it in order to prevent retailers from taking
* 197advantage of their customers and to ensure it did not cross the line into gambling.
By adhering strictly to the letter of the law, the courts thereby exposed defects and 
loopholes in the existing legislation that might then be corrected by a new law.
The courts also played a role in determining the legality of games not 
specified in the legislation but which the prosecution deemed sufficiently similar to 
games that were listed for an offence to have been committed.128 On the whole, the 
courts seemed to have erred on the side of caution, dismissing most such cases on the 
grounds that any similarity had not been proven. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 
3, this attitude on the part of the judiciary was used by others in the administration to 
highlight the deficiency of the gambling laws and, in turn, cited as a reason for 
issuing new legislation that prohibited all forms of gambling, without having to 
mention specific forms. By highlighting that a particular game was not covered by the 
existing legislation, the judiciary might then prompt the government to include it in a 
future law. This was the case with yon chim, a game of skill in which the players 
would pitch coins onto a checkerboard or other similar surface. In 1927, the Supreme 
Court judged that the method of playing yon chim was not similar to the dice games si 
ngao lak or khluk khlik, listed in the 1902 law, and, accordingly, could be played
126 PKPS, 48, p. 1774. The penalty for violating this provision was a maximum prison sentence of one 
month, a fine between 50 and 2,000 baht or both. Ibid., p. 1777.
127 Chumphon, [Descriptions], p. 9.
128 Under the 1902 law, any games similar to those specified as forbidden were also prohibited. Under 
the 1930 and 1936 laws, meanwhile, any games that were similar to those permitted subject to license 
also required a license. See PKPS, 18, pp. 264-5, 270, 548; 20, pp. 508-9; 43, pp. 143-4; 48, pp. 1773-
4.
129 See, for example, ‘ Ruling No. 600/2467’ & ‘Ruling No. 5/2470’, Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 54-
5, 65-6; ‘Ruling No. 525/2475’, Thammasan, 16, pp. 478-80; ‘Ruling No. 1281/2479’, Thammasan, 
20, pp. 1515-17; ‘Ruling No. 445/2480’, Thammasan, 21, pp. 452-5; ‘Ruling No. 364/2483’, 
Thammasan, 24, p. 526.
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without a license.130 Under the 1930 law, however, yon chim was placed on the 
banned list.131 In other cases, the courts’ ruling on the legal status of an unlisted game 
preceded appropriate legislation. In 1916, for instance, the first porisapha court found 
four Chinese who had been gambling on mah-jong -  in Thai, called phai ma chiak or, 
more commonly, phai nok krachok -  to be guilty of gambling without a license, 
despite the fact that mah-jong was not specified in the current law.132 Mah-jong 
subsequently joined yon chim on the permitted subject to license list of the 1930 
law.133 In these instances, the judiciary had a semi-legislative function. Overall, it 
played a critical role in defining what constituted gambling exactly.
Disciplining Government Officials
As mentioned earlier, the status and privilege of Siamese royals, nobles and 
government officials impeded state efforts to enforce the gambling laws. But this was 
perhaps the least of the problems that their participation in gambling, both legal and 
illegal, presented the Siamese government. Firstly, it was well aware that gambling 
by these high-ranking members of society undermined efforts to discourage others 
from giving up the vice and could lead to accusations of hypocrisy.134 At worst, this 
might involve those state officials charged with upholding the law actually breaking it 
themselves. Such was the case in 1918, when Chao Phraya Aphairacha (M. R. W.
130 ‘Ruling No. 5/2470’, Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 65-6.
131 PKPS, 43, p. 149. Similarly, the Supreme Court also ruled in 1927 that the game saba-chut was not 
similar to si ngao lak or khli saba, listed in the 1893 law. Saba-chut was subsequently listed as 
requiring a license under the 1930 law. Curiously, it was then omitted from the 1936 law only to be 
shortly re-listed by the second edition o f the ministerial regulations. See ‘Ruling No. 413/2470’, 
Borirak, [Gambling Act], pp. 75-7; PKPS, 43, p. 150; 48, pp. 1779-81; 49, pp. 254-5.
132 NT, 17 & 28 Oct. 1916,20 Nov. 1916.
133 PKPS, 43, p. 150.
134 For instance, Chulalongkom noted that as long as the nobles and government officials continued to 
gamble, commoners would believe it was perfectly acceptable to do likewise. Similarly, a 1926 report 
asserted that gambling by officials set a poor example to their wives and children. See King 
Chulalongkom, Phithi songkran [Songkran ceremonies], Bangkok: Cremation Volume for Bamrung 
Sisombun, 1978, p. 96; andNA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
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Lop Suthat), the Minister of Justice from June 1912 to May 1926, informed the king
about a judge and a public prosecutor in Samut Songkhram province who had
confessed to gambling illegally.135 Besides making a mockery of the government’s
restrictionist policy, gambling by officials often led them into debt, fraud and
corruption. In turn, this undermined the functioning of the state and tarnished its
legitimacy. In 1903, for instance, a treasury official in the town of Lang Suan,
monthon Chumphon, was found to have embezzled over 1,500 baht from the local
education budget and then gambled it away. Consequently, local teachers did not
1 ^ 6receive their monthly salary. Gambling had a particularly detrimental effect upon
the fledgling police force of the 1890s and early 1900s. In his 1901/2 annual report,
Lawson observed, with regard to Siamese as opposed to Lao policemen, that:
gambling is generally the cause, not only of the desertions, but most of the 
serious crime in the force. What happens is this. A man gets his pay and goes 
straight to the gambling house. He loses all his previous month’s pay, cannot 
pay his debts, and, consequently, cannot get any one to give him any more 
credit. Seeing no way of getting out of the difficulty, he runs away. 
Sometimes instead of running away he steals.137
Lastly, as Chapter 5 will illustrate, the hypocrisy and corruption that gambling
fostered among the upper echelons of Siamese society gave the popular press of the
1910s and 1920s ample ammunition for its critiques of the absolutist social order.
Given all these reasons, it was imperative that the absolute monarchy be seen to take
a hard line against gambling by officials.
How to prevent royals and officials from becoming too embroiled in gambling
had been a concern of the state long before this wave of press criticism.138 The
135 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Aphairacha to Vajiravudh, 8 July 1918’.
136Kanchana, [Government Policy], pp. 112-13.
137 RPAB 120 [1901/2], p. 11. Commenting on the dismissal o f two officers in 1904/5, Lawson noted 
that ‘both were ruined by gambling’. RPAB 123 [1904/5], p. 7.
138 Near the start o f Rama I’s reign, for example, government officials were prohibited from gambling 
in the gambling houses. The penalty of transgressions was 90 lashes and tattooing on die forehead. 
Damrong, [Abolition], p. 13.
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decision to enforce the law against playing thua po outside the gambling houses 
during the various New Year festivities in 1896 was partly motivated by a desire to 
discourage officials from taking part.139 Moreover, the gambling house and lottery 
hall regulations issued in the 1890s prohibited any off-duty policemen or soldiers 
from entering these establishments while in uniform.140 Attempts to enforce these 
rules often led to the police stationed in the dens being assaulted by soldiers wishing 
to enter.141 Until the 1920s, though, there were no such restrictions on civilian 
officials. And, of course, there was nothing to stop police or army men from taking 
part in all the gambling activities conducted outside the gambling houses. Indeed, if 
the Thai-language press is to be believed, state officials were some of the most 
inveterate gamblers in the country. That this was a problem was confirmed in a 1926 
government report which attributed the increase in the number of officials driven into 
financial ruin over the previous ten years to gambling.142
During the Sixth Reign, the government seems to have dealt with officials’ 
involvement in illicit gambling on a case-by-case basis. Available sources indicate 
that those convicted for gambling offences were, upon approval from the king, 
stripped of their rank and dismissed from government service. In early 1918, for 
instance, a police captain was found guilty of conspiring to set up an underground 
thua po den. The Bangkok Criminal Court sentenced him to two month’s 
imprisonment and fined him 800 baht, in addition to him paying a 100 baht reward. 
The police captain was subsequently dismissed.143 Additionally, it seems that officials 
received heavier penalties than ordinary citizens. For example, a kamnan was 
sentenced to six month’s imprisonment for playing a banned game, in addition to a
139 NA R.5 N .l 1.3.K/2, ‘Chulalongkom to Prince Phitthayalap, 10 July 1895’.
m  PKPS, 13, pp. 56, 277, 281.
141 RPAB 1898-99, p. 44.
142 NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
143 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Yomarat to Prachin, 1 Feb. 1918’; ‘Vajiravudh to Yomarat, 6 March 1918’.
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fine, while his fellow gamblers were merely fined.144 Sometimes just a hint of 
wrongdoing was sufficient for action to be taken. In the case of the judge and public 
prosecutor who confessed to illegal gambling mentioned above, another official was 
implicated simply because he had been present and the Minister of Justice urged that 
he also be dismissed.145 The dictum of there being no smoke without fire was also 
applied to the case of the two Phrayas in 1923, referred to earlier. Both Phraya 
Phuban Banthoeng and Phraya Mahathep held important positions within the royal 
household and the Wild Tigers, and, as will be shown in Chapter 5, the case provoked 
great excitement within some sections of the popular press. Both were charged with 
being accessory to the underground dens that had operated on their estates, indeed it 
was implied that they were the effective heads of the gambling ring. While Phraya 
Phuban Banthoeng was found guilty, and sentenced to two month’s imprisonment 
and a 2,000 baht fine, Phraya Mahathep was acquitted due to doubts about the 
witnesses’ testimony.146 Nevertheless, the latter’s reputation had been tarnished and, 
because he had also previously displeased the king, the feeling within the royal court 
was that an example needed to be set. Vajiravudh thus ordered that both officials be 
dismissed from office and stripped of all their ranks, although Phraya Mahathep was 
allowed to retain his title.147 Yet, despite this warning, gambling by government 
officials remained a problem.
Upon coming to the throne, Prajadhipok took a number of steps to reverse this 
trend, instituting formal procedures for dealing with state officials implicated in 
illegal gambling. First, in April 1926, the king ruled that although officials may have
144 BTWM.21 June 1924.
145 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Aphairacha to Vajiravudh, 8 July 1918’.
146 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Chao Phraya Thammathikon to Vajiravudh, 12 Sept. 1923’.
147 NA R.6 N.4.1/9, ‘Vajiravudh to Thammathikon, 13 Sept. 1923’. The public prosecutor later 
successfully appealed against Phraya Mahathep’s acquittal. The official received the same sentence as 
Phraya Phuban Banthoeng. BTWM, 12 Nov. 1923.
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been only an accessory to gambling offences -  by letting others gamble in their 
residence, for instance -  they should be severely reprimanded and even stripped of 
their rank or dismissed.148 Later that year, Prajadhipok went further. Concerned about 
the increasing number of officials that were gambling, getting into debt and then 
being accused of embezzling government funds, the king believed that anyone who 
was a hardcore gambler (pen nakleng hanphanan) was unfit to be an official. He ruled 
that if there was any hint of gambling on their part, they were to be censured. More 
significantly, any official charged with illegal gambling was to be expelled from 
office, regardless of whether the court found them guilty.149 Records show both these 
rulings were applied. In October 1929, an air-force officer was acquitted of playing 
cards illegally only for Prajadhipok to order that he be dismissed.150 Officials so 
accused had to undergo intense scrutiny. For example, although the appellate court 
upheld a lower court’s decision to dismiss a case of illegal gambling against a finance 
official, the Ministry of Finance still examined every aspect of the verdicts in order to 
establish whether there had been any factual basis for the prosecution. Only then was 
that official reinstated.151 This hard-line stance does not seem to have been effective, 
though. There was a steady stream of government officials prosecuted for illegal
* 1 SOgambling throughout the Seventh Reign. Additionally, many officials took the 
concession for unlicensed card-playing between family and friends under the 1930 
gambling law to mean that it was acceptable for them to gamble freely once more.
148 NA MT.2.2/1, ‘Mahithon to Lopburi, 21 April 1926’.
149 Thesaphiban, 31, pp. 234-6.
150 NA R.7 Y.4/7, ‘Cover sheet -  Royal Order, 5 Oct. 1929’; ‘Chinda to Mahithon, 4 Oct. 1929’. For a 
similar case see NA R.7 Y.4/2, ‘Summary o f criminal cases, 6 Dec. 1926’.
151 NA R.7 Y.4/2, ‘Summary of criminal cases, 10 Jan. 1927’.
152 See, for instance, NA R.7 Y.4/2, ‘Summaries of criminal cases, 1 May 1926, 28 March 1927, 15 
Feb. 1928,25 Sept. 1928 & 2 March 1929’; NA R.7 Y.4/7, ‘Chinda to Mahithon, 7 March 1930, 6 Jan. 
1931’; ‘Chao Phraya Sithamma Thibet [Chinda] to Mahithon, 7 June 1932’.
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The Ministry of the Interior was thus forced to issue an order in June 1931 that 
reaffirmed the 1926 one.153
Gambling by officials remained a concern in the post-1932 era. Since the 
constitutional regime’s legitimacy rested partly on its claims that it represented a 
clean break from the hypocrisy of the absolutist order, it was vital that the fledgling 
government try to eradicate the iniquities of its predecessor. The cabinet issued a 
series of regulations, first in 1934 and again in 193S, that instructed all heads of 
departments to monitor the gambling of their subordinates. In any cases where it was 
deemed that the government’s work was being adversely affected by an official’s 
habit, even if it was legal gambling, that person was to be disciplined, with the threat 
of salary deductions or dismissal.154 Moreover, certain officials, such as teachers and 
police officers, were prohibited from all forms of gambling, or indirectly having a 
stake in some gaming activity. Again, violations were liable to be punished with 
dismissal.155
To sum up, these increasingly strict regulations governing gambling by 
officials reflected a number of government concerns, perhaps the most important 
being the fear of gambling, both legal and illegal, as a cause of corruption. 
Additionally, these regulations are indicative of state efforts to impose standards of 
acceptable behaviour within the bureaucracy and the military; the idea that those in 
government service should be above vices such as gambling. As the cases discussed 
above show, however, government officials were as human as the next person.
153 Thesaphiban, 31, pp. 236-7.
154 Thesaphiban, 34, pp. 1162-64(k); BTWM, 25 Oct. 1938.
155 NA MT.2.2/1, ‘Report on regulations for gambling by officials’; ‘Secretary of Civil Service 
Commission to Undersecretary of the Interior, 5 Sept. 1938’.
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Behind Bars
This section will follow the convicted gambling offender into the kingdom’s prisons
to examine the role of the penal administration within the government’s gambling
policy. During the 1890s, Chulalongkorn initiated a series of penal reforms to curb
the abuses that plagued the traditional system; warders were now given salaries, for
instance, rather than having to rely on prisoners’ labour and bribes for remuneration.
The first modern prison, the Bangkok Central Prison, which was modelled on
Singapore’s colonial prison, was opened in the same period. Similar prisons were
later established in all the major provincial centres and the notorious Bang Kwang
Prison for long-term convicts was opened in 1930.156
Gambling, along with other vices such as smoking opium and marijuana, was
rife within the Siamese penal system. In 1902, Lawson commented on the jails in
Bangkok’s suburbs as follows:
In these jails a good many luxuries are provided.... at a certain gaol I have 
myself seen the excellent cockfighting ground provided for the use of the 
prisoners, on which the prisoners nightly pit their fighting cocks against each 
other. Houses for their wives are also provided, and they all have as much 
tobacco and opium as they like.157
Little appears to have changed almost thirty years later when a couple of newspapers
carried exposes of prison conditions. After conducting interviews with prisoners and
warders from various provincial prisons, a journalist for the Ratsadon newspaper
wrote an article in 1928 entitled ‘The State of Provincial Prisons’.158 Amongst a list
of other abuses, he observed that: ‘prisons are excellent gambling dens. You [the
convict] can gamble whenever you wish without having to ask for permission from
anybody. You are better off than people on the outside who always have to ask for
156 Steve Van Beek, Bangkok Then and Now, Bangkok: A B Publications, 1999, pp. 96-7.
157 NA R.5 N .8.1/216, ‘Special Report on Crime in the two Divisions o f the Suburbs with 
recommendations with a view to reduce Crime and improve the administration o f Criminal Justice and 
Police5.
158 For the complete article see Ratsadon, 14 & 17 Dec. 1928.
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permission from officials before gambling.’159 In a similar article the same year, Si 
krung likened the kingdom’s prisons to framing schools for criminals. For the writer, 
the purpose of prison was to act as a deterrent to wrongdoers and discourage those 
incarcerated from re-offending once they were released. However, using the example 
of Samut Prakan provincial prison, the writer identified three factors that undermined 
any efforts at reform. First was the prevalence of gambling; Samut Prakan prison had 
a large, permanent den with all the equipment for games of thua po , dice, cards, fish- 
fighting and so on. Second was the widespread use of opium and marijuana, which 
were sold openly and were constantly available. Lastly, the intimidation and bullying 
of new prisoners by long-term convicts ensured that the former would feel 
pressurised into taking up gambling or di*ugs.160 If a convict was not a compulsive 
gambler before entering prison, the chances were they would be by the time they left.
Such widespread violation of prison regulations and the law could not have 
escaped the notice of the penal authorities. Indeed, on occasion they were complicit in 
these illicit activities. On 21 October 1930, for instance, the police conducted a raid 
on Singburi provincial prison and found 40 to 50 convicts gambling. Amongst those 
arrested was Nai Am, a prison warder implicated as the organiser and banker.161 The 
subsequent investigation concluded that the gambling was encouraged by a shortage 
of manpower and the negligence of the prison staff, especially the jailer. Nai Am, the 
warder, and the prisoners had often gambled in the past but previous attempts to catch 
them in the act had failed. A spy had therefore been placed inside to monitor them.162 
Moreover, the superintendent had little faith in the abilities of the jailer to deal with
159 Ratsadon, 17 Dec. 1928.
160 Si krung, 16 Aug. 1928.
161 NAMT.4.5/13, ‘Extract from Si krung, 28 Oct. 1930’.
162 NA MT.4.5/13, ‘Superintendent of Singburi prison to Prince Upphatthaphong, Lord Lieutenant o f  
monthon Ayutthaya, 11 Nov. 1930’.
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the gamblers and their arrest was thus entrusted to the local police.163 Charges were 
subsequently brought against Nai Am and eight convicts. All pleaded guilty; the 
warder and one convict received two months’ imprisonment for their part as 
organisers, while the others received one month.164 The investigation also revealed 
that another warder had known of the gambling ring but had failed to report it to his 
superiors. His salary was cut by five baht.165
Besides the prison staffs negligence, the other problem was a lack of 
manpower. Although the Singburi prison had the full complement of nine warders, 
only five, including Nai Am, were present when the raid occurred. The other four 
were supervising extramural convict labour. Normally, only one warder would be on 
guard detail like this but, during October, the provincial authorities had been 
preparing for a visit by Prince Lopburi. Extra convict labourers, with warders to 
manage them, had been requisitioned to ensure all the outside preparatory work was 
completed in time. The prison was thus critically short-staffed at the time of the raid 
and it was decided that the gambling could not be solely blamed on the negligence or 
incompetence of the jailer. Nevertheless, the investigation failed to consider any 
underlying reasons why gambling was rife within Singburi prison and other penal 
institutions.167 For the prisoners, gambling was a break from the monotony of life 
inside. This can also be said for the warders who spent long hours in their company. 
Furthermore, providing convicts with opportunities to indulge in opium and gambling 
was a way of supplementing their salary. It can also be seen as an informal method of
163 NAMT.4.5/13, ‘Superintendent to Upphatthaphong, 1 Dec. 1930*.
164 Ibid.
165 NA MT.4.5/13, ‘Superintendent to Upphatthaphong, 16 Dec. 1930s.
166 NA MT.4.5/13, ‘Luang Phiphat to Phra Borihanthanthanit, 10 Dec. 1930s; ‘Superintendent to 
Upphatthaphong, 16 Dec. 1930s.
167 This problem persisted under the constitutional regime. In 1933, for instance, a convict in 
Mahasarakham prison informed on some inmates for gambling. NA MT.2.3.13/2, ‘Lord Lieutenant of  
monthon Nakhon Ratchasima to Minister o f the Interior, 10 Aug. 1933s.
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control. Convicts who were addicted to opium were less likely to cause trouble so 
long as they received their fix. While gambling certainly had the potential to cause 
arguments, if it was run correctly large numbers of prisoners could be engaged in an 
activity that required little warder supervision.
Following the 1932 coup, the new constitutional government launched a 
programme of prison reform with the aim of improving the moral and industrial 
training of convicts.168 Greater efforts were made to ensure prisoners received a basic 
level of education. Recognising that most had had no previous opportunity to study, 
the government sought to give them the necessary skills to make an honest living 
once freed, rather than having to resort to crime.169 A special curriculum was drawn 
up that was designed to provide a primary level (prathom) education in two years. 
Subjects included reading, writing, and arithmetic, along with science, knowledge of 
the country, and ethics. This latter subject ranged from instruction in manners and 
etiquette to the work ethic and thriftiness. The aims of this last class were to 
encourage care for the home, tools and clothes, to dissuade spendthrift behaviour, and
* 17ftto encourage saving. Gambling was to be avoided. There is no indication of how 
successful this education programme was, however. Given the prevalence of 
gambling within prisons, it can be assumed it had little effect in stopping people from 
doing it. Rather than being a solution to the gambling problem, imprisonment was 
part of the problem.
Gambling, Buddhism and the Sangha
According to the Buddha’s teachings, gambling is one of four vices which lead to 
certain self-ruin and destruction; in Thai these are collectively known as abaiyamuk,
168 Thompson, Thailand, p. 289.
169 NA MT.4/46, ‘Penitentiary Department to Chao Khun Prichanusat, Jan. 1934’.
170 NA MT.4.46, [Curriculum for Primary Level Education o f Prisoners].
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which literally means ‘the portals of hell’. For the layperson, gambling is thus 
something to be avoided if one wishes to lead a life free of suffering. Moreover, it is 
generally considered that gambling comes under the strictures against stealing, the 
second of the five precepts (sin ha) that underlie the Thai Buddhist system of 
morality and that should be observed by all meritorious individuals.172 As should be 
apparent by now though, these proscriptions fell largely on deaf ears within Siamese 
society. This final section will argue that this was partly due to the monkhood’s 
implicit condoning of gambling, at both an individual and institutional level.
For monks, the position on gambling is much clearer: it is something that is 
forbidden under the rules governing monastic behaviour.173 In addition, these 
religious injunctions were joined by a number of secular laws prohibiting monks from 
various forms of gambling; offenders were disrobed and punished as a layperson.174 
The regulations for the gambling houses and the huai issued during the early 1890s 
forbade the tax farmers and their employees from allowing monks to enter the dens or 
the lottery hall.175 But, despite these religious and legal sanctions, gambling by monks 
was commonplace. In his memoirs, Phraya Anuman Rajadhon recalls how monks 
often placed stakes on the huai, for instance.176 Similarly, the American Hermann 
Norden, who visited Siam during the Sixth Reign, notes how he often came across 
monks ‘just around the comer from a Wat [temple], engaged in a sport that looked to
171 Chumphon, [Descriptions], p. 7; Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 110 n. 52; George Bradley 
McFarland (ed.), Thai-English Dictionary, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1944, p. 
964.
172 For a discussion of these five precepts and their influence upon Thai behaviour see B. J. Terwiel, 
Monks and Magic: An Analysis o f Religious Ceremonies in Central Thailand, 3rd revised edition, 
Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994, pp. 161-71. Based on his anthropological fieldwork, Terwiel concludes 
that: ‘The general attitude seems to be that full adherence to the five precepts is not compatible with 
ordinary daily life and that people should not be sanctimonious/ Ibid., p. 169.
173 The proscription against gambling is one o f the 227 precepts for monks detailed in the Pali 
Patimokkha. Ibid., pp. 95-7.
174 See for instance the prohibition on monks and novices participating in cock, bird and fish fighting. 
PKPS, 5, pp. 16-18. Abbots were also condemned for the misconduct o f their charges.
175 PKPS, 13, pp. 56, 277,281.
176 Sthirakoses, Looking Back, p. 157.
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me uncommonly like shooting craps’, and being sorely tempted to join in.177 As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, monks were also to be seen placing bets at the horse-races. 
While this was hardly saintly behaviour, it is not surprising, for not all who became 
monks did so out of religious piety. As one Westerner claimed in 1906, ‘many enter 
the monasteries from no other motive than laziness, and some belong to the lowest 
criminal class who hope thus to escape from justice. These are the men who bring the 
monasteries into ill repute.’178 Being ordained was also a way of avoiding 
conscription, something D. E. Malloch alluded to when he stated: ‘I believe three- 
fourths of all the Talapains [monks] in Siam enter the priesthood with a view of 
avoiding hard labour’.179 Carl Bock, meanwhile, asserted that men would enter the 
monkhood in order to get rid of their debts: ‘they apply to some one who wishes to 
make merit with Buddha and induce him to pay the debt on condition of “taking 
orders’” .180
Monks took part not only in public, legal gambling. Kanchana highlights how 
sprawling temple grounds were an excellent location for illicit gambling because they 
provided many secluded places far from prying eyes.181 But this was no guarantee of 
avoiding arrest. In 1912, for instance, the Phetchabun town court found a monk and a 
novice guilty of playing bia bok, a banned game, along with six laypeople, in the 
main chapel of their temple during the night. The two miscreants had denied the 
charges, claiming they had seen light coming from the chapel and, fearing it was a 
fire, had gone to investigate. It was then they had been arrested. Despite their 
protestations, there was sufficient evidence to convict them; the court ordered both to
177 Norden, From Golden Gate to Golden Sun, p. 111.
178 Thompson, Lotus Land, p. 117. See also Buis, Siamese Sketches, p. 64.
179 D. E. Malloch, Siam: Some General Remarks on its Production and particularly on its Imports and 
Exports and the Mode o f  Transacting Business with the People, Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1852,
p. 10.
180 Bock, Temples and Elephants, p. 101.
181 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 117.
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pay a fine of 100 baht. In one final attempt to escape punishment, the monk pointed 
out that religious precepts forbade monks from possessing money and thus neither of 
them could pay. Furthermore, it was not permitted to imprison them in lieu of 
payment. Final judgment in a case such as this was the duty of the king: Vajiravudh 
ordered that the two be expelled from the monkhood and then punished
1 89accordingly.
Clearly, such misconduct had a deleterious effect upon the Buddhist religion 
and the standing of the monkhood.183 It also set a terrible example for the lay 
population. Consequently, it was of grave concern for both the religious and secular 
authorities. In 1896, for instance, the Ministry of Public Instruction and Religion 
issued orders reminding the police to arrest any monk committing a range of listed 
offences. These included betting on the huai, and either entering a gambling house or
1 R4getting someone else to place a bet for him. Similarly, just prior to the annual fair 
at Wat Benchamabophit in 1903, the Ministry ordered the police to be rigorous in
152^preventing monks from gambling during the festivities. These repeated instructions
to the police indicated that, due to the great respect accorded to the monkhood,
officers were loath to arrest miscreant monks. Commenting on the failure of two
constables to arrest a monk who was drunk and disorderly in the lottery hall, Lawson
explained that: T think the reverence they feel for the priestly office was the cause of
1 86their dereliction of duty.’ With regards to monks attending the horse-races during 
the early 1920s, the Sangha sought to circumvent the problem by prohibiting monks
182 NA R.5-6 RL-Kh.Ph/17, ‘Prince Sawat [Svasti] to Vajiravudh, 3 June 1912’; ‘Vajiravudh to Sawat, 
30 June 1912’.
183 Gambling was just the tip of the iceberg when it came to monastic transgressions. The historical 
record provides numerous examples o f monks getting drunk, smoking opium, fornicating, bearing 
arms, and even fighting. See, for instance, PKPS, 6, pp. 164-7; Siam Repository, 1869, pp. 352-3; NA  
R.5 N.49.5/48, ‘Phraya Wisut Suriyasuk to Phraya Intharathipbodi, 17 Sept. 1903’.
184 NA R.5 N.49.5/15, ‘Naret to Phra Anan, 10 Aug. 1896’.
185 NA R.5 N.49.5/50, ‘Wisut to Intharathipbodi, 1 Dec. 1903’.
186 NA R.5 N .8.1/370, ‘Lawson to Nares [Naret], 30 May 1906’.
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or novices from watching any form of entertainment, such as films, or sporting event 
that required paying an admission fee. The police were to assist in bringing any 
offenders before the respective abbot, who had instructions to disrobe them.187
However, the damage done to state policy by the gambling habits of some 
reprobate monks was not nearly as great as that done by the presence of gambling 
stalls at temple fairs. The Belgian traveller Charles Buis described such an event in 
Bangkok around the turn of the twentieth century as follows: ‘Around this place of 
pilgrimage are crowded the elements of a fancy fair, especially gambling tables with 
the most varied games: cards, dice, lottery numbers, turnstiles, roulette -  the complete 
collection of all imaginable tricks to pluck the idiot possessed by the demon of 
gambling.’188 The purpose of these fairs was to raise money for temple, often so that 
repairs to buildings might be carried out.189 Although gambling at such events had 
been going on since time immemorial, Kanchana suggests there was a marked 
increase after the 1902 gambling law came into force.190 By formalising the 
procedure for organising gambling at religious and secular festivals, this law may 
have inadvertently encouraged applications for permits. As with the similar, secular 
events discussed in Chapter 3, only Class 2 gambling was allowed; this was mostly 
gambling for prizes but, occasionally, gambling for cash was permitted.191 Perhaps 
more significant was that gambling was allowed at the Wat Benchamabophit fair, 
held annually from around the turn of the twentieth century. This temple was the most 
important of those built during the Fifth Reign and had strong associations with the
187 NA R.6 N.2/120, ‘Declaration for all abbots, 9 Aug. 1923’.
188 Buis, Siamese Sketches, p. 35.
189 See for instance NA R.5 N.7.7.Ng/12, ‘Phra Ratsadakonkoson to Naret, 13 Feb. 1904’; NA R.5 
N.7.7.Ng/22, ‘Luang Senaphonsitthi to Naret, 23 April 1905’.
190 Kanchana, [Government Policy], p. 111.
191 See NA R.5 N.49.5/59, ‘Lawson to Nares [Naret], 4 Nov. 1904’ in which Lawson raises concerns as 
to whether gambling for cash was to be permitted at the Wat Yuen fair: ‘If so the same very 
disgraceful scenes as those witnessed last year at the Pu-Kow-Tong [the Golden Mount] festival will 
occur again. ’
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royal family. Its annual fair, which was regularly attended by Chulalongkom, thus set 
a benchmark for what was acceptable. Indeed, when gambling at the fair was 
discontinued in the late 1900s, this was cited as the reason for denying permission for 
gambling at other temple fairs within the Greater Bangkok area.192 One of the most 
significant temple fairs of the 1920s and 1930s, if not before, was that held during 
November on the site of the great stupa, Phra Pathom Chedi, in the provincial town of 
Nakhon Pathom. Every year, people from neighbouring provinces and the capital 
would descend upon the town to indulge in gambling. In 1923, the Sayam rat 
reported how every train from Bangkok to the town was packed but people were quite 
happy to stand.193 That year there were over 100 gaming stalls offering all the 
favourites, such as hi-lo and huai chap yiki. The total rent from these stalls amounted 
to 57,750 baht, part of which went to the temple and part to the development of 
public facilities.194 Needless to say, the presence of gambling at these temple fairs 
amounted to the Sangha condoning the vice, in direct contravention of Buddhist 
principles. As the Bangkok Times observed in connection with the Nakhon Pathom 
fair: ‘It appears strange that such things should be connected with a Festival of 
Preaching’.195
It would be unfair to hold the monkhood solely responsible for this state of 
affairs. Indeed, in most cases, these events were organised by laypeople, usually 
government officials and local nobles, on behalf of the temples.196 But gambling at 
temple fairs received little or no condemnation from the monkhood and would surely
192 NA R.5 N.7.7.Ng/28, ‘Naret to Ratsadakonkoson, 19 Jan. 1907’; NA R.5 N.7.7.Ng/31, ‘Naret to 
Ratsadakonkoson, 27 March 1907’; NA R.5 N.49.5/84, ‘Order No. 13/17958, 10 Dec. 1908’.
193 Sayam rat, 23 Nov. 1923.
194 KDM, 25 Nov. 1923.
195 BTWM, 24 Nov. 1923.
196 The Nakhon Pathom festival, for instance, was organised by a twelve-man committee that included 
the Lord Lieutenant o f monthon Nakhon Chaisi and the governor o f the province. The failed 
application for a Class 2 gambling permit at the Wat Mun Lek fair in Bangkok, meanwhile, was made 
by the local headman. NA R.5 N.7.7.Ng/28, ‘Naret to Ratsadakonkoson, 19 June 1907’.
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have required the abbot’s consent for the temple grounds to be used for such 
purposes. While one monk at the 1922 Nakhon Pathom fair may have ‘waxed 
indignant and condemned the placing of the tables on the Pagoda premises at all’,197 
he seems to have been a lone dissenting voice. To make matters worse, in some cases 
it was the monks themselves who organised the gaming. This was the case at a temple 
fair in 1925 in the southern province of Phang Nga where gambling went on for a 
whole week, ‘both in and under priest’s houses [sic], there being as many as ten 
circles going at a time -  as many as one would see at the Tapan Lek [gambling] house 
in Bangkok in the old days.’198 This was not so much condoning the vice as actively 
endorsing it and made a mockery of Buddhist precepts and state efforts to restrict it.
In summary, the state agencies charged with the enforcement of Siam’s 
gambling laws laboured under an array of institutional problems that served to 
impede the government’s restrictionist policy. Inadequate pay within the police force 
and, speculatively, within the penal administration made these two institutions 
susceptible to the corrupting influence of illicit gambling enterprises. Indeed, 
following the abolition of the gambling tax farms, illegal gambling flourished due to 
police support. In the process, the police assumed a vested interest in many forms of 
gambling remaining illegal. The prevalence of gambling within Siam’s penal 
institutions also nurtured this habit within the convict population. Similarly, the use 
of gambling as a fundraiser for temple works, coupled with the misbehaviour of 
individual monks, undermined government policy. Conversely, the judiciary worked 
hard to apply the kingdom’s gambling laws equitably and in doing so highlighted 
deficiencies in the legislation that were, in some cases, corrected by future legislation.
197 BTWM, 24 Nov. 1923.
198 BTWM, 4 Sept. 1925.
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It also strove to suppress gambling through imposing increasingly severe sentences 
on gambling offenders.
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5
The Press and Public Opinion
This chapter will explore the influence of the Siamese press and public opinion upon 
government gambling policy. In their studies of the development of the print media 
and the creation of a public sphere in early twentieth century Siam, Matthew 
Copeland and Scott Barme have illustrated how the nascent Bangkok middle class 
used the media to challenge the discursive authority of the Siamese ruling elite,1 In 
the newspapers, novels, magazines and films of the 1920s and early 1930s, educated 
and politically aware commoners mounted a sustained critique of the absolute 
monarchy and the social order it fostered, casting the former as ‘an archaic, repressive 
institution which impeded Siam’s progress’ and the latter as ‘moribund and 
profoundly corrupt.’ After detailing the creation and articulation of a popular 
nationalism within the Thai-language press that sharply opposed the official 
nationalism espoused by the absolute monarchy, Copeland concludes his study by 
noting the great variety of other hotly debated issues that reflected the socio-political 
malaise of the times and provided critics of absolutism with ammunition for their 
attacks.3 As the first part of this chapter will show, gambling was one of those issues. 
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to say that the Bangkok media spoke for the 
broader, rural population. The second part of this chapter will therefore draw on a 
wider range of sources so that the whisper of the silent majority might be heard.
1 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’; Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok.
2 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 2.
3 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 209.
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The Development of the Siamese Press
Before examining the debate on gambling it is worth considering the general 
development of the Siamese press, its relationship with the government, and the 
characteristics -  editorial stance, circulation figures, the readership, for example -  of 
the particular newspapers used in this study.
Printing presses were introduced into Siam in the mid-1830s by the American 
missionary Dr. Bradley, who also published the country’s first periodical, the short­
lived Bangkok Recorder, in 1844 and, later, the Bangkok Calendar. Another 
missionary, Dr. Samuel Smith, was responsible for the English-language Siam Weekly 
Advertiser (1869-86) and the Thai-language Sayam samai (1882-86). Until the 1880s, 
publishing remained the preserve of these men and the royal court, which published a 
range of official and semi-official periodicals and journals such as 
Ratchaldtchanubeksa (The Government Gazette) and Darunowat.4 During the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, American and European entrepreneurs set up the 
country’s three principal, and long-running, English-language newspapers: the 
Bangkok Times (weekly, 1887-96, daily 1896-1942), the Bangkok Daily Mail, and the 
Siam Observer.5 The latter two also had Thai-language editions, which seem to have 
differed slightly from their English-language counterparts, in both tone and content.6 
By 1910, all three were receiving annual subsidies from the Siamese state and were 
regularly provided with news of government activities. Amongst the English- 
speaking inhabitants of the capital, the Bangkok Times was apparently the most
4 For an overview o f these early publications see Craig J. Reynolds, Seditious Histories: Contesting 
Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts, Singapore: University o f Washington Press, 2006, pp. 56-9.
5 On the ownership and editors of these three newspapers see Wright and Breakspear (eds), Twentieth 
Century Impressions, pp. 293-5; Thompson, Thailand, pp. 789-90. The Bangkok Times (BT) issued a 
weekly, overseas edition called the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail (BTWM) and most of the references to 
the paper are drawn from this publication.
6 The Thai version o f  the Bangkok Daily Mail (BDM) was called the Krungthep Daily Mail (KDM). All 
citations from these sources will thus indicate which version; citations from the Thai version of the 
Siam Obsemer (SO) will be marked with a [t].
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influential and it claimed to have the largest circulation of any paper in the country. It 
was conservative in tone, a defender of the British Empire but sympathetic to Siam, 
and enjoyed a close working relationship with the Siamese government, to which it
n
was not afraid to offer constructive criticism. Under American editorship for much 
of its existence, the Bangkok Daily Mail was more outspoken and a constant thom in 
the government’s side. By 1912, it had a circulation of up to 1,500 copies per issue 
and there are indications this was considerably higher than those of its Thai- and 
English-language rivals.8 After a series of critical commentaries of the king and the 
court, it was bought by Vajiravudh in 1917. But the Bangkok Daily Mail remained 
controversial, often carrying ‘sensational revelations of police corruption’,9 and in 
1927 Prajadhipok sold the paper to his father-in-law, Prince Svasti. It was closed by 
the constitutional regime in October 1933 because of its royalist connections. Like its 
contemporaries, the liberal Siam Observer had government connections and seems to 
have occupied a middle-ground between the conservative, elitist Bangkok Times and 
the controversial, populist Bangkok Daily Mail. It ceased publication in early 1933 
due to financial reasons.10
Of the numerous Thai-language newspapers that emerged in the early 
twentieth century, the Nangsuphim thai and the Chino sayam warasap deserve 
mention. The latter was founded in 1907 by Chinese revolutionaries and, as the name 
suggests, there was both a Thai-language edition and a Chinese one, which was 
considered the more moderate of the capital’s three Chinese-language papers.11 From 
around the start of the Sixth Reign, both the Nangsuphim thai and the Chino sayam 
warasap received government subsidies and, following an attempted coup in 1912,
7 Batson, End o f the Absolute Monarchy, pp. 72-3; Vella, Chaiyol p. 255; Thompson, Thailand, p. 793.
8 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 56 n. 16; Vella, Chaiyol p. 254.
9 Thompson, Thailand, p. 793.
10 Batson, End o f  the Absolute Monarchy, p. 73.
11 Skinner, Chinese Society, p. 156; Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 36 n. 17.
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the former was purchased outright by Vajiravudh. This move was designed to counter 
the Siamese inclination to ‘believe everything they read in the papers’ by ‘seizing the
• 19press as a weapon’ for promoting government policies. Vajiravudh was responsible 
for its editorial policy and frequently used it as an outlet for his writings. It was 
widely recognised as the voice of the government.13 Unsurprisingly, it was shut down 
following the 1932 coup.
According to Copeland, 1917 marked the advent of ‘political journalism’ in 
Siam, with one editor describing his paper as the kingdom’s first political 
newspaper.14 Driven by the growth of the Bangkok reading public, the early 1920s 
saw a proliferation of political journals such as the Yamato and the Bangkok 
kanmuang. These provided a forum in which the emergent middle class could discuss 
matters of national importance and air their grievances. It was the age of the popular 
press. Reflecting the growing antipathy for the absolutist order, these new 
publications had their sights firmly trained on the Sixth Reign court. As Barme 
observes, ‘Deference and respect for authority... were, for the most part 
conspicuously absent from the pages of the popular press’ and ‘irreverent, 
contemptuous attitudes towards authority figures in general, including the monarch 
himself, were commonplace’.15 The first political daily, the Japanese-registered 
Yamato, was started in 1922. Until it was closed by the Bangkok Police Department 
in March 1924, its circulation exceeded that of the Bangkok Daily Mail and the 
government-run Nangsuphim thai}6 The Bangkok kanmuang, meanwhile, enjoyed a 
longer existence; started in October 1922, it survived until 1932. Along with the
12 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 36.
13 Vella, Chaiyol p. 254.
14 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 52.
15 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 97.
16 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 54.
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Krungthep Daily Mail, it was considered ‘the best of the news commentators’.17
Under the two-year editorship of the noted political satirist and cartoonist Sem
Sumanan, the Bangkok kanmuang frequently courted controversy, not least for its
allegations of police corruption and involvement in illegal gambling. In October
1924, Sem left the paper for the new weekly Kro lek, which ‘quickly proved to be one
1 £of the more provocative publications of the late Sixth Reign.’ Another luminary 
from this period was the ‘sensational’ though ‘ably edited’ Si krung}9 which, along 
with the Nangsuphim thai, was the most influential of the Thai-language papers 
during the Seventh Reign. Its owner and editor, Mangkorn Samsen, was an 
important figure in the governments of the early constitutional period and the paper 
came to be seen as a semi-official organ of the new regime.21 Although many of these 
publications were short-lived, Batson estimates that there were 10 to 15 Thai- 
language newspapers in Bangkok at any one time, along with the various English and
99Chinese ones. The most popular had print runs of two to three thousand copies per 
issue, though Barme suggests they may actually have been read by up to 7,000 people 
or more, as the purchaser would invariably pass on their paper to friends, family or 
workmates.23 By the 1940s, the total circulation of all papers within the kingdom was 
estimated at no more than 100,000.24 Copeland has divided these ‘voices of the 
capital’ into two broad camps: the government-subsidised or, as termed herein, the 
mainstream press, which was generally supportive of the government, and the popular
17 Thompson, Thailand, p. 792.
18 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 109.
19 Thompson, Thailand, p. 792.
20 Batson, End o f  the Absolute Monarchy, p. 73.
21 Ibid., pp. 243,266 n. 13.
22 Ibid., p. 72.
23 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 98.
24 Thompson, Thailand, pp. 799-800.
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press, which acted as a forum for the government’s critics. When it came to 
discussions on gambling, however, this distinction was blurred.
Who read these publications? For much of the period in question, the 
readership was concentrated almost exclusively in Bangkok. During the Fifth Reign, 
a conservative estimate of the readership of both the Thai- and English-language 
press would be that it did not extend much beyond the Siamese elite and a limited 
number of male commoners who had been fortunate to receive a modem education. 
Given the modest provision for female education, it can be assumed that women were 
just a fraction of this readership. Due to the growth of both the bureaucracy and the 
commercial economy, Barme suggests that by the 1920s the reading public had 
broadened to include Tow- and middle-level government officials, salaried workers in 
the private sector, and literate members of the Thai working class, as well as educated 
middle-class women.’26 Along with an ‘incipient literati’ of professional journalists, it 
was these groups that used the growing popular press of the 1920s to express their 
dissatisfaction with the absolutist order 27 Even with the expansion of literacy in the 
constitutional era, the provincial reading public remained small.28 The opinions 
expressed in the newspapers detailed above cannot, therefore, be said to be 
representative of the wider population; they were the viewpoints of just a small but 
highly significant minority.
As already noted, the absolute monarchy had an increasingly fractious 
relationship with the press. However, the government’s ability to regulate and control 
it was limited by the ‘unequal’ treaties, which guaranteed the rights of foreign 
nationals to conduct commercial activities within the kingdom. Additionally, some
25 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 58.
26 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 98.
27 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
28 Thompson, Thailand, p. 799.
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local publishers took advantage of extraterritoriality, by registering their publications
90to foreign frontmen, in order to avoid prosecution. Others enjoyed the protection of 
powerful patrons.30 Subsidies were one strategy the government employed to try and 
influence editorial policy, though, as the Bangkok Daily Mail and Chino sayam 
warasap frequently demonstrated, they were no guarantee of compliance. Moreover, 
the commercial boom in publishing during the 1920s further undermined their 
effectiveness.31 Tighter regulation was the other option. According to Vella, however, 
Vajiravudh was an admirer of the free press in England and averse to state 
censorship. Despite the recommendations of his ministers, a press law was not 
enacted until 1923. In its wake, scores of Bangkok publishers were prosecuted, 
printing presses confiscated and many papers, including the Yamato and both editions 
of the Chino sayam warasap, closed. A more comprehensive and stringent press 
law was passed in 1927 and further closures ensued.34 One effect was that The more 
libellous type of attacks on members of the elite... largely disappeared, and criticism 
of authority came to be expressed in broader, less personal terms.’35 Yet, in spite of 
this creeping tendency towards censorship and control, the last years of absolutist rule 
were a time of relative press freedom compared with the post-1932 period. Although 
fonnal censorship was briefly abolished in July 1932 and the People’s Party even 
expressed gratitude for the press’ positive attitude towards its movement, increasing 
regulation and repression were the order of the day. Insecure and acutely sensitive 
towards criticism, the new regime closed a number of papers and enacted a new press
29 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, pp. 16, 72-3.
30 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 99.
31 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, pp. 56-7.
32 Vella, Chaiyol p. 253.
33 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 72, 72 n. 17.
34 Thompson, Thailand, p. 792; Baker and Pasuk, Thailand, p. 118.
35 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 99.
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law before the end of 1932. Over the next decade, fuither measures were initiated to 
curb public debate.36
To what extent did the press influence government policy in general? During 
the Fifth Reign, it can be argued that it was negligible for it was essentially just a 
debating forum for the elite. With the growth of the popular press from the 1910s 
onwards, however, the media began to wield a degree of influence. Both Vajiravudh 
and Prajadhipok apparently read all the principal Bangkok papers and were sensitive 
to writings that criticised their administrations.37 But the two differed in their 
understanding of press power. Vajiravudh saw it as the creator of public opinion, 
while Prajadhipok considered it to be a manifestation of general feeling.38 Tellingly, 
the latter and his ministers often discussed newspaper articles in order to decide
•JQ
which demanded some response or action. Both governments collected extensive 
newspaper clippings on gambling; these not only form the documentary basis of 
much of this chapter but also provide physical evidence that the press was at least 
being heard, if not listened to. During the first decade of the constitutional era, the 
press lost much of its bite due to stricter regulation and censorship; rather than attack 
the government, it tended to be more supportive. This was perhaps due in part to the 
new regime instituting a number of reforms, such as the expansion of female 
education, that had previously been championed by the press. Barme concludes that 
‘the critical activism of the 1920s and early 1930s was replaced to a large extent by a 
growing pragmatism toward and acceptance of the new socio-political order.’40
36 Ibid., pp. 231-2; Thompson, Thailand, pp. 795-8.
37 Vella, Chaiyol pp. 251-2; Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 130. In 1931, Prajadhipok’s 
subscription list included the Nangsuphim thai, Si krung, Bangkok kanmuang, the Bangkok Daily Mail, 
the Siam Obset'ver and the Bangkok Times. Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 130 n. 7.
38 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 129; Batson, End o f the Absolute Monarchy, p. 16.
39 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 130.
40 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 232.
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Portrayals of Gambling in the Press
Throughout the period covered by this study, the Thai- and English-language press 
articulated a more or less unanimous and consistent view on gambling that, in terms 
of both language and opinion, broadly mirrored that of the ruling elite. Gambling was 
a corrosive vice (abaiyamuk); an evil, wicked thing (pen sing chua-rai); and a sure 
path to disaster and ruin (nam khwamhaiyana).41 Sometimes, more evocative terms 
were used: commentators often described gambling as a malign spirit (phi 
kanphanan) that had possessed the Siamese people, for instance.42 Similarly, the 
press echoed the government’s assertions that gambling was a primary cause of 
poverty and crime: it not only threatened the moral and economic well-being of those 
people drawn into its web but also endangered the future of the nation.43 Cautionary 
examples of the harmful effects of gambling were a regular feature within the 
kingdom’s periodicals. Take, for instance, the woman whose fixation with cards 
resulted in her pawning away all her family’s possessions and who was then divorced 
by her husband;44 the young boy found begging for money so he could redeem the 
loin-cloth he had lost through gambling;45 the son of a minor noble who resorted to 
theft to fund his gambling habit;46 the pawnshop clerk who committed fraud in order 
to play billiards and was subsequently arrested;47 and the numerous suicides
48attributed to gambling debts. Commenting on the horror stories that surrounded the 
Winter Fairs of the Sixth Reign, the Bangkok Times suggested Siamese reporters
41 For examples see NT, 13 March 1916; SO [t], 16 Nov. 1916; Sayam sakkhi, 7 July 1923; Bangkok 
kanmuang, 19 July 1923; Lak muang, 20 Oct. 1928.
42 KDM, 14 April 1917; Kro lek, 7 Feb. 1930.
43 In addition to the newspapers cited in the two footnotes above see BTWM, 15 June 1904; KDM, 11 
& 12 June 1914; Awanti, 18 May 1923; Yamato, 5 May 1923.
44 Bangkok Calendar, 1873, pp. 66-7;
45 Siam Repositoiy, 1869, p. 94.
46 CSW, 13 March 1917. According to the Bangkok Times, this was a common occurrence. BTWM, 15 
June 1904.
47 NT, 5 July 1928.
48 Samphan thai, 19 Jan. 1924; BTWM, 21 Jan. 1924.
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tended to exaggerate and were getting some of their ‘facts’ from their imaginations.49 
It had good grounds to be suspicious. In 1923, a writer for the Bangkok kanmuang 
who used the pseudonym KO (mat-det) gave an eye-witness account of his trip to the 
Ratchaburi fair. Amongst other encounters, he described how he had seen a country 
lad lurking behind a food-stall, scrabbling in the dirt for some discarded food that had 
already been half-eaten by a dog. When KO asked the boy if he was mad, he replied 
that he had gambled away all his cash and was desperately hungry.50 However, one 
reader who had also attended the fair later questioned the veracity of this account by 
pointing out various discrepancies that suggested the reporter had not actually been 
there.51 This incident suggests that Siamese commentators felt justified in employing 
a little artistic license to reinforce the damaging effects of gambling. It also raises 
questions, to be addressed in the Conclusion, about the exact nature and extent of the 
perceived gambling problem and implies that certain people might have exaggerated 
so as to advance their interests.
At the same time, and also like the Siamese elite, the mainstream newspapers 
-  the three English-language papers, especially -  recognised that gambling was an 
intrinsic part of human nature and were thus realistic about the extent to which it 
could be limited and controlled.52 Stemming from this, commentators often gave 
suggestions as to how gambling might best be exploited for the greater good of the 
country. In 1914, for instance, one proposed that a system of government bonds 
might be instituted in place of the huai lottery; he believed such an initiative would be 
both less harmful and more beneficial than the huai. Moreover, it was guaranteed to
49 BTWM, 21 Jan. 1924.
50 Bangkok kanmuang, 28 Aug. 1923.
51 NA R.6 N .20.17/27, ‘Letter from khon Pet in reply to KO, 31 Aug. 1923’.
52 Perhaps the best expression of this was the Siam Observer’s editorial on the abolition of the 
gambling houses. SO, 31 March 1917. See also BDM, 14 Feb. 1916; Bangkok kanmuang, 25 July 
1923; BTWM, 27 July 1923.
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succeed because the love of a gamble was so deeply ingrained in the Siamese 
psyche.53 Similarly, in 1928, another commentator made a strong case for an annual 
national lottery, referring to the fact that in civilised countries (araya-prathef), 
lotteries were not considered a straightforward form of gambling since they were not 
as harmful. In his opinion, the benefits of a national lottery far outweighed the 
disadvantages, with the profits being invested in areas of national importance such as 
education.54 Another manifestation of this pragmatic approach was the recognition of 
gambling as a fonn of entertainment and therefore that if it was to be restricted some 
other amusements, such as sports, had to be encouraged: ‘Prohibit gambling by all 
means, but something should be found to take its place.’55
Attitudes towards the Gambling Tax Farms
As might be expected, the missionary press of the mid- to late nineteenth century was 
highly critical of the Siamese state’s reliance upon the gambling tax farms. An article 
in Bradley’s Bangkok Calendar, for instance, noted that the revenue from the huai 
lottery ‘although great has not the weight of a feather in the scale of good, when 
compared with the evils which the collecting of it from the people produces. It is as it 
were [sic] blood drawn from vitals of the body politic, and weakness, and disease, 
and ulceration, and mortification given in exchange for it.’56 The publications of Dr. 
Smith adopted a similar stance: ‘Besides slavery and Government service nothing 
degenerates so much the “family life” of the Siamese as “gambling” and [nothing] is 
a worse and more short sighted policy in regard to finances than the present system of
53 KDM, 11 June 1914.
54 Si krung, 25 Oct. 1928.
55 BTWM, 17 Oct. 1913.
56 Bangkok Calendar, 1873, p. 64.
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gambling houses.’57 This writer then argued that any loss in revenue resulting from 
the closure of the dens would quickly be made good because ‘The people, instead of 
squandering away their money and especially their time, would certainly seek and 
find employment for both... they would produce more and this increased production 
would yield revenues.’58 Such criticisms did not come only from moralising 
Westerners with colonial or proselytising ambitions, however. Siamese commoners 
used Smith’s Sayam samai journal to air their grievances in the belief that it would be 
read by the king.59 In 1886, it earned a letter on ‘The Evils of Gambling In All Its 
Varieties’. There is no clear indication of the writer’s identity but it can be surmised 
that he was a well-educated Siamese because the letter was later reproduced in the 
Siam Weekly Advertiser to ‘show our European readers that Siamese hiow how to 
write.’60 He started by noting his pleasure upon learning that Chulalongkom had 
announced his intentions to close the gambling houses in the mid-1870s before 
lamenting the fact that this had yet to be carried out. Rather, the Fifth Reign had seen 
a great increase in gambling. His was a personal tragedy, for his three sons had been 
ruined by the gambling houses, reduced to stealing and pawning goods to feed their 
addiction. Their debasement was indicative of a wider malaise afflicting Siamese 
society and the writer harked back to the reign of Rama III, when ‘There were fewer 
public offenders than at present.... There were few gambling houses, and as a 
consequence few thieves.’ He concluded by highlighting the extravagant lifestyles of 
the Chinese gambling tax fanners and their tendency to remit large sums of money
57 Siam Weekly Advertiser, 27 Feb. 1886.
58 Ibid.
59 Kullada, Rise and Decline, p. 109.
60 Siam Weekly Advertiser, 27 Feb. 1886. Italics in the original.
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back to China: The Chinaman brought no money into the country. All which he
r i
spends comes from the people who gamble.’
Similar opinions were voiced by the commoner intellectual Thianwan (T. W. 
S. Wannapho). This social campaigner and outspoken critic of the absolutist order 
was a key figure in the development of the Thai-language press.62 Following a 
lengthy spell of imprisonment in the late nineteenth century, Thianwan started a 
journal, Tulawiphak photchanakit, in the 1900s in which to express his reformist 
ideas. These included universal education, a more representative system of 
government, equality for women, the abolition of slavery and polygamy, and a 
prohibition on gambling.63 Thianwan’s criticisms of the state’s patronage of gambling 
show a well-rounded understanding of the issues. Recognising the government’s 
revenue needs, he lamented the fact that ‘true Thais’ and ‘nationalists’ (phuak 
rakchat) did not have the opportunity to bid successfully for all the Bangkok 
gambling farms. If they did, they could then close all the dens but still pay the 
government, thereby freeing the people from ruin. He also highlighted how the 
money the government received from the gambling farms was equal to that spent by 
the tax fanners in, first, acquiring their monopoly through bribes and then running 
their operations, all of which came from the blood and sweat of the common man. 
The social costs were far greater than any advantages the government gained; the 
state was effectively crippling itself. Here Thianwan employed the metaphor of 
disease. But rather than infecting the people, gambling had infected the government 
itself. Combating the symptoms of gambling, namely crime, sapped the strength of
6' Ibid-
62 For an overview o f Thianwan’s life see Walter F. Vella, ‘Thianwan o f Siam: A Man Who Fought 
Giants’ in Ronald D. Renard (ed.), Anuson Walter Vella, Chiang Mai: W. F. Vella Fund, Payap 
University; & Honolulu: Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1986, 
pp. 79-81.
63 Ibid., pp. 81-9; Banne, Woman, Man, Bangkok, pp. 23-6.
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the state, because the cost of building up the police force was more than the revenue 
from the gambling farms. Worse, however much the government spent, it could never 
be enough, for if the disease remained untreated, it would not go away by itself.64 In 
other words, dealing with the effects of gambling was pointless so long as the 
government continued to endorse it. Through the use of such vibrant imagery, 
Thianwan was able to convey to his readership the true cost of the gambling tax 
farms. However, as the letter from the Siam Weekly Advertiser discussed above 
illustrates, there was nothing new about Thianwan’s accounts of the social and 
economic damage resulting from the state patronage of gambling. Rather, as Barme 
argues, his significance lies less in ‘the perceived originality of his thought’ than in 
his ability ‘to bring such ideas to the attention of a broader public’.65 Moreover, 
during the period when his journal was published the government was already 
proceeding full pace with the closure of the provincial gambling houses. 
Nevertheless, such articles generated a wider public awareness of how the 
government’s short-sighted policies were counteiproductive and responsible for many 
of Siamese society’s ills.
On the whole, though, the mainstream press and its readership were 
sympathetic to the problem of how to abolish the gambling tax farms without 
throwing the kingdom’s finances into turmoil.66 Furthermore, it was understood that 
terminating all the farms at once would be counterproductive because gambling was 
so deeply ingrained in the Siamese psyche that closure would invariably lead to a 
sharp upswing in illegal gambling.67 When the huai lottery and the gambling tax 
farms were abolished, the mainstream press was united in approval. The Bangkok
64 This account of Thianwan’s views on gambling is drawn from one of his articles reproduced in 
Sangop Suriyin, Thianwan, 3rd edition, Bangkok: Ruamsan Press, 2000, pp. 118-23.
65 Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, p. 23.
66 See for instance CSW, 8 & 16 Dec. 1914; NT, 13 March 1916; SO [t], 16 Nov. 1916.
67 See for example SO [t], 19 June 1915; KDM , 3 Feb. 1917.
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Times, for instance, likened the end of the haai to the abolition of the state monopoly 
on the sale of spirits in Russia.68 The Thai-language press, meanwhile, lavished 
extravagant praise upon Vajiravudh and his administration.69 The Thai-language 
edition of the Siam Observer even employed the discourse of siwilai to claim that the 
king had truly lifted Siam to a higher level of civilisation.70 As the following section 
will show, however, this was the high point of press approval for the Sixth Reign 
government’s approach to gambling.
Gambling and Critiques of the Sixth Reign Government
As already noted, the late 1910s and early 1920s saw a proliferation of news journals 
that acted as a forum in which critics of the absolutist regime and social order could 
voice their grievances. Two aspects of the gambling issue were particularly 
provocative: first, the involvement or complicity of the nobility and all levels of 
government officials, including the police force, in both legal and illegal gambling 
activities; and, second, the Sixth Reign court’s continued reliance on gambling as a 
revenue provider, despite having publicly renounced it with the abolition of the 
gambling tax farms. Vajiravudh’s regime thereby made itself vulnerable to 
accusations that it was directly responsible for the persistent gambling problem and 
the consequent socio-economic damage. Crucially, these criticisms were not confined 
to the emergent popular press but also sometimes appeared in government-subsidised, 
mainstream newspapers. In short, the press was able to exploit the gambling issue to 
portray the absolute monarchy as inimical to the welfare of the nation.
08 BTWM, 15 March 1916.
69 In addition to a glowing editorial, the Nangsuphim thai published various letters expressing gratitude 
for the king’s grace and mercy. See NT, 13, 24 & 25 Nov. 1916 and also RDM, 16 Nov. 1916.
70 SOIX), 16 Nov. 1916.
253
Judging from the reports and editorials in some sections of the press, 
government officials and members of the upper-class were among the most inveterate 
gamblers and, by setting a poor example to the rest of the population, were culpable 
for the extent of the gambling problem.71 Writing in the Siam Observer, the 
commentator Prarop (literally, ‘Thinking Out Loud’) questioned the effectiveness of 
preaching about the evils of gambling while government officials continued to 
gamble illegally. The priority was getting them to renounce gambling; only then 
might others follow suit.72 The basis for such criticism was the assumption that the 
behaviour of officials and nobles should reflect their lofty position within Siamese 
society; in other words, that they should be above ‘vices’ such as gambling. Failure to 
adhere to these standards led commoners to believe that if the upper classes could not 
resist the urge to gamble, then why should they?73 Following this line of reasoning, 
even the participation of officials and nobles in legal gambling became a source of 
criticism. Commenting on the widespread card-playing in the homes of officials 
during the Siamese New Year in 1917, the Krungthep Daily Mail observed how 
invitations to parties were shamelessly explicit about the gambling that would take 
place. It then attacked the excuse that gambling was a means of relaxation by 
sarcastically noting that playing cards might indeed relieve a mind worn out by 
waiting all day to sign one’s name to receive a salary. After glumly noting that most 
officials’ morals were no different from those of the general population, it concluded 
that gambling by officials was more serious because they received a salary, derived 
from the labour of the people, which they then gambled away.74 This critique was 
extended to high-class women and the wives of officials, whose gambling habits were
71 See for instance KDM, 26 Nov. 1916. These sentiments were also vividly expressed in satirical 
cartoons, some of which are discussed in Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, pp. 111-13, 120-1.
72SO[t] ,  19 June 1915.
73 SO [t], 17 Jan. 1917.
74 KDM, 14 April 1917.
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a particular bete noire of the press. What seems to have most infuriated commentators 
was that these women led lives of relative luxury and, unencumbered by the need to 
go to work, squandered their free time taking part in illicit card circles rather than 
engaging in more useful activities.75 In addition to these moralistic concerns, the 
press feared that the gambling habits of government officials, or their wives, might 
lead them into embezzlement and corruption.76 These criticisms of the gambling 
habits of the nobility and government officials formed part of a broader critique upon 
the misbehaviour -  the drinking, womanising, idleness, and general hedonism -  of 
these social groups, the underlying aim of which seems to have been to shame them 
into conforming to a certain standard of propriety.
Another area that provided the press with ammunition for attacks upon the 
absolutist social order was a perceived double standard in law enforcement. As noted 
in Chapter 4, members of the Siamese elite enjoyed virtual immunity from arrest or 
prosecution because of their social status and privileges. The Sara rat summed up this 
situation by noting that, despite all the arrests for illegal gambling made by the police, 
it was only the small fry that seemed to get caught while the big fish got away.77 
Given this, it is hardly surprising that the popular press had a field day in 1923 when 
two high-ranking nobles were implicated heads of a large underground gambling ring 
-  the case of the two Phrayas discussed in Chapter 4. Recognising the significance of 
such high-profile arrests, the Yamato observed that it was a warning to all members of
no
the nobility that their status would no longer protect them. According to the Awanti, 
however, public opinion held that the two suspects would escape punishment; ‘Could
75 KDM , 23 Jan. 1917; BTJVM, 12 July 1924. The latter paper carried a translation of an article from a 
Thai-language journal. See also Barme, Woman, Man, Bangkok, pp. 127-9.
76 See for instance SO [t], 17 Jan. 1917; KDM, 23 Jan. 1917; CSW, 10 Feb. 1917.
77 Sara rat, 2 May 1923. For similar sentiments see CSW, 27 Jan. 1917 & 15 Feb. 1923; SO [t], 22 
Dec. 1922.
78 Yamato, 5 May 1923.
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it be that the country’s laws do not apply to people of rank?’ it asked rhetorically.79 
Nevertheless, both papers were convinced the two nobles were guilty and, on account 
of the disregard they had shown for the country’s laws and the king’s will, called for 
them to be punished severely in order to set an example to others in similar 
positions.80 Indeed, the Awanti wrote an open letter to the editors of five other 
newspapers, proposing they collectively petitioned the king to dismiss the two nobles 
from government service and strip them of rank.81
The press also commonly made thinly veiled allusions to police complicity in 
illicit gambling. Puzzled as to why illegal gambling had increased since 1917, the 
Sara rat, for instance, wondered how the gambling house tax farmers had managed to 
catch many more offenders before abolition than the police were able to in the early 
1920s, despite the fact that the latter had ten times more men at its disposal.82 
Similarly, the Awanti concluded its praise for Police Commissioner Phraya Athikon’s 
role in arresting the two nobles mentioned above by mischievously asking him if he 
had come across any other large illicit dens recently.83 Lastly, the Chino sayam 
warasap ran an article detailing how villagers in a district on the outskirts of 
Bangkok, where underground gambling was rife, were protected from arrest by a 
‘heavenly being’ (thewada). Whenever a household wished to gamble, a flag was 
raised. The ‘heavenly being’, presumably a corrupt official, would then fly to that 
house to collect an offering -  of money rather than ‘heavenly sustenance’ (thip- 
yahan) -  and in return would warn of any approaching police officers, thereby giving 
the illegal gamblers time to hide evidence of their crime.84
79Awanti, 11 May 1923.
80 Yamato, 17 May 1923.
81 Awanti, 9 May 1923.
82 Sara rat, 2 May 1923.
83 Awanti, 9 May 1923.
84 CSW, 16 Dec. 1916.
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Perhaps one of the most controversial articles of its time, an outstanding
example of satirical writing, and a brilliant synthesis of all the criticisms outlined
above, was a piece by Sem Sumanan that appeared in the Bangkok kanmuang on 12
March 1923. It has already been discussed by Copeland, though not in its entirety,
and, given its significance, merits further examination.85 Sem started by commenting
on the prevalence of ‘unusually fat’ police officers in the capital’s Chinese districts
since the closure of the gambling houses. This was unusual because:
the police stationed in these districts ought to be getting plenty of exercise 
catching gamblers. Moreover, one would expect them to be irritated by the 
extra work but instead they are surprisingly happy -  as happy as if they’d won 
the 100,000 baht jackpot in the lottery. Not only are they delighted by the 
opportunity to get exercise catching gamblers, but it would appear that it is 
precisely this type of exercise which is helping them to look so hearty. 
Without the Chinese... our policemen might waste away.86
As Copeland highlights, this ‘exercise’ was a metaphor for bribes.87 The article then
went on to discuss the ‘people with eighteen or nineteen crowns’ (phuak sip-paet sip-
kao mongkut) who also made a living from illegal gambling. The phrase ‘eighteen
crowns’ refers to the eighteen monkey warriors that served Rama in the Indian epic
Ramayana,88 In popular parlance, however, it is used to refer to people of a
duplicitous -  or perhaps, more literally, multiplicitous -  nature and in present day
Thailand might be applied to such characters as door-to-door salesmen or used-car
QQ
dealers. ‘Nineteen crowns’, meanwhile, was a phrase coined by Sem to refer to 
high-ranking government officials who, on account of their status, deserved an extra 
crown. Of course, the implication was that they were even more duplicitous and 
untrustworthy than those commoners involved in illegal gambling. By night they did 
not remain at home but drove helter-skelter through the streets to frequent, various
85 See Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, pp. 86-7.
86 Quoted in ibid., p. 86.
87 Ibid.
88 McFarland, Thcii-English Dictionary, p. 867.
89 My thanks to Chatnopdol Aksomsawad for explaining this usage.
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dens in which they won and lost huge sums of money. When these officials then ran 
up gambling debts that their salaries could not cover, they frantically tried to find 
more cash. Sem concluded by calling them bandits and thieves who stole from the 
people, whether it be private money that they won from others or the state’s money 
when they blew their salaries.90 As might be expected, this article caused quite a stir 
and Phraya Athikon brought a libel suit against the Bangkok kanmuang, in what 
became known as ‘the Case of the Fat Policeman’. This eventually led to Sem being 
imprisoned in August 1923.91
This did not deter Sem, however, and while inside he continued his campaign 
to expose police complicity in illegal gambling. On 15 September 1923, the Bangkok 
kanmuang earned one of his cartoons depicting a demon that personified gambling 
ushering people into hell (see Figure 5.1). Copeland observes that the caption -  which 
reads: ‘Is m ’lord just going to sit there while demon gambling pulls fellow human 
beings down to hell?’ -  was a direct address to the Police Commissioner.92 A year 
later, Sem reiterated his allegations in another cartoon, this time portraying Phraya 
Athikon as a dog tracking down illegal gamblers (see Figure 5.2). As Copeland notes, 
the word ‘gambling’ on the side of the dog implies that ‘the hunt need go no further
no
than the Police Commissioner himself.’
90 This article is reproduced in the archival file NA R.6 N .4 .1/214, ‘Extract from Bangkok kanmuang, 
12 March 1923’.
91 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 87.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.,p. 111.
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Figure 5.1: Cartoon from Bangkok kanmuang, 15 September 1923 (Source: Copeland, 
‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 107)
Figure 5.2: Cartoon from Kro lek, 30 November 1924 (Source: Copeland, ‘Contested 
Nationalism’, p. 114)
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Perhaps more damaging to the Sixth Reign government were the criticisms 
surrounding its use of gambling as a fundraising device, specifically through fetes 
such as the Winter Fair and that in Ratchaburi where gaming stalls were a prime 
attraction. As already noted in Chapter 3, the press earned stories describing the 
harmful effects of these opportunities to indulge in gambling, with reports of families 
driven into poverty and people driven to suicide. Although the government 
mouthpiece the Nangsuphim thai was quick to blame the people for foolishly 
bringing ruin upon themselves, other sections of the press held the organisers of these 
events directly accountable for the social damage.94 Additionally, many papers 
reasoned that the provision of public facilities for gambling at these fairs induced 
people to gamble, legally and illegally, at other times, while also encouraging other 
local authorities to set up similar fundraising events.95
Besides the ascribed social damage and blatant inducement to gamble, the 
press had a number of other objections to these fairs. First, while most newspapers 
recognised that the money went to worthwhile causes such as the Wild Tigers and the 
development of the air force, many objected to the way in which charity was used as 
a pretext for gambling, especially since the harmful effects far outweighed the 
benefits. As a headline in the Bangkok kanmuang put it: ‘Gambling in aid of the 
nation is killing the elephant to acquire its tusks.’96 The main culprits were the Wild 
Tigers, which was the main beneficiary of the Winter Fair, and Phraya Nonthisen, 
Chief of Staff of the corps and organiser of that event.97 One newspaper compared the 
fundraising methods of the Wild Tigers with those employed by other organisations, 
such as the Siamese Red Cross, which relied on parades, exhibitions, and handicraft
94 NT, 22 Nov. 1924; CSW, 14 Feb. 1923.
95 See for instance Yamato, 26 July 1923; Samphan thai, 8 Dec. 1923; Sayam rat, 28 Nov. 1924.
96 Bangkok kanmuang, 8 Feb. 1924. See also CSW, 14 Feb. 1923.
97 See for example Sayam rat, 10 Sept. 1923.
260
fairs in order to solicit donations from the public. Given these alternatives, it argued, 
the Wild Tigers had no excuse for promoting gambling to meet its financial 
requirements.98 It is in this context that another cartoon by Sem Sumanan, published 
in the 11 January 1925 edition of Kro lek, should be viewed (see Figure 5.3). The 
cartoon’s setting is most likely the clubhouse of the Royal Division of the Wild 
Tigers.99 In the upper left comer a figure that Copeland identifies as Vajiravudh is 
‘happily quaffing a beer’ while locked in conversation with another person, perhaps 
Phraya Nonthisen himself.100 Members of the Wild Tigers watch as two skeletons 
play a game of billiards. The caption reads: ‘A competition between national 
development and the Wild Tigers’. Although a little ambiguous, Sem seems to be 
implying that Vajiravudh and his court were enjoying the profits from the Wild 
Tigers’ gambling enterprises at the expense of emaciated gamblers, represented by 
the skeletons. In other words, the development of the Wild Tigers was more 
important to the king than the welfare of the Siamese people and the nation.
98 NA R.6 N.20.17/29, ‘The fundraising methods of the Wild Tigers compared with those of other 
organisations. ’ There is no indication as to which paper this article was taken from. The Siamese Red 
Cross was often lauded for its refusal to be associated with any gambling activities or to endorse it as a 
source o f income. See Yamato, 26 July 1923; Bangkok kanmuang, 8 Feb. 1924. However, as shown in 
Chapter 3, even it succumbed to the easy money offered by lotteries during the economic crisis of the 
early 1930s.
99 Greene details how the Royal Division received the most generous grants from the Privy Purse and 
was equipped with billiard tables imported from England. Greene, Absolute Dreams, p. 83.
100 Copeland, ‘Contested Nationalism’, p. 112.
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Figure 5.3: Cartoon from Kro lek, 11 January 1925 (Source: Copeland, ‘Contested 
Nationalism’, p. 117)
Phraya Khathathonbodi, the Lord Lieutenant of monthon Ratchaburi, was 
similarly vilified for organising fundraising fetes where the monopoly rights for 
gambling stalls were put up for auction.101 Some papers wondered why he had to rely 
on gambling revenue to build an airstrip when other monthons had managed to find 
other means.102 The Sayam rat even went so far as to question his fitness for office.103 
In their campaign against gambling, some elements of the press thereby identified 
certain figures within the Siamese elite as the main villains; the implication being that 
if they were removed from office, gambling would diminish.
The press was also concerned as to the destination of the money raised from 
these events. For instance, when the committee responsible for the annual motor-
101 Bangkok kanmuang, 19 July 1923; Sayam rat, 10 Sept. 1923.
102 Yamato, 26 July 1923; Bangkok kanmuang, 28 Aug. 1923.
103 Sayam rat, 28 Nov. 1924. See also BTWM, 29 Nov. 1924.
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racing meetings and air-displays published its 1922/3 report on the donations it had 
made, the Yamato pointed out that the police force had received some money, despite 
the fact that the entrance-cum-lottery tickets for the event had not listed it as a 
recipient. Meanwhile, out of all the kingdom’s hospitals, which were one of the 
indicated beneficiaries, only the Central Hospital had received any money. The paper 
observed bitterly that this was fair because the word ‘hospital’ (rong phayaban) on 
the ticket had no letter ‘S’ at the end and it was thus presumptuous to assume that it 
meant many hospitals.104 Of course, the tickets were in the Thai language, which has 
no plural form for nouns, and the Yamato was being ironic in using an English 
language grammatical construction to explain why hospitals had not received their 
due. The implication was that the committee had distributed the funds dishonestly. 
Similarly, the Chino sayam warasap was alarmed at the way in which government 
officials sought to profit personally from the Winter Fairs by investing in running 
some of the gambling stalls. Noting how some shamelessly paraded their 
involvement, the paper commented that the only charity these officials were 
interested in was themselves. It then observed caustically that they believed they were 
entitled to make money in this manner, as it was entirely appropriate for their 
status.105
Another major objection was that the games at the fairs tended to be 
straightforward gambling games, such as hi-lo and si ngao lak which were played for 
cash, rather than more traditional fairground games, such as target shooting and 
fishing for prizes. The legality of gambling for cash at these events was highly 
ambiguous: for some papers it was merely bending the law, for others it was breaking 
it outright. The Bangkok kanmuang took a particularly hard line on this. Before the
104 Yamato, 1 Aug. 1923.
105 CSW, 15 Feb. 1923.
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1923 Winter Fair it apparently asked Phraya Nonthisen not to allow playing for
money. Its plea fell on deaf ears, however, for after the event the Wayamo newspaper
playfully noted that ‘Chao Khun Nonthisen doesn’t care who says what and because
of this we could gamble for money and have fun.’ The Wayamo then teased the
Bangkok kanmuang by inquiring what it might do now that its threats had had no
effect, and praised the organiser of the Winter Fair for being steadfast.106
Nevertheless, the paper’s flippant tone makes it clear who was the real villain. The
Bangkok kanmuang also used satire to make a point, and one reporter’s description of
his visit to the 1924 Winter Fair is a fine example. Stopping at one stall, he takes
great pleasure in watching some high-society ladies who, it is implied, were gambling
there. But this did not last long:
My delight turned to horror when I saw Chao Khun Nonthisen, the organiser 
of the Winter Fair, along with a few other officials and a beautiful lady come 
to sit at the stall. ‘Hey! Why have you come? Ah, I see! Oh, yes! You’ve 
come to stop them gambling for money, for sure.’ Immediately my shock 
turned to delight once more for I had actually seen a government official of 
Siam doing his duty! ‘Hurrah for Chao Khun Nonthisen.’ But just as soon as I 
opened my mouth to thank Khun Nonthisen for coming to stop the gambling, 
he took a 20 baht note from his pocket and placed a 5 baht stake on hi-lo. He 
won as well. As the stallholder gave him his winnings, I was amazed. ‘Chao 
Khun Nonthisen, organiser of the fair; Chao Khun Nonthisen, favourite of His 
Majesty; Chao Khun Nonthisen, you who know only too well that gambling 
for money does not conform with the wishes of the King. But alas! Instead of 
stopping this as you should have done, you do the opposite and start playing 
hi-lo. It’s appropriate for a noble like yourself and in accordance with the 
wishes of His Majesty, right?’ Tired of seeing Phraya Nonthisen’s face, I 
decided it was better to go home. Just as I turned to leave, I heard Chao Khun 
say: “This is good fun, playing like the truly civilised (yang ni sanuk di len 
yang siwilai tae). Hey! I’ve won 10 baht!” The stallholder gave him 10 baht. 
‘Fine. It’s fun just like you say. But the people will be ruined on account of 
this fun.’107
Through his feigned surprise and mock delight, the writer launches a withering 
assault on Phraya Nonthisen that leaves no doubt in the reader’s mind as to who was
105 Wayamo, 21 Feb. 1923.
107 Bangkok kanmuang, 10 Jan. 1924.
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to blame for the country’s gambling problem. By describing Phraya Nonthisen’s 
excitement in winning such a petty sum, the writer also suggests his greed and 
preoccupation with money. Lastly, the writer subverts the discourse of siwilai to 
show that the civilised state to which Phraya Nonthisen and, by extension, the Sixth 
Reign court aspired was immoral, materialistic and would ultimately destroy the 
country.
In sum, for the press, the extent of the gambling problem during the early 
1920s represented all that was wrong with the absolutist social order: the corruption, 
hypocrisy, inequality, injustice and moral turpitude related to gambling was a 
manifestation of a wider social malaise afflicting Siamese society. Moreover, through 
critiques such as those outlined above, the press laid the blame for the gambling 
problem on the court, identifying certain government figures as the principal 
promoters and casting them as enemies of the nation. That these attacks had some 
influence on government policy can be deduced from the fact that, following 
Vajiravudh’s death, the Winter Fairs were discontinued and the Seventh Reign 
government abandoned the use of gambling as a fundraiser. Additionally, as detailed 
in Chapter 4, Prajadhipok took a more serious view of government officials taking 
part in any form of gambling, instituting a number of regulations for disciplining 
those that did. However, there were also instances when the press exerted a much 
more direct influence.
The Power of the Press
On at least two occasions, pressure from Siamese newspapers compelled the 
government into taking action against popular forms of gambling. The first was in 
regards to the prohibition of the one-baht sweepstakes at Bangkok’s two horse-racing
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clubs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the press and some members of the reading public 
condemned these sweeps for nurturing people’s gambling obsession, impoverishing
* * 1 OR *the lower classes and accentuating social problems. One paper highlighted how
monks placing bets on the races was damaging to the Buddhist religion and might be
criticised by foreigners.109 Even the Nangsuphim thai objected to the sweeps on the
grounds that the practice of closing government offices and banks early on race days
was bad for business.110 Some papers questioned the legality of betting on the horses,
the Siam Observer reasoning that the main reason it was tolerated in Siam was
because it was done in Britain and France.111 The Bangkok Times took a different
stance, justifying the prohibition of the sweeps on the grounds that their existence had
contravened the spirit of government policy: ‘The principle the State... adopted
[following the abolition of the gambling tax farms] was simply that of no public
facilities for gambling, and that is all that is being applied now.... Both the race clubs
of Bangkok have gone beyond that, and have provided public facilities for 
1 10gambling.’ The Sayam sakkhi staged an especially vigorous campaign against the 
sweeps, vehemently insisting that they were in direct contravention of the law. It 
based this assessment on the argument that, apart from the ministerial regulations that 
listed specific games and activities, any form of betting that did not depend on either 
skill or knowledge could be considered gambling.113 The paper then implied that the 
reason the relevant officials, Chao Phraya Yomarat in particular, had failed to take 
action against the sweeps was because other nobles and high-ranking officials had 
interests in the two race clubs. Here it repeated the claim that the country’s laws had
108 BTWM, 9 May 1922 & 19 July 1923; CSW, 25 June 1923.
109 Sayam sakkhi, 9 July 1923.
110 AT, 18 April 1923.
1,1 SO [t], 22 Dec. 1922.
112 BTWM, 19 July 1923.
113 Sayam sakkhi, 9 July 1923.
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to be respected by all classes, nobles and commoners alike.114 Later, the paper 
attempted to force the government’s hand by expressing its confidence that Chao 
Phraya Yomarat was not afraid of the important individuals with shares in the clubs 
and that the Police Commissioner, Phraya Athikon, was just waiting for his orders.115
Following the prohibition of the sweeps in July 1923, the Thai-language press 
seems to have been almost unanimous in its approval of the move, as was the general 
public.116 Noting that the governments of neighbouring countries such as Singapore 
had already forbidden them, the Chino sayam warasap thought it entirely appropriate 
that the Siamese administration should follow suit.117 The Sayam sakkhi, meanwhile, 
attributed the prohibition to the success of its own editorials and issued the following 
warning:
Since the words in our paper have resulted in officials cutting off a means of 
sucking the flesh and blood of the people {tat hon-thang sup luat-nua 
ratsadon-ponlamuang), groups that have a vested interest in issuing the 
sweeps have been furious with us. But we aren’t afraid of these wicked 
people, and let any that still try to suck the flesh and blood of the people know 
that we’ll continue to call for officials to take action just as in this case.118
Later, the paper offered a more humble assessment of the press campaign against the
sweeps, noting that regardless of whether it had been decisive or not, the sweeps had
been prohibited.119 But the crucial point is that the Thai-language press believed that,
with sustained pressure, it could sway the government on certain matters and be a
force for change.
It is also possible to discern press influence in the clampdown on the two 
billiard variants, ru and him, during the late 1920s. The Krungthep Daily Mail was 
apparently the first paper to raise concerns about the growing popularity of billiard ru
114 Sayam sakkhi, 7 July 1923.
115 Sayam sakkhi, 9 July 1923.
116 CSW, 21 July 1923; KDM, 25 July 1923.
117 CSW, 18 July 1923.
118 Sayam sakkhi, 18 July 1923.
119 Sayam sakkhi, 10 Aug. 1923.
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among the labourers and children of Bangkok in May 1928, and others quickly joined
120in the chorus of disapproval. As noted in Chapter 3, newspapers soon began to 
carry reports of burglaries, violent quarrels, and suicides that were attributable to this 
game. Besides encouraging crime, there were numerous other objections to billiard 
ru. First, it required little skill and tended to be played solely for betting purposes,
• 191thereby inculcating a love and knowledge of gambling. An opinion piece in Si 
Jcrung, meanwhile, worried how the widespread playing of billiard ru along all the 
capital’s streets might tamish the country’s image in the eyes of foreigners, leading 
them to wonder why Siamese men were allowed to gamble all day without doing any 
work. Similarly, police officers playing the game in public, some right in front of the
• 199porisapha court, did little to help matters. Perhaps the biggest concern though, was 
the game’s popularity among Siam’s youth. Boys between the ages of 12 and 18 
regularly visited Bangkok’s numerous billiard halls after school or sometimes even 
played truant. There they would remain long into the night or until they had lost all 
their cash. As an illustration of the damage caused by the game, the Krungthep Daily 
Mail offered the unhappy, tabloid-esque tale of a hotel owner whose son frequently 
skipped school to play billiard ru. Driven into depression and unable to eat or sleep, 
the man had locked his errant son in his bedroom. But the boy broke down the wall 
and fled to a billiard hall. His father finally found him at dawn the next day and 
punished him. The son escaped once more, though, and had yet to return home. The 
paper concluded by urging the government to stop the nation’s children being 
corrupted by the game.123
120 KDM, 25 May 1928; NT, 13 June 1928; Si kning, 15 June 1928.
121 Si kning, 13 Aug. 1928; Bangkok kanmuang, 25 Aug. 1928.
122 Si kning, 18 Aug. 1928.
123 KDM, 27 Sept. 1928. See also KDM, 30 June 1928.
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Initially, the press was pessimistic as to whether billiard ru would be banned. 
This was because regular billiards was not covered by existing legislation and was 
very popular among Westerners and government officials, the Knmgthep Daily Mail 
implying that its status as a gentleman’s game made it immune from prohibition.124 
The argument then ran that the government could not prohibit billiard ru and leave 
the regular game untouched without seeming unjust.125 Once the press learnt that the 
government was considering issuing a new gambling law, however, it was widely 
expected that billiard ru, if  not regular billiards too, would be included in the new 
legislation.126 It could not come soon enough for the Krungthep Daily Mail. Noting 
that it would be at least another six months before the law was ready, the paper 
asserted that gambling on billiard ru would increase as people seized the opportunity 
to profit from it while it was still legal, and it begged the government to take more
197 ♦immediate action. When owners of billiard halls converted their tables into ones for
playing billiard lum, the Bangkok kanmuang took up this call. It argued that billiard
lum was illegal because its scoring system was similar to that of an already forbidden
game, and even sent a reporter to question Phraya Athikon as to why the police had 
128yet to suppress it. Soon after this visit, the police clamped down on the game 
before prohibiting it outright. Once again, the press forced the government’s hand, in 
this case prompting it to take immediate action rather than wait for the appropriate 
legislation to be completed.
Although the constitutional regime succeeded in muzzling the more critical 
elements of the press, newspaper opinion still exercised some influence over
m  KDM, 25 May 1928.
125 Si kritng, 15 June 1928; KDM, 30 June 1928. In recognition of this, the Ncmgsuphim thai defended 
regular billiards by presenting an extensive comparison of the two games to show how they differed. 
NT, 13 June 1928.
126 Lak muang, 15 Oct. 1928.
127 KDM, 27 Sept. 1928.
128 Bangkok kanmuang, 6 Feb. 1929.
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gambling policy in the 1930s. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the proposal for the ‘Little
Heaven’ casino in Bangkok met its end due to public opposition. A letter by ‘Small
Flutter5 to the Bangkok Times gives some indication of how this was voiced. First, the
writer questioned why that paper had not condemned ‘a former Minister [for]
allowing his name to be associated with a project, the aims and objects of which,
most of us believe, are simply to encourage gambling of the worst type.’ Then he
took aim at the promoters of the scheme:
One cannot understand their motive for trying to mulct the poor people of 
their hard-earned cash. Would it not be better for them [the promoters] to risk 
some of their superfluous cash in real industrial enterprises which may enable 
some of the unemployed to find work? The more one thinks over this 
question, the more one becomes convinced that the establishment of casinos
190in Siam would indeed be a tragedy.
The establishment of the first govemment-run casinos in 1939 seems to have 
engendered a lukewarm response from the public. As ‘Hermit’, who was apparently a 
Thai judge from Songkhla and a regular contributor to the Bangkok Times, noted, 
‘The respectable classes are against the scheme, while the easy-going class are in 
favour of it; but they seem to agree that Hua Hin casino will not be sufficiently well 
supported by the type of visitors required by the scheme. If we must have a casino, 
Singora [Songkhla] should be the first choice.’130 While it is unlikely that such 
sentiments were a critical factor behind the Phibun regime’s decision to abandon the 
casino project, this indicates a widespread assumption that, irrespective of its merits, 
the scheme was destined to fail. Lastly, when the Bangkok casinos set up by the 
Khuang Aphaiwong government during the latter years of the Second World War 
were closed in June 1945, the Thai mai newspaper welcomed the news and was
129 BTWM, 25 May 1934.
130 BTWM, 2 May 1939.
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confident the people would be united in celebration. Clearly, the casino project had 
little support in the press.
The Whisper of the Silent Majority
Attempting to pin down something as nebulous and ephemeral as public opinion in 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century Siam is nigh on impossible. When 
newspapers claimed that the public was behind a particular initiative or reported the 
general feelings on a particular topic, it is difficult to know who exactly made up this 
public or shared these feelings. A conservative assessment would be that the press 
was really speaking only about and for its readership. Another collection of sources 
employed herein are letters, most of them anonymous, from members of the public to 
the authorities complaining, for instance, about a local fish-fighting den and the 
unsavoury characters it attracted or a government official abusing the procedure for
132issuing gambling permits. These present snapshots into the mind of the writer but 
in most cases it is unclear who they were and just how representative their views were 
of the broader population. Apart from these sources, however, the historical record 
provides scant insight into what the ordinary Siamese person thought. With these 
problems and limitations in mind, this section will attempt to capture some of the 
opinions of the broader, predominantly rural Siamese population on gambling and 
related government policy, and determine what influence the common man had on 
that policy.
Gambling obviously provoked an array of differing views and feelings among 
the various sections of Siamese society. At one extreme were the professional 
gamblers and its promoters, denizens of the gambling houses before their termination
131 Thai mai, 5 June 1945.
132 NA R.6 N.42/37, ‘A “Gentleman” to Phraya Phetcliapani, 28 April 1917’; NA R.6 N.42/26, ‘The 
Oppressed to Yomarat, 20 Sept. 1915’.
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and patrons of the underground dens that sprung up after. For them, gambling was 
their life and their livelihood. These people appear in the historical record primarily 
as statistics for gambling convictions. At the other were those people who considered 
gambling to be an evil that was, at best, retarding Siam’s development or, at worst, 
slowly destroying the country. Such people might have been members of the Anti- 
Gambling League, which, under the leadership of Prince Damrong, was established 
around the turn of the twentieth century to press for the abolition of the gambling tax 
farms. Beyond a few cursory references, there is little information on this 
organisation or its membership, however.133 But, given its royal connections, it can be 
surmised that it was an elite movement. Between these two extremes was the bulk of 
the population, many of whom may have gambled occasionally: playing cards during 
the Songkran festival, purchasing the odd lottery ticket, or frequenting the gaming 
stalls at the Winter Fair, for instance. Others might not have gambled but saw little 
harm in it as long as it was not done to excess. Contemporary Western commentators 
may have depicted the Siamese as oblivious to the potential harm gambling could 
cause but, as Hong Lysa has shown, this was partly to reinforce ‘the essential 
unfathomable difference’ between East and West and to illustrate how Asian subjects 
subscribed to a different moral code that was impenetrable to the Western mind.134 
This was a strategy for emphasising Western superiority and says more about the 
colonial mindset than that of the Siamese. For those that had to live with an inveterate 
gambler, the damaging effects of their pastime -  debt, poverty, theft, and bankruptcy 
-  were all too apparent. For those with no firsthand experience, the evils of
133 BTWM, 15 June 1904; W. A. Graham, Siam: A Handbook o f Practical, Commercial and Political 
Information, London; Alexander Moring, 1924, vol. 1, p. 340.
134 Hong Lysa, ‘“Stranger within the Gates”: Knowing Semi-Colonial Siam as Extraterritorials’, 
Modern Asian Studies, 38, 2 (2004), pp. 341-2. To illustrate this point, Hong presents an almost 
farcical scene from the British Consular Court in which the judge tries in vain to make a Siamese 
woman see the error of her ways in sending one of her young sons to place a stake on the huai lottery.
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unchecked gambling were conveyed through proverbs and fables. Take the following 
saying for example:
If bandits plunder your home, you will have no property to use (Tuk chon 
phlon, mai mi khong cha chai).
If a fire should bum, you will have no house in which to live (Tuk phai mai, 
mai mi ruan chayu).
If you lose at po, you will have no land on which to live (Tuk po kin, mai mi 
phaen-din chayu)P5
In this hierarchy of disasters, gambling is the worst because, unlike the other two, it 
leaves its victims with nothing at all with which to rebuild their lives.136
Attitudes and opinions on gambling varied depending on the form. As noted 
in Chapter 1, the huai lottery had a much broader appeal than the gambling houses. 
Indeed, there are some tantalising hints of public antipathy and opposition towards 
the latter. While visiting a town near Chiang Mai in the late nineteenth century, Holt 
Samuel Hallett leamt that tax farmers had been prevented from setting up gambling 
houses and opium dens ‘by common consent’.137 After all the gambling houses were 
closed in the southern monthons of Nakhon Si Thammarat and Chumphon in 1898, a 
missionary observed that: ‘Regular nakleng gamblers are feeling rather sore over it, 
but the better class of people express great satisfaction and approval of the 
improvement this has wrought in the life of the people and in their general 
prosperity’.138 Similarly, when all the provincial gambling houses were finally closed 
in 1906, public celebrations, organised by local governors, were staged in several 
central provinces. These involved religious ceremonies, such as the honouring of 
Buddha images and the giving of alms to monks, sporting contests, and theatrical 
performances. At the event in Ayutthaya, there were also hot-water baths and a
135 Phra Thepphawethi, That khong kanphancin [The Evils of Gambling], Bangkok, 1940, p. 5.
136 Ibid., p. 6.
137 Hallett, Thousand Miles, p. 366.
138 BTWM, 3 Oct. 1898.
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110doctor’s surgery, where medicine was distributed. Although many people attended 
and it is tempting to see their attendance as approval for government policy, it should 
be noted that these celebrations were held during the Songkran festival, a time of year 
traditionally associated with fun and games, and people may have been lured by the 
attractions rather than the cause. Nevertheless, these examples suggest there was a 
background hum of disapproval for the gambling houses.
In contrast, card playing seems to have been universally popular during the 
first decades of the twentieth century. This popularity may have been due in part to 
hardcore gamblers taking up different games following the closures of the gambling 
houses but the widespread passion for cards in particular stemmed from its social 
function. There was even a poem extolling the joys of playing cards.140 Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the concession under the 1930 law for unlicensed card playing 
between family and friends, or in private members clubs, was a result of this 
popularity.141 Attitudes change with time, however. By the mid-1930s, the lack of 
restraint led to disgust and a public backlash, perhaps best illustrated by a popular 
song in which a man admonishes his wife, a regular patron of card dens, for 
neglecting their family, that sold extremely well on vinyl.142 Around the same time, 
the constitutional regime annulled the concession for unlicensed card playing. This 
indicates how government policy was occasionally in tune with public opinion.
For the most part, however, the stance of the government and the attitudes of 
the mass population were not in unison. The loudest manifestation of this discord was 
the cacophony produced by contraventions of, and convictions under, the gambling 
laws. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, gambling offences were consistently one of
139 NA R.5 Kh.14.l-Kh/18, ‘Damrong to Sommot, 27 April 1906’, ‘Commissioner of monthon 
Ayutthaya, 18 April 1906’, ‘Damrong to Sommot, 2 May 1906’.
140 Anek, [Thai Card Games], p. 13.
141 Ibid., p. 14.
142 Ibid., p. 15.
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the top three classes of offences in terms of the number of people convicted.143 Of
course, this was but a fraction of the number gambling illegally. Unfortunately, these
statistics do not give any indication of the exact nature and circumstances of the
offence, or the sentence imposed. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume most
convictions were for minor infringements of the gambling law committed by ordinary
people, some perhaps ignorant of the law, who had the misfortune to be caught
gambling illegally in the wrong place and at the wrong time. In support of this
assessment, one Western judicial adviser attributed the sharp rise in the number of
revenue convictions between 1902/3 and 1903/4 — from 234 to 1,150 — to the
implementation of the 1902 gambling law in Bangkok:
The general license to indulge in gambling with dice and cards granted during 
the new-year holidays was this year regulated more precisely as to time, and 
hundreds found themselves in the lock-up for gambling either before the 
official time had begun or after it expired.14
Clearly, people continued to gamble even when it was in contravention of the law,
though this was probably due not so much to ignorance or outright defiance as to
indifference. Although the government may have branded certain foims of gambling
as illegal because they were considered to be undesirable and harmful to society,
many did not share these views. Indeed, if the aim of the government’s gambling
policy was to change people’s behaviour, then it is fair to say that for the period
covered by this study it failed. That certain games continued to be played long after
they had been prohibited is one of the clearest indications of this failure. In February
1940, for example, 15 people were arrested for playing po kam, some fifty years after
that game had been confined to the gambling houses and nearly twenty-five years
143 The other two classes were offences against property and offences in contravention of the opium 
and excise laws. See SY 1924-25, pp. 248-9; SY 1929-30, pp. 302-3; S Y 1931-33, pp. 354-5; S Y 1933- 
35, pp. 370-1; SY 19373/8-1938/39, pp. 358-9.
144 Ministry o f Justice Report fo r the Year 122 (1903-04), p. 8.
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after it had been banned.145 And this was not an isolated incident: underground huai
I 4Alotteries continued to be run into the 1940s, if not longer. This suggests that for
many the kingdom’s gambling laws lacked legitimacy. In other words, although
certain games and actions were proscribed by legislation, this did not mean that the
Siamese people necessarily saw those games or actions as criminal.
Some of the ruses illegal gamblers used to evade the law have already been
discussed in Chapter 4. Perhaps none were more effective than those that targeted the
state officials charged with detecting and suppressing illegal gambling. As a woman
from Bang Chan, a village once on the outskirts of Bangkok, explained in 1953:
We have always played cards in this part of Bang Chan.... If the police came 
to arrest people, we would pay them or give them food or drink.... Some 
police wanted to play cards and made good money gambling. When such a 
policeman came along, he took off his hat and held it high on a pole to warn 
us he was coming, then we could see over the tall grass. People would stop 
and invite him to come in.147
With those state officials who were not so susceptible to bribery, meanwhile, people
used other tactics to prevent them from doing their jobs. One Siamese commentator
who had travelled widely throughout the country asserted that kamnans and village
headmen were reluctant to arrest illegal gamblers in their localities because those
gamblers came from within their own social circle. These grassroots officials feared
that if they were to carry out their duties fully, then they might be ostracised from
148their own communities. Moreover, the commentator highlighted how villagers used 
malicious gossip and slander to undermine the authority of local officials who put
145 BTWM, 24 Feb. 1940.
146 BTWM, 5 Feb. 1940.
147 Sharp and Hanks, Bang Chan, pp. 127-8.
148 Si Jirung, 12 May 1928. This is indicative of the contradiction between the traditional and modern 
roles of the village headman. Within the village community, the headman had traditionally been the 
defender of local interests; indeed, his authority depended on him being a strong leader who could 
protect the village from outsiders and state impositions. Conversely, the rapidly centralising Siamese 
state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the headman as the means for articulating 
its demands and enforcing its will. See Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall o f the Thai Absolute 
Monarchy, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994, pp. 102-3.
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their duty to the state before their perceived responsibility to their communities. He 
gave the example of a particularly strict kamnan who arrested people without bias and 
had consequently been dubbed a jobs-worth and ridiculed by local people.149 This 
name-calling is a classic example of what James C. Scott has termed ‘weapons of the 
weak’, meaning techniques employed by the poor and downtrodden to ensure that 
those in their communities who are better off and more powerful conform to certain 
social norms.150 The use of such tactics to subvert the enforcement of Siam’s 
gambling laws reinforces the argument that those laws were not in accord with the 
worldview of many Siamese people. For them, the gambling laws were an 
unwelcome and unrealistic imposition of the state.
But while some aspects of government attempts to restrict gambling may have 
been unpopular, the legitimacy of that policy was rarely openly questioned. One of 
the few exceptions to this stemmed from the 1939 prohibition on cockfighting 
imposed by the Phibun regime. This move provoked written protests from a group of 
northern farmers, who sent a petition bearing almost one hundred signatures to the 
Ministry of the Interior, and from the MP for the southern province of Nakhon Si 
Thammarat. Their principal objection to the ban was that cockfighting was a genuine, 
traditional Thai sport that had gone on since ancient times. Both parties also framed 
their protests in terms of agricultural development: fighting cocks were an indigenous 
breed and, since the prohibition, the Thai chicken breeding industry had gone into 
decline.151 The ban on cockfighting was thus perceived and portrayed as an attack
149 The exact name this official had been given was ‘khun hoe yot tamlai y a t \  which can be literally 
translated as ‘Sir So Excessively Proud of His Position that fie Destroys His Relatives’. Si la-ung, 12 
May 1928.
150 James C. Scott, Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984, esp. pp. 22-5, 234-5, 282.
151 NA MT.0201.1.1/1577, Nai Khwai Kaenkaeo, Nai Tan Wongbaipet and associates to Minister of 
the Interior, 24 Sept. 1940’; NA MT.0201.1.1/1579, ‘MP for Nakhon Si Thammarat to Minister of the 
Interior, 23 Sept. 1940’.
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upon Thai identity. The government was not swayed by these arguments, however,
I S9and the ban remained in place. Presumably, this did not stop people from staging 
cockfights and, given the fact that they continue to this day, the prohibition eventually 
fell into abeyance.
As noted in Chapter 4, gambling by government officials was a major concern
among some sections of the public. From the mid-191 Os, there was a steady stream of
anonymous letters to the administration accusing certain officials of having gambling
problems, running illicit gambling rings, covering up for others involved in such
1enterprises, or neglecting their suppression duties. Sometimes these claims were 
just part of a longer list of charges of official corruption and abuse.154 It is not clear in 
all cases whether the authorities investigated these allegations, though it seems that 
the constitutional regime took them more seriously than its absolutist predecessor. 
When there was an investigation, the authorities usually found there was no factual 
basis for the allegations or, if there were hints of malpractice, not enough evidence for 
any action to be taken against the accused.155 Questions could naturally be raised 
about the rigour and impartiality of the investigators. For instance, in January 1940 
the governor of Pathum Thani province was accused of being a hardcore gambler 
who would compel other officials to play cards illegally. The only step the Ministry
152 NA MT.0201.1.1/1577, ‘Secretary of Minister of Interior to Nai Kliwai and associates, 3 Oct. 
1940’; NA MT.0201.1.1/1579, ‘Secretary of Minister of Interior to MP for Nakhon Si Thammarat, 3 
Oct. 1940s.
153 See for example NA R.6 N.42/32, ‘An Honest Person to the Minister of Local Government, July 
1916’; NA R.6 N.42/95, ‘Anonymous letter from people of Pak Klong Plira Klianong, 22 March 
1925’; NA MT.0201.1.1/185, ‘Anonymous letter, 9 Oct. 1936s; NA MT.0201.1.1/1354, ‘People of 
Sukhothai to Phibun, 1 Dec. 1939s. People may have made similar anonymous accusations before the 
1910s but no examples were found during the archival research for this study.
154 See for instance NA R.6 N.42/85, ‘Mr Watching the Government to tire Minister of the Interior, 19 
June 1923’; NA R.6 N.42/92, ‘The People, 25 June 1925’; NA R.6 N.42/114, ‘The People of Phra 
Pradaeng province’; NA MT.0201.1.1/2, ‘Villagers of tambon Talat Mai to PM, 18 Feb. 1934’; NA 
MT.0201.1.1/898, ‘Nai Sawat to Chaikan, 3 Aug. 1938’; NA MT.0201.1.1/1007, ‘Nai Lek to Phibun, 1 
March 1939’.
155 See for example NA MT.0201.1.1/2, ‘Ang Thong Provincial Committee to Undersecretary of the 
Interior, 13 June 1934s; NA MT.0201.1.1/1007, ‘Ang Thong Provincial Committee to Director- 
General o f the Department of the Interior, 27 July 1939’.
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of the Interior apparently took was to ask the governor to explain himself. In response 
he produced a number of letters from various senior provincial officials and the police 
rebutting the allegations.156 In some cases, the allegations arose from a 
misunderstanding on the part of the accuser. In 1940, for example, the deputy 
governor of Phrae province was accused of quashing a case against five officials who 
had been arrested for illegal gambling in a social club.157 The governor’s subsequent 
investigation concluded that there had been no perversion of justice. The officials had 
merely been playing cards for cigarettes and alcohol; according to the public 
prosecutor and a judge this was not against the law and thus there was no basis for a
* 158criminal case.
It is tempting to see these letters as indications of public antipathy to gambling 
or, at the very least, towards gambling by officials, and as indirect expressions of 
support for the government’s restrictionist policy. For some, this certainly seems to 
have been the case. During the Seventh Reign clampdown on officials engaging in 
any form of gambling, the wife of a government clerk wrote to the Lak muang 
newspaper listing officials she had seen gambling on billiards. As she explained, she 
was not doing this for malicious reasons. Rather, her husband had become involved 
with this betting and had blown his salary; the couple now did not have enough 
money for food and were in debt.159 Similarly, some wrote out of apparent concern 
for the negative effects that the gambling habits of government officials might have 
on their work and the government’s reputation.160 Others had more malign motives,
156 NA MT.0201.1.1/1221Undersecretary of the Interior to Governor of Pathum Thani, 27 Jan. 1940’, 
‘Governor o f Pathum Thani to Undersecretary o f the Interior, 8 Feb. 1940’.
157 NA MT.0201.1.1/1581, ‘Anonymous letter to PM, 15 May 1940’, ‘Undersecretary of the Interior to 
Khanakrommakan Phrae province, 5 June 1940’.
158 NA MT.0201.1.1/1581, ‘Governor o f Phrae to Undersecretaiy o f the Interior, 14 June 1940’.
159 NA R.7 M.26.2/6, ‘Extract from Lak muang, 22 Jan. 1927’.
160 NA MT.0201.1.1/1354, ‘People of Sukhothai to Phibun, 1 Dec. 1939’; NA MT.0201.1.1/1221, ‘Nai 
Prasoet to PM, Jan. 1940’.
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though. By the late 1920s, the public had become aware that the government took a 
dim view of its officials gambling and that those so accused faced severe disciplinary 
action. Some people may therefore have made false allegations against particular 
officials in order to discredit them and undermine the local administration; indeed, 
this was just the conclusion reached by an investigation into the conduct of the 
district chief of Damnoen Saduak and his wife, who had allegedly won on an 
underground huai lottery.161 Similarly, the governor of Pathum Thani referred to 
above concluded that claims of him being an inveterate gambler had been cooked up 
by illegal gamblers in retaliation for the hard-line stance he had taken in suppressing 
their activities.162 In this milieu of accusations and counter-claims it is difficult to 
deteimine who was telling the truth. What is clear, however, is that common people 
realised that they could use the government’s anti-gambling policy and legislation for 
their own ends, to sully the reputations of local elites and possibly cause them to be
i rn
removed from office or transferred. The gambling laws and government policy 
enabled people to turn the tables on officials. Like successive governments, the mass 
population may thus have considered gambling to be a crime only when it suited their 
own interests: a little light gambling on cards between family and friends was 
perfectly acceptable but for government officials to do the same was not. In short, 
people’s opinions on gambling were often contradictory and as varied as the myriad 
foims of gambling.
The emergent popular press in early twentieth century Siam had both a short­
term impact on the government’s gambling policy, through provocative campaigns
161 NA MT.0201.1.1/297, Ratchaburi Provincial Committee to Undersecretary o f the Interior, 15 Aug. 
1936’.
162 NA MT.0201.1.1/1221, ‘Governor of Pathum Thani to Undersecretary o f the Interior, 8 Feb. 1940’. 
153 Of all the anonymous letters used in this section, there was only one that resulted in an official 
being dismissed from office. See NA R.6 N.42/103, ‘Report No. 3360, 17 Feb. 1937.
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highlighting the ‘evils’ of a particular form of gambling that then led to that form’s 
regulation or prohibition, and a long-term influence, through piercing critiques of the 
hypocrisy and moral turpitude engendered by gambling that then resulted in the 
government regulating the behaviour of its officials more strictly. These criticisms 
were but one symptom of a broader and more deep-seated disenchantment with 
absolutist society. The mass population, meanwhile, exerted a more subtle and 
indirect influence as the government sought to accommodate popular tastes while 
trying to eliminate undesirable, ‘criminal’ behaviour. Moreover, the common people 
were not merely passive subjects of gambling laws imposed from above: in some 
instances, they used those laws to make government officials accountable for their 
behaviour. The gambling policy of successive governments was constantly evolving 
as a response to changes in Siamese society.
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Conclusion
Gambling is the heritage of mankind. Lucidness or wit may 
help some escape from ruin, but most of us human beings 
must keep on gambling. Wherever gambling is illegal, it 
must be carried out secretly. If the authorities in Siam were 
serious about arresting gamblers, the kingdom’s jails 
would overflow.
Arkartdamkeung Rapheephat, The Circus o f  Life1
The setting is Monte Carlo, probably sometime in the 1920s, and Wisoot, the 
protagonist of Arkartdamkeung Rapheephat’s ground-breaking 1929 novel The 
Circus o f Life (Lakhon haeng chiwit), is moved to make the above observation whilst 
morbidly contemplating the ruin caused by unchecked gambling in the resort’s 
casinos. It is one of many occasions in the novel where the distinction between 
fiction and fact becomes blurred and where Wisoot’s voice seems to become that of 
the author. Indeed, the story of Wisoot’s life closely shadows that of Arkart, and, as 
Marcel Barang notes, even at the time of its release, ‘the novel was widely perceived 
as a thinly disguised autobiography’.2 A love of gambling is not the least of the 
similarities between creator and creation, though in the author’s case it had tragic 
consequences. Arkart was bom in November 1905; his father was Prince Rabi 
(Ratburi Direkrit), one of Chulalongkom’s many sons and the Minister of Justice 
from 1896 to 1910. According to Arkart, the two were never close and his sense of 
estrangement from his father was compounded when his parents divorced in 1918. 
Arkart then went to live with his mother, who had been accused by her husband of
1 Arkartdamkeung, The Circus o f Life, p. 195.
2 Marcel Barang, ‘Preface’ in Arkartdamkeung, The Circus o f  Life, p. 9. Rachel Harrison has also 
commented upon the novel’s ‘semi-autobipgraphicaP nature. See Rachel Harrison, ‘Between East and 
West’ in Monique Zaini-Lajoubert (ed.), Etats et literature en Asie: L ‘ emergence des etats modemes, 
Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2003, esp. pp. 179-182. Details o f Arkart’s life are drawn from these two 
sources.
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being an inveterate gambler. It is from her that Arkart is said to have acquired his 
passion for gambling. In 1924, he went to study in England, before moving on to 
Georgetown University in the United States. Returning to Bangkok via Japan in 
1928, Arkart then entered government service and proceeded to write his masterpiece 
The Circus o f Life, in which he draws heavily on his experiences of life overseas to 
depict Wisoot’s own journey around the world. However, after incurring substantial 
debts, and having been implicated in a string of financial scandals, he fled to Hong 
Kong in 1931, from where he often visited the casinos in Macao. Arkart committed 
suicide in May 1932.3 Wisoot’s description of gamblers that had lost everything in 
Monte Carlo’s casinos and then taken their own lives thus seems chillingly 
prescient.4 What makes the novel most remarkable, though, is its international scope: 
by venturing overseas, Wisoot gains the perspective to offer constructive criticisms of 
Siamese society, with the practice of polygamy coming in for particular 
condemnation.5 The Circus o f Life thus suggests Arkart’s desire for social change and 
it is in this light that Wisoot’s comments on gambling should be considered.
The quote is insightful on a number of levels. Firstly, Arkart displays a 
profound recognition of gambling’s fundamental human appeal and, stemming from 
this, the futility of attempts to restrict it. Secondly, in questioning the authorities’ 
resolve in arresting illicit gamblers, he alludes to the corruption arising from 
gambling’s illegality in a very matter-of-fact, non-condemnatory manner. On a 
deeper level, however, this statement challenges the Siamese government’s very 
commitment to the suppression of gambling: was it truly serious about restricting 
gambling? In turn, this raises questions about the real purpose of government policy,
3 Arkart was not the only member o f his family whose life was blighted by gambling. His eldest 
brother had a passion for horse-racing which led to him gambling away his entire inheritance and the 
family home.
4 Harrison, ‘Between East and West’, p. 180.
5 Ibid., pp. 172-3.
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and whether or not the government was successful in achieving those aims. 
Moreover, by asserting that ‘the kingdom’s jails would overflow’ if all illicit 
gamblers were imprisoned, Arkart is making an assumption about the amount of 
illegal gambling in Siam. But was it really as great as he implies and members of the 
political elite and literati claimed? More importantly, was the Siamese population’s 
gambling habit actually as problematic and harmful as was depicted? These are some 
of the questions to be addressed in this conclusion, which, following Wisoot’s lead, 
will also look overseas so as to gain new perspectives on gambling in Siam.
Gambling in Siam in Perspective
In order to evaluate the success of the Siamese government’s gambling policy, it is 
first necessary to clarify what the ruling elite actually wished to achieve. As should 
be familiar by now, they considered gambling to be a social evil that was a potent 
source of crime, poverty and, before its final formal abolition in 1905, debt slavery. 
Moreover, gambling encouraged moral laxity and indolence amongst the population 
and, through a combination of all these factors, retarded economic development. At 
times, it is almost as if  gambling was held to be the cause of all Siam’s ills, a view 
the ruling elite shared with missionaries, foreign advisers and the emergent 
indigenous middle class. Indeed, such a view of gambling was repeated mantra-like 
in government reports, travelogues and newspapers until it became a self-evident 
truth that required no explanation.6 It thereby followed that if gambling could be
6 For instance, in his 1905 report on alternative sources of revenue to the gambling house tax farms, F. 
H. Giles stated: ‘The evils o f gambling and their effect on the plastic nature o f the people... are too 
well known to require any comment here.’ NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Memorandum containing 
proposals as to the manner in which revenue can be raised to supply the deficiency which will be 
caused by the abolition o f the gambling houses in the provinces.’ Similarly, the report of the annual 
meeting o f local authorities for 1924/5 noted that it was already known to what extent gambling was an 
evil and an enemy o f good governance but then went on to reiterate its supposedly damaging social 
and economic effects anyway. NA R. 6 N .l 1.5.Ch/17, ‘Ministry of the Interior Consultation on Class 2 
Gambling.’
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restricted or even eliminated, then poverty and crime would be reduced and Siam’s 
prosperity assured. The reality was a little different, however.
A lack of comprehensive statistical information on the volume of gambling in 
Siam, the amount of crime, levels of poverty, and the incidence of debt slavery makes 
it extremely difficult to evaluate the success of the government’s restrictionist policy 
towards gambling or to judge the extent to which it was based on accurate 
perceptions.7 Indeed, this dearth of statistics indicates that government policy was 
based predominantly on general impressions rather than hard facts. Naturally, this 
had profound implications, allowing different groups of people to make largely 
unsubstantiated claims about gambling and its effects in order to advance personal or 
institutional interests. It has already been noted in Chapter 5 that some newspaper 
commentators exaggerated the damage caused by gambling and, on occasion, even 
resorted to outright fabrication in order to drive home their point. It would be unfair 
and naive to assume they were the only ones to do so. The reasons for this and its 
effects will be considered later but first it is necessary to try and determine the actual 
impact of government policy.
Turning first to the issue of gambling as a cause of debt slavery, it can be
suggested that the gradual closure of the gambling houses in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries did little to reduce this form of human bondage, for the
simple reason that it was implemented too late to have much effect. The main
impetus for the abolition of slavery came from a decree issued by Chulalongkom in
1874. This ruled that anyone bom a hereditary slave from 1868 onwards would gain
their liberty at the age of 21 and, more pertinently with regards to gambling, any free
person bom after 1868 could not sell themselves or be sold into slavery upon
7 David Dixon makes note o f this lack o f statistics on gambling, and its implications, in his study of  
attitudes and reactions to betting in England and Wales between the 1890s and 1930s. Dixon, From 
Prohibition to Regulation, pp. 9-10.
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reaching 21. While the 1874 decree did not affect existing debt slaves and still 
allowed parents to sell their children into slavery, it seems that it did have a 
significant indirect impact on this latter practice. Indeed, many people mistakenly 
believed that the decree had actually forbidden the buying and selling of children 
bom after 1868, leading some to complain about the difficulties of finding a buyer in
o #
order to service or discharge a debt. By the time the final abolition decree was issued 
in 1905, the number of slaves and potential slaves had been greatly diminished.9 
Given that the initial closures of the Bangkok gambling houses during the late 1880s 
and early 1890s probably did little to reduce gambling in the capital and that the first 
provincial dens were closed only in 1898, it is difficult to see how these moves had 
more than a negligible impact upon debt slavery.
Similarly, there are few firm indications that the government’s attempts to 
restrict and regulate gambling had much effect upon crime rates or levels of poverty 
in Siam. Indeed, both of these social problems, and fluctuations in their prevalence, 
arise from a wide range of socio-economic factors, of which gambling can reasonably 
be considered only a minor one at best. Throughout the period covered by this study, 
the incidence of crime appears to have grown inexorably almost year-on-year. The 
most comprehensive and complete statistics on criminal behaviour for early twentieth 
century Siam are those showing the number of people convicted for criminal 
offences: this figure increased almost tenfold during the first four decades of the 
twentieth century, from 11,353 convictions in 1903/4 to well over 100,000 a year in 
the second half of the 1930s.10 To a certain extent, this was a reflection of Siam’s
8 Chatchai, ‘Siamese “Slavery”, pp. 235-7.
9 Ibid., pp. 7, 269-78. Baker and Pasuk observe that by the turn o f the twentieth century, ‘Only a few 
ageing debts slaves and war captives now remained’. Baker and Pasuk, Thailand, p. 61. Slavery was 
not abolished completely in the north of Siam until 1912.
10 The figure for 1903/4 is taken from the Ministry o f Justice Report fo r  the Year 122 (1903-04), p. 13, 
and the approximation for the 1930s from the S Y 1937-38 & 1938-39, p. 358.
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growing population, which increased from about 8.1 million in 1910 to around 14.5 
in 1937.11 However, the amount of convictions grew at a far greater rate than the 
population: from 36.82 convictions per 10,000 people in 1911/12 to 77.04 in 
1937/8.12 In other words, a higher proportion of people were being convicted for 
criminal offences in the late 1930s than in the early 1910s. Of course, these statistics 
for convictions may well reflect more the activities and attitudes of the police and the 
judiciary than the incidence of crime. Besides reflecting institutional biases, crime 
statistics in general are subject to a number of other variables, such as changes in the 
methods of recording crime and administrative reforms within police forces and 
judiciaries.13 As was recognised at the time, the rise in the number of reported crimes 
and the number of criminal cases bought before the Siamese courts in the 1900s were 
largely due to increasing public confidence in the police, improvements in detection 
and prosecution, and the expanding territorial jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.14 
Despite these factors, both Siamese and Western government officials believed the 
rate of crime in the country was rising and maintained that gambling was a primary 
cause.15 In his report on the police for the year 1919/20, Lawson, then in his role as 
adviser to the Ministry of Local Government, observed a worrying increase in crime 
over the previous ten years: reproduced below is a table showing the incidence of 
serious offences for this period.
11 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 301.
12 The 1911/12 figure is a result o f calculations based on the population and conviction figures from SY 
1916, pp. 16,193, and the 1937/8 figure is taken straight from SY 1937-38 & 1938-39, p. 359.
13 For discussions o f the problems in interpreting crime statistics see, for instance, V. A. C. Gatrell and 
T. B. Hadden, ‘Criminal statistics and their interpretation’ in E. A. Wrigley (ed.), Nineteenth Century 
Society: Essays in the Use o f  Quantitative Methods fo r  the Study o f  Social Data, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972, esp. pp. 350-8; and Eric Monkkonen, ‘Systematic Criminal Justice 
History: Some Suggestions’, Journal o f  Interdisciplinary History, 9, 3 (Winter 1979), pp. 451-64.
14 RPAB 1899-1900, p. 21; Ministry o f  Justice Report fo r the Year 122 (1903-04), p. 8; Ministry o f  
Justice Report fo r the Year 123 (1904-05), pp. 5, 11; Ministry o f  Justice Report fo r  the Year 126 
(1907-08), pp. 7-8.
15 See for instance NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 4 Aug. 1903’; NA R.6 
N.4.1/73, ‘Trotter to Yomarat, 23 Dec. 1915’; NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
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Table 6.1: Number of Cases of Homicide, Gang Robbery and Robbery between 
1909/10 and 1919/20.
Year Homicide Gang Robbery Robbery
1909/10 429 281 310
1910/11 658 598 347
1911/12 661 709 303
1912/13 859 707 346
1913/14 1052 610 296
1914/15 1218 701 345
1915/16 1201 691 448
1916/17 1222 612 665
1917/18 1139 668 404
1918/19 1299 653 405
1919/20 1493 963 559
Source: NA R.6 N.4.1/165, ‘A Report on work of Gendarmerie and on the Criminal 
Statistics of Siam for the year B. E. 2462’, p. 62.
Lawson attributed the sharp jump in 1910/11 to the deleterious effects of 
conscription, introduced for the police force in 1908/9. As noted in Chapter 4, 
conscripts tended to be ill-disciplined and, due to the low rates of pay, their morale 
was low, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the police force as a deterrent to crime. 
The marked rise in 1919/20, meanwhile, was due to habitual criminals interned in the 
penal settlement on Koh Pai being removed from the island and distributed 
throughout the country.16 Interestingly, the cancellation of the concession for 
unlicensed gambling during the Siamese and Chinese New Years and Songkran in 
1913, the abolition of the huai lottery in 1916, and the closure of the last Bangkok 
gambling houses in 1917 do not seem to have made any significant impression on the 
number of these offences. Indeed, as Lawson and other members of the 
administration suggested, abolition may actually have encouraged crime, since it
16 NA R.6 N.4.1/165, ‘A Report on work o f Gendarmerie and on the Criminal Statistics o f Siam for the 
year B. E. 2462’, pp. 62-3.
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fuelled an increase in underground gambling dens. Although there may have been 
some short-term victories in curbing crime, as was believed to be the case following 
the closure of all gambling houses in the southern monthons of Nakhon Si 
Thammarat and Chumphon around the turn of the century,18 in the long term, 
government policy had little discernible impact.
In spite of what the ruling elite, government officials, foreign advisers and 
newspaper commentators may have thought, the link between gambling and crime 
was neither so certain nor clear-cut. As noted in Chapter 1, crimes of acquisition, and 
theft in particular, were closely associated with gambling. Remarkably, however, the 
number of people per 10,000 of population convicted for offences against property -  
theft, snatching and robbery, gang robbery, extortion, cheating and fraud, criminal 
misappropriation, receiving stolen property, and mischief -  remained surprisingly 
stable between the early 1910s and late 1930s, despite all the changes and initiatives 
in the government’s restriction or promotion of gambling. In 1910/11, the ratio of 
convictions per 10,000 people for these crimes was 12.91 and the following year it 
was 14.38.19 From 1919/20 to 1938/9, this figure then fluctuated between 11.74
(1933/4) and 14.95 (1929/30), the only exception being the year 1920/21 when, for
• 20 • * reasons unknown, it soared to 17.89. This consistency of convictions for property
offences per 10,000 of Siam’s population suggests the rate of crimes of acquisition
was largely unaffected by the government’s attempts to suppress gambling.
Additionally, in 1936, the Ministry of the Interior conducted a survey of convicts in
53 prisons to find out what had driven them to crime: factors included revenge
17 Ibid., p. 66; NA R.7 Kh.2/2, ‘Ideas about suppressing gambling’.
18 NA R.5 Kh.l4.1.Kh/18, ‘Damrong to Chulalongkom, 4 Aug. 1903’; ‘Damrong to Sommot, 13 Feb. 
1904’.
19 These figures are the result o f calculations using the population and crime statistics from SY 1916, 
pp. 16, 192-3; and Wyatt, Thailand, p. 301.
20 SY 1924-25, p. 249; SY 1929-30, p. 303; SY 1931-33, p. 355; SY 1933-35, p. 371; SY 1937-38 & 
1938-39, p. 359.
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(khwam akhat), drunkenness, love, anger, and unemployment. Out of 7,399 cases, the 
most common answer was poverty, with 1,819 respondents or nearly a quarter of the 
total. Only 42 prisoners gave gambling as the reason for their criminal behaviour, the 
least of all the categories.21 It could be argued that many might have been forced into 
crime by gambling induced poverty but this would suggest a surprising lack of self- 
awareness among those interviewed for this survey. It is more reasonable to conclude 
that gambling was indeed not the major cause of crime that many in Siam thought it 
to be.
Similar doubts can be raised about gambling as a prime cause of poverty. 
Over the course of the previous chapters, numerous examples of its insidious effects 
-  children stealing from parents, starving families, huge gambling debts leading to 
suicide and so on -  have been cited; the overall impression created by government 
reports and newspaper commentaries is that such happenings occurred with 
depressing regularity. But this seems unlikely, if only for the simple reason that these 
examples derived their efficacy as cautionary tales of the dangers of unchecked 
gambling from their extreme nature. Undoubtedly, some people succumbed to 
addiction and were ruined by their gambling habit -  the case of Arkart discussed in 
the opening section is testament to that -  but it is reasonable to assume that the 
majority gambled within their means and for the sake of entertainment. Indeed, the 
idea that gambling was the root of all Siamese society’s ills seems to have been based 
on a misguided and patronising view of the mass population as indolent, irresolute 
and irresponsible. Perhaps one of the most extreme exponents of such a view was 
Chao Phraya Wongsanupraphat, a distant cousin of Vajiravudh and government 
minister during the final years of the Fifth Reign and throughout the Sixth. During his
21 NA SR.0201.5/4, ‘Report on investigation of reasons for wrongdoing’. The figures in the report are 
reproduced in English in Landon, Siam in Transition, p. 154.
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tenure as Minister of Agriculture between 1909 and 1912, he was charged with 
drawing up proposals for alleviating the economic distress of the Siamese cultivator 
resulting from the recession in Siam’s rice trade during the second half of the 
1900s.22 Rice farmers in the Rangsit district of the Central Plain had been particularly 
hard hit by a series of heavy monsoons that had overwhelmed the ‘inadequate and 
deteriorating drainage facilities’ and destroyed their crop. Although Chao Phraya 
Wongsanupraphat identified a number of reasons for the recession -  increases in the 
rate of land tax, the high exchange value of the baht, and the effects of conscription 
on rural families, for instance -  he primarily blamed the farmers for their own 
hardship: ‘With the gradual development of the gambling habit, all sense of saving 
and economising for bad times is practically gone. So that when the blow comes it 
will lay them prostrate.’24 In his study of the recession and the Minister of 
Agriculture’s suggestions for dealing with it, Brown concludes that Chao Phraya 
Wongsanupraphat’s unsympathetic view of the Siamese cultivator blinded him to the 
necessity of developing an adequate irrigation system and prevented him from 
formulating an impartial and precise assessment of the causes of the recession, on
* 25 . ,i * «which a basis for action could be built. This hints at one reason why the perceived 
gambling problem received such prominence in debates on the state of the nation: it 
was easier for the ruling elite to blame Siam’s social and economic troubles on the 
population’s gambling habit than it was to recognise the state’s failure to provide and 
maintain the necessary economic infrastructure.
The Siamese elite’s rigid conviction that gambling was the cause of all the 
country’s woes stemmed in part from their educational background and experience of
22 The recession and Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat’s proposals are discussed in Ian Brown, The Elite 
and the Economy in Siam, c. 1890-1920, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 77-88.
23 Ibid., p. 87.
24 NA R.6 KS.1/4, ‘Memorandum on our Domestic Economy’.
25 Brown, The Elite and the Economy, pp. 87-8.
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the West. From around the 1830s, the elite of King Mongkut’s generation acquired a 
fascination for Western ideas and technology, cultivating contacts with missionaries, 
such as Dr. Bradley, and other Westerners. The future King Chulalongkorn and his 
brother princes -  most prominently, Damrong and Devawongse -  accordingly 
received an education that combined traditional Siamese elements with modem 
Western ones. Starting in the last decades of the nineteenth century, young members 
of the royal family, including nearly all of Chulalongkorn’s sons, and the nobility 
were sent to study in England and other imperial metropoles, with many spending 
their formative years overseas. For instance, Arkart’s father, Prince Rabi, lived in 
England from the age of 11 to 22, studying law at Oxford before returning to Siam to 
take up government service in 1896. Significantly, while abroad, he required tuition 
in the Siamese language to ensure he did not forget his mother tongue.26 With the 
expansion of the military and civilian bureaucracy in the 1890s and 1900s, increasing 
numbers of commoners were also given the opportunity for an overseas education. It 
was in Paris in the mid-1920s where Pridi and Phibun, among others, first discussed 
their plans to overthrow the absolute monarchy. To a greater or lesser extent, these 
elite and non-elite Siamese not only acquired Western knowledge and skills but also 
Western tastes and prejudices. As noted in Chapter 2, for example, it was during his 
time in England that Vajiravudh became enamoured with participation in sport as a 
means of promoting camaraderie and restoring the virility, dissipated in part by 
gambling, of the common Thai man. This bears all the hallmarks of the anti-gambling 
discourse prevalent in England at the time, in which gambling on professional sport 
had allegedly superseded taking part in ‘manly’ outdoor activities and was thus seen
26 Loos, Subject Siam, p. 49.
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as a threat to masculinity.27 Similarly, it was probably while overseas that Chao 
Phraya Wongsanupraphat acquired his disdainful opinion of the Siamese cultivator,
* •« ORwhich, as Brown notes, mirrored European attitudes. Upon returning to Siam, it is 
fair to say that these Westernised Siamese, especially those of high status, had more 
in common with the foreign advisers who aided them in the process of 
administrative, legal, and financial reform, than they did with Siam’s rural 
population, to whom -  in terms of dress, conduct, and, most significantly, mindset -
• 29they were only marginally less alien. This cultural distance between rulers and ruled 
left ample ground for misunderstandings; what the Siamese elite saw as problem 
gambling may have been nothing of the sort to the Siamese fanner.
More crucially, in late nineteenth and early twentieth century England, if not 
elsewhere in Europe, conventional wisdom held that gambling, crime and poverty 
were closely connected. Tellingly, just as in Siam, this link was based on general 
impressions and statements of opinion rather than on statistical evidence.30 As Dixon 
puts it while commenting on the Home Office’s fierce articulation of this view, ‘It 
was not necessary to prove that betting caused crime and other social problems: 
acceptance of the causal connection was a matter of common sense.’31 Since it was 
established orthodoxy in the seat of empire that gambling was a virulent cause of 
crime and poverty, it should not be surprising that the Siamese elite adhered to this 
opinion. Moreover, within Siam the causal connection was reinforced and 
exaggerated by a range of actors. As already suggested, for the ruling elite, the
27 See Dixon, From Prohibition to Regulation, p. 58.
28 Brown, The Elite and the Economy, p. 93 n. 113.
29 Batson makes a similar point in regards to the Bangkok appointed Siamese officials who were sent 
to administer the outlying areas of the kingdom during the late nineteenth century, noting their 
similarity to the Western colonial officials in other parts of South East Asia. Batson, End o f  the 
Absolute Monarchy, p. 12.
30 Dixon, From Prohibition to Regulation, pp. 194-7.
31 Ibid., p. 197.
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gambling problem disguised some of the inadequacies and failures of the state: for 
instance, it could be claimed that crime was rife because gambling was so prevalent, 
not because the police force was too small and ill equipped. Conversely, gambling’s 
undesirability gave the constitutional regime of the 1930s the pretext for 
monopolising the provision of lotteries and other gaming facilities: gambling was an 
evil but, since it could not be eliminated entirely, it was better that the state, and only 
the state, provide some tightly regulated outlet for it. For the missionaries and 
colonialists of the nineteenth century, meanwhile, the Siamese state’s reliance on the 
gambling tax farms was evidence of the backward and exploitative nature of the 
indigenous regime: the prevalence of gambling justified their presence and possible 
intervention in the country, while also underlining their supposed superiority. 
Similarly, for the emerging middle-class intelligentsia of the 1910s and 1920s, the 
gambling problem gave them grounds to criticise the ruling regime: the absolute 
monarchy was inimical to the good of the nation partly because it exploited people’s 
love of gambling for revenue purposes. For the undermanned and underpaid police 
force, the illegality of gambling was both a burden and a blessing: by entering into 
alliance with illicit gambling promoters, the police were able to regulate gambling to 
some extent, reduce their workload, and supplement their meagre income. For the 
ordinary Siamese farmer or Chinese labourer, gambling’s illegality enabled them to 
bring government officials to account: as detailed in Chapter 4, even mere allegations 
of gambling were sometimes enough for an official to be dismissed from service. 
From these differing perspectives, the ultimate success or failure of government 
attempts to restrict gambling becomes immaterial: the gambling issue derived its 
utility from the mere occurrence of gambling. Moreover, the efficacy of these various 
strategies depended wholly on gambling being seen to be a social evil that brought
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nothing but disaster in its wake. If gambling were seen as a legitimate and relatively 
innocuous foim of entertainment, then it would lose its potency as a political tool. In 
other words, gambling was a problem largely because it suited people’s interests for 
it to be perceived as a problem. When viewed from another perspective, the 
prevalence of gambling in Siam/Thailand during the period of this study becomes not 
the cause of the kingdom’s problems but rather a symptom of its growing prosperity 
and a signifier of its transition to modernity. People gambled more because they had 
both the money and time to do so: rice farmers could buy lottery tickets with their 
cash surplus, while clerks in Bangkok could visit the horse-races on their day-off and 
stake a portion on their favourite. It was less a cause for concern than one for 
celebration. Tellingly, in the early 1950s, an elderly woman in Bang Chan village 
observed that: ‘Gambling disappeared two years ago. People in the same hamlet used 
to hear about a game of cards and gather together. Now the money is all gone. There
32 * *are more poor people.’ A rise in the cost of living had done what government policy 
could not.
Gambling in Thailand Today: The Past in the Present
Fast-forward to present day Thailand, however, and the government’s attitude and 
policies towards gambling seem to have changed little, in spite of the wide-ranging 
socio-economic transformation the country has undergone over the last sixty years. 
Indeed, the legal and regulatory framework established during the 1930s and 1940s 
has created an environment in which gambling has become ever more deeply 
entrenched in the illegal economy. Apart from the twice-monthly state lotteries, the 
totes on horse-racing and bookmaking on Thai boxing (mitai thai), most forms of
32 Sharp and Hanks, Bang Chan, p. 194.
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gambling either remain illegal or are subject to such a complex and restrictive 
licensing system as to render them virtually so. Nevertheless, gambling remains as 
prevalent as it did in the past, if  not more so: 70 percent of the Thai population are 
said to take part in the gaming economy.34 Illegal gambling takes three principal 
forms: gaming in casinos, the underground lottery (huai tai din), and betting on 
football matches. Underground casinos and gambling dens of all sizes, styles and 
clientele can be found throughout the country. In 1996, it was estimated that there 
were between 187 and 300 such establishments in Bangkok alone and at least 89 in 
the provinces.35 These are frequented by people from all walks of life: businessmen, 
politicians, artists, housewives, office workers, teenage students, and the 
unemployed. However, the largest illicit gambling enterprise in the country, both in 
economic and organisational terms, is the underground lottery: Pasuk et al. claim 
about four million people are involved in its sales and administration network, and it 
has an estimated annual turnover equivalent to eight percent of GDP.36 The 
underground lottery is run in tandem with the state lottery, upon which the winning 
numbers are based. There are various ways of placing a stake: most commonly, 
punters bet on the last two or three digits of the first prize number in the official 
draw.37 These variants, and the slightly better odds some offer, make the underground 
lottery a serious rival to the government one. Furthermore, while state lottery tickets 
cost 40 baht each, punters can stake just a few baht on its illegal twin, which also 
pays out more in prize money: 70 to 75 percent of the total money staked as opposed
33 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 216-17. The Ministry of the Interior no longer grants 
permits for all the games on List B (games permitted subject to license) of the Gambling Act B. E. 
2478, while others can be played only during special occasions. See Lisut, [Gambling Handbook], pp. 
88-90.
34 Philip Comwel-Smith, Very Thai: Everyday Popular Culture, Bangkok: River Books, 2005, p. 197.
35 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 33-4.
36 Ibid., p. 45.
37 For a complete description o f tire different methods of betting, their chances o f winning and their 
return see ibid., pp. 48-50.
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to 60 percent.38 A more recent gambling craze is betting on the results of football 
matches, with games in international tournaments and the English Premier League 
being the most popular. The development of football gambling is a graphic example 
of globalisation and has been facilitated by advances in technology: people watch the 
games on satellite TV, place bets by mobile phone or the Internet, and transfer money 
electronically.39 It is especially prevalent amongst the young: in the build-up to Euro 
2004, there was much concern about teenage schoolboys betting on games and the 
Bangkok police made a point of targeting areas around Ramkhamhaeng University, 
where football gambling was said to be rampant.40 A poll by the Thai Farmers Bank 
Research Centre found that Thais were expected to spend up to 33 million baht 
betting on this tournament, with 62 percent of the respondents saying they would bet 
between friends and 37 percent saying they would gamble with a bookmaker.41 
Additionally, Thais regularly go abroad to gamble, visiting Macao, Hong Kong, and 
Las Vegas among other locations 42 Closer to home, there are 23 casinos just across 
the border in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, many of which are Thai-owned.43 
According to the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 
nearly three million Thais visited these cross-border establishments in 2001.44 
Similarly, offshore liners replete with gaming tables ply the Gulf of Thailand.
Huge sums of money are involved in the illegal gambling economy. In 2001, 
the underground lottery is reckoned to have made 542 billion baht, while recent 
surveys have placed the turnover of Bangkok casinos at 673 billion baht and of
38 Ibid., pp. 45-6.
39 For a comprehensive study of football gambling see ibid., Ch. 4.
40 BP, 10 and 12 June 2004.
41 BP, 11 June 2004.
42 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 19-20.
43 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business o f  Politics in Thailand, Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm, 2004, p. 116.
44 BP, 30 May 2004.
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provincial ones at 142 billion.45 Moreover, Thais are said to bet over 100 billion baht 
on football a year.46 Finally, in the mid-1990s, an influential owner of a Bangkok 
casino estimated that the country lost at least 21 billion baht annually because of 
people going overseas to gamble.47 So great is the amount being gambled in foreign 
casinos that it is claimed to affect the baht exchange rate.48 The social cost to the 
country is also high, with the proceeds from illicit gambling enterprises going to 
organised crime. Indeed, the government’s restrictive policy may inadvertently have 
nurtured crime syndicates. In the late 1930s, the American academic Kenneth P. 
Landon claimed that organised crime had yet to gain a foothold in the country.49 This 
assessment appears to be supported by the government reports and other sources used 
in this study; apart from the Chinese secret societies, large-scale criminal 
organisations are hardly ever referred to in connection with gambling. It was only in 
the 1940s and 1950s that organised crime took off in Bangkok, running some casinos 
and collecting protection money from others.50 The organisations behind present-day 
cross-border casinos are also involved in the drug trade, smuggling, and money 
laundering.51 Furthermore, policing illegal gambling is a strain on the police force 
and diverts precious resources away from the suppression of perhaps more serious 
crimes. This is to say nothing of the corrupting influence it has upon the police and, 
since the development of party politics, politicians.
Given the vast sums of potential revenue from gambling the Thai state 
currently forgoes, along with the economic and social costs of illegal gambling, it is
45 Comwel-Smith, Very Thai, p. 199.
46 Ibid., p. 197.
47 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 19-20.
48 Comel-Smith, Very Thai, 198.
49 Landon, Siam in Transition, p. 154.
50 For details on the growth o f Bangkok crime syndicates up to the early 1990s see Pasuk et al., Guns, 
Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 25-33, 39-40.
51 Ibid., p. 14.
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not surprising that governments frequently contemplate adopting a more liberal
52stance and legalising casinos in particular. A 1996 survey conducted by a group of 
academics at Chulalongkorn University among the Bangkok middle class and 
opinion makers found a majority in favour of legalising casinos, though people were 
divided over lifting restrictions on other forms of gambling.53 However, although the 
case for government-run casinos is persuasive, such proposals have generally 
attracted fierce criticism and have consequently been shelved. Whereas gambling has 
been progressively decriminalised in many developed and developing countries over 
the last half century, Thailand has stood still. Moreover, with the advent of the 
Internet and online gambling, controlling gambling becomes ever more difficult and 
unrealistic. The end result is that the Thai government’s stance on gambling looks 
increasingly out-of-date and out-of-step with economic sense, technological 
developments, and people’s behaviour.54
Unsurprisingly, the primary impediment to the decriminalisation of gambling 
in Thailand remains the police force. In 2002, a senior police officer revealed that ‘up 
to 10 gambling dens in Bangkok each pay up to 10 million baht a month for the 
police force to turn a blind eye.’55 Lawson’s observation, quoted in Chapter 2, that it 
was impossible to conduct illicit gambling on any scale without the police knowing 
about it, remains as true today as it was a hundred years ago. One justification the 
police use for their ‘informal taxes’ on casinos is that they do not receive enough 
money in their budget for crime suppression work, particularly because much of it
52 The most recent was the administration of Thaksin Shinawatra (PM from February 2001 to 
September 2006), a descendant o f a Chinese immigrant to Siam in the late nineteenth century who 
became a gambling house tax farmer, first in Chanthaburi and later in Chiang Mai. On the tax farming 
career of Thaksin’s great grandfather see Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, pp. 26-8.
53 For the details o f the survey see Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, pp. 219-30.
54 Ibid., p. 218.
55 Quoted in Comwel-Smith, Very Thai, p. 198.
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requires paying informers.56 So long as police salaries and budgets remain 
inadequate, it is not in their interest to see a liberalisation of the kingdom’s gambling 
laws. Similarly, some politicians have close connections with illicit gambling 
promoters or are themselves involved. The proceeds of the underground lottery are 
used to buy votes at election time and to finance the campaigns of some candidates. 
Additionally, the extensive administrative and client network of this enterprise is 
used as an electioneering machine and vote-bank.57 In short, too many influential 
actors still have a vested interest in the illegality of gambling.
Of course, many people still object to gambling on moral and social grounds. 
More intriguing though is the way in which the anti-gambling discourse continues to 
be used to demonise proponents of decriminalisation. The latest public figure to fall 
victim to such attacks was Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s most successful politician 
at the ballot box and easily one of the most controversial. Following its electoral 
success in 2001, his Thai Rak Thai (literally, Thai love Thai) party absorbed two 
other parties to become the first to wield an outright parliamentary majority. 
Combined with new constitutional provisions designed to strengthen the prime 
minister and to encourage more stable governments, this meant Thaksin acquired an 
unprecedented degree of political power for an elected Thai premier. The manner in 
which he chose to wield it ensured he had many enemies. Among businessmen 
involved in the entertainment industry and international investors, it was generally 
acknowledged that Thaksin represented the best opportunity for legalising casinos.59 
Such a move was certainly in keeping with the former prime minister’s economic 
policy, branded Thaksinomics, in which he sought to bring illicit business enterprises
56 Pasuk et al., Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, p. 35.
57 On the role o f the underground lottery hosts in politics see ibid., pp. 64-8.
58 Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, pp. 94-95.
59 Matichon, 19 Feb. 2003.
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above ground in order to contribute to growth and government revenue.60 As part of 
this strategy, in 2003 the Government Lottery Office instituted a large number of 
draws of two and three digit numbers for fixed prizes in order to undermine the 
underground lottery, a tactic that met with some success.61 A year- later, the NESDB 
proposed the establishment of state-run casinos as a means of combating corruption 
and the underground economy, while also creating jobs and investment.62 While 
controversial, this was totally overshadowed by the uproar caused by the Liverpool 
Football Club lottery scheme.63 In May 2004, Thaksin, as part of a consortium of 
Thai Rak Thai billionaires, tried to buy a 30 percent stake in the English Premier 
League club. After this was denounced as unconstitutional, he announced he was 
going to purchase the shares on behalf of ‘Thailand as a country’, using public 
money. Predictably, this too was denounced, on the grounds that it was inappropriate. 
Thaksin then proposed raising the funds through a lottery. Tickets would cost 1,000 
baht, with a first prize of one billion baht, a second of 100 million, and others going 
down to 100,000 baht for the last place.64 In addition, all purchasers would receive a 
200 baht share in the football club. The lottery scheme generated a storm of protest 
from academics, press commentators, social activists, and students. For instance, the 
Khao sot newspaper pointed out that ticket holders’ shares might become worthless 
due to fluctuations in the London stock exchange and that the proposal totally 
contradicted the government’s campaign to rid the nation of vice, including the
/ c
underground lottery. Following criticisms from his one-time mentor, Chamlong
60 Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, p. 116.
61 Ibid.; Comwel-Smith, Very Thai, p. 198.
62 BP, 30 May & 11 June 2004.
63 Unless indicated the information on the Liverpool lottery scheme is taken from Pasuk and Baker, 
Thaksin, pp. 243-6.
64 BP, 30 May 2004.
65 Khao sot, 25 May 2004.
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Srimuang, that the scheme would spur greed and incite a lending rush, Thaksin 
kicked the Liverpool lottery proposal into touch.66
The anti-gambling discourse deployed in the recent debates over 
decriminalisation is little changed from that which was articulated during the period 
covered by this study. One critic of the Liverpool lottery scheme, for instance, 
claimed it would ‘increase crime, lead to gambling addiction and ruin families.’67 As 
in the past, concerns were raised about gambling’s effects on children: it was claimed 
that if casinos were legalised it would encourage them to believe that gambling was a 
legitimate activity, with disastrous consequences for society.68 Even the new two- 
and three-digit lottery draws, the revenue from which goes to providing scholarships 
for the education of children from low-income families, were condemned on similar 
grounds. At a seminar at Thammasat University, a Bangkok senator argued that: 
‘doing this is like using money from committing a sin to make merit. It is a way to 
justify the lottery run. More importantly, it has confused children and caused them to 
feel grateful to the lottery.’69 One slight difference, however, is that a greater 
emphasis now seems to be placed on the immorality of gambling and how it 
contravenes Buddhism. Indeed, Thaksin has all but been accused of being a ‘bad’ 
Buddhist, with the senator quoted above claiming that the proposals for legalising 
casinos showed that the premier lacked true understanding of Buddhist principles. 
Similarly, at the same seminar a Thai academic claimed that the Thaksin 
government’s ‘moral standard was lower than its ability to perform economic work’
70and that it ‘had failed to follow Buddhist precepts.’ Proposals for decriminalising 
gambling were thus evidence of how Thaksin focused only on economic
66 BP, 4 & 6 June 2004.
07 BP, 31 May 2004.
68 BP, 28 March 2004.
69 Quoted in BP, 13 June 2004.
70 Ibid.
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development without considering the social costs of his schemes.71 Just as the 
popular press in the 1920s used an anti-gambling discourse to undermine the 
legitimacy of the absolutist regime, Thaksin’s opponents deployed it to illustrate why 
his premiership was detrimental to the Thai nation and how he personally was 
morally unfit to govern.
There is one new element in the present-day anti-gambling discourse, though 
it draws its potency from the past. In February 2003, Matichon, a ‘quality’ newspaper 
aimed at the urban middle class, ran an article discussing the legalisation of casinos.72 
Revealingly, the article included a photograph of King Chulalongkom and opened 
with a quotation in which he expressed his fears about the spread of gambling within 
Bangkok. After reporting how the legalisation of casinos was on the political agenda 
once more, the writer claimed that their proponents were being wilfully ignorant 
about Chulalongkom’s attitude towards gambling, his policy of closing the dens and 
his reasons for doing so. The writer went on to quote a lengthy passage from 
Chulalongkom’s study of the Songkran festival in which the king attributed the 
longevity of the Chakri dynasty to its determination to rid the country of vice. 
Chulalongkom then stated that any member of the royal family or government 
official that respected the magnanimity of the monarchy should refrain from
* 73 *gambling or seeking to profit from it. The article’s writer concludes by observing 
how the great threat posed by gambling that Chulalongkom had foreseen and tried to 
forestall was now in danger of coming to pass.74 What is striking is that the writer 
makes no attempt to explain why legalisation might be disadvantageous for present- 
day Thailand; it is enough to present some examples of Chulalongkom’s thoughts on
71 In addition to ibid., see also BP, 6 June 2004.
11 Matichon, 19 Feb. 2003.
73 For the original text see Chulalongkom, [Songkran Ceremonies], pp. 94-6.
74 Matichon, 19 Feb. 2003.
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gambling. In short, the writer’s argument amounts to little more than gambling is bad 
because Chulalongkom said so. Although never spelt out, and ignoring the historical 
myopia of the writer, the implications are clear. To be a proponent of 
decriminalisation is to be not only a ‘bad’ Buddhist but, even more seriously in a 
country where the monarchy is highly revered and loyalty to it is considered the very 
essence of Thai identity, to be anti-monarchist and un-Thai. By contemplating the 
legalisation of casinos, it was insinuated that Thaksin was challenging the wisdom of 
Chulalongkom and, by association, that of the current monarch, King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej.75
The world has turned and turned since the legal and conceptual framework of 
the Thai government’s restrictionist policy on gambling was formulated but, as a 
consequence of the entrenched interests of the police and politicians and, perhaps just 
as crucially, the long shadow cast by one of the country’s most revered monarchs, the 
pendulum has yet to swing back.
75 As Loos notes, ‘The culture industry in Thailand has solidified the link between King Chulalongkom 
and Thailand’s regnant monarch... making it impossible to critique one without indirectly critiquing 
the other.’ Loos, Subject Siam, p. 15.
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